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Battle of Chunj
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Battle of Chunj
The Battle of Chunj, also known as the Chunj Operation, was a military campaign fought between Pakistani and Indian forces from 25 June until 23 November 1948, during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948. The Indian 163rd Brigade first advanced from Handwara to Tithwal and from Uri to Urusa. The 163rd Brigade then launched an offensive from Tithwal, raising a threat to Pakistani-held Muzaffarabad. The move caused much panic in the Pakistani high command. The capture of Domel was the main objective of the Indian offensive. Domel, only 18 miles (29 km) from Tithwal, was a key position for the Pakistan Army to hold in Muzaffarabad.
The 10th Brigade of the Pakistan Army, under Brigadier Haji Iftikhar Ahmad, was tasked to stop the Indian advance, and defend Muzaffarabad at all costs. The Pakistani high command also consider it necessary to drive out the Indian troops from the heights of the Chunj range and push the Indian troops back to the left bank of the Neelum River, also known as the Kishanganga River. Because of the evacuation of all the advanced positions across the river, the Indian command considered it a major loss.
The Indian forces had gained success by capturing Tithwal earlier, but with the fall of the Chunj feature to Pakistan, the summer offensive of the Indian army from Tithwal towards Muzaffarabad failed. The Pakistani advance added a huge area to the Pakistani controlled side on the left bank of the Neelum River. Major Alan Macfarlane Sloan, a British engineer officer and professional soldier fighting for the Pakistanis, was praised for his actions which led to the capture of crucial peaks in the Tithwal area in July 1948. The Pakistani forces switched their focus towards the Chakothi area after achieving victory in Tithwal. Later, another victory in Pandu by the Pakistanis pushed the Indians out of the Pandu feature, a commanding position over other nearby features, a noteworthy achievement in the conflict. Stalemate ensued afterwards in this sector until ceasefires took effect on 1 January 1949.
In May 1948, the Indian 163rd Brigade launched an offensive in Tithwal sector which raised the threat to Muzaffarabad after their forces advanced from Handwara to Tithwal and from Uri to Urusa. The advance caused much panic and desperation in the Pakistani high command. The capture of Domel was the main objective of the Indian offensive. Domel, only 18 miles (29 km) from Tithwal, is a neighborhood in Muzaffarabad, and was a formidable key position for the Pakistani command to defend and hold.
The 10th Brigade of the Pakistan Army under Brigadier Haji Iftikhar Ahmad was tasked to stop the Indian advance and defend Muzaffarabad at all costs. The Pakistani high command also considered it necessary to drive out the Indian troops from the heights of the Chunj range and push the Indian troops back to the left bank of the Neelum River. The 4th Battalion of the 16th Punjab regiment was also called into the warzone in Kashmir from Abbottabad right after finishing Operation Curzon on 29 February 1948.
It was tasked to halt the advance of Indian troops from the road of Domel to Uri, consisting of troops formed from Azad Kashmir and tribesmen excluding the regiments own troops. Then later in 24 May it was instructed to immediately move in Tithwal sector. The regular troops of India and Pakistan fought each other from May onward.
Pir Sahaba ridge, Point 7302 and Point 7229 were occupied by the Indian forces after facing a lack of opposition from Pakistani troops. After the reconnaissance sortie made by Colonel Khan, he called a session related to their approach to the positions of the Indian forces. Colonel Khan ascertained the intentions and strength of the Indian troops, and informed his team about the detailed intelligence available to him. His plan was to use attrition warfare to distort the Indian advance by using selective groups.
These groups were to inflict maximum attrition on Indian forces and occupy the heights within the given rations and ammo. This led to confusion among the Indian forces, and would result in their troops regrouping for the defense of the area. Colonel Khan would make further reconnaissance sorties and partner with raiding patrols. The unit successfully halted the Indian advance by deceiving them.
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Battle of Chunj
The Battle of Chunj, also known as the Chunj Operation, was a military campaign fought between Pakistani and Indian forces from 25 June until 23 November 1948, during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948. The Indian 163rd Brigade first advanced from Handwara to Tithwal and from Uri to Urusa. The 163rd Brigade then launched an offensive from Tithwal, raising a threat to Pakistani-held Muzaffarabad. The move caused much panic in the Pakistani high command. The capture of Domel was the main objective of the Indian offensive. Domel, only 18 miles (29 km) from Tithwal, was a key position for the Pakistan Army to hold in Muzaffarabad.
The 10th Brigade of the Pakistan Army, under Brigadier Haji Iftikhar Ahmad, was tasked to stop the Indian advance, and defend Muzaffarabad at all costs. The Pakistani high command also consider it necessary to drive out the Indian troops from the heights of the Chunj range and push the Indian troops back to the left bank of the Neelum River, also known as the Kishanganga River. Because of the evacuation of all the advanced positions across the river, the Indian command considered it a major loss.
The Indian forces had gained success by capturing Tithwal earlier, but with the fall of the Chunj feature to Pakistan, the summer offensive of the Indian army from Tithwal towards Muzaffarabad failed. The Pakistani advance added a huge area to the Pakistani controlled side on the left bank of the Neelum River. Major Alan Macfarlane Sloan, a British engineer officer and professional soldier fighting for the Pakistanis, was praised for his actions which led to the capture of crucial peaks in the Tithwal area in July 1948. The Pakistani forces switched their focus towards the Chakothi area after achieving victory in Tithwal. Later, another victory in Pandu by the Pakistanis pushed the Indians out of the Pandu feature, a commanding position over other nearby features, a noteworthy achievement in the conflict. Stalemate ensued afterwards in this sector until ceasefires took effect on 1 January 1949.
In May 1948, the Indian 163rd Brigade launched an offensive in Tithwal sector which raised the threat to Muzaffarabad after their forces advanced from Handwara to Tithwal and from Uri to Urusa. The advance caused much panic and desperation in the Pakistani high command. The capture of Domel was the main objective of the Indian offensive. Domel, only 18 miles (29 km) from Tithwal, is a neighborhood in Muzaffarabad, and was a formidable key position for the Pakistani command to defend and hold.
The 10th Brigade of the Pakistan Army under Brigadier Haji Iftikhar Ahmad was tasked to stop the Indian advance and defend Muzaffarabad at all costs. The Pakistani high command also considered it necessary to drive out the Indian troops from the heights of the Chunj range and push the Indian troops back to the left bank of the Neelum River. The 4th Battalion of the 16th Punjab regiment was also called into the warzone in Kashmir from Abbottabad right after finishing Operation Curzon on 29 February 1948.
It was tasked to halt the advance of Indian troops from the road of Domel to Uri, consisting of troops formed from Azad Kashmir and tribesmen excluding the regiments own troops. Then later in 24 May it was instructed to immediately move in Tithwal sector. The regular troops of India and Pakistan fought each other from May onward.
Pir Sahaba ridge, Point 7302 and Point 7229 were occupied by the Indian forces after facing a lack of opposition from Pakistani troops. After the reconnaissance sortie made by Colonel Khan, he called a session related to their approach to the positions of the Indian forces. Colonel Khan ascertained the intentions and strength of the Indian troops, and informed his team about the detailed intelligence available to him. His plan was to use attrition warfare to distort the Indian advance by using selective groups.
These groups were to inflict maximum attrition on Indian forces and occupy the heights within the given rations and ammo. This led to confusion among the Indian forces, and would result in their troops regrouping for the defense of the area. Colonel Khan would make further reconnaissance sorties and partner with raiding patrols. The unit successfully halted the Indian advance by deceiving them.
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