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Army Group A
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Army Group A
Army Group A (German: Heeresgruppe A) was the name of three distinct army groups of the Heer, the ground forces of the Wehrmacht, during World War II.
The first Army Group A, previously known as "Army Group South", was active from October 1939 to June 1941 and notably served in the Battle of France as the decisive army group in the implementation of the "Sickle Cut" military plan that inflicted crushing subsequent defeats on the French armed forces at occasions such as the Battle of Sedan, Battle of Boulogne and Battle of Dunkirk and that ultimately led to the Armistice of 22 June 1940. Army Group A was subsequently used in the German occupation of France and temporarily became the first Oberbefehlshaber West in German-occupied France. It was eventually replaced in this function by Army Group D and redeployed to German-occupied Poland in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. At the commencement of that attack, Army Group A was renamed "Army Group South" on 22 June 1941, ending the first deployment.
The second Army Group A was inserted into the German line on 7 July 1942, when Army Group South was split during the German 1942 summer offensive ("Case Blue") into Army Group B in the north (directed towards Stalingrad) and Army Group A in the south (directed towards the Caucasus). It advanced towards the Terek river, but was eventually forced to withdraw by the winter of 1942/43, concurrent with the decisive defeat of Army Group B in the Battle of Stalingrad. Initially confined to the Kuban bridgehead and the Crimean peninsula, Army Group A fought a rearguard action against the Red Army during its westwards withdrawal through Ukraine. On 2 April 1944, it was renamed "Army Group South Ukraine".
The third and final Army Group A came into existence on 23 September 1944, when the previous Army Group North Ukraine was renamed "Army Group A". It existed for about five months that were marked by constant withdrawals from the advancing Red Army and eventually left Army Group A at the Oder river line. On 25 January 1945, Army Group A was one of several army groups to be renamed, receiving the designation "Army Group Center". No subsequent Army Group A was formed.
Army Group A was formed, through the redesignation of Army Group South, on 26 October 1939 in the central sector of Germany's western frontiers, along the France–Germany border and Belgium–Germany border, in the broader area of the Eifel and Hunsrück mountain ranges. Under its previous name, the army group had fought in the Invasion of Poland in September and October 1939. The initial commander and chief of staff of Army Group A were the same persons who held these portfolios during the time of Army Group South in Poland, Gerd von Rundstedt as commander and Erich von Manstein as chief of staff.
Enthusiasm among the higher echelons of Army Group A for a repetition of the armored thrusts of the Poland Campaign was initially limited; Army Group A chief of staff Georg von Sodenstern predicted as late as 5 March 1940 that a repetition of the swift advances through what was estimated to be a well-developed French defensive line was less than likely.
Nonetheless, the military preparations that the Wehrmacht ultimately settled for in regards to the upcoming Western Campaign was in accordance with the "Manstein Plan", developed by then-chief of staff of Army Group A Erich von Manstein on his post in the Koblenz Electoral Palace, where the HQ of Army Group A was then located. Manstein had developed the first drafts of his conception in late October 1939 upon his first receival of the original deployment plan against France. Whereas this original plan envisaged to place the focus of operations with the northernmost army group, Army Group B, Manstein instead demanded that the focus be shifted towards Army Group A and the German center. In total, Manstein issued seven memoranda (31 October, 6 & 21 & 30 November, 6 & 12 December, 12 January) arguing for his proposal in various ways. As Manstein's insistence annoyed the army's general chief of staff, Franz Halder, he was removed from the position of Army Group A chief of staff and instead moved to the command of the upcoming XXXVIII Army Corps, thus eliminating him from a major command post in the upcoming campaign. The Mechelen incident in January 1940, which provoked a response by the Allied armies and allowed the Germans to observe the Allied defensive movements, gave additional credibility to the Manstein Plan, as it made the encirclement of Allied forces in the Low Countries appear plausible.
The Manstein Plan found its way to Hitler's desk through the interventions of Günther Blumentritt, Henning von Tresckow and Rudolf Schmundt, and Hitler received Manstein for a private meeting on 17 February 1940 in Berlin. Hitler, who found thought experiments that he had himself had in the previous weeks confirmed in Manstein's more elaborate presentation and ordered its implementation, resulting in a complete shift of plans by OKH, placing the German Schwerpunkt southwards in accordance with the Manstein Plan. Nonetheless, even though Franz Halder was eventually swayed, many detractors remained. Especially the commander of Army Group B (the army group that stood to lose the most materiel from the change of plans), Fedor von Bock, believed the change of military focus to be an irresponsible gamble. Additionally, the implementation of the plan was not helped by the fact that Halder's intrigue to replace Manstein had resulted in the appointment of Georg von Sodenstern as chief of staff of Army Group A. A conservative-minded planner, von Sodenstern had initially been selected by Halder precisely because he opposed the Manstein Plan, and was now left to oversee its realization. Indeed, there were now serious reservations in the upper echelons of Army Group A whether or not the motorized and armored formations should truly be in the vanguard during the advance, or whether it would not be preferable to attack with the infantry first. Such doubts were voiced by von Sodenstern, Blumentritt, and notably by army group commander Gerd von Rundstedt himself. This scepticism was not shared by the advocates of rapid armored assaults, such as Heinz Guderian of XIX Army Corps.
