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DO-178C
DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification is the primary document by which the certification authorities such as FAA, EASA and Transport Canada approve all commercial software-based aerospace systems. The document is published by RTCA, Incorporated, in a joint effort with EUROCAE and replaces DO-178B. The new document is called DO-178C/ED-12C and was completed in November 2011 and approved by the RTCA in December 2011. It became available for sale and use in January 2012.
Except for FAR 33/JAR E, the Federal Aviation Regulations do not directly reference software airworthiness. On 19 Jul 2013, the FAA approved AC 20-115C, designating DO-178C a recognized "acceptable means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with the applicable FAR airworthiness regulations for the software aspects of airborne systems and equipment certification."
Since the release of DO-178B, there had been strong calls by FAA Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) for clarification/refinement of the definitions and boundaries between the key DO-178B concepts of high-level requirements, low-level requirements, and derived requirements and a better definition of the exit/entry criteria between systems requirements and system design (see ARP4754) and that of software requirements and software design (which is the domain of DO-178B). Other concerns included the meaning of verification in a model-based development paradigm and considerations for replacing some or all software testing activities with model simulation or formal methods. The release of DO-178C and the companion documents DO-278A (Ground Systems), DO-248C (Additional information with rationale for each DO-178C objective), DO-330 (Tool Qualification), DO-331 (Modeling), DO-332 (Object Oriented), and DO-333 (Formal Methods) were created to address the issues noted. The SC-205 members worked with the SAE S-18 committee to ensure that ARP4754A and the above noted DO-xxx documents provide a unified and linked process with complementary criteria.
Overall, DO-178C keeps most of the DO-178B text, which has raised concerns that some issues with DO-178B, such as the ambiguity about the concept of low-level requirements, may not be fully resolved.
The RTCA/EUROCAE joint committee work was divided into seven Subgroups:
The Model Based Development and Verification subgroup (SG4) was the largest of the working groups. All work is collected and coordinated via a web-site that is a collaborative work management mechanism. Working artifacts and draft documents were held in a restricted area available to group members only.
The work was focused on bringing DO-178B/ED-12B up to date with respect to current software development practices, tools, and technologies.
The Software Level, also known as the Development Assurance Level (DAL) or Item Development Assurance Level (IDAL) as defined in ARP4754 (DO-178C only mentions IDAL as synonymous with Software Level), is determined from the safety assessment process and hazard analysis by examining the effects of a failure condition in the system. The failure conditions are categorized by their effects on the aircraft, crew, and passengers.
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DO-178C
DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification is the primary document by which the certification authorities such as FAA, EASA and Transport Canada approve all commercial software-based aerospace systems. The document is published by RTCA, Incorporated, in a joint effort with EUROCAE and replaces DO-178B. The new document is called DO-178C/ED-12C and was completed in November 2011 and approved by the RTCA in December 2011. It became available for sale and use in January 2012.
Except for FAR 33/JAR E, the Federal Aviation Regulations do not directly reference software airworthiness. On 19 Jul 2013, the FAA approved AC 20-115C, designating DO-178C a recognized "acceptable means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with the applicable FAR airworthiness regulations for the software aspects of airborne systems and equipment certification."
Since the release of DO-178B, there had been strong calls by FAA Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs) for clarification/refinement of the definitions and boundaries between the key DO-178B concepts of high-level requirements, low-level requirements, and derived requirements and a better definition of the exit/entry criteria between systems requirements and system design (see ARP4754) and that of software requirements and software design (which is the domain of DO-178B). Other concerns included the meaning of verification in a model-based development paradigm and considerations for replacing some or all software testing activities with model simulation or formal methods. The release of DO-178C and the companion documents DO-278A (Ground Systems), DO-248C (Additional information with rationale for each DO-178C objective), DO-330 (Tool Qualification), DO-331 (Modeling), DO-332 (Object Oriented), and DO-333 (Formal Methods) were created to address the issues noted. The SC-205 members worked with the SAE S-18 committee to ensure that ARP4754A and the above noted DO-xxx documents provide a unified and linked process with complementary criteria.
Overall, DO-178C keeps most of the DO-178B text, which has raised concerns that some issues with DO-178B, such as the ambiguity about the concept of low-level requirements, may not be fully resolved.
The RTCA/EUROCAE joint committee work was divided into seven Subgroups:
The Model Based Development and Verification subgroup (SG4) was the largest of the working groups. All work is collected and coordinated via a web-site that is a collaborative work management mechanism. Working artifacts and draft documents were held in a restricted area available to group members only.
The work was focused on bringing DO-178B/ED-12B up to date with respect to current software development practices, tools, and technologies.
The Software Level, also known as the Development Assurance Level (DAL) or Item Development Assurance Level (IDAL) as defined in ARP4754 (DO-178C only mentions IDAL as synonymous with Software Level), is determined from the safety assessment process and hazard analysis by examining the effects of a failure condition in the system. The failure conditions are categorized by their effects on the aircraft, crew, and passengers.