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Mirza Aziz-ud-Din Muhammad (6 June 1699 – 29 November 1759), better known by his regnal name Alamgir II, was the fifteenth Mughal emperor from 1754 to 1759. He was the son of Jahandar Shah.

Key Information

Born Mirza Aziz-ud-Din, the second son of Jahandar Shah, was raised to the throne by Imad-ul-Mulk after he deposed Ahmad Shah Bahadur in 1754. On ascending the throne, he took the title of Alamgir and tried to follow the approach of Aurangzeb (Alamgir I). At the time of his accession to the throne he was 55 years old. He had no experience of administration and warfare as he had spent most of his life in jail. He was a weak ruler, with all powers vested in the hand of his vizier, Imad-ul-Mulk.

In 1756, Ahmad Shah Durrani invaded India once again and captured Delhi and plundered Mathura. While the Marathas became more powerful because of their collaboration with Imad-ul-Mulk, and dominated the whole of northern India. This was the peak of the Maratha expansion, which caused great trouble for the Mughal Empire, already weak with no strong ruler. Relations between Alamgir II and his usurping vizier, Imad-ul-Mulk had now deteriorated, their troubled relation would culminate in the murder of Alamgir by Imad-ul-Mulk. Alamgir II's son Ali Gauhar escaped persecution from Delhi, while Shah Jahan III was placed on the throne.

Early life

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Alamgir II was born Aziz-ud-Din on 6 June 1699 at Burhanpur and was the second son of Muizz-ud-Din, who himself was the son of Bahadur Shah (Shah Alam). So, Aurangzeb was his great-grandfather. His mother was a jat, Anup Bai, with little clarity about her existence.[4]

Aziz-ud-Din was 7 when his great-grandfather Aurangzeb died in the Deccan. After the death of his grandfather Bahadur Shah I in 1712 the war of succession followed. In these wars his father Jahandar Shah was defeated by the next Mughal Emperor, Farrukhsiyar who reigned till 1719.

Aziz-ud-Din was then imprisoned in 1714 by Asaf Jah I under the ruler Farrukhsiyar. From 1714 to 1754 he was in captivity. After the death of Ahmad Shah Bahadur, he was released in 1754 by the usurping Vizier Ghazi ud-Din Khan Feroze Jung III. He perceived Aziz-ud-Din as a frail personality who would not object to his regime. Therefore, on 2 June 1754, Aziz-ud-Din was given the title Alamgir II by the vizier out of his own recommendation, as he wanted to follow the centralized approach of Aurangzeb.

Succession to throne

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Imad-ul-Mulk, a persecutor of the Mughal imperial family, holds a banquet.

Imad-ul-Mulk hired Maratha mercenaries to do his bidding[5] and put all the imperial revenues into his own pocket and starved Alamgir II's family. He also persecuted Ali Gauhar, the elder son of Alamgir II.

Since then, relations between Alamgir II and Imad-ul-Mulk's regime were so bad that the latter got him assassinated in November 1759.

Reign

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After the emergence of Alamgir II the Mughal Empire had impulsively began to re-centralize, particularly when many Nawabs sought the gratification of the Mughal Emperor and his co-ordination regarding their resistance to the Maratha. This development was clearly unwelcome by Imad-ul-Mulk who sought to strengthen his authoritarianism with the undaunted support of the Marathas. His Amir-ul-Umara and Mir Bakhshi continued to be Mirza Ashraf, the son of Khan Dowran VII (a noble in the reign of Farrukhsiyar and Muhammad Shah).[6][7]

Alliance with the Durrani Empire

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In the year 1755, the acclaimed Mughal viceroy of Punjab, Moin-ul-Mulk died, his widow Mughlani Begum desperately sought the assistance of Ahmad Shah Durrani to halt any succession struggle and to quell the Sikh rebels in the eastern regions.

Ahmad Shah Durrani and his forces then marched into Lahore in the year 1756 and appointed his son Timur Shah Durrani as the new viceroy at Lahore, under the protection of the commander Jahan Khan and also placed Adina Beg as the Faujdar of Doab. Ahmad Shah Durrani then plundered Sikh and Hindu inhabitants in the unstable and outlawed eastern regions of the Punjab.

Patthargarh fort (literally meaning: "stone stronghold") outside Najibabad, built by Najib ad-Dawlah in 1755, during the reign of the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II.

He then marched towards Delhi, in January 1757, the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II with courtiers such as Shah Waliullah, nobles such as Najib-ul-Daula, and the imperial family went to meet Ahmad Shah Durrani, whose forces then engaged the Marathas in combat and threatened to overthrow and execute the regime of Imad-ul-Mulk in the sacking of Delhi.

Ahmad Shah Durrani's relations with the Mughal Emperor, strengthened further when his son Timur Shah Durrani was chosen as the suitor of Alamgir II's daughter Zuhra Begum. Ahmad Shah Durrani himself also married Hadrat Begum the daughter of the former Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah.[8]

Ahmad Shah Durrani returned to Kabul leaving his forces led by his son Timur Shah Durrani consolidating themselves inside the garrisons of Lahore where they founded the Zamzama cannon with the assistance of Mughal metalsmiths.

