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Regulatory takings in the United States
In United States constitutional law, a regulatory taking refers to a situation in which governmental regulations restrict the use of private property to an extent that the landowner is substantially deprived of the reasonable use or value of their property. This principle is grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which stipulates that governments are obligated to provide just compensation for such takings. This amendment is applicable to state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby ensuring that property rights are protected at both federal and state levels.
In 1922, the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that governmental regulations that went "too far" were a taking. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the majority of the court, stated that "[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Before the court, was a Pennsylvanian law that forbade all mining under inhabited land. The Court held this law to be a taking of the coal owned by the Pennsylvania Coal Company.
The early mining operations often removed so much of the underground coal that the mines became a hazard to the miners underground and to those residing on the surface. For this reason, the Pennsylvania legislature acted to limit the amount of material that could be removed from the mines below in order to leave sufficient underground support below. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon involved an action by an individual landowner who sought to prevent a mining operation from violating this law, undermining his or her home. Under Pennsylvania law, the deed also conveyed the right to surface support to the coal company which could thus remove subsurface coal even if that caused subsidence. The coal companies argued in Pennsylvania Coal that they had acquired a right to mine the coal and the right to allow the surface to collapse because these rights had been purchased from the original landowners. The owner's deed conveyed the surface but in express terms reserved the right to remove all the coal. The state and the surface landowners argued that the right to cause surface collapse was not property. The deed provided that the grantee takes the premises with that risk and waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining out the coal. The coal company essentially owned a property right to mine as much as it wished. Over a dissent by Justice Brandeis, the court ruled that Pennsylvania's statute deprived the coal companies of the right to mine their coal.
The Holmes opinion is considered one of the most important opinions in the history of takings law.
While it is often asserted that the doctrine of regulatory takings originated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922), it is argued that the roots of this doctrine extend far earlier, tracing back to developments in American jurisprudence after the Civil War. Early cases, such as Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. (1872), opened the door to a broader interpretation of takings, allowing for challenges to regulations that interfered with property use. However, the U.S. Supreme Court initially maintained a more restrictive approach, focusing primarily on physical takings. In contrast, various state courts advanced the doctrine by invalidating regulations that affected property rights, even in the absence of physical invasion or title issues. Influential jurists of the period, including Justice David Brewer and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., began to articulate foundational theories regarding regulatory takings. They posited that governmental regulations could amount to takings if they significantly impaired the economic viability or practical use of private property, reinforcing the notion that property rights extend beyond mere physical control. Consequently, the Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon decision did not emerge in isolation; rather, it served to crystallize and formalize a line of legal reasoning and precedents that had been gestating within the broader contours of 19th-century American legal thought.
In Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis (1987), the Supreme Court revisited the issue of mining restrictions. In this case, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, which required coal companies to leave at least 50 percent of the coal in place beneath certain structures to prevent subsidence. The Court, in contrast to Mahon, took a more favorable view of the legislation, finding that it did not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Court emphasized that the regulation was designed to serve a legitimate public interest by protecting the surface from damage caused by mining and did not deprive the coal companies of all economically viable use of their land.
The Court wrote:
[T]he character of the governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare. [t]here is no record in this case to support a finding, similar to the one the Court made in Pennsylvania Coal, that the Subsidence Act makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business. Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others. These restrictions are "properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship".
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Regulatory takings in the United States
In United States constitutional law, a regulatory taking refers to a situation in which governmental regulations restrict the use of private property to an extent that the landowner is substantially deprived of the reasonable use or value of their property. This principle is grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which stipulates that governments are obligated to provide just compensation for such takings. This amendment is applicable to state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby ensuring that property rights are protected at both federal and state levels.
In 1922, the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that governmental regulations that went "too far" were a taking. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the majority of the court, stated that "[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Before the court, was a Pennsylvanian law that forbade all mining under inhabited land. The Court held this law to be a taking of the coal owned by the Pennsylvania Coal Company.
The early mining operations often removed so much of the underground coal that the mines became a hazard to the miners underground and to those residing on the surface. For this reason, the Pennsylvania legislature acted to limit the amount of material that could be removed from the mines below in order to leave sufficient underground support below. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon involved an action by an individual landowner who sought to prevent a mining operation from violating this law, undermining his or her home. Under Pennsylvania law, the deed also conveyed the right to surface support to the coal company which could thus remove subsurface coal even if that caused subsidence. The coal companies argued in Pennsylvania Coal that they had acquired a right to mine the coal and the right to allow the surface to collapse because these rights had been purchased from the original landowners. The owner's deed conveyed the surface but in express terms reserved the right to remove all the coal. The state and the surface landowners argued that the right to cause surface collapse was not property. The deed provided that the grantee takes the premises with that risk and waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining out the coal. The coal company essentially owned a property right to mine as much as it wished. Over a dissent by Justice Brandeis, the court ruled that Pennsylvania's statute deprived the coal companies of the right to mine their coal.
The Holmes opinion is considered one of the most important opinions in the history of takings law.
While it is often asserted that the doctrine of regulatory takings originated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922), it is argued that the roots of this doctrine extend far earlier, tracing back to developments in American jurisprudence after the Civil War. Early cases, such as Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. (1872), opened the door to a broader interpretation of takings, allowing for challenges to regulations that interfered with property use. However, the U.S. Supreme Court initially maintained a more restrictive approach, focusing primarily on physical takings. In contrast, various state courts advanced the doctrine by invalidating regulations that affected property rights, even in the absence of physical invasion or title issues. Influential jurists of the period, including Justice David Brewer and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., began to articulate foundational theories regarding regulatory takings. They posited that governmental regulations could amount to takings if they significantly impaired the economic viability or practical use of private property, reinforcing the notion that property rights extend beyond mere physical control. Consequently, the Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon decision did not emerge in isolation; rather, it served to crystallize and formalize a line of legal reasoning and precedents that had been gestating within the broader contours of 19th-century American legal thought.
In Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis (1987), the Supreme Court revisited the issue of mining restrictions. In this case, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, which required coal companies to leave at least 50 percent of the coal in place beneath certain structures to prevent subsidence. The Court, in contrast to Mahon, took a more favorable view of the legislation, finding that it did not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Court emphasized that the regulation was designed to serve a legitimate public interest by protecting the surface from damage caused by mining and did not deprive the coal companies of all economically viable use of their land.
The Court wrote:
[T]he character of the governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare. [t]here is no record in this case to support a finding, similar to the one the Court made in Pennsylvania Coal, that the Subsidence Act makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business. Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others. These restrictions are "properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship".