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Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank
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Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank
On March 10, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) failed after a bank run, marking the third-largest bank failure in United States history and the largest since the 2008 financial crisis. It was one of three bank failures, along with Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank, in March 2023 in the United States.
Seeking higher investment returns from its burgeoning deposits, SVB had dramatically increased its holdings of long-term securities since 2021, accounting for them on a hold-to-maturity basis. The market value of these bonds decreased significantly through 2022 and into 2023 as the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to curb an inflation surge, causing unrealized losses on the portfolio. Higher interest rates also raised borrowing costs throughout the economy and some Silicon Valley Bank clients started pulling money out to meet their liquidity needs. To raise cash to pay withdrawals by its depositors, SVB announced on Wednesday, March 8 that it had sold over US$21 billion worth of securities, borrowed $15 billion, and would hold an emergency sale of some of its treasury stock to raise $2.25 billion. The announcement, coupled with warnings from prominent Silicon Valley investors, caused a bank run as customers withdrew funds totaling $42 billion by the following day.
On the morning of March 10, the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation seized SVB and placed it under the receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). An additional $100 billion were expected to be withdrawn during Friday. About 89 percent of the bank's $172 billion in deposit liabilities exceeded the maximum insured by the FDIC. Two days after the failure, the FDIC received exceptional authority from the Treasury and announced jointly with other agencies that all depositors would have full access to their funds the next morning. Seeking to auction off all or parts of the bank, the FDIC reopened it on Monday March 13 as a newly organized bridge bank, Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. Although some characterized the government response as a bailout, the plan did not entail rescuing the bank, its management or shareholders, but rather making uninsured depositors whole from the proceeds of selling the bank's assets, without the use of taxpayer money.
The collapse of SVB had significant consequences for startup companies in the U.S. and abroad, with many briefly unable to withdraw money from the bank. Other large technology companies, media companies, and wineries were also affected. For a number of founders and their venture capital backers, this was the bank of choice.
SVB was a commercial bank founded in 1983 and headquartered in Santa Clara, California. At its collapse, SVB was the 16th largest bank in the U.S. by total assets and was heavily skewed toward serving companies and individuals from the technology industry. Nearly half of U.S. venture capital-backed healthcare and technology companies were financed by SVB. Companies such as Airbnb, Cisco, Fitbit, Pinterest, and Block, Inc. have been clients of the bank. In addition to financing venture-backed companies, SVB was well known as a source of private banking, personal credit lines, and mortgages to tech entrepreneurs, and specialized lending money to higher-risk new companies. Silicon Valley Bank required an exclusive relationship of those borrowing from the bank. Prior to Thursday March 9, 2023, SVB was in "sound financial condition", according to the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, though an increased number of short sellers began to target SVB earlier in the year. Employees received their annual bonuses on March 10, 2023, hours before the government took control of the company.
As of the last call report of the bank, filed on December 31, 2022, it held $209 billion in total assets, with $175.5 billion in total deposits, of which the bank estimated $151.6 billion (86.4 percent) were uninsured.
The bank's deposits increased from $62 billion in March 2020 to $124 billion in March 2021, benefiting from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on science and technology. Most of these deposits were invested in long-term Treasury bonds as the bank sought a higher return on investment than was available on shorter-term bonds. These long-term bonds fell in current market value as interest rates rose during the 2021–2023 inflation surge and they became less attractive as investments relative to newer bond issues. In April 2022, SVB's chief risk officer stepped down, and a successor was not named until January 2023—a period coinciding with the period of interest rate increases.
At the end of 2022, the bank had a $117 billion bond portfolio, divided into a $91.3 billion held-to-maturity portfolio (meaning it was not marked to market and profits or losses would not be realized until maturity) and a $26 billion available-for-sale portfolio (which as the name implies was marked to market). At that point in time, its marked-to-market unrealized losses for securities held to maturity exceeded $15 billion. The bank did not hedge against interest rate risk on that part of its bond portfolio, apparently for the same reason that most banks do not: the hedge itself would bounce around with the market, while the point of holding bonds to maturity is to hold them at par. Most banks minimize interest rate risk in their held-to-maturity portfolios by buying shorter-term bonds. The bank did hedge against interest rate risk on its available-for-sale portfolio by building up a portfolio of $15.2 billion of interest rate swaps by the end of 2021.