He was supported by Mohammad Bahawal Khan II (Nawab Amir of Bhawalpur) and Muhammad Nasir Khan I (Khanate of Kalat).[9]

Siege of Delhi (1757)

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Main article: Battle of Delhi (1757)

In July 1757, the Marathas led by Raghunathrao rejected the alliance established between the Durrani Empire and the Mughal Empire, they were assisted by Imad-ul-Mulk and encamped 30 km opposite to the Red Fort and occupied all the villages by the Jamuna they began to besiege Delhi.

The Marathas fought against Alamgir II's incumbent Mir Bakhshi ("Paymaster") Najib-ul-Daula along with his lieutenants Qutub Shah and Aman Khan and a Mughal Army of 2,500 garrisoned inside the metropolis of Delhi. The angry Maratha set ferries ablaze and stopped food supplies from entering Delhi, while Najib-ul-Daula positioned his heavy artillery outside the vicinity of the Red Fort.

Unable to gain any assistance from Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was engaged in quelling various rebellions near Herat; Najib-ul-Daula surrendered after resisting the combined brigands of Maratha Confederacy for more than five months, he conceded defeat and withdrew to Najibabad. When the Marathas entered Delhi the emperor Alamgir II and his royal family had somehow fled to Bharatpur State. The Marathas looted and plundered the city and the people of Delhi. Mosques and Shrines built by the Mughals were desecrated; and the Peshwa conspired to place Vishwasrao upon the Mughal throne.

Imad-ul-Mulk was reappointed Mir Bakhshi and with the support of the Marathas.[10] Not long after entering Delhi the Marathas encountered a Jat regiment sent by Suraj Mal who now began to claim sovereignty over Delhi. The Jat also plundered Delhi but soon afterwards made it possible for Alamgir II and the Mughal royal family to return to Delhi from Bharatpur.

However, despite losing control of Delhi, Najib-ul-Daula and his associates, such as Qutub Khan and Abdus Samad Khan the Mughal Faujdar of Sirhind, continued to challenge the Maratha Confederacy and its allies during confrontations at Saharanpur and Shahabad Markanda. In response the Marathas sacked the inhabitants of Taraori, Karnal and Kunjpura.[10]

The Maratha attack upon Kunjpura triggered a military response by Ahmad Shah Durrani. Whose forces crossed the sacred rivers of India in search of their Maratha opponents.

Subjects opposing the Maratha Confederacy

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In the year 1756, Alamgir II sympathised with the cause of his loyal Nawabs of Kurnool, Cuddapah and Savanur, when their assigned territories were ravaged and plundered until 1757 by the Maratha chieftain Balaji Baji Rao.

Third Carnatic War (1757–1763)

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Main article: Carnatic Wars
Mughal artillerymen at Plassey during the Carnatic Wars.

Loss of Bengal

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Alamgir II grieved the death of Alivardi Khan the famous Nawab of Bengal, who annually pledged 5 million dams to the imperial court. His successor Siraj-ud-Daula was recognised as the next Nawab of Bengal, but he faced internal rivals who refused to consider the firman granted by Alamgir II to Siraj-ud-Daula. These internal conflicts would lead Siraj-ud-Daula to hastily annex Calcutta from the English East India Company, without the permission of the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II and Salabat Jung. Siraj-ud-Daula was quickly defeated by Clive who recaptured Calcutta and defeated Siraj-ud-Daula during the Battle of Plassey in the year 1757. After the annihilation of his entire army Siraj-ud-Daula fled and was killed by the forces of the treacherous Mir Jafar. The deceased Siraj-ud-Daula's pretensions were criticised in the Mughal imperial court by Ghulam Husain Tabatabai, and Alamgir II refused to recognise Mir Jafar as the next Nawab of Bengal. In response to the imperial court's decision Mir Jafar thus consolidated and allied with the manipulative Imad-ul-Mulk against the imperial family.

Authority in the Deccan

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Throughout Alamgir II's reign French commandant de Bussy and Lally and their allies such as Salabat Jung and Hyder Ali greatly contributed to the advancement of forces in the Deccan opposed to the utter dominance of the Maratha renegades, their achievements had earned them fame throughout the influential circles within the Mughal Empire. In the year 1756, Salabat Jung's forces utilised heavy muskets known as Catyocks, which were attached to the ground, it was known to have fired more rapidly than a cannon.[11] These new weapons would completely reverse fortunes of the Maratha rebels. Soon after the Battle of Plassey, the French commander De Bussy, also entitled Saif-ud-Daula Umdat-ul-Mulk and Mansabdar of 7000, by the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II. He captured the Northern Circars from the British along with his assistant Hyder Jung the "Vakil" (attorney) representing the French within the Mughal Empire and Salabat Jung. However the Northern Circars were retaken by Forde in the year 1758 and De Bussy was recalled to France. Fearing the worst, Salabat Jung reconciled with the English East India Company and recognised their protectorate and was soon overthrown by his own brother Nizam Ali Khan.

Raja of Kashmir

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In 1754, the Durrani governor of Kashmir, Sukh Jiwan Mal, expelled his deputy and asserted independence. To ratify his claim, he asked Alamgir II to recognise him as the sole representative of Kashmir. Alamgir II, in an agreement, conferred the title of Raja upon Sukh Jiwan.

Nawab of Punjab

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Adina Beg, the former Nazim of Doaba, was appointed as the governor of Punjab by Nana Saheb I after his victory over the Durranis. Adina, who rather served as an autonomous ruler, was designated as the Nawab of Punjab by Alamgir II as he bestowed upon him the title of Zafar Jang Bahadur.

Nawab of Bhopal

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In the year 1758, the Mughal Army of Faiz Mohammad Khan the Nawab of Bhopal was treacherously attacked by his step-mother Mamola Bai who suddenly besieged the Mughal garrison at Fortress of Raisen in 1758, according to the layout of the Marathas. The outraged Mughal Emperor Alamgir II, then issued a firman supporting Faiz Mohammad Khan was the Nawab of Bhopal the only chosen administrator of Raisen, the emperor also granted the title Bahadur to Faiz Mohammad Khan the Nawab of Bhopal. However the fort remained under the control of Mamola Bai and the renegade Nanasaheb Peshwa. The fortress of Raisen was quickly retaken by Faiz Mohammad Khan in the year 1760, after the tragic assassination of Alamgir II and after Sadashivrao Bhau threatened to ravage Bhopal prior to the Third Battle of Panipat. It is believed that Faiz Mohammad Khan's Sepoys were among those who had cut off the various supply routes of the Marathas just before the Third Battle of Panipat.

Nawab of Cambay

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Najm-ad-Dawla supported British presence in Cambay. Turning much of his estate into an international "safe zone". Although it is likely that he too had to face threats from the Maratha climax.

"Nawab of Mysore"

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In 1758, Hyder Ali and his Sepoys captured Bangalore from "Khande Rao of the Maratha Confederacy".

In honour of his achievements during the Carnatic Wars, the king gave him the title "Nawab Haider Ali Khan Bahadur".

Zenith of the Maratha Confederacy

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Maratha Confederacy at its zenith in 1760, the Peshwa discussed abolishing the Mughal Empire and placing Vishwasrao on the imperial throne in Delhi.

In 1758 the Marathas led by Raghunathrao occupied Lahore after extracting an extortion of imperial wealth from Imad-ul-Mulk, together they conspired the overthrow of young Timur Shah Durrani. Raghunathrao drove out Jahan Khan and Timur Shah Durrani, the son and viceroy of Ahmad Shah Durrani. Timur Shah Durrani and his forces were forced to retreat from Lahore to Peshawar under the force of attacks from Sikhs and Marathas. This victory made the belligerent Peshwa, grandiosely sack Delhi, and stated his intentions of placing Vishwasrao on the Mughal throne.[12]

Assassination

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Many of his actions had angered the people of India. Fearing a backlash in the summer of the year 1759 Prince Ali Gauhar escaped from Delhi.

Agitated by the daring escape, Imad-ul-Mulk and Sadashivrao Bhau reckoned that Alamgir II was about to advance his son Prince Ali Gauhar, to dispossess and overthrow their regime.

After detailed consideration Imad-ul-Mulk and an angry mob of various ethnic groups plotted to murder the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II and the assassinations of prominent members of his family in the winter of 1759.[13]

Aftermath

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The defeat of Alamgir II's son-in-law, Timur Shah Durrani by the Marathas in the year 1760, provoked the wrath of Ahmad Shah Durrani, who launched a massive campaign gathering more troops than ever before. In response to Imad-ul-Mulk and Sadashivrao Bhau; Najib-ud-Daula and his firm alliance of principal Muslim nobles in the Mughal Empire and Ahmad Shah Abdali recaptured Delhi and placed it under the nominal authority of Shah Alam II. In the south Hyder Ali and his Mysore Army ferociously attacked the Maratha. Meanwhile, Shah Alam II anticipated the collapse of the Maratha and declared Shuja-ud-Daula his Grand Vizier and Najib-ud-Daula as his honorary Mukhtar Khas (Chief Representative).[14][15] These developments eventually culminated into rise of religious and political loyalties that eventually clashed at the "Third Battle of Panipat" in the year 1761.

Foreign relations

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Seven Years' War

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See also: Seven Years' War
the Mughal Ambassador

In 1756, the Seven Years' War had broken out and Alamgir II was supported by various international belligerents of that war. It was the first global war in which the Mughal emperor had his involvement apart from the boundaries of India. Alamgir II was initially involved in that war because the British were hasty in their attempts to conquer Bengal Subah.

A portrait of Marquis de Bussy-Castelnau.

In 1755, De Bussy received letter from new Mughal Emperor Alamgir II requesting French assistance to put down the Maratha Confederacy. Alamgir II asked if it was possible for De Bussy to dispatch a French contingent of 1000 strong to protect the Mughal Empire's capital at Delhi. Alamgir II also promised to pay a hefty sum for the maintenance of the French and even promised to settle disputes in the Carnatic Wars in favour of the French East India Company.[16]

In 1757, Alamgir II had successfully achieved peace between the Durrani Emirate and the Mughal Empire. Alamgir II even secured a matrimonial alliance[17] when Timur Shah Durrani married Gauhar Afroz Begam the daughter of the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II in February 1757[citation needed] and Ahmad Shah Durrani married Hazrat Begum the daughter of the former Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah in 1757.[18]

in the year 1751, the Swedish East India Company was operating in Surat as a co-belligerent of Alamgir II. They were probably instrumental in assisting the first Nawab of Junagadh.

It is believed that Alamgir II even tried to reconcile the English East India Company and the French East India Company before his death in 1759.

Death

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Silver rupee issued in the name of Alamgir II, date of AH 1172 (c. 1758).

The newly appointed Mughal Grand Vizier after Ahmad Shah Durrani's invasion was Najib-ud-Daula who tried to consolidate the remains of the Mughal Empire by uniting distant Faujdars (commanders), Nawab's and Nizams into a common cause against the Marathas. Fearing their wrath the deposed Imad-ul-Mulk aligned himself with the Maratha leader Sadashivrao Bhau and launched a counterattack against Najib-ud-Daula which lasted 15 days and resulted in the defeat of Najib-ud-Daula who was driven north.

Imad-ul-Mulk then feared that the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II would recall Ahmad Shah Durrani, or use his son Prince Ali Gauhar, to dispossess him of his newfound power with the Marathas. Therefore, Imad-ul-Mulk plotted to murder the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II and his family. A few Mughal Princes, including Ali Gauhar desperately managed to escape before assassination. In November 1759, the Mughal Emperor Alamgir II was told that a pious man had come to meet him, Alamgir II, ever so eager to meet holy men, set out immediately to meet him at Kotla Fateh Shah, he was stabbed repeatedly by Imad-ul-Mulk's assassins. The Mughal Emperor Alamgir II's death was mourned throughout the Mughal Empire, particularly by the Muslim populace.

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Silver Rupee of the Madras Presidency, minted in Arkat, struck in the name of Mughal emperor Alamgir II (posthumously).

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Alamgir II

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Alamgir II, born Aziz-ud-Din (1699–1759), was the Mughal emperor who nominally ruled from 3 June 1754 until his on 29 November 1759. The second son of the deposed emperor , he was installed on the throne by the influential wazir Imad-ul-Mulk after the latter overthrew , but exercised no real authority amid the empire's accelerating disintegration. His brief tenure witnessed repeated Afghan invasions under , including the sack of in 1757, escalating Maratha influence, and the British East India Company's consolidation of power following the , all underscoring the Mughal court's impotence and reliance on transient alliances. Alamgir II's defining characteristic was his subjugation to Imad-ul-Mulk, whose ruthless control culminated in the emperor's murder to elevate yet another compliant successor, marking a pivotal step in the empire's effective collapse.

Early Life

Birth and Family Background

Mirza Aziz-ud-Din, who assumed the imperial title Alamgir II upon his ascension, was born on 6 June 1699 as the second son of Mughal prince , better known as . Jahandar Shah, born in 1661, was himself the third son of Emperor and would briefly rule as Mughal emperor from March 1712 to February 1713 before his deposition and execution amid succession struggles. Through this lineage, Aziz-ud-Din was the grandson of (reigned 1707–1712) and the great-grandson of Emperor (reigned 1658–1707), positioning him within the extended Timurid-Mughal dynasty during a period of intensifying imperial fragmentation following Aurangzeb's death in 1707. Historical accounts provide scant details on his early siblings or mother, reflecting the often opaque personal lives of Mughal royals amid court intrigues and the preference for lesser-known concubines over principal wives in princely progeny.

Imprisonment and Formative Years

Mirza Aziz-ud-Din, who would later rule as Alamgir II, was born on 6 June 1699 as the second son of , a Mughal prince and future short-lived emperor (r. 1712–1713). His father was the third son of Emperor (r. 1707–1712), placing Aziz-ud-Din within the extended imperial family amid the intensifying succession struggles following Aurangzeb's death in 1707. At the time of his birth, the family was stationed in , a key Mughal administrative center in the Deccan. Jahandar Shah ascended the throne in March 1712 after Bahadur Shah I's death triggered a fratricidal war among princes, but his reign collapsed within a year due to intrigue led by the , Abdulla Khan and Hussain Ali Khan, who backed the rival claimant . Jahandar Shah was defeated, captured, and executed on 11 February 1713 near . In the ensuing power consolidation under (r. 1713–1719), Aziz-ud-Din, then aged about 14, was deemed a potential threat as a surviving male heir of the deposed ruler and imprisoned around 1714 to neutralize any dynastic claims. Aziz-ud-Din's confinement lasted over four decades, spanning the reigns of multiple emperors including , , Rafi ud-Daula, (r. 1719–1748), and (r. 1748–1754). Details on the exact locations or conditions of his imprisonment remain sparse in contemporary accounts, but it effectively isolated him from administrative, military, or political experience, fostering a reclusive existence focused on survival rather than preparation for rule. This prolonged sequestration, intended to eliminate rival lineages amid chronic throne vacancies and noble factionalism, left him frail and detached from empire affairs by the time of his release. In June 1754, the ambitious wazir Ghazi-ud-Din Imad-ul-Mulk, seeking a pliable figurehead after deposing the blinded Ahmad Shah, orchestrated Aziz-ud-Din's liberation from prison and enthronement as emperor, viewing his long incarceration as evidence of docility unlikely to challenge noble dominance. At age 55, Aziz-ud-Din adopted the title Alamgir II, evoking the memory of (Alamgir I), but his formative isolation ensured nominal authority overshadowed by wazirial control from the outset.

