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Black May (World War II)
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Black May (World War II)
Black May refers to May 1943 in the Battle of the Atlantic campaign during World War II, when the Kriegsmarine U-boat arm (U-Bootwaffe) suffered high casualties with fewer Allied ships sunk; it is considered a watershed in the Battle of the Atlantic.
After February battles around Convoy SC 118, Convoy ON 166 and Convoy UC 1, Black May was the culmination of the March–May 1943 crisis in the Battle of the Atlantic. The U-boat offensive reached its peak in March, with big convoy battles, first around Convoy HX 228, Convoy SC 121, and Convoy UGS 6; then followed the battle for Convoy HX 229/Convoy SC 122, the largest convoy battle of the war. Allied losses for March totalled 120 ships of 693,000 long tons (704,000 t) of which 82 (476,000 long tons (484,000 t)) were lost in the Atlantic. The U-Bootwaffe lost 12 U-boats. The official Royal Navy historian, Stephen Roskill, concluded, "The Germans never came so near to disrupting communications between the New World and the Old as in the first twenty days of March 1943".
Some respite for the Allies came in April, as Karl Dönitz, the Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU, commander U-boats) was unable to maintain as many U-boats in the Atlantic. Many of the boats involved in March had headed for their bases but the boats still operational in the month remained active. A particular shock at the end of April was the attack by U-515 on Convoy TS 37, which saw the loss of four tankers in three minutes and another three over the next six hours. Allied losses in April were 64 ships totalling 345,000 long tons (351,000 t); 39 ships (235,000 long tons (239,000 t)) were lost in the Atlantic. Fifteen U-boats were lost from all causes. In the following month, the strategic and tactical advantages swung to the Allies, where it remained for the rest of the campaign.
In May 1943, U-boat strength reached its peak, with 240 operational U-boats, of which 118 were at sea, yet the sinking of Allied ships continued to decline. May 1943 also had the greatest monthly losses suffered by U-boats up to that time, with 41 being destroyed, 25 per cent of the operational U-boats. The month opened with the battle for Convoy ONS 5, which was costly for both sides, with the loss of 13 merchant ships and six U-boats. The tactical improvements of the escorts began to take effect; the next three convoys that were attacked resulted in seven ships sunk and an equal number of U-boats. Five U-boats were sunk attacking Convoy SC 130, with Admiral Karl Dönitz's son, Peter, among those lost aboard U-954, while no convoy ships were lost.
Allied losses in May were 58 ships of 299,000 long tons (304,000 t), of which 34 ships of 134,000 long tons (136,000 t) were lost in the Atlantic. On 24 May 1943, Admiral Dönitz, shocked at the defeat suffered by the U-boats, ordered a temporary halt to the U-boat campaign; most were withdrawn from operational service. The U-boats were unable to return in significant numbers until autumn and never regained the advantage. During May there had been a drop in Allied losses, coupled with a tremendous rise in U-boat losses; 18 boats were lost in convoy battles in the Atlantic in the month, 14 were lost to air patrols; six of these in the Bay of Biscay. With losses in other theatres, accidents and other causes, the total loss to the U-boat arm in May was 43 boats.
This month had the most losses suffered by the U-boat Arm in the war so far, nearly three times the number of the previous highest, and more boats than had been lost in the whole of 1941. Equally significant was the loss of experienced crews, particularly the junior officers, who represented the next generation of commanders. Black May signalled a decline from which the U-boat arm never recovered; efforts were made over the next two years but the U-boats were never able to re-establish their threat to Allied shipping.
This change was the result of a combination of the sheer numbers of Allied ships at sea, Allied air power at sea, and technological developments in anti-submarine warfare. These had been introduced over the period and came to fruition in May, with devastating results. Operational analysis was used here, too, to improve the efficiency of attack methods and the weapons in use.
The most important factor in the Allied success was that the escorts were getting better; escort groups were becoming more skilled, and scientific analysis was producing more efficient tactics. New weapons such as the Hedgehog, and Mark 24 FIDO Torpedo, were coming into use, and new tactics, such as the creeping attack pioneered by Captain "Johnnie" Walker, proved devastatingly effective. Support groups were organised, to be stationed at sea instead of being tied to a particular convoy, making them ready to reinforce convoys under attack, and to have the freedom to pursue U-boats to destruction rather than just drive them away.
