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Battle of Bakhmut
Battle of Bakhmut
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Battle of Bakhmut
Part of the eastern front of the Russo-Ukrainian war
Battle of Bakhmut 2022
View of western Bakhmut in April 2023
DateJuly 2022[1][2][b] – 20 May 2023[c]
Location48°35′N 38°0′E / 48.583°N 38.000°E / 48.583; 38.000
Result Russian victory – see § Result
Belligerents
Ukraine
Commanders and leaders
Russia Yevgeny Prigozhin[7][8] Oleksandr Syrskyi[9]
Strength
85,000+ Wagner mercenaries[10][11] 30,000+ soldiers[12]
80,000 soldiers (Prigozhin claim)[13]
Casualties and losses
Estimates vary, see § Military casualties
204 Bakhmut residents killed (4 children), 505 injured (17 children)[14]

The Battle of Bakhmut was a major battle between the Russian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Armed Forces for control of the city of Bakhmut, during the eastern front, a theatre of the Russo-Ukrainian war.[15] It is regarded by some military analysts to be the bloodiest battle since World War II.[16][17]

The shelling of Bakhmut began in May 2022, and Russian offensives on the distant approaches to the city began in early July.[1][3][4] The main assault towards the city itself started after Russian forces advanced from the direction of Popasna following a Ukrainian withdrawal from that front.[18] The main assault force consisted primarily of mercenaries from the Russian paramilitary organization Wagner Group, supported by regular Russian troops and reportedly Donetsk People's Republic militia elements.[19][20][21]

In late 2022, following Ukraine's Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives, the Bakhmut–Soledar front became an important focus of the war, being one of the few front lines where Russia remained on the offensive.[22] Attacks on the city intensified in November 2022, as assaulting Russian forces were reinforced by units redeployed from the Kherson front, together with newly mobilized recruits.[23][24] By this time, much of the front line had descended into positional trench warfare, with both sides suffering high casualties without any significant advances.[25] By using repeated assaults composed of former convicts, Wagner troops were able to gradually gain ground[26][27] and by February 2023, they captured territory in the north and south of Bakhmut and threatened encirclement. Ukrainian forces began slowly withdrawing deeper into the city[28][29] and the battle turned into fierce urban warfare.[28] By March 2023, Russian forces captured the eastern half of the city, up to the Bakhmutka river.[30][31]

By 20 May 2023, Bakhmut had been mostly captured by Russian forces,[32][33][34] with the Ukrainian military claiming control of a small strip of the city proper along the T0504 highway.[35][36][37] Nonetheless, Ukraine started counterattacks on Russia's flanks, seeking to encircle the city.[38] Around the same time on 25 May, Wagner began withdrawing from the city to be replaced by regular Russian troops,[39] amidst heavy internal squabbles between Wagner leadership and Russian high command.[40][41] In September 2023, President Zelensky said Ukraine would continue to fight to retake Bakhmut.[42]

Although initially a target with lesser tactical importance,[43] Bakhmut became one of the central battles of the Russo-Ukrainian War, with it gaining significant symbolic importance for both sides, as President Zelensky declared it to be the "fortress of our morale",[44] and due to the heavy investment of manpower and resources both sides used to control the city.[45][46] The battle of Bakhmut has been described as a "meat grinder" and a "vortex" for both the Ukrainian and Russian militaries.[47][48] The intensity of the battle and the high number of casualties suffered by both sides during the fight, alongside the trench and urban warfare, has drawn comparisons to the Battle of Verdun in World War I,[49][50][51] as well as to the Battle of Stalingrad in World War II.[52][53][54] It has been called the most prominent urban battle of the war,[55] with it being reported as the site of "some of the fiercest urban combat in Europe since World War II".[56]

Background

[edit]
An apartment block in Bakhmut after Russian shelling. Shelling of the city began in May 2022.[57]

Bakhmut, formerly known as Artemivsk, was the site of a 2014 battle between Ukraine and the self-declared separatist Donetsk People's Republic. Pro-Russian separatists had captured parts of the city during the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine in April, and a Ukrainian special forces unit together with the National Guard were dispatched to expel the separatists from the city. The separatists were expelled to the city's outskirts where clashes continued until July 2014, when they finally retreated from the area.[58]

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a key Russian goal was to capture the Donbas region, consisting of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The initial push for Bakhmut was part of an attempt to encircle the Ukrainian forces at the Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk salient; together with another push from the Lyman direction, it would create a pocket and trap Ukrainian forces there.[43] Starting on 17 May 2022, Russian forces began shelling Bakhmut, killing five people including a two-year-old child.[59][60]

After the fall of Popasna, Ukrainian forces retreated from the city to reinforce positions at Bakhmut by 22 May.[18] Meanwhile, Russian forces managed to advance on the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway, endangering the remaining Ukrainian troops in the Lysychansk-Sievierodonetsk area.[61][62] The Russian checkpoint along the highway was later demolished, although fighting resumed on 30 May along the Kostiantynivka-Bakhmut highway, where Ukrainian forces successfully defended the highway.[63][64]

Shelling of Bakhmut continued throughout the rest of June and July.[65] Following the battles of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk in early July, Russian and separatist forces captured all of Luhansk oblast, and the battlefield shifted towards the cities of Bakhmut and Soledar. On 25 July, Ukrainian forces withdrew from the Vuhlehirska Power Station, along with the nearby town of Novoluhanske, giving Russian and separatist forces a "small tactical advantage" towards Bakhmut.[66][67] Two days later on 27 July, Russian shelling of Bakhmut killed three civilians and wounded three more.[68]

Prior to the battle in Bakhmut, Ukrainian Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi claimed that Russia held a five-to-one manpower advantage over Ukraine along the eastern front.[69]

Battle

[edit]

Early shelling and Russian encroachment (July–October 2022)

[edit]

On 22 July 2022, Russian forces reportedly captured the southern part of Pokrovske, less than five kilometers east of Bakhmut.[70] Five days later, it was reported that Russian troops had taken full control of the village,[71] as part of setting conditions to advance west on Bakhmut.[72][73]

On 1 August 2022, Russian forces launched assaults on settlements southeast and northeast of Bakhmut, including Yakovlivka, Soledar, and Vershyna, which the Ukrainian General Staff said it had repelled. Pro-Russian Telegram channels claimed that Russian forces were within two kilometers of the city.[74][75] The following day, Ukraine reported that Russian forces had increased airstrikes and shelling of Bakhmut, beginning a ground attack on the southeastern part of the city.[76] On 4 August, Wagner Group mercenaries managed to break through Ukrainian defenses and reach Patrice Lumumba street on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[77] In the following days, Russian forces continued to push towards Bakhmut from the south, with the Ukrainian general staff stating on 14 August that Russian forces had achieved "partial success" near Bakhmut, but offering no specifics.[78]

Night shelling in the city center on 21 September burned the Martynov Palace of Culture, where the humanitarian headquarters worked. During the extinguishing of the fire, the local fire department was shelled, which reported that two SES staff were injured and equipment damaged.[79] At night, a five-story building was also partially destroyed by Russian shelling.[80][81] A Russian missile strike on 22 September destroyed the main bridge across the Bakhmutka river that bisects the city, disrupting both civilian travel and Ukrainian military logistics.[82]

American military correspondent David Axe reported that by 26 September, Russia's 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division, which had a prewar strength of over 12,000 troops, had been largely destroyed and rendered combat ineffective as a result of heavy casualties sustained in the fighting around Bakhmut, and in the concurrent 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive.[83]

On 7 October, Russian forces advanced into the villages of Zaitseve and Opytne on the southern and southeastern outskirts of Bakhmut, while on 10 October, the UK Defence Ministry claimed that Russian troops advanced closer to Bakhmut.[84][85] On 12 October, Russian forces claimed to have captured Opytne, located 3 km south of Bakhmut, and Ivanhrad, although these towns were still contested.[86] Fighting within Bakhmut's urban boundaries began some time before 24 October since, by this day, Ukraine did a minor counteroffensive that pushed Russian forces from some factories on the eastern outskirts of the city, along Patrice Lumumba street.[87][88]

Early winter escalation (November–December 2022)

[edit]
A Ukrainian soldier in a trench near Bakhmut, November 2022

By early November, much of the fighting around Bakhmut had descended into trench warfare conditions, with neither side making any significant breakthroughs and hundreds of casualties reported daily amid fierce shelling and artillery duels.[89][25] On 1 November, Ukrainian journalist Yurii Butusov [uk] described the evolving nature of the battle in an interview. Butusov noted that Russian forces had suffered "huge losses every day" assaulting Bakhmut and its outskirts since early May, but insisted that they were adapting their tactics against increasingly exhausted Ukrainian defenders. He noted that the Russians were concentrating multiple small groups of infantry to break defense lines on "narrow" sections of the front.[90]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces breached defense lines on Bakhmut's southern approach, allegedly capturing the villages of Andriivka, Ozarianivka, and Zelenopillia and making minor advances in Opytne through 28–29 November.[91][92][needs independent confirmation] Wagner fighters attacked Kurdyumivka, adjacent to Ozarianivka, with some Russian milbloggers claiming the settlement was captured.[93] Russian forces also attacked Ukrainian positions southeast of Bakhmut.[94] On 3 December, Serhii Cherevatyi, a spokesperson for Ukraine's Eastern Command, described the Bakhmut front as "the most bloody, cruel and brutal sector ... in the Russian-Ukrainian war so far", adding that the Russians had conducted 261 artillery attacks in the past day alone.[95]

The same day, a Georgia military volunteer told the media that a group of Georgian volunteers had been surrounded during clashes near Bakhmut. The commander was wounded and five or six volunteers, serving in Ukraine's 57th Brigade, had been killed, prompting Georgian president Salome Zourabichvili to express condolences.[96] On 6–7 December, the Russian defense ministry claimed that their forces, including Wagner fighters, had successfully repelled Ukrainian counterattacks south of Bakhmut.[97] The commander of the Ukraine National Guard's Svoboda Battalion, defending Bakhmut's southern flank, said they were "fighting for every bush" and predicted Russia would struggle to overcome a canal above and behind Kurdiumivka.[98]

On 9 December, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of "destroying" Bakhmut, calling it "another Donbas city that the Russian army turned into burnt ruins". Former soldier and eyewitness to the battle Petro Stone called the Bakhmut front a "meat grinder", saying the Russians were "covering Bakhmut with fire 24/7".[99] Soldiers of Ukraine's 24th Mechanized Brigade recounted recent battlefield engagements to media, such as one multi-day firefight with 50 Russian troops dug into a treeline where in some places "we were only 100 metres apart". Ukrainian soldiers claimed that front line Russian troops often attacked with little tank support, with Wagner PMC fighters serving as the main assault troops and under-equipped mobiks (recently mobilized Russian recruits) holding defensive positions. One Ukrainian artillerymen alleged that "80 percent" of the remaining civilian population, surviving in basements and supplied by mobile grocery trucks that periodically enter the city, was pro-Russian.[100][27]

A 9K22 Tunguska of Ukraine's 30th Mechanized Brigade Anti-Air Battalion in the vicinity of Bakhmut

On 11 December a railway bridge over the E40 (M-03) highway north of Bakhmut was destroyed; the Russians accused the Ukrainians of demolishing it to hamper future Russian advances towards Sloviansk.[101][102]

On 13 December, Russian sources claimed that proper urban street fighting had begun in the eastern and southeastern sectors of Bakhmut, particularly along Pershotravnevyy avenue up to Dobroliubova street in Zabakhmutka, while also claiming that 90% of Opytne had been captured amid fierce Ukrainian resistance. The Ukrainian General Staff said they successfully repelled assaults northeast and south of Bakhmut from the Soledar and Kurdiumivka directions, respectively.[103][104][105] On 17 December, footage emerged online of trenches in Bakhmut's city center, indicating Ukrainian defenders were preparing for urban combat.[106]

On 18–19 December, Ukrainian forces, purportedly including dismounted infantry supported by British-donated Wolfhound Tactical Supply Vehicles, counterattacked along Fyodor Maksimenko Street and pushed Wagner forces back to the eastern outskirts of the suburban area amid "grinding" street clashes. Meanwhile, Ukraine's Joint Forces Task Force reported repelling "five to seven" Russian infiltration groups near Bakhmut daily.[107][108] A Ukrainian commander reported that an abundance of drone surveillance allowed for quick responses to small Russian assaults on the outskirts, while also alleging that Russia did not control Bakhmut's eastern industrial zone. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a Western think tank and war observer, could not independently verify the claim of Ukraine entirely controlling the outskirts at the time.[109]

On 20–21 December, President Zelenskyy made an unannounced visit to the Bakhmut front, where he met with soldiers, awarded medals and delivered speeches.[110] Meanwhile, heavy shelling and fighting on Bakhmut's outskirts[109][111] continued as Russian forces continuously attempted to break entrenched Ukrainian positions on the city's flanks. Reportedly, Wagner fighters were assaulting strongholds in Bakhmutske, Pidhorodne, and Klishchiivka, located along Bakhmut's northeastern and southwestern flanks respectively, while the Ukrainians continued to hold northern Opytne, blunting Russia's advance from the south.[112]

On 26 December, Ukraine's governor of Donetsk, Pavlo Kyrylenko, said over 60 percent of Bakhmut's infrastructure was damaged or destroyed.[113] The ISW judged that Russia's advance on Bakhmut had "culminated" by 28 December, assessing that Russian and Wagner forces had grown increasingly unable to sustain the previous scale of infantry assaults and artillery barrages.[114] By early January 2023, the pace of fighting and rate of artillery fire in the Bakhmut sector had significantly decreased, and The Kyiv Independent remarked that the battle was "near culmination".[115]

Capture of Soledar and partial encirclement (January–April 2023)

[edit]
Ruined residential area in Bakhmut, March 2023
View of western Bakhmut, April 2023

Following a local offensive in early January 2023, Russian forces captured the nearby town of Soledar, located 20 kilometres (12 mi) north of Bakhmut, by 16 January 2023.[116] In its 7 January assessment, the ISW considered the capture of Soledar as helping Russian forces to advance on Bakhmut from the north, although they claimed that Russian troops would need to cut off the T0513 highway between Siversk and Bakhmut to strangle Ukrainian supply lines to Bakhmut.[117]

In February, Russian forces solidified gains north of Bakhmut and began pressuring Ukrainian troops on the northern axis, making incremental gains in the towns north of the city.[28] On 1 February, The New York Times reported that the Russians had increased the intensity of attacks on Bakhmut and its surrounding areas.[118] Days later on 5 February, the British Ministry of Defence stated that Russian troops were able to fire upon the M03 and H32 roads north of the city, the main Ukrainian supply route for northern Bakhmut.[119] On 11 February, Russian forces captured the village of Krasna Hora northeast of Bakhmut.[120] Around this time, analysts suggested Russian losses had increased to 820 casualties a day between Bakhmut and the battle of Vuhledar.[121] By 13 February, the Ukrainian government claimed their defenses in the village of Paraskoviivka were waning, with fierce battles around the clock.[122][123] By 22 February, Russian forces partially encircled Bakhmut from the east, south, and north.[124]

By 3 March, Ukrainian soldiers had destroyed two key bridges, creating the possibility for a controlled fighting withdrawal.[29] On 4 March, Bakhmut's deputy mayor told news services that there was street fighting but that Russian forces had not taken control of the city.[125][126] The same day, the chief of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, said that the city was encircled except for one road still controlled by the Ukrainian military, as had been the case since 22 February.[127] On 5 March Ukrainian commander Oleksandr Syrskyi said the fighting had reached the "highest level of tension".[9]

On 7 March, Ukraine withdrew from areas of Bakhmut east of the Bakhmutka river,[30][31][128][129][130] making the river the front line between the opposing forces.[131] On 9 March, the MiG-17 monument, which had become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance in Bakhmut during the battle, was destroyed by Russian forces.[132] On 11 March, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence said that by this point in the fighting Wagner Group units were "taking the lead in fighting", and that the river had become a "killing zone" for Wagner units while at the same time Ukrainian forces were at risk of being cut off.[131] On 22 March, the UK defence ministry observed that "There is a realistic possibility that the Russian assault on the town (Bakhmut) is losing the limited momentum it had achieved, in part because some Russian Ministry of Defense units have been redeployed to other sectors."[133]

On 26 March, Wagner forces captured the strategically significant Azom factory in the city.[134] On 6 April, Russian forces took control of the city center.[135]

On 14 April, the British defence ministry observed that Russia had "re-energised its assault on the Donetsk Oblast town of Bakhmut as forces of the Russian MoD and Wagner Group have improved co-operation ... Ukrainian forces face significant resupply issues but have made orderly withdrawals from the positions they have been forced to concede."[136]

On 17 April, the People's House [de] of the city was destroyed[137] by retreating Ukrainian soldiers belonging to the 77th Airmobile Brigade to prevent the building from being used as a refuge by Russian forces.[138] On 18 April, Ukrainian General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russia was "increasing the activity of heavy artillery and the number of air strikes, turning the city into ruins".[139]

On 26 April, the Ukrainian Air Force dropped four 500-pound GBU-62/B JDAM glide bombs on a high-rise building in the Russian-controlled part of Bakhmut, possibly from two MiG-29s. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces were destroying high-rise buildings in Bakhmut to prevent them from being used "as ammo dumps, fighting positions and observation posts."[140]

The Institute for the Study of War assessed that by the beginning of May 2023, Ukraine only controlled 1.89 square kilometers (4.54%) of the city.[141]

Ukrainian flanking counterattacks begin (May 2023)

[edit]
The Orthodox Annunciation church building in west Bakhmut was reportedly destroyed by 8 May 2023.

In May 2023, Russian forces claimed to have captured Bakhmut city proper, while Ukrainian forces insisted clashes continued within the city as they conducted counterattacks on the outskirts. Meanwhile, as Russian attacks culminated, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin sharply increased his public criticism of the Russian Ministry of Defence's management of the battle.

On 1 May, Ukrainian spokesman Serhiy Cherevaty gave an estimate of the current strength of Russian forces attacking the city. He stated that "on the Bakhmut direction, 25,600 personnel, 65 tanks, 450 armored fighting vehicles, 154 guns, 56 rocket salvo systems are fighting against us".[142]

On 2 May, Yevgeny Prigozhin complained that there was a shortage of ammunition, with his forces needing 300 tonnes a day.[143] Within a few days, Prigozhin threatened that he would withdraw all Wagner personnel from the city by 10 May, the day after Victory Day. He further denounced Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, saying: "in the absence of ammunition [Wagner personnel are] doomed to perish senselessly."[40][144][145][146] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov agreed to replace Wagner forces with Chechen units in the city, according to Prigozhin.[147]

On 6 May, Ukrainian military sources reported that the Russians were shelling the city with phosphorus munitions, with several videos and photos being released that showed the effects of the bombardment.[148] The BBC, analyzing the footage, said that while the footage definitely showed Russian forces using some sort of incendiary munitions, it was unable to verify that it was phosphorus specifically.[149]

On 7 May, Prigozhin announced that Gerasimov would resume artillery ammunition distribution to Wagner forces, that Wagner forces would remain in Bakhmut, and that Sergey Surovikin would be acting as an intermediary between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defence.[150] The ISW assessed that Gerasimov likely agreed to keep Kadyrov out of the Russian High Command and that the situation showcased that the Russian Ministry of Defense was having difficulty commanding Wagner forces.[150] Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian Commander of Ground Forces, said that Prigozhin's claims of ammunition shortages were false, saying that the Russians were "pummeling" their positions.[151]

On 9–10 May, Ukrainian forces launched counterattacks on Bakhmut's outskirts, expelling Russian troops from the southern bank of the Berkhivka Reservoir, located about 4 kilometers northwest of Bakhmut.[152] General Syrskyi claimed that the Russians had been forced back over 2 km (1.2 miles) in the attack, with spokesman Serhiy Cherevaty further claiming that 11 IFVs, two armored personnel carriers, a light artillery tractor, five field ammunition depots, and one Zala UAV were destroyed.[153][154] The Ukrainians said their 3rd Separate Assault Brigade had cleared an area 1,730 metres wide and 700 metres deep, routing units of Russia's 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and killing 23 soldiers and wounding over 40. One tank and four AFVs were also destroyed, with Ukrainian Border Guards also repelling Russian advances from within the city itself, destroying an 11-man assault group.[155][156][157] The 72nd Brigade had "escaped" from the city and the remaining troops had suffered very high casualties, with the 3rd Assault Brigade claiming to have completely destroyed the 72nd's 6th and 8th Companies, and agreed with Prigozhin's claim that "500 Russian corpses" were left on the battlefield. The brigade's 3rd Separate Assault Battalion alone was reportedly responsible for 64 Russians killed, while information on another 87 "eliminated" was being "clarified" at the time. They also claimed to have taken five prisoners.[158][159]

Prigozhin accused the regular Russian forces of "[running] away" from their positions in response to the counterattacks, while Wagner forces were allegedly forbidden from retreating under threat of "high treason" charges. He claimed Russia's defence ministry was more focused on internal power struggles and "intrigues" than actually fighting, and also accused the ministry of only providing his troops 10% of what was promised, resulting in high Wagner casualties. He again threatened that if he did not receive ammunition, Wagner would withdraw from their positions.[160]

On 15 May, General Syrskyi stated the recent counterattacks were "the first success of offensive actions in the defence of Bakhmut."[161] On 16 May, the Ukrainian defence ministry claimed that their forces had liberated 20 square kilometers in the north and south of the suburbs of Bakhmut, while also admitting that Russian forces were still advancing in the city itself, by using both paratroopers and artillery.[162]

On 18 May, Prigozhin said that regular Russian forces had withdrawn up to 570 meters (1,880 feet) to the north of the city, exposing Wagner's flanks, while his soldiers had advanced up to 400 meters inside the city.[163][164] On 19 May, Ukrainian sources claimed Ukrainian troops had advanced a mile in some areas, or "150 to 1,700 metres". A Ukrainian commander, Petro Podaru, said that Russian artillery fire had transitioned towards preventing Ukrainian forces from "deliver(ing) more infantry, ammunition and other things" via access roads west of Bakhmut.[165] On the same day, the Ukrainians claimed the Russians had recently deployed several thousand more troops to the Bakhmut front.[166]

Capture of Bakhmut and Wagner withdrawal (20 May – early June 2023)

[edit]
Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade soldiers raiding a trench, May 2023

On 20 May, Prigozhin proclaimed the capture of Bakhmut by Wagner forces, who were set to transfer their captured positions to regular Russian forces before withdrawing. The Russian defence ministry also subsequently stated that the city had been captured.[167] The Ukrainians denied that the city was fully captured,[168] with Ukrainian deputy minister of defence Hanna Maliar saying the situation was "critical" but insisted Ukrainian troops still controlled areas of the city, notably the private sector in the 'Litak' ('Samolet' in Russian) area.[169][170] The ISW was unable to immediately confirm Prigozhin's statement and reiterated Ukrainian reports that fighting continued,[171] particularly citing that the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade had recaptured a region 1,750 meters wide and 700 meters deep in the suburbs.[172]

On 21 May, the Ukrainian defence ministry claimed that its forces had "taken the city in a semi-encirclement".[38] On the other hand, officials described their holdout around the T0504 highway as "insignificant". Based on this, the ISW assessed that Ukrainian forces had indeed withdrawn from the city, except for some fortified areas adjacent to the two highways on the city's western approach.[172] Prigozhin again insisted the entirety of Bakhmut had been captured "right up to the last centimetre" and added that Wagner made no advances on 21 May as they were preparing to withdraw later in the week.[173] Geolocated footage published on 21 May showed that Wagner forces had advanced towards the T0504 entrance to southwestern Bakhmut. Clashes were reportedly taking place as of 22 May in localities neighboring Bakhmut.[174] On 23 May, the Ukrainian General Staff did not declare fighting in Bakhmut for the first time since December 2022. Ukrainian officials insisted that Ukraine held positions near the former MiG-17 monument in southwestern Bakhmut in spite of footage purportedly showing Wagner forces near the monument. Fighting in the localities outside of Bakhmut's city limits continued.[175]

On 25 May, Prigozhin promised to withdraw all Wagner forces from Bakhmut to transfer full control to Russian units by 1 June. The ISW assessed that the units supplanting Wagner forces within the city were from the Donetsk People's Republic militia.[176][177][41] In their 26 May report, the ISW cited Russian milbloggers as reporting on successful Ukrainian counterattacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Klischiivka, northwest and southwest of Bakhmut respectively.[178]

In their 27 May report, the ISW noted a substantial decrease in Russian offensive activities in and around Bakhmut. Hanna Maliar attributed this to Russian forces performing relief in place operations to cover Wagner withdrawals. They also noted failed Russian attacks against the suburbs of Khromove and Predtechyne and that there was no change to the status of the reported Ukrainian-controlled strip in the city's southwestern outskirts. The ISW further assessed that the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade had recently been sent to Bakhmut to cover Russian flanks. The British Ministry of Defence and the ISW both assessed that the unit supplanting Wagner was the 132nd Separate Guard Motorized Rifle Brigade of the DNR's 1st Army Corps, reflecting Russia's attempts to have the city be incorporated into the DPR. The ISW also speculated that Russia would redirect their forces from Bakhmut to the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.[179]

Prigozhin said on 28 May that regular Russian forces where performing relief operations, and that the full withdrawal of Wagner forces would not take place until 5 June. The rate of Russian assaults remained low, with only two reported attacks against the suburbs of Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Ivanivske, both of which were unsuccessful. Ukrainian Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported one instance of fighting near Bakhmut and published geolocated footage that indicated that Russian forces had made marginal gains west of Klishchiivka.[180]

On 29 May, the ISW reported only one unsuccessful attack against Orikhovo-Vasylivka and stated that Russia's 106th Guards Airborne Division had been sent to reinforce the northern flank.[181] Both armies were less active in offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on 30 May.[182] The ISW reported more unsuccessful Russian attacks against Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Bila Hora, Khromove, Ivanivske and Klishchiivka on 31 May. It also noted that the DPR's 1st "Wolves" Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade were active in Zaliznianske. They further assessed that Russia was cycling the DPR irregulars out of the Avdiivka-Donetsk front to be replaced by regular Russian forces in Bakhmut which, in turn, were to be sent to Avdiivka. Maliar claimed that Ukrainian forces maintained control over the southwestern outskirts and entrance to Bakhmut city.[183]

By 1 June, only 90 Wagner personnel remained within the city. Meanwhile, Russian attacks against Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bila Hora remained unsuccessful.[184] Ukrainian Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty claimed that Russian units did not participate in Wagner's attrition style of warfare, and instead were using defensive tactics.[185]

On 2 June, Prigozhin accused Russian forces of attempting to attack Wagner forces using anti-tank mines, adding that there were no injuries.[186][187] On 3 June, the ISW and the British defence ministry stated that under-strength Russian Airborne Forces, including those of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, 106th Guards Airborne Division, and two other unspecified brigades had deployed to the Bakhmut area.[187] The next day, Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces may have recaptured areas in the southwestern outskirts of the city, supporting the repeated Ukrainian reports of control there since 20 May.[36]

Military strength and tactics

[edit]
Ukrainian border guard uses a reconnaissance drone to spot Wagner Group fighters and strike their position with artillery, March 2023

There are few reports of the military units and strengths employed by either Russia or Ukraine during the battle. However, Russian assault forces were primarily spearheaded by Wagner Group private military contractors, ex-convicts, reinforcements from other front lines in Ukraine, and recently mobilized recruits.[27] Then-Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin reported that Wagner had employed 35,000 regular mercenary fighters. This had been supplemented by 50,000 mercenaries recruited from Russian prisons.[10][11]

Wagner Group forces enjoyed advantages such as having its flanks covered by regular Russian airborne units, Wagner's own alleged use of Russian convicts as expendable infantry for attacks, and a 5:1 advantage in artillery firepower.[188] Wagner's forces reportedly consisted of a majority of recruited, under-trained ex-convicts and a minority of well-trained contractors serving as group commanders that operated efficiently and encrypted radio communications.[98] Some observers likened Russian tactics to Soviet-style human wave attacks, with Russian troops repeatedly assaulting Ukrainian positions with waves of infantry.[27][26] Some Ukrainian soldiers alleged that Wagner used its recruited ex-convicts as first wave "human bait" to reveal Ukrainian positions, with those refusing to advance being threatened with execution by firing squads or barrier troops.[189][190][26][191] In late January 2023, Russia began supplanting some Wagner units with better-trained National Guard of Russia (Rosgvardia) and paratroopers, enabling them to make further advances on the front line.[192][failed verification] During the battle, Russian forces also targeted Bakhmut with Iranian-made drones after 450 of them were reportedly delivered to Russia in mid-October 2022.[193]

Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov visiting troops in Bakhmut, December 2022

Ukrainian forces reportedly consisted of a "hodgepodge of units", consisting initially of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade and the 58th Motorized Brigade, who were later reinforced by many other units, including special forces and territorial defense units.[47][24][89] The Ukrainians also constantly rotated their units.[194][better source needed] Military analyst Michael Kofman characterized the Ukrainian strategy as "not one inch back", choosing to hold onto Bakhmut instead of falling back to the more defensible terrain west of the city.[188] Ukrainian commanders expended significant resources in Bakhmut, with their strategy being to keep Russia preoccupied with Bakhmut in order to prevent further offensives elsewhere on the front lines.[195] Conversely, Kofman argued that Ukraine's usage of well-trained National Guard and infantry units against poorly trained Wagner forces was tying down Ukraine's well-trained units and preventing them from conducting offensives of their own.[196] On 10 January 2023, Polish think tank Rochan Consulting estimated Ukraine may have had ten brigades fighting in Bakhmut at the time, or around 30,000 personnel.[12] Prigozhin claimed on 17 April that 80,000 Ukrainian troops were defending Bakhmut.[13]

On 2 June 2023, Prigozhin reported that Wagner forces had been almost totally withdrawn from the battle.[187] At the end of June, the Ukrainian military assessed the strength of Russian forces to be 50,300 soldiers, 330 tanks and 140 artillery systems, and reported that no Wagner personnel remained.[8]

Aftermath

[edit]

On 4 June 2023, the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive began and the Bakhmut sector was one of its three main axes.[197][198] However, only small amounts of territory were recaptured,[198] most notably Andriivka on 15 September and Klishchiivka around 17 September.[199][200] By 29 November 2023, after the counteroffensive had stalled, Russian forces had regained the initiative and captured Khromove on the western outskirts of Bakhmut. They had also recaptured considerable portions of territory south of the Berkhivka Reservoir that they previously lost in May.[201][202] Bakhmut was the largest Ukrainian city to switch hands in 2023 and the battle greatly contributed to Russia's net gain of territory during the year.[203][better source needed]

Strategic value

[edit]
Military situation in Ukraine as of 25 April 2023

The overall strategic value of Bakhmut was considered dubious by many analysts, observing that the resources and lives Russia spent assaulting the city far outweighed its importance.[204] The British defence ministry and US National Security Council both insisted capturing Bakhmut would only be a "symbolic" victory for Russia rather than a strategic one.[205][206] Konrad Muzyka and expert on Russian security Mark Galeotti argued that Russia's costly assault was a matter of both preserving prestige and sunk cost fallacy—that Russian forces had already expended so much manpower in the war effort on other fronts that they "may as well do everything they can" to seize the city instead of abandoning the effort.[204] George Barros from the Institute for the Study of War characterized Russia's costly capture of Bakhmut as "a tactical victory" but "operational failure—contributing to the continued Russian strategic failure".[207]

However, other observers and sources noted that Bakhmut is a key regional logistics and transport hub where two roads, the T0504 to Kostiantynivka and T0513 to Siversk, pass through.[98][208] Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy attributed both tactical and symbolic value to Bakhmut, calling it a "fortress of our morale" and refusing to order a tactical retreat from the city in March 2023, saying its capture would give Russia an "open road" to important cities in eastern Ukraine.[209][195] Jon Roozenbeek, British Academy postdoctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge, likewise observed that securing Bakhmut would put the larger Donbas cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk within sufficient Russian artillery range. Other sources concurred with this analysis, detailing how the city's significance "cannot be overstressed" as it lay at a fork pointing toward Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.[210][211][212]

Retired Ukrainian colonel Serhiy Hrabskyi suggested the Wagner Group was seeking glory in capturing Bakhmut, as leader Yevgeny Prigozhin was poised to reap significant monetary and political rewards if Wagner captured the city on behalf of the Russian government.[22] Researchers also pointed out that Bakhmut lies on the southeast of the Yuzivska gas field, and "control over the Yuzivska field would considerably strengthen Putin's strategy of weaponizing Russia's gas exports. Even rendering Yuzivska a militarized no-man's-land or ruined waste could set Ukraine's movement toward energy sovereignty back for decades".[213]

On 21 May 2023, following the effective capture of Bakhmut, some Russian state media outlets compared the fall of the city to the Soviet victory in the battle of Berlin; a Russian fighter told a Channel One correspondent that he felt "probably the same emotions as our grandfathers had in Berlin".[214] Meanwhile, other Russian ultranationalist milbloggers celebrated the capture of Bakhmut but emphasized that "Bakhmut is not Berlin" and that the capture of the city would be simply another step in ongoing difficult operations to achieve Russian objectives in Ukraine.[215]

A Channel One broadcast on 1 July 2023 compared the siege of Mariupol to the battle for Bakhmut. It claimed that the latter had not been "the most important city from the point of view of the front", and that the Wagner Group fighters destroyed and captured the city for over 7.5 months. The broadcast contrasted this to Mariupol (portrayed as "one of the most important centres of Ukrainian metallurgy"), which had been captured by the Russian Army and the National Guard of Russia after 71 days.[216] This report was televised one week after the Wagner Group rebellion.[216]

Battlefield conditions

[edit]
No man's land on the outskirts of Bakhmut, November 2022

With extremely high casualties, costly ground assaults with very minimal territorial changes, and shell-pocked landscapes, volunteers, media, and government officials alike compared battlefield conditions in Bakhmut to conditions on the western front of World War I,[217][218] particularly the battles of Verdun and the Somme.[219] Furthermore, the battle was marked by some of the fiercest urban combat not seen in Europe since World War II,[56][220] along with brutal hand-to-hand combat,[221] drawing a number of comparisons to the Battle of Stalingrad.[222][53] Retired US Marine Corps Colonel Andrew Milburn, the leader of a foreign volunteer group in Ukraine called the Mozart Group and an eyewitness to the battle, compared conditions in the Bakhmut countryside to Passchendaele in World War I and the city itself to Dresden in World War II.[223] A Ukrainian soldier fighting in Bakhmut stated that the battle was "worse than Stalingrad",[224] while another soldier described it as "real hell".[225] It was noted that "bloody battles unprecedented in recent decades" were occurring during the urban combat phase of the battle, as reported by Serhiy Cherevatyi, the spokesperson for Ukraine's eastern military command.[226] In December 2022, an article reported that the battle was only matched by the "siege of Mariupol in its sheer brutality and casualty count".[227]

Historian Geoffrey Roberts considered the comparisons between the battles of Bakhmut and Stalingrad as being inaccurate, arguing that in addition to Bakhmut being comparatively minuscule in size, the battle itself was not as strategically important as Stalingrad was on the future of the war.[228] Professor Alexander Hill also commented on the similarities drawn up between Bakhmut and past battles, stating that on a basic level Bakhmut is similar in that it was a battle of attrition causing a countless number of casualties, but ultimately stating that the "fighting in and around Bakhmut won't be another Stalingrad or Verdun, because what is taking place isn't history repeating itself and nor can it be, even if we can find similarities between past and present."[229] While Stalingrad had strategic value as an industrial city and also as a vital transportation artery for the Volga River, the city of Bakhmut has little strategic value, as analyst Dara Massicot said Bakhmut was becoming "like a Stalingrad except for without the importance of Stalingrad".[230]

On 21 May 2023, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy compared the battle and the destruction of the city to that of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in 1945, saying that the events "absolutely remind me of Bakhmut and other cities like it ... absolutely, nothing alive there, all buildings are destroyed, there is even no understanding where a street is and where a building is. Absolute total destruction. Nothing left, no people left."[231] The level of destruction has also been compared to the more recent Battle of Aleppo.[232][233]

Casualties

[edit]

Military casualties

[edit]

The battle of Bakhmut was described as one of the bloodiest battles of the 21st century, with the battlefield being described as a "meat grinder" and a "vortex" for both the Ukrainian and Russian militaries.[47][48] On 11 January 2023, Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak described the fighting ongoing at Bakhmut and Soledar as the bloodiest since the start of the invasion.[234]

Russia

[edit]

As early as December 2022, it was estimated that hundreds of military personnel from both sides were killed and wounded each day. Intense shelling and frontal attacks by the Russians with minimal gains have been compared to the conditions of the First World War. Russia and Ukraine have been engaged in a battle of attrition.[235] However, according to NATO and Ukrainian officials Russian losses have been disproportionate by comparison. On 6 March, an assessment by NATO was that five times as many Russians were being killed, while the Ukrainian government claimed the Russians had "potentially" lost seven times as many soldiers as Ukraine.[236] By early June, the Ukrainian military increased this claim to 7.5 times.[36]

Between 6 and 31 January 2023, the Ukrainians claimed that 17,000 Russian soldiers lost their lives in the battle, which is nearly double the monthly average they had reported the previous year.[237]

On 24 February, American General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that the Russians had lost between 1,100 and 1,200 soldiers killed "down around" Bakhmut the previous day alone, a death toll he compared with the battles of Iwo Jima and Shiloh. If accurate, this would make it one of the deadliest days of the war by that point.[238][239] Meanwhile, two days later on 26 February, former Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated that the Russians were losing 500 men killed and another 900 wounded in action every day fighting for Bakhmut.[240] General Milley, appearing before the US House Committee on Armed Services on 29 March, described the reportedly high Russian casualties as a "slaughter-fest".[241]

On 13 March, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed that another 1,100 Russians had been killed and 1,500 wounded over the past week. Meanwhile, the Russians claimed that 220 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the city on 13 March alone.[242][44] Meanwhile, on 17 March, NATO estimated that the Russians were suffering 1,500 casualties per day, mainly from the fighting around Bakhmut. They also stated that Ukraine's losses were "an order of magnitude less" in fighting where "several thousand" shells a day had been fired by both sides.[243]

On 13 April, the Ukrainians claimed to have inflicted more than 4,500 casualties on the Russians in the previous two weeks alone.[244]

On 1 May, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Russia had suffered more than 20,000 soldiers killed in combat and 80,000 wounded on the Bakhmut front since December 2022. He also said that half of these losses were from the Wagner Group.[245] The White House compared reported Russian casualty figures to those of World War II battles, highlighting that the casualties were reportedly more than the 19,000 US troops killed and 80,000 wounded in the Battle of the Bulge, and that it was about three times the 7,100 soldiers the US lost in the Battle of Guadalcanal.[246]

According to Western analysts, the spike in Russian casualties around this time had led to fears that the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive, planned for later in the spring, may become "carnage". The US said that such fierce fighting shows that the bloody carnage may become even worse after the start of Kyiv's counteroffensive to retake the occupied territories.[247][248][249]

Speaking at a G7 summit on 21 May, US President Joe Biden said that the "Russians have suffered over 100,000 casualties in Bakhmut."[250] On 2 June, United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, reported that Russia had suffered over 100,000 casualties in Ukraine in the preceding six months (i.e. since the start of December).[185] At the same time, the UK Ministry of Defense reported 60,000 Russian personnel killed or wounded near Bakhmut since May 2022,[185] while the Ukrainian military would claim 100,000 personnel killed or wounded in the ten months since August 2022.[187]

Meanwhile, Ukraine claimed that Wagner had suffered over 81,000 casualties during the battle with 21,000 killed.[197][251][252] On 2 July, the Ukrainians, while maintaining the figure of 21,000 "Wagnerites" killed, increased the number of wounded to 80,000 in "the east".[253]

High losses were highlighted by Yevgeny Prigozhin as one of the key points in his criticism of Russian Ministry of Defense which eventually culminated in him launching an armed rebellion in June 2023.[254] On 2 June, the ISW reiterated reports by the British defence ministry that Russia gained "48 centimetres for each of the 60,000 personnel killed or wounded near Bakhmut since May 2022". Ian Stubbs, a British senior military advisor, claimed that Russia had suffered nearly half of those casualties, almost 30,000 killed or wounded, in the last three months since March. "These staggering losses have achieved at total advance of just 29 kilometres."[185][255]

Open-source analysis from Mediazona results in Russian losses of up to 800 killed per week by public obituaries alone.[256] Fall 2023 research suggests that recent estimates[by whom?] have Russian losses at 32,000–43,000 dead and 95,000 wounded.[257][dubiousdiscuss] 2024 academic researches indicate Russian forces casualties as up to 4 times more than of Ukrainian, but Ukraine was losing valuable experienced soldiers, whereas on the Russian side, Wagner forces were likely 70% ex-convicts.[258][259]

In February 2024, Meduza and Mediazona assessed a total of 21,000 dead among all Russian forces attacking Soledar and Bakhmut.[260] In June 2024 an investigation by the BBC and Mediazona revealed that 19,547 Wagnerites were killed during the Bakhmut offensive, of which 17,175 were convicts.[261][5] The number is based on documented family members' compensation payments and does not include at least several dozens of killed Wagner members who have not indicated any relatives.[262] Historian Nikolay Mitrokhin [ru] assessed the number of losses by the Russian side as 25,000 killed, with the same number being killed in Soledar.[263]

On 24 May 2023, Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that over 20,000 Wagner fighters had been killed in the Bakhmut battle, with half that number being former prisoners. He also reported that they had as many wounded as killed.[264][10][11][265] However, former Russian officer and milblogger Igor Girkin opined that Wagner has likely suffered more than 40,000 killed in action (including 15,000 mercenaries and 25,000 convicts), with again the same number wounded. In part, this is based on a claimed discrepancy between the number of prisoners recruited and, the number either reported killed or repatriated at the end of their service.[266][267] Major General John Harrel, in his analysis of reported figures, highlights that out of the 50,000 convicts recruited by the Wagner Group, only 25,000 received pardons, with the remaining 25,000 killed. According to one report, the number of professional mercenaries killed may have reached 15,000, bringing the total number of Wagner personnel killed to approximately 40,000, with overall casualties – both killed and wounded – amounting to 80,000. Harrel estimates Wagner's personnel strength at 85,000 at the beginning of 2023, declining to 5,000 following the Battle of Bakhmut. He further notes that the unfavorable killed-to-wounded ratio suggests poor recovery of the wounded and inadequate medical treatment.[268]

Ukraine

[edit]

Die Welt reported that some Ukrainian companies fighting in Bakhmut had lost more than 80% of their soldiers and that the Ukrainian military had to send fresh reserves to replenish preexisting units while also putting together new brigades for the planned counteroffensive later that year.[269]

During the battle, Ukrainian soldiers gave Oleksandr Syrskyi, the officer commanding Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut, the nicknames "Butcher" and "General 200" due Syrskyi's use of high casualty tactics during the battle.[270][271] The nickname General 200 is a reference to Cargo 200, the Soviet military code for military fatalities.[272]