Ascension to the Throne

Political Chaos Under

ascended the Mughal throne on April 22, 1748, succeeding his father amid a severely diminished empire reeling from Nadir Shah's sack of in 1739 and ongoing provincial rebellions. His early reign saw a against at the on March 11, 1748, where Mughal forces repelled the Afghan invader but failed to prevent further incursions into and the northwest. Internal court factions deepened the disarray, as Ahmad Shah delegated authority to his mother and the eunuch Javed Khan, who assumed regency powers and amassed wealth through corrupt practices, inciting resentment among hereditary nobles like the Sayyids and Turani chieftains. Grand Vizier , the , navigated these rivalries by combating Sikh uprisings in and allying temporarily with Maratha forces against Durrani's third invasion in 1751–1752, which resulted in Afghan plundering of and heavy tribute demands from . However, Safdar Jang's military defeats, including losses to Afghan-Rohilla coalitions, eroded central authority and fueled intrigue, with his rival Imad-ul-Mulk, appointed Mir Bakshi in , exploiting noble discontent. The emperor's inability to unify the nobility or mobilize resources against external threats accelerated territorial losses; Maratha armies advanced into the region, while Durrani's campaigns reduced to a nominal vassalage by , extracting annual tribute and installing Afghan governors. Economic strain from these exactions, compounded by administrative paralysis and Javed Khan's execution by Safdar Jang's forces in , left the court in paralysis, with Ahmad Shah increasingly sidelined. This vortex of intrigue and invasion culminated in Ahmad Shah's deposition in June 1754, after which he was blinded and confined to , symbolizing the empire's descent into puppetry under warring factions.

Role of Imad-ul-Mulk in Elevation

Ghāzī al-Dīn ʿImād al-Mulk, grandson of Āṣaf Jah I and a key Turani noble, maneuvered to seize control of the Mughal court amid escalating factional strife in 1753–1754. Discontent with Emperor Aḥmad Shāh Bahadur's perceived weakness and favoritism toward Persian and Rohilla elements, Imad-ul-Mulk allied with Maratha forces led by to challenge the incumbent regime. This coalition enabled him to enter forcefully, culminating in the deposition of Aḥmad Shāh on 2 June 1754. Following the coup, Imad-ul-Mulk blinded and imprisoned Aḥmad Shāh at , eliminating immediate rivals to his authority. He then selected Aziz-ud-Din, the second son of the late Emperor and a long-imprisoned prince lacking administrative or military experience, as the new emperor under the regnal name Alamgir II. This choice, formalized on 3 June 1754, positioned Alamgir II as a malleable , allowing Imad-ul-Mulk to assume the vital office of wazir and effectively rule as . Alamgir II's selection over more assertive candidates ensured Imad's dominance, as the 55-year-old prince had spent over four decades in confinement since the succession wars after Aurangzeb's death. Imad-ul-Mulk's elevation strategy reflected pragmatic power consolidation rather than loyalty to Timurid lineage; by installing a passive sovereign, he diverted imperial revenues to his coffers, hired Maratha mercenaries for enforcement, and sidelined Alamgir II's family, underscoring the wazir's exploitative control from the outset. This arrangement perpetuated Mughal ceremonial facade while vesting real authority in Imad's hands, amid broader imperial fragmentation.

Reign (1754–1759)

Court Politics and Wazir's Control

Upon his installation as emperor on 3 June 1754, Alamgir II found himself under the complete dominance of his wazir, Ghāzī ud-Dīn Imād ul-Mulk, who had orchestrated the deposition of the previous ruler, Aḥmad Shāh Bahādur, the day prior by blinding and imprisoning him. Imād ul-Mulk, a young noble from the House of the Niẓām and grandson of Niẓām ul-Mulk, assumed the wazirate immediately and vested all administrative and military authority in his own hands, rendering Alamgir II, then aged 55 with no prior experience in governance or warfare, a mere ceremonial . This power dynamic was characterized by Imād's unscrupulous tactics, including the manipulation of factions to eliminate rivals and consolidate his influence over imperial decisions. Court politics during Alamgir II's reign revolved around Imād ul-Mulk's ambitious maneuvers to reassert Mughal centrality amid regional fragmentation, though his efforts were undermined by personal aggrandizement and erratic policies. Imād sought to leverage alliances, such as recognizing chief Najīb ud-Daulah as the emperor's agent, but frequently alienated potential supporters through extortion and intrigue. The emperor's scholarly and pious disposition offered little resistance initially, but attempts by Alamgir II to assert independence—such as influencing appointments or policy—only heightened tensions with the wazir, exacerbating internal divisions without yielding effective control. Imād's dominance extended to financial administration, where he withheld resources from the palace, at one point leaving the emperor without means to maintain basic court functions, such as lighting fires for days or providing suitable transport a mere month and a half into the reign. This wazir's control fostered a climate of instability, as Imād prioritized short-term gains over sustainable governance, repeatedly shifting allegiances to counter threats from Marathas, , and provincial governors. Historical accounts, drawing from Persian chronicles, depict Imād as a ruthless operator whose overreach— including plundering nobles and ignoring imperial dignity—eroded any semblance of unified court authority under Alamgir II. By , following Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī's , Imād temporarily lost influence to Maratha interveners but regained it, only to further entrench his puppetry over the throne through coercive measures. The resultant court was a hotbed of , with Imād's policies alienating key figures like the ' remnants and allies, setting the stage for his eventual desperation in 1759.

