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Battle of Samana
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| Battle of Samana | |||||||
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| Part of Mughal-Sikh Wars | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
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| Strength | |||||||
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3,000 Cavalry 5,000 Infantry 8,000 Total | 10,000+ | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 20 to 80 were killed | 50,000 Mughal, Children, Women, Were Massacred | ||||||
The Battle of Samana was fought between the Khalsa under the leadership of Banda Singh Bahadur and the Mughal Government of Samana in 1709. Following the battle, Banda Singh Bahadur shook the administration of Delhi.[5]
Background
[edit]Samana was a town where executioners Sayyed Jalal-ud-din, Shashal Beg and Bashal Beg lived. Sayyed Jalal-ud-din was responsible for the execution of Sikh Guru Teg Bahadur, whereas, Shashal Beg and Bashal Beg were responsible for the execution of Guru Gobind Singh's two children.[6][7]
Battle
[edit]The Sikhs had 3,000 horsemen and 5,000 foot-soldiers.[8] The commander of Samana had his town well defended. Banda advanced with speed during the night and reached the gates of Samana by the dawn of November 26. Once the gate-keepers were killed the whole army charged into the town. The executioners of Guru Tegh Bahadur and his grandchildren were killed.[8] The peasantry of the neighborhood joined Banda Singh's army of 8,000, looking to wreak vengeance upon their expropriating zamindars (feudal lords) and together with Banda and his army entered the town from all sides, killed thousands of the city's inhabitants and razed the town.[6][9][10][4] Nearly 10,000 Muslims are said to have been massacred in the town and a great amount of wealth was obtained.[11][12]
Aftermath
[edit]After the successful expedition against Samana, Banda Singh Bahadur established the First Sikh State and appointed Fateh Singh as the Governor of Samana.[8][13] Later, some important towns on the way to Sirhind were plundered, especially as they could provide military assistance to Sirhind.[14][15] Banda also forcibly took supplies from the villagers and plundered Ambala on the way.[16] The villages of Kunjpura, Ghuram and Thaska were also destroyed by the Sikhs, which were inhabited by Muslim Ranghars, who committed atrocities against the general population.[17]
References
[edit]- ^ Joon, Rs (2017-04-20). "Foreword to History: A Novel". University of Illinois Press. 1: 179–180. doi:10.5406/illinois/9780252039003.003.0023.
While on his way to Punjab, Banda Bairagi broke his journey at Sehri - Khandaa a Jat village of Dahiya Gotra, 20 miles west of Delhi. From there he dispatched letters to all the Jathedars of the Panth to concentrate forthwith. He planned to attack and loot the Royal treasury by and by the Sikhs started arriving and the strength of the force rose to 14000. He attached Samana, overran Sadhora
- ^ Sagoo 2001, p. 124.
- ^ Jacques, Tony (2007). Dictionary of Battles and Sieges. Greenwood Press. p. 891. ISBN 978-0-313-33536-5.
- ^ a b Jacques, p. 892
- ^ Alexander Mikaberidze (31 July 2011). Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia: A Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. pp. 120–. ISBN 978-1-59884-337-8. Retrieved 15 September 2013.
- ^ a b Sagoo 2001, p. 125.
- ^ Singh, Patwant (2007). The Sikhs. Crown Publishing Group. p. 68. ISBN 9780307429339.
- ^ a b c Singh and Singh, Daljeet and Kharak (1997). Sikhism its Philosophy and History. Nagar, Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies. p. 426. ISBN 81-85815-03-8.
- ^ Journal of Indian History. Department of Modern Indian History, 1981. 1981. p. 209.
The peasantry joined hands with the Sikhs and did not hesitate to wreak vengeance upon their expropriating landlords.
- ^ Grewal, J. S. (1998-10-08). The Sikhs of the Punjab. Cambridge University Press. p. 82. ISBN 978-0-521-63764-0.
- ^ Gupta, Hari Ram (1944). Studies in Later Mughal History of the Panjab, 1707-1793. p. 46.
- ^ Singh, Ganda (1950). A Short History of the Sikhs. Orient Longmans. p. 79.
- ^ Gandhi, Surjit (1999). Sikhs In The Eighteenth Century. p. 28.
- ^ Gandhi 1999, p. 28.
- ^ Sagoo, Harbans Kaur (2001). Banda Singh Bahadur and Sikh Sovereignty. Deep & Deep Publications. p. 124. ISBN 9788176293006.
- ^ Macauliffe, Max Arthur (2013-03-28). The Sikh Religion: Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors. Cambridge University Press. p. 247. ISBN 978-1-108-05547-5.
- ^ Gupta, Hari Ram (1999) [1937]. History of the Sikhs: Evolution of Sikh Confederacies (1708-69) (PDF). Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. p. 9. ISBN 9788121502481.
Battle of Samana
View on GrokipediaHistorical Context
Mughal Persecution of Sikhs
The ninth Sikh Guru, Tegh Bahadur, was executed on November 11, 1675, in Delhi on direct orders from Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb after refusing demands to convert to Islam or perform miracles to prove his spiritual authority.[3] The Guru's arrest stemmed from his intervention to protect Kashmiri Pandits from Aurangzeb's campaign of forced conversions, which involved demolishing temples and imposing discriminatory taxes like the reintroduced jizya on non-Muslims in 1679, exacerbating economic burdens on Sikh communities in Punjab.[3] [4] These policies reflected Aurangzeb's broader orthodoxy-driven intolerance toward non-Muslim groups, including Sikhs, whom he viewed as a growing challenge to imperial authority through their emphasis on equality and resistance to conversion.[4] Persecution escalated after the formation of the Khalsa military order by the tenth Guru, Gobind Singh, on April 13, 1699, at Anandpur Sahib, which militarized Sikhs as a direct response to ongoing Mughal encroachments and symbolized defiance against religious subjugation. Mughal governors (faujdar) in Punjab, empowered to enforce imperial edicts, responded with intensified suppression, including raids on Sikh gatherings, confiscation of lands, and punitive taxation that targeted Khalsa adherents for their refusal to submit to Islamic law or pay arbitrary levies beyond standard revenue demands. This pattern of abuses peaked with military assaults on Guru Gobind Singh's forts, culminating in the battles of Anandpur and Chamkaur in late 1704, where his two elder sons were killed, and the subsequent capture of his younger sons by Mughal forces.[5] The town of Samana, a Mughal-aligned settlement dominated by Sayyid families, exemplified local complicity in these atrocities, as it was the origin of the executioners Shashal Beg and Bashal Beg, who carried out the bricking alive of Guru Gobind Singh's youngest sons—Sahibzada Zorawar Singh (aged 9) and Sahibzada Fateh Singh (aged 6)—in Sirhind on December 26, 1705, under faujdar Wazir Khan's orders after they refused conversion.[6] [1] Wazir Khan, as Sirhind's governor, had overseen prior massacres of Sikhs and enforced Aurangzeb's directives with particular zeal, including public executions to deter Khalsa recruitment and suppress Sikh proselytization in the region.[6] Such acts, rooted in a policy of exemplary violence to maintain Mughal hegemony, fueled Sikh perceptions of systemic existential threat, framing subsequent resistance as defensive retribution against perpetrators of religiously motivated killings and cultural erasure rather than mere rebellion.[4]Banda Singh Bahadur's Background and Commissioning
Banda Singh Bahadur was born Lachman Dev on October 16, 1670, in Rajauri in the Jammu region to a Rajput family of agriculturists.[7] At age fifteen, disturbed by killing a pregnant doe while hunting, he abandoned his martial pursuits and family, adopting the ascetic life of a Bairagi under the guidance of a sadhu named Janaki Prasad, eventually known as Madho Das.[7] He settled near the Godavari River at Nanded in Maharashtra, where he practiced renunciation and reportedly acquired esoteric powers through yoga and meditation over sixteen years.[8] On September 3, 1708, Guru Gobind Singh arrived at Madho Das's dera in Nanded and, through spiritual confrontation, compelled the ascetic to submit; the following day, Madho Das accepted Khalsa initiation, receiving the name Banda Singh Bahadur.[7] The Guru directed him to Punjab to combat Mughal tyranny, explicitly tasking him with avenging the martyrdoms of Sikhs, including the bricking alive of his two younger sons (Sahibzadas) by Wazir Khan at Sirhind, and to uproot oppression while establishing independent Sikh rule.[9] As symbols of temporal authority, Guru Gobind Singh bestowed five arrows, a Nishan Sahib (Sikh flag), and a nagara (war drum), dispatching him with five advisory Sikhs and twenty-five warrior companions to mobilize resistance.[9] [8] This commissioning marked Banda's pivot from passive asceticism to active militancy, grounded in the empirical reality of Mughal persecution against Sikhs, which had escalated under Aurangzeb and continued post-1707.[7] En route from Nanded, Banda halted at various locales to recruit, arriving at the Punjab border by early 1709 and appealing to Jat peasants dispossessed by zamindari exactions and other marginalized groups chafing under imperial revenue demands.[10] By November 1709, near Sonepat, his forces numbered about 500, comprising initial Sikh adherents supplemented by local Jat recruits drawn to the promise of land redistribution and retribution against faujdar oppression.[10]Prelude to the Battle
Strategic Selection of Samana