Military observers estimated that the average Ukrainian soldier's survival time in Bakhmut was 3 days.[273]

As of 29 January 2026, UALosses confirmed the names of 13,313 Ukrainian soldiers killed, 16,402 missing, and 337 who are currently prisoners of war.[274]

Civilian casualties

[edit]

In early December 2022, only between 7,000 and 15,000 of Bakhmut's prewar population of 80,000 remained in the city.[275][276]

On 31 May 2023, the city's mayor, Oleksii Reva, reported 204 residents had been killed and 505 injured since the invasion began, with 500 residents remaining in the city.[277] However, Bakhmut had been subject to Russian bombardment since at least May 2022.[278]

Attrition

[edit]

On 1 May 2023, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby sought to emphasize Wagner Group's reported usage of ex-convicts as cannon fodder.[246] On 17 May, the Ukrainian military published an interview with a captured Wagner mercenary, who was also a former Russian convict. In the video, the man claimed that he had been wounded and then abandoned to die by his comrades in a trench for four days before he was taken prisoner, indicating that Russian forces were leaving behind their wounded soldiers. He also said that Russian forces were suffering great losses, saying there is a "trench where a corpse is lying on a corpse".[279]

Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin had previously suggested Wagner was deliberately turning Bakhmut into a "meat grinder" to inflict heavy attritional casualties on Ukrainian forces.[45] One Western official gave an inverse view, saying the battle was "giving Ukraine a unique opportunity to kill a lot of Russians", due to purportedly poor Russian tactics.[46] In their 2 June 2023 report, over a week after the capture of Bakhmut, the ISW noted claims by Ukrainian Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty that regular Russian units were not participating in the attrition-style of warfare that Wagner forces had done, and that Russian forces were by this time engaging in a defensive strategy.[185][280]

Military analysts characterize the battle as attritional for both sides, and "both sides thought that attrition favoured them". During the battle, regular Russian forces managed to fortify the southern and northern fronts and train the 300,000 soldiers conscripted in the fall of 2022.[258][281] After extensive attrition at Bakhmut, Russia did not conduct further advances west towards Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in the months after the city's capture.[282] Ukraine's future offensive potential was also diminished and the continued expenditure of experienced soldiers on the Bakhmut front during the subsequent summer counteroffensive hindered success in the southern front, where more experienced units performed better than those reliant on Western equipment.[283][258]

Result

[edit]

Multiple war studies academic researchers characterize the outcome of the battle as a "pyrrhic",[49][259][284][285] or "hollow" Russian victory.[2][198] British military analyst Ben Barry cautioned that Russia may have reserved its more elite, well-prepared units for future operations, but nevertheless considered the victory to be "pyrrhic".[284] Other independent analysts and news organizations, nonetheless, considered the attritional battle an overall Russian victory.[286][287][288]

American officials repeatedly voiced concern over Ukraine's decision to keep a large presence in the Bakhmut area despite unfavorable conditions. Some observers even linked the heavy losses Ukraine suffered during the battle with the failures of the subsequent counteroffensive, given that Russian casualties in Bakhmut were mostly expendable press-ganged ex-convicts that freed up regular Russian forces to build up defenses along the Zaporizhzhia front, whereas elite Ukrainian units such as the 93rd Mechanised Brigade, which had a direct overall impact to the aforementioned counteroffensive, suffered heavy attrition in Bakhmut.[289][290]

Allegations of war crimes

[edit]

In March 2023, a 12-second video was posted of a captured Ukrainian soldier with a cigarette quietly saying "Slava Ukraini", who was then shot dead by an unseen perpetrator.[291] Some Ukrainian media sources and bloggers suggested that the POW was Oleksandr Igorevich Matsievskyi, a soldier from Nizhyn who had been deployed to Bakhmut and gone missing in January.[292]

On 8 April 2023, a video was posted on a pro-Russian social media channel, showing a pair of decapitated corpses on the ground beside a destroyed armoured vehicle. The video's (Russian-speaking) recorder, stating how the vehicle had been destroyed by a mine, laughed that "They killed them. Someone came up to them. They came up to them and cut their heads off." According to the channel the incident occurred in Bakhmut and was done by mercenaries from the Wagner Group.[293] Another video posted on Twitter shows a soldier with a yellow armband (a symbol of the Ukrainian military) screaming before he is beheaded by a Russian-speaking soldier with a knife.[294][295] Foliage in the background suggested the video was taken during the summer.[293] The Institute for the Study of War also reported that an image of the head of a Ukrainian soldier mounted on a spike was circulating around Russian social media.[293]

On 5 July 2023, the Ukrainians claimed that the Russians had attacked them with an arsenic based chemical weapon called lewisite in an artillery bombardment, which had previously been used during World War I. The strike reportedly left some Ukrainian soldiers with symptoms of chemical weapons exposure.[296][better source needed] Production of more than 100 grams of lewisite per year is banned internationally under the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997, and its use as a chemical weapon is banned as a Schedule 1 substance.[297]

See also

[edit]

Notes

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Battle of Bakhmut was a protracted urban battle during the , pitting Russian forces—primarily the alongside regular army units—against Ukrainian Armed Forces for control of the city of (known as Artemivsk in Russian) in . Fighting intensified in 2022 following Russian advances from nearby and lasted until May 20, 2023, when Ukrainian forces withdrew after defending the ruined city for nearly ten months of attritional combat characterized by house-to-house assaults, artillery barrages, and human-wave tactics. The engagement, often described as a "meat grinder" due to its exceptionally high toll, yielded a tactical Russian victory with the capture of Bakhmut but at immense cost, diverting resources from broader fronts and exposing deficiencies in Russian command coordination, as evidenced by public clashes between Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu over ammunition supplies and tactical support. Prigozhin stated that Wagner suffered approximately 20,000 fatalities in the fighting, roughly half of them former convicts recruited en masse for frontal assaults, underscoring the reliance on expendable convict storm units to grind down Ukrainian defenses entrenched in high-rise buildings and industrial sites. Ukrainian estimates placed total Russian losses exceeding 100,000 killed or wounded, though independent verification remains limited; the battle's strategic value was minimal, as the devastated city offered no significant logistical or operational advantage to justify the depletion of elite assault units and equipment. The prolonged defense nonetheless inflicted disproportionate attrition on the attackers, buying time for Ukrainian reinforcements elsewhere and highlighting the efficacy of fortified urban positions against numerically superior but poorly coordinated forces.

Background

Strategic and Geographic Context

, located in in eastern Ukraine's region, lies on the River approximately 55 kilometers north of city and 200 kilometers southeast of . The city, with a pre-war population of around 71,000, served as an administrative and industrial hub, featuring salt mines, chemical plants, and supporting the region's coal-dependent . Geographically, its position amid rolling plains and provided defensive advantages through built-up areas and river crossings, though the surrounding steppe terrain favored artillery and mechanized advances in open approaches. In the broader , held operational significance as a potential chokepoint on highways linking to key Ukrainian-held cities like and , roughly 50 kilometers to the west, which anchor defenses in northern . Russian forces, advancing from captured territories in after the May 2022 fall of , viewed as a stepping stone toward encircling these strongholds and fulfilling objectives to control the entire Donetsk region, part of Moscow's stated goal to "liberate" . For Ukraine, holding disrupted Russian momentum, buying time to fortify rear lines and inflict disproportionate casualties in an attritional fight, leveraging the city's urban density to negate some Russian advantages in firepower. Despite its tactical value, analysts have questioned Bakhmut's overarching strategic weight, noting it offered no decisive logistical or economic prizes beyond symbolic prestige, especially as Russian assaults diverted resources from broader fronts like or . Ukrainian commanders, including those echoing Soviet-era lessons from Stalingrad, prioritized bleeding Russian manpower over retaining the ruined , which by early 2023 was 90% destroyed and isolated on three sides. This calculus reflected Donbas's entrenched role in the conflict, where control of industrial nodes like underpinned Russia's narrative of historical and resource claims, even if military gains proved pyrrhic.

Prelude and Initial Engagements

Russian forces initiated artillery shelling of on May 17, 2022, during the broader battle for , a key logistical hub approximately 24 kilometers to the southeast, from which Ukrainian troops withdrew on May 8 amid intense pressure. This early bombardment targeted civilian infrastructure, including a five-story residential building hit by rockets, resulting in casualties and setting the stage for attritional warfare in the region as Russian units consolidated gains after the failed offensive and shifted focus eastward..jpg) Ukrainian defenses in and around , fortified since the 2014 conflict, relied on entrenched positions and to mitigate the barrages, though the city's pre-war of about 70,000 faced increasing displacement. Following the Russian capture of on July 3, 2022, which concluded the battle for Severodonetsk, Moscow's forces redirected elements toward the Bakhmut axis as part of a to control the T0504 linking Bakhmut to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Russian advances originated from positions in Verkhnokamyanske and Bilohorivka to the north, aiming to envelop the Siversk-Bakhmut salient, while southern probes targeted approaches from . These movements reflected a doctrinal emphasis on grinding territorial gains through superiority, though logistical strains and Ukrainian resistance limited momentum, with no major achieved by late July. Initial ground engagements escalated in mid-, with Russian assaults south and northeast of repelled by Ukrainian troops on July 16, though marginal advances occurred near Vershyna and east of . By July 22, Russian units reportedly seized the southern outskirts of Pokrovske, less than 5 kilometers east of the city, followed by intensified fighting around the settlement on July 26-27. Ukrainian forces conducted localized counterattacks, leveraging terrain and to inflict , but Russian shelling and strikes, including on Pokrovske, sustained pressure without decisive breakthroughs, foreshadowing the prolonged stalemate ahead.

Belligerents and Forces

Russian-Led Forces

The Russian-led forces in the Battle of Bakhmut primarily comprised the , which conducted the main assaults from late 2022 through early 2023, supported by regular units of the including the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division, 76th Guards Air Assault Division, and 106th Guards Airborne Division, as well as militias affiliated with the (DPR). The , under the command of , deployed assault units emphasizing infantry advances in urban terrain, often employing high-casualty tactics with minimal mechanized support to preserve equipment. Wagner's composition included an estimated 6,000 mercenaries supplemented by 20,000 to 30,000 recruits, who were rapidly trained and deployed as expendable frontline infantry after recruitment drives began in mid-2022, with overall Wagner forces in the battle estimated up to 85,000 including convicts and support elements. Prigozhin stated that approximately half of Wagner's 20,000 fatalities in the battle were convicts, reflecting the group's reliance on penal units for attritional assaults. These forces operated alongside regular Russian and airborne troops, which provided but were secondary to Wagner's role until the PMC's partial withdrawal on May 25, 2023, after which Russian Ministry of Defense units assumed greater responsibility for holding captured positions. DPR separatist militias contributed auxiliary troops, including local fighters integrated into joint operations for flanking and defensive tasks, though their numbers remained smaller and less documented compared to Wagner's contingent. Overall, Russian-led forces totaled tens of thousands in the Bakhmut sector, with Wagner peaking at around 50,000 personnel concentrated on the city's encirclement efforts from November 2022 onward. This structure highlighted inter-service tensions, as Prigozhin publicly criticized Russian for ammunition shortages that hampered Wagner's advances in March 2023.