Alliance with Ahmad Shah Durrani

In late 1756, amid escalating threats from the Maratha Confederacy's expansion into northern and internal factionalism, Mughal Grand Vizier Imad-ul-Mulk dispatched invitations to , ruler of the , urging him to intervene against regional rivals including the and Marathas. , responding to these overtures alongside pleas from other actors like the widow Mughlani Begum, launched his third major invasion of , departing in November 1756 and advancing toward . Ahmad Shah's forces entered on January 28, 1757, initially maintaining order but resorting to plunder after riots erupted in early March, resulting in an estimated 30,000 civilian deaths and widespread devastation. To consolidate political ties, Ahmad Shah arranged the marriage of his son Shah, aged approximately 10, to one of Alamgir II's daughters on February 14, 1757, symbolizing a dynastic that granted Timur nominal oversight in parts of like Sirhind as dowry. This union aimed to bind Durrani and Mughal interests against common foes, though Alamgir II, largely a under Imad-ul-Mulk's dominance, exercised minimal influence over the arrangement. Prior to departing Delhi on April 7, 1757, Ahmad Shah reaffirmed Alamgir II's nominal imperial authority over territories south of the Sutlej River, extracting a substantial tribute of 60 lakh rupees and military contingents for his campaigns. He appointed Rohilla leader Najib-ud-Daulah as Mir Bakhshi () of the Mughal court, empowering him to enforce Afghan-aligned policies, curb Maratha advances, and collect revenues on behalf of the Durrani sovereign. This de facto regency under Najib provided Alamgir II temporary protection from Maratha incursions but highlighted the empire's subordination to external Afghan power, with Imad-ul-Mulk compelled to submit and adjust his ambitions accordingly. The alliance proved short-lived and asymmetrical, as Ahmad Shah's subsequent campaigns prioritized plunder and territorial gains over sustained Mughal restoration, leaving Delhi economically crippled and Alamgir II's court further fragmented by 1759. Despite the formal recognitions, the Durrani interventions exacerbated Mughal decline, fostering resentment among local powers and underscoring the emperor's inability to assert independent authority.

Confrontations with the Maratha Confederacy

During Alamgir II's reign, the wazir Imad-ul-Mulk forged an alliance with the Maratha Confederacy to counter Afghan influence and consolidate power, inviting Maratha forces led by Raghunathrao, , and Mahadji Shinde to in 1757 following Ahmad Shah Durrani's occupation earlier that year. This collaboration enabled the expulsion of Afghan garrisons from the city and suppression of rival factions, including leaders, but it also introduced significant Maratha military presence in Mughal territories, extracting tribute and from and surrounding areas. Imad-ul-Mulk's reliance on Maratha mercenaries and armies effectively made them de facto protectors of the throne, though this arrangement sowed seeds of tension within the fractured Mughal court. Opposition to Maratha expansion arose from Najib ud-Daulah, whom Alamgir II appointed as Mir Bakshi () around 1755 to balance Imad-ul-Mulk's dominance, leading to direct confrontations between Najib's Rohilla-aligned forces and Maratha armies. Najib organized resistance in the region, engaging in skirmishes and defensive campaigns against Maratha incursions aimed at securing revenue-rich territories and punishing strongholds. These clashes intensified as Marathas, emboldened by their Delhi foothold, pushed into and beyond, defeating contingents in a series of engagements that highlighted the Mughal empire's inability to unify against external powers. By 1758–1759, Maratha campaigns under Raghunathrao extended to , where they clashed with Afghan and remnants loyal to or Mughal interests, capturing briefly and imposing control over northwest territories previously under nominal Mughal suzerainty. Najib ud-Daulah's forces suffered setbacks, including retreats to , forcing temporary submissions and tribute payments to Marathas, which further eroded central authority. These confrontations, though not always pitched battles, underscored the Marathas' aggressive expansion and the Mughal regime's dependence on divisive alliances, culminating in heightened instability that invited further invasions. Alamgir II, as a , witnessed his nominal empire's contraction amid these power struggles, with Maratha victories accelerating the fragmentation of Mughal control in northern .

