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X Article
"The Sources of Soviet Conduct", commonly "X Article", is an article written by George F. Kennan and published under the pseudonym "X" in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine. It introduced the term "containment" to widespread use and advocated the strategic use of that concept against the Soviet Union. It expanded on ideas expressed by Kennan in a confidential February 1946 telegram, formally identified by Kennan's State Department number, "511", but informally dubbed the "long telegram" for its size.
Kennan composed the long telegram in response to inquiries about the implications of a February 1946 speech by Joseph Stalin. Though the speech was in line with previous statements by Stalin, it provoked fear in the American press and public; Time magazine called it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day". The long telegram explained Soviet motivations by recounting the history of Russian rulers as well as the ideology of Marxism–Leninism. It argued that the Soviet leaders used the ideology to characterize the external world as hostile, allowing them to justify their continued hold on power despite a lack of popular support. Washington bureaucrats quickly read the confidential message and accepted it as the best explanation of Soviet behavior. The reception elevated Kennan's reputation within the State Department as one of the government's foremost Soviet experts.
After hearing Kennan speak about Soviet foreign relations at the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1947, international banker R. Gordon Wasson suggested that he share his views in an article for Foreign Affairs. Kennan revised a piece he had submitted to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in late January 1947, but his role in government precluded him from publishing under his name. His superiors granted him approval to publish the piece provided it was released anonymously; Foreign Affairs attributed the article only to "X". Expressing similar sentiments to that of the long telegram, the piece was strong in its anti-communism, introducing and outlining a basic theory of containment. The article was widely read; though it does not mention the Truman Doctrine, having mostly been written before Truman's speech, it quickly became seen as an expression of the doctrine's policy. Retrospective commentators dispute the impact of the article, although Henry Kissinger referred to it as "the diplomatic doctrine of the era".
Joseph Stalin, General Secretary and de facto leader of the Soviet Union, spoke at the Bolshoi Theatre on February 9, 1946, the night before the symbolic 1946 Supreme Soviet election. The speech did not discuss foreign policy, but instead made pledges to expand industry. He justified the expansion by pointing to Marxist–Leninist theory, warning that capitalism possessed a predisposition towards conflict.
Stalin's speech provoked fear in the American press and public, with Time magazine calling it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day." George F. Kennan, then working for the US State Department as chargé d'affaires in Moscow, found the speech routine and reflective of previous statements from Stalin. With this in mind, he issued only a quick summary of the speech for the State Department. Despite the familiar statements from Stalin, the context in which they were made – including the Soviet Union's recent rejection of Bretton Woods and evidence of atomic espionage in the United States and Canada – alarmed officials in Washington. In a 1982 interview, former diplomat Elbridge Durbrow expressed that Stalin's speech had in effect said, "to hell with the rest of the world." US President Harry Truman was confused by the Soviet's policies, at times appearing belligerent and at others exercising self-restraint. Leaders were increasingly coming to the conclusion that the existing quid pro quo strategy was ineffective against the Soviets, but had no replacement strategy.
Durbrow and another diplomat, H. Freeman Matthews – both readers of Kennan's earlier telegrams – were confused by Kennan's relative silence about the speech. On 13 February, Matthews drafted a message, signed by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, asking for an analysis. The message described the press and public's reaction having been, "to a degree not hitherto felt", and expressed: "We should welcome receiving from you an interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these announced policies." W. Averell Harriman, having recently returned from his ambassadorship to the Soviet Union, spoke to Kennan and encouraged him to write a thorough analysis.
Kennan probably wrote rough drafts of a message before dictating a final version to his secretary, Dorothy Hessman, on February 22, 1946. Finishing late at night, he took the message to the Mokhovaya code room in Moscow and had it telegraphed back to Washington. The message was quickly dubbed the "long telegram" because, at a little over 5,000 words, it was the longest telegram sent in the history of the State Department.
Identified as "511" by Kennan's State Department number, the message is divided into five sections, covering the Soviet Union's background, current features, future prospects and the implications these would have for the United States. It opens with an apology for its length but qualifies the necessity of responding to all the then pressing concerns at once. Kennan begins by laying out the world from the Soviet perspective, splitting it into socialist and capitalist sectors. The alliance between the United States and Great Britain was destined to fail, and would either lead to war between them or a joint attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed they would ultimately prevail in such a conflict, but would need to grow their strength and exploit the capitalists' tendency towards conflict amongst one another in the meantime. Kennan described these ideas as absurd, pointing out that capitalist countries were not failing and were not always in conflict. Further, he described the idea that the United States and Great Britain would deliberately enter into a war against the Soviets as the "sheerest nonsense".