Ukrainian Forces

Ukrainian forces defending Bakhmut operated under the Eastern Grouping of Troops, commanded by Colonel General , who directed operations from the outset of intensified Russian assaults in late 2022 and made on-site tactical decisions to counter enemy advances. Syrskyi's approach emphasized attrition of Russian assault units through defensive positioning and , though it drew criticism for high Ukrainian casualties amid the prolonged urban fighting. The core defensive effort relied on regular mechanized brigades of the , involving approximately 30,000–80,000 troops through rotations, with key units including the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade "Kholodnyi Yar", 58th Motorized Brigade, 57th Motorized Brigade, 24th Mechanized Brigade, 30th Mechanized Brigade, 77th Airmobile Brigade, 128th Mountain Assault Brigade, 46th Airmobile Brigade, 4th Tank Brigade, 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, territorial defense units, Kraken Regiment, and International Legion volunteers. The 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade "Kholodnyi Yar" served as a primary unit responsible for holding key positions in and around the city; it assumed direct responsibility for Bakhmut's defense on January 19, 2023, and conducted operations including the liberation of nearby positions like those near Klishchiyivka. Equipped with and tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery systems, the brigade engaged in close-quarters combat and repelled assaults using anti-tank weapons and autocannons mounted on carriers. Precise troop numbers and full unit composition remained classified for operational security, but the defense involved multiple brigades rotated through the sector, supported by artillery units providing counterfire and drone teams for targeting. A post-battle estimated around 10,000 Ukrainian personnel killed or severely wounded across the engagement, reflecting the scale of committed forces amid sustained Russian pressure from November 2022 to May 2023. Syrskyi later stated that Russian losses in exceeded Ukrainian ones, attributing this to effective degradation of elite enemy brigades during the eight-month defense.

Course of the Battle

Early Phases (August–October 2022)

Russian forces reprioritized offensives in the area in July and August , following the culmination of their operations in the Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk salient, redirecting elements of the and proxy militias towards the city's northern and eastern approaches. Initial assaults targeted villages such as Vershyna, , and Yakovlivka, involving artillery preparation and infantry probes, though many early attacks were repelled with Ukrainian disrupting advances. These operations marked the transition from broader front consolidation to focused pressure on , a road hub connecting to and , amid ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives elsewhere that diverted Russian resources. Ukrainian defenses, anchored by the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade "Kholodnyi Yar" and territorial units, held fortified positions on elevated terrain north and east of , leveraging Western-supplied artillery like M777 howitzers for ranged interdiction while conducting limited counterattacks to reclaim probing gains. Throughout and , Russian forces achieved marginal progress, such as incremental control over parts of and approaches to Zaitseve, but at the cost of attritional engagements under persistent Ukrainian drone surveillance and precision strikes; shelling intensified, damaging civilian infrastructure in but failing to breach urban outskirts. Geolocated footage confirmed limited Russian tactical movements, often stalled by minefields and fortified lines, with no confirmed encirclement attempts succeeding during this phase. By October, Russian regulars had closed to within several kilometers of Bakhmut's northern and eastern edges, prompting escalated assaults and the initial commitment of mercenaries on to spearhead urban probing, though Ukrainian forces maintained dominance over supply routes via . This period saw heightened intensity, with Russian aviation and multiple-launch rocket systems targeting Ukrainian logistics, yet defenses inflicted disproportionate losses through ambushes and , setting conditions for the prolonged attritional fighting ahead; independent assessments noted Russian operational pauses due to manpower shortages and equipment attrition, contrasting official claims of steady progress.

Intensification and Wagner Assault (November 2022–February 2023)

In November 2022, the Wagner Group significantly escalated its role in the assault on Bakhmut, shifting from supporting regular Russian units to leading the main offensive efforts after earlier advances stalled. Employing assault groups composed largely of minimally trained convict recruits promised amnesty upon six months of service, Wagner conducted repeated small-unit attacks to infiltrate Ukrainian positions on the city's eastern and southern flanks, prioritizing volume over precision to exploit gaps in defenses. By late November, these tactics yielded marginal gains, including near-complete control of the southern village of Kurdyumivka, though Ukrainian forces from the 93rd Mechanized Brigade repelled multiple probes into the urban core. December saw continued intensification, with Wagner focusing on the southern approaches via Opytne and Andriivka, where convict-led waves absorbed heavy fire to enable follow-on advances by more experienced elements. On December 20, Ukrainian President visited forward positions near Bakhmut, commending defenders for holding against "superhuman" pressure amid reports of Wagner's daily assaults numbering in the dozens. , Wagner's financier, publicly lashed out at Russian Defense Minister around mid-December, alleging deliberate withholding of artillery shells critical for the offensive, a claim underscoring emerging frictions between Wagner and the regular military over logistics and prioritization. Entering 2023, Wagner's momentum built through attritional grinding, capturing the nearby town of by late January after fierce fighting in its salt mines, which threatened to outflank from the north and severed key Ukrainian supply routes. Ukrainian commanders withdrew from on January 25 to avoid , redirecting reserves to bolster 's defenses, where Wagner pressed assaults across the Bakhmutka River into the eastern districts. Prigozhin touted these gains as evidence of Wagner's effectiveness, contrasting it with perceived incompetence in regular units, while U.S. intelligence assessed that Wagner had incurred approximately 30,000 total casualties since the invasion by February 17, with roughly 9,000 fatalities, the majority concentrated in the sector due to the high-risk tactics. By early February, Wagner elements had secured much of the territory east of the and advanced into multi-story districts on the city's periphery, though Ukrainian forces retained the western half and administrative center, inflicting disproportionate losses through prepared urban defenses and drone strikes. Zelenskyy reaffirmed commitment to the "fortress" of on , emphasizing its role in tying down Russian reserves despite the mounting toll. The period's slow, costly progress highlighted Wagner's reliance on expendable manpower over maneuver, yielding tactical footholds at the expense of operational tempo and sustainability.

Attritional Stalemate and Final Push (March–May 2023)

In March 2023, Russian forces, primarily from the , continued incremental advances within eastern and central amid fierce urban combat, but Ukrainian defenders repelled multiple assaults and maintained control of western districts, turning the battle into a protracted characterized by high attrition on both sides. Geolocated footage showed Wagner elements seizing small blocks in the city's industrial zones, yet Ukrainian forces conducted limited tactical withdrawals to consolidate defenses while inflicting heavy losses through fortified positions and artillery fire. Commander reported ongoing counterattacks north of near Bohdanivka and Ivanivske, preventing Russian envelopment. On March 22, Ukrainian President visited frontline troops near to award medals, emphasizing the defense's role in degrading Russian capabilities. April saw sustained Wagner assaults yielding marginal gains in Bakhmut's central areas, including advances toward the T0504 highway, but progress remained slow due to Ukrainian resistance and logistical strains on Russian supply lines exposed to drone strikes and . Wagner leader publicly escalated criticisms of Russia's Ministry of Defense for ammunition shortages and delays in reinforcements, highlighting inter-Russian tensions that hampered the offensive's momentum. Ukrainian forces bolstered defenses west of the city, demolishing bridges and preparing fallback lines, while repelling attacks in surrounding heights that could enable . The attritional nature persisted, with Russian forces unable to achieve operational breakthroughs despite committing convict recruits in high-casualty assaults. In early May, Prigozhin threatened to withdraw Wagner units from by May 10, citing acute ammunition deficits and lack of support from regular Russian troops, though he reversed course after receiving emergency resupplies, allowing assaults to resume. Russian forces intensified pressure on remaining Ukrainian pockets in western , capturing key buildings and advancing along the Bakhmutivka River, amid reports of Ukrainian forces thinning out to preserve strength for broader counteroffensives. On May 20, Prigozhin declared Wagner's "complete capture" of after 224 days of fighting, claiming control over the ruined city center, though Ukrainian officials described the situation as critical but denied total loss, asserting retention of positions in the west and suburbs. Wagner began withdrawing assault units on May 25, handing responsibility to Russia's Forces and , marking the end of their dominant role in the battle.

Military Tactics and Innovations

Urban Warfare Dynamics

The Battle of Bakhmut exemplified the attritional nature of modern , characterized by prolonged house-to-house fighting amid extensive destruction from barrages that reduced much of the city to rubble by early 2023. Russian forces, led by the , employed systematic bombardment with up to 50,000 shells per day to degrade Ukrainian defenses and urban infrastructure, creating a landscape of ruins that both provided cover for defenders and channeled attackers into predictable assault corridors. This approach shifted the battle from initial attempts in late 2022 to direct infantry penetration by March 2023, highlighting how urban terrain favors defenders through fortified positions in buildings and basements but can be overcome with sustained firepower and manpower. Wagner's tactics relied on small assault groups of 8 to 50 minimally trained convicts, often advancing in daylight of , mortars, and drone to seize incremental positions, such as individual trenches or structures, with rarely permitted. These "meat wave" assaults integrated real-time adjustments via commercial drones like Mavic models for spotting and Lancet kamikaze strikes, compensating for limited communication and coordination in close-quarters environments. Ukrainian forces countered with entrenched defenses using minefields, automatic grenade launchers, and basement command posts for drone-guided fire, exploiting the urban clutter to disrupt Russian advances and achieve favorable casualty ratios estimated at 1:7. The urban setting diminished the role of armored vehicles on both sides due to rubble obstacles, ambushes, and anti-tank mines, forcing a return to infantry-centric operations reminiscent of positional warfare but augmented by unmanned systems. Drones proved pivotal for surveillance and precision strikes in the confined spaces, enabling to direct Soviet-era with Polish munitions against exposed Russian groups, while used grenade-dropping quadcopters to probe defenses. Overall, demonstrated that urban combat dynamics prioritize attrition over maneuver, with attackers succeeding through resource-intensive destruction rather than technological superiority alone, though at prohibitive human costs.