Territorial Losses in Bengal and Deccan

![The Nawab's artillery at Plassey.jpg][float-right] During Alamgir II's reign, the Mughal Empire lost effective control over following the decisive British victory at the on 23 June 1757. British East India Company forces under defeated Nawab Siraj-ud-Daulah, who had nominally owed allegiance to the Mughal emperor. The battle resulted in the installation of as a puppet subservient to British interests, granting the Company control over 's vast revenues and administration. This shift severed the province's practical ties to , as the British exploited the region's wealth—estimated at annual revenues exceeding 3 million rupees—to fund further expansion, while Mughal authority became purely symbolic. The preceding tensions arose from Siraj-ud-Daulah's in 1756 and British retaliation, but Plassey's outcome, facilitated by Mir Jafar's betrayal and a mere 50 British casualties against 500 on the Nawab's side, marked the irreversible decline of Mughal in eastern . Alamgir II, ensnared in court intrigues under wazir Imad-ul-Mulk, lacked the resources or will to contest this loss, which deprived the empire of one of its most prosperous subahs and accelerated fiscal collapse. In the Deccan, territorial integrity further eroded as Nizam consolidated autonomy with French backing. Elevated with the title Amir-ul-Mamalik by , Salabat Jung allied with French commander Charles de Bussy, who aided in suppressing rivals and repelling Maratha threats from 1756 onward. In gratitude, Salabat Jung ceded the —five coastal districts yielding significant revenue—to the French East India Company in 1758, detaching these Mughal territories without imperial consent. Coins from Arcot mint continued bearing Alamgir II's name, underscoring nominal loyalty amid independence. This arrangement fortified the Nizam's rule but fragmented Deccan holdings, with French influence extending Mughal weaknesses against European interlopers and regional foes like the Marathas, who exacted tributes. Alamgir II's inability to enforce central oversight exemplified the empire's administrative paralysis, as provincial governors prioritized foreign alliances over Delhi's fading directives.

Relations with Regional Powers

Alamgir II's relations with regional powers were characterized by nominal Mughal suzerainty amid growing autonomy of successor states and European trading companies. Various Deccan nawabs, including those of , Cuddapah, and , continued to appeal to the imperial court for support; in 1756, Alamgir II sympathized with their plight after Maratha incursions ravaged their territories, underscoring the emperor's lingering symbolic authority despite practical impotence. Similarly, he conferred the title Amir-ul-Mamalik upon , the , in recognition of his position, though the Nizam's alignment with French forces under Charles de Bussy highlighted shifting alliances in the Deccan. The British East India Company maintained formal deference to Alamgir II by striking silver rupees in his name at the Arcot mint of the , with examples bearing the frozen 6 (corresponding to AH 1172 or 1758/59 CE), even as the company expanded control post-Plassey in 1757. This practice reflected strategic acknowledgment of Mughal legitimacy to legitimize trade and territorial gains, while the company's actions in —defeating Siraj ud-Daulah without imperial consultation—illustrated eroding central oversight. French influence, mediated through support for the Nizam, positioned them as counterweights to British advances, though Alamgir II's court exerted minimal direct influence over these rival European entities.

Economic Strain and Administrative Weakness

The under Alamgir II (r. 1754–1759) experienced acute economic strain, exacerbated by the usurpation of revenues by Wazir Imad-ul-Mulk, who appropriated even the funds from the royal , leaving the emperor in financial penury. This internal predation compounded the broader fiscal collapse, as provincial remittances dwindled amid territorial fragmentation and the dysfunction of the jagirdari system, which impaired land revenue collection and military upkeep. Central authority's inability to enforce tax assessments or curb noble embezzlement further eroded the treasury, rendering the empire unable to fund defenses against invasions or sustain administrative functions. Administrative weakness stemmed from Alamgir II's lack of experience—having spent decades in confinement—and his subordination to Imad-ul-Mulk, who monopolized decision-making and sidelined imperial oversight. The wazir's tyrannical control fostered , factionalism, and inefficiency, with key offices filled by loyalists rather than competent administrators, leading to breakdowns in , revenue auditing, and provincial . This allowed regional governors and warlords to withhold tributes, as seen in the empire's failure to reclaim revenues from rebellious Deccan and territories disrupted by Afghan incursions. The cumulative effect was a hollowed-out unable to respond to crises, such as the 1757 sack of by Afghan forces under , which inflicted direct economic damage through plunder and disrupted trade routes. Without reforms to centralize authority or revitalize revenue mechanisms, the administration devolved into paralysis, accelerating the empire's reliance on ad hoc alliances and accelerating its disintegration into successor states.

Assassination and Immediate Aftermath

The Plot by Imad-ul-Mulk

By , tensions between Emperor Alamgir II and his Ghazi ud-Din Imad-ul-Mulk had escalated, as the emperor sought to curtail the vizier's dominance over court affairs and explored alliances that threatened Imad's authority. Imad-ul-Mulk, fearing displacement through Alamgir's potential appeals to external powers like or reliance on his son Ali Gauhar, resolved to eliminate the emperor and his immediate family to secure a more pliable successor. The plot culminated on November 29, 1759, when Alamgir II was deceived into visiting Kotla Fateh Shah under the pretense of meeting a revered holy man, isolated without his entourage in a darkened chamber. There, assassins dispatched by Imad-ul-Mulk repeatedly stabbed the emperor, ensuring his death while minimizing immediate resistance. This act of regicide allowed Imad to swiftly proclaim Shah Jahan III, a grandson of Bahadur Shah I, as the new puppet emperor, perpetuating his de facto control over the Mughal throne.