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Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank
On March 10, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) failed after a bank run, marking the third-largest bank failure in United States history and the largest since the 2008 financial crisis. It was one of three bank failures, along with Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank, in March 2023 in the United States.
Seeking higher investment returns from its burgeoning deposits, SVB had dramatically increased its holdings of long-term securities since 2021, accounting for them on a hold-to-maturity basis. The market value of these bonds decreased significantly through 2022 and into 2023 as the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to curb an inflation surge, causing unrealized losses on the portfolio. Higher interest rates also raised borrowing costs throughout the economy and some Silicon Valley Bank clients started pulling money out to meet their liquidity needs. To raise cash to pay withdrawals by its depositors, SVB announced on Wednesday, March 8 that it had sold over US$21 billion worth of securities, borrowed $15 billion, and would hold an emergency sale of some of its treasury stock to raise $2.25 billion. The announcement, coupled with warnings from prominent Silicon Valley investors, caused a bank run as customers withdrew funds totaling $42 billion by the following day.
On the morning of March 10, the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation seized SVB and placed it under the receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). An additional $100 billion were expected to be withdrawn during Friday. About 89 percent of the bank's $172 billion in deposit liabilities exceeded the maximum insured by the FDIC. Two days after the failure, the FDIC received exceptional authority from the Treasury and announced jointly with other agencies that all depositors would have full access to their funds the next morning. Seeking to auction off all or parts of the bank, the FDIC reopened it on Monday March 13 as a newly organized bridge bank, Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. Although some characterized the government response as a bailout, the plan did not entail rescuing the bank, its management or shareholders, but rather making uninsured depositors whole from the proceeds of selling the bank's assets, without the use of taxpayer money.
The collapse of SVB had significant consequences for startup companies in the U.S. and abroad, with many briefly unable to withdraw money from the bank. Other large technology companies, media companies, and wineries were also affected. For a number of founders and their venture capital backers, this was the bank of choice.
SVB was a commercial bank founded in 1983 and headquartered in Santa Clara, California. At its collapse, SVB was the 16th largest bank in the U.S. by total assets and was heavily skewed toward serving companies and individuals from the technology industry. Nearly half of U.S. venture capital-backed healthcare and technology companies were financed by SVB. Companies such as Airbnb, Cisco, Fitbit, Pinterest, and Block, Inc. have been clients of the bank. In addition to financing venture-backed companies, SVB was well known as a source of private banking, personal credit lines, and mortgages to tech entrepreneurs, and specialized lending money to higher-risk new companies. Silicon Valley Bank required an exclusive relationship of those borrowing from the bank. Prior to Thursday March 9, 2023, SVB was in "sound financial condition", according to the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, though an increased number of short sellers began to target SVB earlier in the year. Employees received their annual bonuses on March 10, 2023, hours before the government took control of the company.
As of the last call report of the bank, filed on December 31, 2022, it held $209 billion in total assets, with $175.5 billion in total deposits, of which the bank estimated $151.6 billion (86.4 percent) were uninsured.
The bank's deposits increased from $62 billion in March 2020 to $124 billion in March 2021, benefiting from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on science and technology. Most of these deposits were invested in long-term Treasury bonds as the bank sought a higher return on investment than was available on shorter-term bonds. These long-term bonds fell in current market value as interest rates rose during the 2021–2023 inflation surge and they became less attractive as investments relative to newer bond issues. In April 2022, SVB's chief risk officer stepped down, and a successor was not named until January 2023—a period coinciding with the period of interest rate increases.
At the end of 2022, the bank had a $117 billion bond portfolio, divided into a $91.3 billion held-to-maturity portfolio (meaning it was not marked to market and profits or losses would not be realized until maturity) and a $26 billion available-for-sale portfolio (which as the name implies was marked to market). At that point in time, its marked-to-market unrealized losses for securities held to maturity exceeded $15 billion. The bank did not hedge against interest rate risk on that part of its bond portfolio, apparently for the same reason that most banks do not: the hedge itself would bounce around with the market, while the point of holding bonds to maturity is to hold them at par. Most banks minimize interest rate risk in their held-to-maturity portfolios by buying shorter-term bonds. The bank did hedge against interest rate risk on its available-for-sale portfolio by building up a portfolio of $15.2 billion of interest rate swaps by the end of 2021.
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