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1980 Summer Olympics boycott
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1980 Summer Olympics boycott
The 1980 Summer Olympics boycott was the largest boycott in Olympic history and one part of a number of actions initiated by the United States to protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, which hosted the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, and its satellite states later boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.
The Western governments first considered the idea of boycotting the Moscow 1980 Summer Olympics in response to the situation in Afghanistan at the 20 December 1979 meeting of NATO representatives. The idea was not completely new to the world: in the mid-1970s, proposals for an Olympic boycott circulated widely among human rights activists and groups as a sanction for Soviet violations of human rights. At that time, very few member governments expressed interest in the proposal. However, this idea gained popularity in early January 1980 when Soviet scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov called for a boycott. On 14 January 1980, the Administration of President Jimmy Carter joined Sakharov's appeal and set a deadline by which the Soviet Union had to pull out of Afghanistan or "face the consequences", including an international boycott of the games. On 26 January 1980, Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark announced that Canada, like the US, would boycott the Olympic Games if Soviet forces did not leave Afghanistan by 20 February 1980. Carter also proposed moving the Olympics to Greece on a permanent basis to eliminate the issue of politicisation of the Games' hosting, but the International Olympic Committee (IOC) rejected this idea.
When the deadline passed a month later without any change to the situation in Central Asia, Carter pushed U.S. allies to pull their Olympic teams from the upcoming games. On 21 March, Carter announced that the United States would boycott the Moscow games. In April, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) voted in support of the boycott, and the delegates voted by a 2–1 margin to support the President's call to boycott the Moscow Olympics.
In late January, the Soviet regime prepared to face down this "hostile campaign". As Soviet Central Committee documents show, in addition to its own propaganda efforts, it was relying on the IOC and its 89 members to behave as in the past (e.g. after the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968), and not give in to pressure from national governments. It noted that the government and the National Olympic Committee of France had already stated a willingness to participate.
After its 24 April meeting, the head of the USOC Robert Kane told the IOC that the USOC would be willing to send a team to Moscow if there were a "spectacular change in the international situation" in the coming weeks.
In an attempt to save the Games, Lord Killanin, then president of the IOC, arranged to meet and discuss the boycott with Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, before the new 24 May deadline. Killanin insisted that the Games should continue as scheduled, while President Carter reaffirmed the US position to boycott the Games unless the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan.
The IOC protested, claiming that the "pressures by the US and other supporting countries for the boycott were an inappropriate means to achieve a political end, and the victims of this action would be the athletes." West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that the American attitude that the allies "should simply do as they are told" was unacceptable, although West Germany did join the boycott.
Several interventions at the late April 1980 Bilderberg meeting in Aachen included discussion of the implications of the boycott. The world would perceive a boycott, it was argued, as little more than a sentimental protest, not a strategic act. An African representative at the Bilderberg meeting voiced a different view: whether there was additional support outside the US or not, he believed a boycott would be an effective symbolic protest and be dramatically visible to those within the Soviet Union.[citation needed] Some Soviet dissidents expressed an opinion that a boycott would be a strong message to the Soviet Union who breached the Olympic rules (using state-sponsored doping and professional athletes despite the fact that the rules of the time only allowed amateurs) to achieve their political goals.
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1980 Summer Olympics boycott
The 1980 Summer Olympics boycott was the largest boycott in Olympic history and one part of a number of actions initiated by the United States to protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, which hosted the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, and its satellite states later boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.
The Western governments first considered the idea of boycotting the Moscow 1980 Summer Olympics in response to the situation in Afghanistan at the 20 December 1979 meeting of NATO representatives. The idea was not completely new to the world: in the mid-1970s, proposals for an Olympic boycott circulated widely among human rights activists and groups as a sanction for Soviet violations of human rights. At that time, very few member governments expressed interest in the proposal. However, this idea gained popularity in early January 1980 when Soviet scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov called for a boycott. On 14 January 1980, the Administration of President Jimmy Carter joined Sakharov's appeal and set a deadline by which the Soviet Union had to pull out of Afghanistan or "face the consequences", including an international boycott of the games. On 26 January 1980, Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark announced that Canada, like the US, would boycott the Olympic Games if Soviet forces did not leave Afghanistan by 20 February 1980. Carter also proposed moving the Olympics to Greece on a permanent basis to eliminate the issue of politicisation of the Games' hosting, but the International Olympic Committee (IOC) rejected this idea.
When the deadline passed a month later without any change to the situation in Central Asia, Carter pushed U.S. allies to pull their Olympic teams from the upcoming games. On 21 March, Carter announced that the United States would boycott the Moscow games. In April, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) voted in support of the boycott, and the delegates voted by a 2–1 margin to support the President's call to boycott the Moscow Olympics.
In late January, the Soviet regime prepared to face down this "hostile campaign". As Soviet Central Committee documents show, in addition to its own propaganda efforts, it was relying on the IOC and its 89 members to behave as in the past (e.g. after the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968), and not give in to pressure from national governments. It noted that the government and the National Olympic Committee of France had already stated a willingness to participate.
After its 24 April meeting, the head of the USOC Robert Kane told the IOC that the USOC would be willing to send a team to Moscow if there were a "spectacular change in the international situation" in the coming weeks.
In an attempt to save the Games, Lord Killanin, then president of the IOC, arranged to meet and discuss the boycott with Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, before the new 24 May deadline. Killanin insisted that the Games should continue as scheduled, while President Carter reaffirmed the US position to boycott the Games unless the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan.
The IOC protested, claiming that the "pressures by the US and other supporting countries for the boycott were an inappropriate means to achieve a political end, and the victims of this action would be the athletes." West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that the American attitude that the allies "should simply do as they are told" was unacceptable, although West Germany did join the boycott.
Several interventions at the late April 1980 Bilderberg meeting in Aachen included discussion of the implications of the boycott. The world would perceive a boycott, it was argued, as little more than a sentimental protest, not a strategic act. An African representative at the Bilderberg meeting voiced a different view: whether there was additional support outside the US or not, he believed a boycott would be an effective symbolic protest and be dramatically visible to those within the Soviet Union.[citation needed] Some Soviet dissidents expressed an opinion that a boycott would be a strong message to the Soviet Union who breached the Olympic rules (using state-sponsored doping and professional athletes despite the fact that the rules of the time only allowed amateurs) to achieve their political goals.
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