Execution and Short-Term Consequences

On November 29, 1759, Alamgir II was assassinated on the orders of his Imad-ul-Mulk, who had grown resentful of the emperor's attempts to assert independence. Lured to Kotla Fateh Shah under the pretext of meeting a , Alamgir II was stabbed repeatedly by Imad-ul-Mulk and his accomplices in a dark corridor, marking a brutal end to his nominal rule. In the immediate aftermath, -ul-Mulk swiftly enthroned the obscure prince Muhi-ul-Millat as , a pliable to legitimize his unchecked dominance over the Mughal court and revenues. This eliminated Alamgir II's resistance but accelerated the empire's disintegration, as it prompted the flight of Alamgir's son Ali Gauhar—who proclaimed himself —and alienated potential allies, leaving Imad temporarily unopposed yet reliant on fragile Maratha alliances amid ongoing invasions and regional revolts.

Death and Succession

Final Days and Burial

In late November 1759, Alamgir II, confined to nominal authority amid Imad-ul-Mulk's usurpation of power, was lured under false pretenses to visit a saint's shrine near . On , he was stabbed to death by Balabash Khan, a subordinate on the wazir's orders, marking the violent end to his five-year reign as a puppet emperor. Deprived of any ceremonial rites, Alamgir II's unclothed corpse was discarded into the River by his assassins, an act that underscored the Mughal dynasty's profound institutional collapse and the wazir's contempt for imperial dignity. No tomb or formal burial site is recorded for the emperor, whose remains were thus lost to the waters.

Installation of Shah Jahan III

Following the assassination of Alamgir II on 29 November 1759 by his wazir Imad-ul-Mulk, the latter swiftly installed Mirza Muhi-ul-Millat, titled , as the new Mughal to preserve his own dominance over the weakened court. Imad-ul-Mulk, facing the flight of Alamgir II's son Ali Gauhar from amid political intrigue, selected —a distant relative descended from —as a pliable unlikely to challenge his authority. The installation, occurring shortly after the murder, reflected the factional power struggles in , where Imad-ul-Mulk sought to counterbalance threats from Maratha influences and Afghan incursions by maintaining a nominal Mughal continuity under his control. 's elevation underscored the erosion of imperial legitimacy, as real power resided with the wazir, who manipulated successions to navigate alliances and rivalries among regional potentates. This brief regime lasted less than a year, until 's deposition in October 1760, highlighting the transient nature of late Mughal enthronements driven by vizierial ambition rather than dynastic merit or broad consensus.

Legacy

Historical Evaluation of Rule

Alamgir II's rule (1754–1759) is assessed by historians as emblematic of the Mughal Empire's terminal phase, marked by absolute nominal authority and systemic disintegration driven by internal factionalism and external predation. Installed by the ambitious vizier Imad-ul-Mulk, who wielded power, Alamgir II functioned as a "harmless crowned puppet," lacking the administrative acumen, military prowess, or political energy to restore order, owing to decades of princely confinement that left him aged and isolated at accession. His personal piety and scholarly bent, reminiscent of , offered no counterbalance to the empire's , as nobles pursued self-interest amid unpaid soldiery, alienated crown lands, and rampant corruption. The reign's inefficacy is evidenced by unchecked territorial erosion and economic penury; Delhi endured Ahmad Shah Abdali's devastating invasion and plunder in January 1757, extracting vast booty including 28,000 camels and royal captives, while Maratha incursions under Dattaji Sindhia intensified pressures by 1759. Historian describes this era as one of "unrelieved weakness and misery," with the emperor reduced to utter penury—his revenues usurped—and the state a "hollow shell" incapable of fielding disciplined forces against , Sikh, or Afghan threats. Imad-ul-Mulk's tenure as wazir exacerbated decline through cowardice, shortsightedness, and venality, selling offices and alienating allies, culminating in Alamgir II's murder on November 29, 1759, to install a pliable successor. Causally, Alamgir II's impotence amplified pre-existing structural frailties—jagirdari crises, noble disloyalty ("every one proclaims himself a sovereign"), and fiscal exhaustion from prior invasions like Nadir Shah's 1739 sack—rendering the empire vulnerable to regional autonomy and foreign dominance, as seen in the 1765 subordinating the throne to British pensionary status at Rs. 1,800 daily. While figures like Najib-ud-Daula provided localized stability through diplomacy and mild governance until 1770, the emperor's silence amid these upheavals sealed the dynasty's irrelevance, transitioning Mughal sovereignty from imperial overlordship to symbolic relic.

Personal Scholarly Contributions

Alamgir II, born Aziz-ud-Din in 1699, produced no known original scholarly works during his lifetime. Confined to prison shortly after his father's deposition in 1713, he spent approximately 41 years in seclusion, which severely restricted opportunities for intellectual or literary pursuits. Upon his release and enthronement in at age 55, his nominal rule until 1759 was overshadowed by the dominant influence of wazir Imad-ul-Mulk, focusing primarily on political survival amid invasions and internal strife rather than cultural or academic endeavors. Historical accounts portray Alamgir II as a strict adherent to orthodox Islamic principles, emulating the puritanical style of , but without evidence of personal compositions in Persian , historical chronicles, theological treatises, or scientific treatises common among earlier Mughals. No diwan of ghazals, letters, or translations are attributed to him, distinguishing his profile from scholarly emperors like or . This absence aligns with contemporary descriptions emphasizing his lack of administrative experience and reliance on advisors, leaving scholarly patronage—rather than production—to court figures under his titular authority.

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