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Army Group A
Army Group A (German: Heeresgruppe A) was the name of three distinct army groups of the Heer, the ground forces of the Wehrmacht, during World War II.
The first Army Group A, previously known as "Army Group South", was active from October 1939 to June 1941 and notably served in the Battle of France as the decisive army group in the implementation of the "Sickle Cut" military plan that inflicted crushing subsequent defeats on the French armed forces at occasions such as the Battle of Sedan, Battle of Boulogne and Battle of Dunkirk and that ultimately led to the Armistice of 22 June 1940. Army Group A was subsequently used in the German occupation of France and temporarily became the first Oberbefehlshaber West in German-occupied France. It was eventually replaced in this function by Army Group D and redeployed to German-occupied Poland in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. At the commencement of that attack, Army Group A was renamed "Army Group South" on 22 June 1941, ending the first deployment.
The second Army Group A was inserted into the German line on 7 July 1942, when Army Group South was split during the German 1942 summer offensive ("Case Blue") into Army Group B in the north (directed towards Stalingrad) and Army Group A in the south (directed towards the Caucasus). It advanced towards the Terek river, but was eventually forced to withdraw by the winter of 1942/43, concurrent with the decisive defeat of Army Group B in the Battle of Stalingrad. Initially confined to the Kuban bridgehead and the Crimean peninsula, Army Group A fought a rearguard action against the Red Army during its westwards withdrawal through Ukraine. On 2 April 1944, it was renamed "Army Group South Ukraine".
The third and final Army Group A came into existence on 23 September 1944, when the previous Army Group North Ukraine was renamed "Army Group A". It existed for about five months that were marked by constant withdrawals from the advancing Red Army and eventually left Army Group A at the Oder river line. On 25 January 1945, Army Group A was one of several army groups to be renamed, receiving the designation "Army Group Center". No subsequent Army Group A was formed.
Army Group A was formed, through the redesignation of Army Group South, on 26 October 1939 in the central sector of Germany's western frontiers, along the France–Germany border and Belgium–Germany border, in the broader area of the Eifel and Hunsrück mountain ranges. Under its previous name, the army group had fought in the Invasion of Poland in September and October 1939. The initial commander and chief of staff of Army Group A were the same persons who held these portfolios during the time of Army Group South in Poland, Gerd von Rundstedt as commander and Erich von Manstein as chief of staff.
Enthusiasm among the higher echelons of Army Group A for a repetition of the armored thrusts of the Poland Campaign was initially limited; Army Group A chief of staff Georg von Sodenstern predicted as late as 5 March 1940 that a repetition of the swift advances through what was estimated to be a well-developed French defensive line was less than likely.
Nonetheless, the military preparations that the Wehrmacht ultimately settled for in regards to the upcoming Western Campaign was in accordance with the "Manstein Plan", developed by then-chief of staff of Army Group A Erich von Manstein on his post in the Koblenz Electoral Palace, where the HQ of Army Group A was then located. Manstein had developed the first drafts of his conception in late October 1939 upon his first receival of the original deployment plan against France. Whereas this original plan envisaged to place the focus of operations with the northernmost army group, Army Group B, Manstein instead demanded that the focus be shifted towards Army Group A and the German center. In total, Manstein issued seven memoranda (31 October, 6 & 21 & 30 November, 6 & 12 December, 12 January) arguing for his proposal in various ways. As Manstein's insistence annoyed the army's general chief of staff, Franz Halder, he was removed from the position of Army Group A chief of staff and instead moved to the command of the upcoming XXXVIII Army Corps, thus eliminating him from a major command post in the upcoming campaign. The Mechelen incident in January 1940, which provoked a response by the Allied armies and allowed the Germans to observe the Allied defensive movements, gave additional credibility to the Manstein Plan, as it made the encirclement of Allied forces in the Low Countries appear plausible.
The Manstein Plan found its way to Hitler's desk through the interventions of Günther Blumentritt, Henning von Tresckow and Rudolf Schmundt, and Hitler received Manstein for a private meeting on 17 February 1940 in Berlin. Hitler, who found thought experiments that he had himself had in the previous weeks confirmed in Manstein's more elaborate presentation and ordered its implementation, resulting in a complete shift of plans by OKH, placing the German Schwerpunkt southwards in accordance with the Manstein Plan. Nonetheless, even though Franz Halder was eventually swayed, many detractors remained. Especially the commander of Army Group B (the army group that stood to lose the most materiel from the change of plans), Fedor von Bock, believed the change of military focus to be an irresponsible gamble. Additionally, the implementation of the plan was not helped by the fact that Halder's intrigue to replace Manstein had resulted in the appointment of Georg von Sodenstern as chief of staff of Army Group A. A conservative-minded planner, von Sodenstern had initially been selected by Halder precisely because he opposed the Manstein Plan, and was now left to oversee its realization. Indeed, there were now serious reservations in the upper echelons of Army Group A whether or not the motorized and armored formations should truly be in the vanguard during the advance, or whether it would not be preferable to attack with the infantry first. Such doubts were voiced by von Sodenstern, Blumentritt, and notably by army group commander Gerd von Rundstedt himself. This scepticism was not shared by the advocates of rapid armored assaults, such as Heinz Guderian of XIX Army Corps.