Human Wave Tactics and Convict Units

In mid-2022, , leader of the , initiated a large-scale recruitment of from Russian penal colonies to bolster forces for the assault on , offering pardons and financial incentives equivalent to about $1,700 monthly pay plus $38,000 to families of those killed, with freedom promised after six months of service or 50 days of frontline combat. By early 2023, U.S. intelligence estimated that had deployed around 50,000 fighters in , including approximately 40,000 drawn from prisons. An independent investigation later documented that recruited at least 48,366 overall for the invasion, with a significant portion—estimated at tens of thousands—funneled into the , where himself admitted to losing 20,000 personnel by May 2023, including roughly 10,000 based on his claims of proportional losses between convict and regular units. These units, often organized into "" detachments with minimal training—typically limited to a few weeks of basic instruction—were deployed in high-intensity urban assaults starting in late 2022, functioning as in repeated frontal attacks against fortified Ukrainian positions. Wagner's approach emphasized attritional human wave tactics, involving dispersed small groups (10-20 fighters) advancing in successive waves under heavy and drone support, absorbing casualties to exhaust Ukrainian defenses before follow-up exploitation by more skilled Wagner veterans. Captured Russian convicts and Wagner prisoners of war described these operations as involving "gigantic" losses, with units ordered to charge machine-gun nests and trenches without adequate cover, often under threats of execution for or enforced by Wagner commanders. Ukrainian military spokesmen, such as Serhiy Cherevaty, reported that nearly all convict recruits committed to were killed or wounded by March 2023, highlighting the disposability of these forces in Wagner's strategy. The tactic's effectiveness stemmed from sheer manpower volume overwhelming Ukrainian ammunition and manpower constraints in the prolonged siege, enabling incremental gains in Bakhmut's ruins from November 2022 onward, though at a cost exceeding 1 billion USD in compensation payments to families as documented in leaked Wagner records. Prigozhin publicly defended the approach as necessary due to ammunition shortages from Russia's Defense Ministry, arguing it traded convict lives for strategic progress, but critics, including Russian military analysts, noted its inefficiency in preserving experienced fighters and its reliance on , with execution videos released by Wagner to deter flight. By February 2023, as convict recruitment tapered amid high attrition, Wagner shifted toward integrating survivors with regular troops, though the human wave model persisted in diluted form until the group's dissolution post-Prigozhin's . This method, while enabling Wagner to capture key districts like the AZOM factory area, exemplified causal trade-offs in attritional warfare: temporary territorial advances bought with irreplaceable , straining Russia's overall recruitment pool.

Casualties, Equipment Losses, and Verification Challenges

Reported Figures and Methodologies

Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, stated on May 24, 2023, that more than 20,000 Wagner fighters had been killed in the battle for Bakhmut, with approximately half being recruited convicts and the other half professional contractors; this figure derived from Wagner's internal accounting amid Prigozhin's public criticisms of Russian military leadership for ammunition shortages and tactical failures. Wagner forces bore the brunt of the assault, employing convict storm units in human-wave attacks, which Prigozhin described as leading to "enormous" losses due to inadequate support. Ukrainian officials reported minimal specific figures for their own casualties in Bakhmut, emphasizing instead daily enemy losses through the General Staff's public tallies, such as over 1,100 Russian soldiers killed in a few days in March 2023; these estimates relied on , intercepted communications, and after-action reports but were not independently verified and served propagandistic purposes by inflating adversary attrition while classifying Ukrainian deaths. President Zelenskyy echoed this approach, framing Ukrainian losses as strategically sustainable compared to Russian ones, without disclosing numerical data. Ukrainian casualty estimates for Bakhmut remain opaque, with broader assessments suggesting figures significantly lower than Russian losses, potentially in the range of 10,000 to 20,000 total casualties based on reported ratios of 5:1 to 7:1 favoring Ukraine. Local authorities reported 204 civilians killed and 505 injured in Bakhmut since the start of the invasion. Western analyses, drawing from (OSINT), , and leaked assessments, estimated Russian casualties in at 20,000 to 30,000 killed and wounded by early March 2023, with total Russian and Wagner casualties reaching 60,000–100,000 or more by May 2023 according to U.S. and UK estimates, based on patterns in Wagner recruitment drives, grave counts, and video evidence of assaults; for instance, UK Ministry of Defence assessments used probabilistic modeling from observed assault frequencies and survival rates in urban combat, noting peaks of 1,100–1,500 daily Russian casualties. Ukrainian casualties remained opaque, with broader U.S. intelligence suggesting tens of thousands across the battle but no Bakhmut-specific breakdown due to reliance on classified and reluctance to disclose allied losses. Equipment losses were tracked primarily through OSINT methodologies, such as Oryx's visual confirmation protocol requiring geolocated photos or videos of destroyed, damaged, or captured hardware before tallying; this conservative approach documented thousands of Russian vehicles lost overall in the but did not isolate Bakhmut-specific aggregates, though from the showed frequent tank and abandonments amid urban fighting. Russian claims minimized such losses, reporting only verified enemy captures, while Ukrainian sources exaggerated via unverified strike videos. Verification challenges stemmed from restricted access, deliberate , and the destruction of in , rendering comprehensive audits reliant on partial, side-biased .

Discrepancies Between Sources

Reports of in the Battle of Bakhmut exhibit significant variances across sources, primarily due to the absence of independent verification amid restricted access to the combat zone and incentives for each side to minimize their own losses while exaggerating adversaries'. , head of the , publicly stated on May 24, 2023, that his forces suffered 20,000 fatalities during the assault on , with approximately half comprising convict recruits; a subsequent Wagner assessment claimed 22,000 killed and 40,000 wounded by May 20, 2023. These figures contrast sharply with Russian Ministry of Defense claims, which historically underreport overall losses and attribute minimal to Bakhmut operations, often framing advances as low-cost despite Prigozhin's criticisms of inadequate support from regular forces. U.S. intelligence assessments, declassified in part, estimated Russian casualties exceeding 100,000—including over 20,000 killed—in the Bakhmut theater from December 2022 to May 2023, reflecting the intensity of attritional assaults but relying on intercepted data and satellite imagery rather than ground counts. Ukrainian sources, such as the General Staff, reported Russian losses at rates up to nine times their own in Bakhmut by mid-2023, with daily figures sometimes cited in the thousands, though without detailed methodologies or breakdowns; these claims align with NATO evaluations suggesting a 5:1 Russian-to-Ukrainian casualty ratio but lack corroboration from neutral observers. Open-source efforts, like Mediazona's obituary-based tracking of Russian deaths, confirm elevated fatalities during the Bakhmut phase but capture only a fraction—estimated at 45-65%—of total losses due to underreporting and classification of convicts as non-military. Equipment losses present fewer discrepancies owing to visual confirmation methodologies, yet challenges persist in attributing units specifically to Bakhmut. Oryx, an platform, documented thousands of visually verified Russian vehicle destructions across the war by late 2023, with spikes correlating to Bakhmut's urban fighting, including infantry fighting vehicles and tanks vulnerable to Ukrainian drones and ; however, these undercount non-visualized losses and do not isolate Bakhmut totals precisely. Ukrainian claims of Russian matériel attrition often exceed confirmed figures, while Russian reports omit or downplay captures, such as those of tanks and RPO-A launchers in Artemivsk (Bakhmut's Russian name). Verification remains hampered by terrain destruction, electronic warfare jamming footage, and selective releases, underscoring reliance on partisan analysis over empirical body counts.

Strategic Assessments

Russian Perspective and Gains

Russian forces, led by the , announced the full capture of (known as Artemovsk in Russian nomenclature) on May 20, 2023, after prolonged urban fighting that began in August 2022. The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the liberation of the city, stating that assault detachments had completed the operation through decisive actions. President personally congratulated Defense Minister and Wagner leader , describing the achievement as a complex task accomplished by courageous and professional soldiers. From the Russian perspective, the battle exemplified the effectiveness of integrated assault tactics, including the use of convict-recruited units alongside regular forces and private military contractors, in overcoming fortified Ukrainian defenses in dense urban terrain. Officials portrayed the victory as a pivotal step in securing the region, with control of Artemovsk providing a logistical base for potential advances toward key Ukrainian-held cities like and , though subsequent operations saw limited immediate progress. Prigozhin emphasized the psychological dimension, noting that while the city held minimal inherent strategic value, its capture inflicted severe attrition on Ukrainian elite units and boosted Russian morale as the first major urban center taken since the initial phases of the conflict. However, the victory was pyrrhic, marked by massive casualties and exposing internal rifts, particularly over ammunition supplies during the assault, which Prigozhin publicly criticized. These tensions contributed to the Wagner Group's mutiny against the Russian Ministry of Defense in June 2023. Tangible gains included territorial consolidation, with Russian forces securing the city's ruins and surrounding heights, alongside captured Ukrainian such as T-64BV tanks and flame launchers, which were documented as trophies. The operation was credited with degrading Ukrainian combat capabilities, with Prigozhin claiming Wagner forces alone eliminated tens of thousands of opponents, though independent verification remains challenging due to restricted access and conflicting reports. Critics within Russian military circles, such as former commander , dismissed the endeavor's strategic merit, arguing it yielded negligible operational advantages relative to the resources expended, highlighting internal debates on the battle's overall utility.

Ukrainian Perspective and Costs

Ukrainian military leaders, including Commander of the Ground Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi, described the defense of Bakhmut as a deliberate attritional strategy to maximize Russian casualties while buying time to fortify positions westward and disrupt enemy momentum. This approach succeeded in holding the city for nearly 10 months against superior numbers, inflicting disproportionate casualties estimated at 5–7 times higher on Russian and Wagner forces, depleting their resources and delaying broader advances in Donetsk Oblast. Syrskyi emphasized that holding the city for over eight months from late 2022 to May 2023 served a "military necessity," enabling Ukrainian forces to degrade Russian assault capabilities through sustained urban resistance. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy supported this approach in February 2023, stating Ukraine would defend Bakhmut "but not at any price," prioritizing preservation of lives amid escalating costs. By May 2023, after Russian forces claimed control, Zelenskyy acknowledged the city's physical loss but framed it symbolically as enduring in Ukrainian resolve. This perspective positioned Bakhmut not as a tactical stronghold—given its limited strategic infrastructure—but as a grinding engagement that weakened Russian manpower and Wagner Group's convict recruits, preventing broader advances in Donetsk Oblast. Subsequent Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks recaptured nearby villages, such as Klishchiivka in September 2023. The human toll on Ukrainian forces was severe, though exact figures remain classified to avoid aiding Russian targeting and morale. Western intelligence estimated Russian casualties in Bakhmut at 20,000–30,000 killed or wounded by March 2023, with NATO officials citing a 5:1 Russian-to-Ukrainian loss ratio based on battlefield assessments. Ukrainian sources claimed even higher disparities, up to 9:1, attributing this to effective defensive tactics against human-wave assaults. Independent analyses suggest Ukrainian fatalities in the battle numbered in the low tens of thousands when including wounded, representing a significant portion of overall war losses estimated at 60,000–100,000 killed by mid-2025. Syrskyi faced internal for prolonging the defense, which some argued escalated avoidable attrition in a symbolically overvalued ruin, diverting elite units from potential counteroffensives. Civilian evacuations mitigated non-combatant deaths, but over 200 Bakhmut residents were confirmed killed, with infrastructure devastation complicating post-battle recovery. Material costs compounded operational strains, with infantry-heavy urban fighting limiting major equipment engagements but exacerbating ammunition shortages. Ukrainian artillery units rationed shells by March 2023, often selecting targets selectively due to depleted stocks, which hampered against Russian advances. Open-source tracking by Oryx documented thousands of visually confirmed Ukrainian vehicle losses across the war, including tanks and armored fighting vehicles, though Bakhmut-specific attributions were sparse given the close-quarters emphasis on and drones. The battle accelerated consumption of Western-supplied munitions, contributing to broader logistical pressures as awaited resupplies amid delayed aid deliveries.