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X Article
"The Sources of Soviet Conduct", commonly "X Article", is an article written by George F. Kennan and published under the pseudonym "X" in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine. It introduced the term "containment" to widespread use and advocated the strategic use of that concept against the Soviet Union. It expanded on ideas expressed by Kennan in a confidential February 1946 telegram, formally identified by Kennan's State Department number, "511", but informally dubbed the "long telegram" for its size.
Kennan composed the long telegram in response to inquiries about the implications of a February 1946 speech by Joseph Stalin. Though the speech was in line with previous statements by Stalin, it provoked fear in the American press and public; Time magazine called it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day". The long telegram explained Soviet motivations by recounting the history of Russian rulers as well as the ideology of Marxism–Leninism. It argued that the Soviet leaders used the ideology to characterize the external world as hostile, allowing them to justify their continued hold on power despite a lack of popular support. Washington bureaucrats quickly read the confidential message and accepted it as the best explanation of Soviet behavior. The reception elevated Kennan's reputation within the State Department as one of the government's foremost Soviet experts.
After hearing Kennan speak about Soviet foreign relations at the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1947, international banker R. Gordon Wasson suggested that he share his views in an article for Foreign Affairs. Kennan revised a piece he had submitted to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in late January 1947, but his role in government precluded him from publishing under his name. His superiors granted him approval to publish the piece provided it was released anonymously; Foreign Affairs attributed the article only to "X". Expressing similar sentiments to that of the long telegram, the piece was strong in its anti-communism, introducing and outlining a basic theory of containment. The article was widely read; though it does not mention the Truman Doctrine, having mostly been written before Truman's speech, it quickly became seen as an expression of the doctrine's policy. Retrospective commentators dispute the impact of the article, although Henry Kissinger referred to it as "the diplomatic doctrine of the era".
Joseph Stalin, General Secretary and de facto leader of the Soviet Union, spoke at the Bolshoi Theatre on February 9, 1946, the night before the symbolic 1946 Supreme Soviet election. The speech did not discuss foreign policy, but instead made pledges to expand industry. He justified the expansion by pointing to Marxist–Leninist theory, warning that capitalism possessed a predisposition towards conflict.
Stalin's speech provoked fear in the American press and public, with Time magazine calling it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day." George F. Kennan, then working for the US State Department as chargé d'affaires in Moscow, found the speech routine and reflective of previous statements from Stalin. With this in mind, he issued only a quick summary of the speech for the State Department. Despite the familiar statements from Stalin, the context in which they were made – including the Soviet Union's recent rejection of Bretton Woods and evidence of atomic espionage in the United States and Canada – alarmed officials in Washington. In a 1982 interview, former diplomat Elbridge Durbrow expressed that Stalin's speech had in effect said, "to hell with the rest of the world." US President Harry Truman was confused by the Soviet's policies, at times appearing belligerent and at others exercising self-restraint. Leaders were increasingly coming to the conclusion that the existing quid pro quo strategy was ineffective against the Soviets, but had no replacement strategy.
Durbrow and another diplomat, H. Freeman Matthews – both readers of Kennan's earlier telegrams – were confused by Kennan's relative silence about the speech. On 13 February, Matthews drafted a message, signed by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, asking for an analysis. The message described the press and public's reaction having been, "to a degree not hitherto felt", and expressed: "We should welcome receiving from you an interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these announced policies." W. Averell Harriman, having recently returned from his ambassadorship to the Soviet Union, spoke to Kennan and encouraged him to write a thorough analysis.
Kennan probably wrote rough drafts of a message before dictating a final version to his secretary, Dorothy Hessman, on February 22, 1946. Finishing late at night, he took the message to the Mokhovaya code room in Moscow and had it telegraphed back to Washington. The message was quickly dubbed the "long telegram" because, at a little over 5,000 words, it was the longest telegram sent in the history of the State Department.
Identified as "511" by Kennan's State Department number, the message is divided into five sections, covering the Soviet Union's background, current features, future prospects and the implications these would have for the United States. It opens with an apology for its length but qualifies the necessity of responding to all the then pressing concerns at once. Kennan begins by laying out the world from the Soviet perspective, splitting it into socialist and capitalist sectors. The alliance between the United States and Great Britain was destined to fail, and would either lead to war between them or a joint attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed they would ultimately prevail in such a conflict, but would need to grow their strength and exploit the capitalists' tendency towards conflict amongst one another in the meantime. Kennan described these ideas as absurd, pointing out that capitalist countries were not failing and were not always in conflict. Further, he described the idea that the United States and Great Britain would deliberately enter into a war against the Soviets as the "sheerest nonsense".