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Black May (World War II)
Black May refers to May 1943 in the Battle of the Atlantic campaign during World War II, when the Kriegsmarine U-boat arm (U-Bootwaffe) suffered high casualties with fewer Allied ships sunk; it is considered a watershed in the Battle of the Atlantic.
After February battles around Convoy SC 118, Convoy ON 166 and Convoy UC 1, Black May was the culmination of the March–May 1943 crisis in the Battle of the Atlantic. The U-boat offensive reached its peak in March, with big convoy battles, first around Convoy HX 228, Convoy SC 121, and Convoy UGS 6; then followed the battle for Convoy HX 229/Convoy SC 122, the largest convoy battle of the war. Allied losses for March totalled 120 ships of 693,000 long tons (704,000 t) of which 82 (476,000 long tons (484,000 t)) were lost in the Atlantic. The U-Bootwaffe lost 12 U-boats. The official Royal Navy historian, Stephen Roskill, concluded, "The Germans never came so near to disrupting communications between the New World and the Old as in the first twenty days of March 1943".
Some respite for the Allies came in April, as Karl Dönitz, the Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU, commander U-boats) was unable to maintain as many U-boats in the Atlantic. Many of the boats involved in March had headed for their bases but the boats still operational in the month remained active. A particular shock at the end of April was the attack by U-515 on Convoy TS 37, which saw the loss of four tankers in three minutes and another three over the next six hours. Allied losses in April were 64 ships totalling 345,000 long tons (351,000 t); 39 ships (235,000 long tons (239,000 t)) were lost in the Atlantic. Fifteen U-boats were lost from all causes. In the following month, the strategic and tactical advantages swung to the Allies, where it remained for the rest of the campaign.
In May 1943, U-boat strength reached its peak, with 240 operational U-boats, of which 118 were at sea, yet the sinking of Allied ships continued to decline. May 1943 also had the greatest monthly losses suffered by U-boats up to that time, with 41 being destroyed, 25 per cent of the operational U-boats. The month opened with the battle for Convoy ONS 5, which was costly for both sides, with the loss of 13 merchant ships and six U-boats. The tactical improvements of the escorts began to take effect; the next three convoys that were attacked resulted in seven ships sunk and an equal number of U-boats. Five U-boats were sunk attacking Convoy SC 130, with Admiral Karl Dönitz's son, Peter, among those lost aboard U-954, while no convoy ships were lost.
Allied losses in May were 58 ships of 299,000 long tons (304,000 t), of which 34 ships of 134,000 long tons (136,000 t) were lost in the Atlantic. On 24 May 1943, Admiral Dönitz, shocked at the defeat suffered by the U-boats, ordered a temporary halt to the U-boat campaign; most were withdrawn from operational service. The U-boats were unable to return in significant numbers until autumn and never regained the advantage. During May there had been a drop in Allied losses, coupled with a tremendous rise in U-boat losses; 18 boats were lost in convoy battles in the Atlantic in the month, 14 were lost to air patrols; six of these in the Bay of Biscay. With losses in other theatres, accidents and other causes, the total loss to the U-boat arm in May was 43 boats.
This month had the most losses suffered by the U-boat Arm in the war so far, nearly three times the number of the previous highest, and more boats than had been lost in the whole of 1941. Equally significant was the loss of experienced crews, particularly the junior officers, who represented the next generation of commanders. Black May signalled a decline from which the U-boat arm never recovered; efforts were made over the next two years but the U-boats were never able to re-establish their threat to Allied shipping.
This change was the result of a combination of the sheer numbers of Allied ships at sea, Allied air power at sea, and technological developments in anti-submarine warfare. These had been introduced over the period and came to fruition in May, with devastating results. Operational analysis was used here, too, to improve the efficiency of attack methods and the weapons in use.
The most important factor in the Allied success was that the escorts were getting better; escort groups were becoming more skilled, and scientific analysis was producing more efficient tactics. New weapons such as the Hedgehog, and Mark 24 FIDO Torpedo, were coming into use, and new tactics, such as the creeping attack pioneered by Captain "Johnnie" Walker, proved devastatingly effective. Support groups were organised, to be stationed at sea instead of being tied to a particular convoy, making them ready to reinforce convoys under attack, and to have the freedom to pursue U-boats to destruction rather than just drive them away.
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