Controversies and Debates

Internal Russian Conflicts

During the Battle of Bakhmut, which intensified from late 2022 into early 2023, the , led by , engaged in escalating public disputes with Russia's Ministry of Defense (MoD), particularly over and operational control. Prigozhin repeatedly accused Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff of incompetence and deliberately withholding ammunition from Wagner forces, claiming this sabotage hindered advances in the city. These allegations surfaced prominently in February 2023, when Prigozhin stated that Wagner fighters were "starving for ammunition" due to failures, attributing stalled progress to insufficient shells despite Wagner's frontline role in urban assaults. The feud peaked in May 2023 amid Wagner's push to capture Bakhmut's center. On May 5, Prigozhin threatened to withdraw all Wagner contingents from the city by May 10, citing depleted supplies—down to "the last days" of bullets and shells—and blaming MoD prioritization of regular army units over mercenaries, whom he called "cannon fodder" in a "meat grinder." In video statements, he directly lambasted Shoigu and Gerasimov for betraying troops, releasing footage of ammunition crates allegedly marked for Wagner but redirected by the MoD. Russian military bloggers and pro-war channels amplified these claims, reporting that MoD logistics favored less effective regular units, exacerbating Wagner's reliance on convict recruits and human-wave tactics. MoD officials countered that Wagner received ammunition per contractual obligations but suffered from inefficient usage and overextension, though they provided no detailed public rebuttals during the battle's height. The disputes delayed Wagner offensives, forcing temporary halts and contributing to high casualties, as Prigozhin's ultimatums pressured for resupplies—ultimately granted after intervention, allowing Wagner to claim Bakhmut's fall on May 20, 2023. This infighting revealed fissures in Russian command unity, with Prigozhin positioning Wagner as more effective than the "incompetent" regular forces, a narrative that eroded authority and foreshadowed broader risks.

Ukrainian Defense Rationale and Criticisms

Ukrainian military and political leaders, including President , framed the defense of as essential for demonstrating resolve and preventing the perception of territorial abandonment, with Zelenskyy explicitly calling the city a "fortress" whose fall would undermine morale across . This stance aligned with a broader attrition strategy under Eastern Front commander , who oversaw the prolonged urban fighting to maximize Russian losses, particularly against Wagner Group's convict recruits deployed in high-casualty assaults, thereby diverting enemy reserves from other fronts and enabling subsequent Ukrainian advances in and regions during September–November 2022. Proponents of the defense, including assessments from the Institute for the Study of War, argued that holding remained "strategically sound" by the spring of 2023, as it forced to commit disproportionate resources—estimated at over 20,000 Wagner casualties alone by May 2023—while preserving Ukraine's defensive lines and buying time for Western aid integration. Ukrainian officials emphasized that the battle degraded Russian assault capabilities, with daily enemy casualties exceeding 800 in the sector by early 2023, creating favorable exchange ratios despite the urban terrain's disadvantages. Critics, including Western military analysts, contended that Bakhmut held negligible operational value as a non-garrison without major or centers to justify the human cost, rendering the defense a resource-intensive fixation that eroded Ukraine's units faster than Russian convict fodder. Syrskyi himself acknowledged in December 2022 that "militarily, has no strategic importance," highlighting internal tensions where the emphasis on attrition—mirroring Soviet doctrinal persistence—prioritized grinding fights over maneuver, leading to accusations of excessive casualties among experienced troops amid shortages by 2023. Reports indicated Ukrainian losses in approached tens of thousands killed or wounded by mid-2023, with detractors arguing these irreplaceable personnel could have bolstered more decisive counteroffensives elsewhere, potentially amplifying the Pyrrhic nature of the victory for . Rumors persisted of disagreements between Syrskyi and then-Commander-in-Chief , with the latter reportedly advocating withdrawal to conserve forces, underscoring debates over whether symbolic holds outweighed tactical preservation.

Broader War Implications and Propaganda

The Battle of Bakhmut exemplified in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, where prioritized inflicting disproportionate casualties on Russian forces over retaining the city's limited tactical value as a minor . Ukrainian focused on maximizing enemy losses—estimated by Western officials at a 5:1 favoring in some phases—to degrade Russian offensive capabilities across the front, thereby buying time for mobilization and Western arms deliveries. This approach strained Russian ammunition reserves, with daily Wagner Group consumption exceeding 60,000 artillery shells by early 2023, accelerating Moscow's reliance on North Korean supplies and exposing logistical vulnerabilities. For , the fixation on Bakhmut diverted resources from other sectors, potentially easing Ukrainian preparations for the June 2023 counteroffensive, though the battle's human toll—over 20,000 Wagner fatalities claimed by group leader —highlighted the unsustainability of convict-based assaults without corresponding territorial advances elsewhere. Propaganda narratives diverged sharply, with Russian state outlets framing the May 20, 2023, declaration of victory as evidence of inexorable progress toward control, downplaying costs to sustain domestic support for the "special military operation." Ukrainian leadership, including visits by President to frontline units, portrayed the defense as a moral and strategic triumph, emphasizing Russian "" tactics and high losses to rally national resilience and justify continued resistance despite risks. Post-capture disputes persisted, as rejected full Russian control claims, citing residual pockets of resistance and maneuvers west of the city, while Russian media amplified Wagner's role to glorify private military contributions over regular army efforts. These efforts extended to international audiences, with portraying as validation of its attritional superiority and leveraging imagery of ruined infrastructure to underscore barbarity, influencing Western debates amid perceptions of Ukrainian overextension. The battle's fallout amplified internal Russian fissures, as Prigozhin's accusations of ammunition shortages and betrayal by military brass eroded cohesion, presaging his June 2023 armed revolt against the defense ministry. Broader war dynamics shifted toward entrenched positional fighting, reinforcing Ukraine's emphasis on defensive depth and drone-enabled attrition while compelling Russia to integrate Wagner remnants into state structures, albeit at the cost of elite assault capabilities. This episode underscored propaganda's role in sustaining belligerents' will, with symbolic "victories" masking empirical realities of mutual exhaustion and minimal shifts in the 1,000-kilometer .

Aftermath and Legacy

Immediate Post-Battle Developments

Following the Wagner Group's announcement on May 20, 2023, that it had captured Bakhmut after months of intense urban combat, the mercenary force initiated a withdrawal of its units starting on , transferring frontline positions to regular Russian Ministry of Defense troops. This handover occurred amid reported ammunition shortages for Wagner and escalating disputes between its leader and Russian military command over and credit for the . Ukrainian officials contested full Russian control, asserting that their forces retained small pockets within the city and conducted counterattacks on its northern and southern flanks, recapturing some ground in the suburbs by late May. Further Ukrainian counteroffensives in subsequent months recaptured nearby villages such as Andriivka on September 15, 2023, and Klishchiivka on September 17, 2023, though Bakhmut itself remained under Russian control. The front line around Bakhmut subsequently stagnated, with limited advances by either side. Russian forces shifted to "mopping-up" operations in early June 2023 to eliminate remaining Ukrainian holdouts amid the city's , though progress was slowed by the destruction and Wagner's rapid exit, which left gaps in defensive lines. A detailed released on June 21, 2023, revealed extensive devastation, with over 80% of 's buildings damaged or destroyed, complicating efforts to secure and rebuild supply routes. Ukrainian commanders redirected resources away from toward broader counteroffensive preparations elsewhere, while maintaining localized pressure to prevent Russian consolidation, as evidenced by reported advances south of the city in late May. The transition exposed vulnerabilities in Russian command structure, with Wagner's departure—initially planned for May 10 but delayed—leaving approximately 8,000 convict recruits and regular units to hold the area, amid Prigozhin's public criticisms of inadequate support from . By early , Russian claimed stabilized defenses around , but independent assessments noted stalled offensives beyond the city due to exhausted assault units and high exceeding 100,000 combined for both sides in the battle. Ukrainian President described as "destroyed" but emphasized its value in inflicting disproportionate losses on Russian forces, framing the defense as a tactical attrition success despite the territorial loss.

Long-Term Military Lessons

The Battle of Bakhmut exemplified the resurgence of attrition warfare in urban environments, where attackers face exponential casualty rates due to fortified positions, rubble cover, and integrated defensive fires. Russian Wagner Group forces, employing small assault teams of three to five personnel supported by heavy artillery barrages and loitering munitions like the Lancet drone, achieved incremental advances through repeated probes and human-wave tactics using convict recruits, sustaining 60% casualty rates in those units without collapsing operational tempo. This approach captured the city by May 2023 after nine months of fighting, but at a confirmed cost of 19,547 Wagner fatalities—mostly low-skill infantry—with a comparable number severely wounded, yielding an initial 4:1 loss ratio favoring Ukrainian defenders. Ukrainian forces, holding elevated ruins with drones for spotting and precision strikes, inflicted these losses but suffered around 10,000 killed or severely wounded, disproportionately among experienced units, which eroded tactical proficiency for subsequent operations. The lesson underscores that urban assaults demand combined-arms integration and tolerance for high attrition, but mass infantry tactics remain inefficient against prepared defenses without air superiority or technological overmatch, favoring defenders who prioritize isolation over full clearing. A core implication for modern militaries is the imperative of force preservation amid positional stalemates, as Bakhmut's —despite negligible strategic value post-devastation—drew disproportionate commitments, depleting Ukraine's cadre and seeding inexperienced formations for later counteroffensives. Wagner's success stemmed from scalable "storm group" methods, later adopted by Russian regular units as detachments, emphasizing fire suppression, minimal maneuver, and rapid exploitation of breaches in networks. However, reliance on expendable recruits highlighted manpower limits; peer adversaries with smaller populations cannot replicate such losses indefinitely without industrial and adaptations. Armies must train for flexible shifts between defense and localized counterattacks, integrate unmanned systems for and strikes to mitigate transparency risks, and develop doctrines prioritizing maneuver over fixation on secondary objectives, as prolonged urban attrition amplifies logistical strains and erodes . Broader doctrinal shifts include recognizing urban battles' political amplification, where tactical gains like Bakhmut's fall bolstered Russian and but failed to enable operational breakthroughs, reinforcing trench-dominated fronts that persisted in the stagnant post-battle period. For Western forces, accustomed to maneuver-centric paradigms, Bakhmut signals the need to revive attrition-resistant , invest in scalable small-unit urban tactics, and counter enemy mass with precision effects from drones and , while avoiding politically driven overcommitments that forfeit initiative. Failure to adapt risks replicating the battle's pyrrhic dynamics in future high-intensity conflicts, where technological enablers like FPV drones and electronic warfare extend defensive edges but cannot substitute for disciplined force employment.

References

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