Banda Singh Bahadur selected Samana as the initial target of his 1709 campaign against Mughal authority due to its notoriety as a hub for executioners involved in the martyrdoms of Sikh Gurus, including Jalal-ud-Din, the executioner of Guru Tegh Bahadur in 1675, who hailed from the town.[11][12] This symbolic significance made Samana a focal point for retribution against Mughal-aligned oppression, aiming to avenge historical Sikh persecutions and demonstrate the Khalsa's resolve in confronting symbols of tyranny.[1] Practically, Samana's status as a prosperous Mughal-administered town offered substantial economic incentives through plunder, which was essential for sustaining Banda's nascent forces and funding subsequent operations against imperial outposts.[11] The town's wealth, derived from its role as a regional center, allowed the Sikh army to seize resources that disrupted local Mughal supply networks and bolstered their mobility toward Delhi-linked territories.[12] The choice also served psychological objectives, rallying Sikh morale by targeting a site emblematic of past atrocities and signaling vulnerability in Mughal defenses to potential recruits among oppressed peasantry and converts, thereby accelerating the momentum of rebellion without immediate confrontation of larger garrisons like Sirhind.[1] This calculated strike on November 26, 1709, established an early victory that propagated the Khalsa's capability for territorial assertion.[11]Mobilization of Sikh Forces
Following his arrival in Punjab in early 1709, Banda Singh Bahadur issued edicts summoning Sikhs from the Majha, Doaba, and Malwa regions to assemble for resistance against Mughal oppression, rapidly gathering volunteers driven by vengeance for the martyrdoms under Aurangzeb and loyalty to Guru Gobind Singh's Khalsa. These forces comprised irregular fighters, primarily Jat Sikh peasants and lower-caste Hindus from tribes including Bhullar, Brar, Dhaliwal, and Dhillon, totaling estimates of 4,000–5,000 horsemen and 7,000–8,000 foot soldiers by the time of the Samana campaign, supplemented by some Muslims and merchants providing logistical support.[13][1] The mobilization emphasized Khalsa ideological unity, enforcing discipline through the Rahit code that abolished caste-based hierarchies in command, enabling warriors of varied backgrounds to rise on merit and devotion rather than birth, while battle cries invoking Guru Gobind Singh such as "Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal" reinforced collective resolve against the professional Mughal army.[13] This ragtag yet fervent host contrasted sharply with Mughal regulars, relying on shared purpose over formal training to sustain cohesion during the buildup. In mid-November 1709, the assembled forces departed from strategic camps in the Punjab hills, such as areas near Muktsar and Ludhiana, executing a stealthy march that evaded major Mughal patrols to preserve surprise for the target. Armament consisted of traditional and improvised weapons procured through community sales and merchant aid from Malwa, including swords, spears, shields, bows with quivers, knives, sticks, and limited matchlocks, prioritizing mobility and close-quarters combat over artillery.[13][1] The assault commenced on November 26, 1709, after a night march to the town's gates at dawn.[1]Opposing Forces
Composition of Banda's Khalsa Army
Banda Singh Bahadur commanded the Khalsa army during the assault on Samana on November 26, 1709, with forces estimated at around 8,000 combatants, comprising a core of battle-hardened Khalsa Sikhs supplemented by peasant levies from Punjab villages who joined seeking retribution against Mughal oppression.[1] These recruits, often from agrarian backgrounds, brought numerical strength but limited formal training, relying on the discipline of veteran warriors to cohere the irregular force.[14] Key leadership fell to Banda himself, advised by a council of five senior Khalsa figures dispatched by Guru Gobind Singh, including Baj Singh—a descendant of Guru Amar Das—and his brother Ram Singh, who coordinated contingents and tactical decisions.[15] This structure emphasized decentralized command among trusted captains, blending spiritual authority with martial expertise to direct the mixed levies effectively. Armament was rudimentary and suited to mobile warfare, featuring matchlock muskets for ranged fire, swords and spears for close combat, and bows for skirmishing, with a focus on cavalry charges leveraging horses from local Sikh stock rather than siege artillery, which the army lacked in significant quantity at this early stage.[14] The army's cohesion derived from intense morale fueled by vows of vengeance for the 1705 martyrdom of Guru Gobind Singh's younger sons, Zorawar Singh and Fateh Singh, at the hands of Sirhind's governor Wazir Khan, as well as broader Sikh grievances over familial executions and forced conversions, transforming personal and communal outrage into fanatical resolve.[16][17] This ideological motivation offset material disadvantages, enabling sustained aggression despite the levies' inexperience.Mughal Garrison and Local Defenses
The defenses of Samana were commanded by the local faujdar and key officials, including the Sayyid executioner Jalal-ud-din, whose family had long-standing enmity with the Sikh community stemming from roles in prior persecutions under Mughal rule.[1][18] The garrison comprised regular Mughal troops, Pathan warriors, and local Muslim militia, relying on the town's predominantly Islamic population for support.[19][20] Estimates of defending forces varied, but historical accounts indicate several thousand combatants, emphasizing numerical superiority over disciplined irregular Sikh challengers.[21] Samana's fortifications included encircling stone walls and numerous havelis fortified as secondary strongpoints, armed with matchlock guns and artillery to repel assaults.[20] The town maintained grain stores and drew sustenance from tribute exacted from surrounding villages, enabling sustained defense against sieges. As a Mughal minting center, it amassed resources that bolstered its military preparedness.[22] However, overreliance on these fixed defenses and underestimation of Banda Singh Bahadur—perceived as an untested ascetic leading peasant levies—exposed vulnerabilities, compounded by potential fissures among local elites and conscripts lacking unified command.[23]Course of the Battle
Initial Sikh Assault
In late November 1709, Banda Singh Bahadur's Khalsa forces initiated their assault on Samana, a fortified Mughal stronghold approximately 50 kilometers north of Sirhind, by approaching under cover of darkness and launching a coordinated strike at dawn on November 26.[1] This surprise element disrupted the garrison's preparedness, as the Sikhs—numbering around 3,000 to 5,000 irregular warriors primarily armed with swords, spears, and limited matchlocks—encircled the town's perimeter, preventing immediate organized resistance from the roughly 2,000-4,000 Mughal troops and local militia inside.[24] The attackers' ideological commitment, fueled by grievances over prior Mughal persecutions including the execution of Guru Tegh Bahadur by Samana's resident Sayyid Jalal-ud-din, imparted a momentum that compensated for their material disadvantages against better-provisioned defenders.[25] The opening phase emphasized rapid penetration of the outer mud-brick walls and gates, with Sikh detachments employing direct scaling attempts and incendiary tactics to create breaches amid the chaos. Targeted strikes on Mughal officers further fragmented command cohesion, as the Khalsa prioritized eliminating key leaders to sow disarray among the ranks, leveraging their familiarity with guerrilla-style engagements honed in Punjab's hill tracts. This approach exploited the garrison's overconfidence in Samana's defenses, which included rudimentary ramparts but lacked rapid reinforcement due to the seasonal timing in the onset of winter, when overland travel from regional centers like Sirhind became logistically challenging.[11] By midday, the initial surge had secured footholds within the town's periphery, demonstrating how the Sikhs' disciplined fervor—manifest in their refusal to retreat despite casualties—overpowered the defenders' initial volleys, setting the stage for deeper incursions without awaiting pitched field engagements.[24] Mughal accounts, though sparse, acknowledge the swiftness of this onset as a factor in the garrison's failure to mount a unified counterattack early on.[26]Fall of Samana's Fortifications
The Sikh forces under Banda Singh Bahadur, having breached the outer town gates in a dawn surprise attack on November 26, 1709, advanced toward Samana's central fortifications, which included a sturdy Mughal citadel defended by artillery positions.[1] The garrison, comprising Mughal regulars and local levies, mounted a defense from the walls, firing cannon and musket volleys, but the Sikhs exploited the element of shock to press forward without a prolonged siege, avoiding the resource drain of extended encirclement.[23] This rapid approach reflected tactical realism, as the defenders, though prepared with artillery, proved complacent after years of unchallenged dominance in the region.[24] Over the ensuing day, the assault intensified with direct storming of the fort's gates, where Sikh warriors employed ladders and battering techniques amid heavy resistance.[1] Hand-to-hand combat ensued in the breach points, leveraging the Khalsa's discipline in close-quarters fighting—honed through guerrilla experience—against the garrison's more static formations, which faltered under the ferocity of coordinated Sikh charges.[24] Local support from aggrieved peasants, resentful of the Sayyid family's extortionate tax farming that had burdened the agrarian populace, aided the breakthrough by providing intelligence and possibly diverting defender attention, though no mass desertions are recorded.[1] By the following night, the citadel fell, enabling full Sikh control.[23]The capture culminated symbolically with the assertion of Khalsa authority over the citadel, marking Samana as the first territorial conquest by Sikh forces independent of Mughal oversight and signaling a shift from rebellion to governance.[1] This event underscored the vulnerabilities of isolated Mughal strongholds to mobile, ideologically motivated assaults, where numerical parity was overcome by speed and resolve rather than heavy siege equipment.[23]
