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Battleship Row
Battleship Row
Battleship Row
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The formation of ships in Battleship Row (USS Vestal not shown)

Battleship Row was the grouping of seven U.S. battleships in port at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, when the Japanese attacked on 7 December 1941.[1] These ships bore the brunt of the Japanese assault. They were moored next to Ford Island when the attack commenced. The ships were Arizona, California, Maryland, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia. A repair ship (former coal ship), Vestal, was also present, moored next to Arizona.[1]

Creation

[edit]

When the United States Navy decided in 1919 to establish a major naval base in Pearl Harbor, the southeastern side of Ford Island was ceded from control of the Army Air Service at the behest of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. Due to its location in the center of the harbor, where the water was deepest and the potential for maneuvering greater than along the shores, this coast of Ford Island became the de facto mooring location for the Pacific Fleet's battleships and took on the nickname "Battleship Row".

Attack and aftermath

[edit]
Japanese planes attacking Battleship Row, as seen from the southwest. Ford Island is in the center of the picture, and Battleship Row is behind the island.

Arizona, California, Oklahoma, and West Virginia were sunk during the attack (albeit, California and West Virginia were refloated and rejoined the fleet in 1944). Arizona suffered the most serious damage and loss of life, an explosion in a forward magazine breaking the hull in two. Of the other four battleships, Nevada suffered damage sufficient to keep her non-operational until late 1942; Tennessee and Maryland, although damaged, returned to service in early 1942.[1] Pennsylvania was in dry dock, making attack difficult, and, as a result, was relatively undamaged. Vestal was also damaged. Battleship Row was not visible from Hickam Field because of the thick black smoke. Following the attack, operations immediately commenced to refloat and repair the damaged ships. The first to be completed was Nevada on 19 April 1942. By the end of the war, all except Arizona and Oklahoma had returned to service. Each of the six surviving battleships saw service in the Pacific island hopping campaign. Nevada also served in the Atlantic and supported the invasion of Normandy. All six were decommissioned soon after the war was over. Nevada and Pennsylvania were expended in atomic bomb tests in the Pacific.[1] The rest were scrapped in the late 1950s. Oklahoma was eventually refloated but not repaired, and capsized and sank while being towed back to the mainland for scrapping. Arizona's hull remains a memorial, one of the most popular tourist attractions on the island.[1]

An aerial view of Battleship Row moorings on the southern side of Ford Island, three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In upper left is the sunken California, with smaller vessels clustered around her. Diagonally, from left center to lower right are: Maryland, lightly damaged, with the capsized Oklahoma outboard. A barge is alongside Oklahoma, supporting rescue efforts.[1] Tennessee, lightly damaged, with the sunken West Virginia outboard. Arizona, sunk, with her hull shattered by the explosion of the magazines below the two forward turrets. The dark oil streaks on the harbor surface originate from the sunken battleships.

Utah was in port at Pearl Harbor, but was not moored with the rest of the battleships, as she had since been converted to a target ship. However, she was still sunk within a few minutes of the battle.[1]

Ships that were attacked

[edit]
  • Arizona: (flagship of Battleship Division One) hit by two armor-piercing bombs, exploded; total loss. 1,177 dead.
  • Oklahoma: hit by nine torpedoes, capsized; total loss. 429 dead. Refloated November 1943; capsized and lost while under tow to the mainland May 1947.
  • Utah: hit by two torpedoes, capsized; total loss. 58 dead. Was commissioned as a target ship at the time of the attack and was docked on the west side of Ford Island, opposite Battleship Row.
  • West Virginia: hit by two bombs, nine torpedoes, sunk; returned to service July 1944. 106 dead.
  • California: hit by two bombs, two torpedoes, sunk; returned to service January 1944. 104 dead.
  • Nevada: hit by six bombs, one torpedo, beached at Hospital Point; after attack, moved across channel and later sunk at Waipio Peninusula; returned to service October 1942. 60 dead.
  • Tennessee: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 5 dead.
  • Maryland: hit by two bombs; returned to service February 1942. 4 dead (including floatplane pilot shot down).
  • Pennsylvania (flagship of the U.S. Pacific Fleet):[2] in drydock with Cassin and Downes, hit by one bomb, debris from USS Cassin; remained in service. 15 dead, 14 missing.

See also

[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Pearl Harbor attack.
Wikimedia Commons has media related to USS Arizona Memorial.

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Battleship Row

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from Grokipedia
Battleship Row was the designation for the mooring quays along the southeast shore of in , , where seven battleships were berthed on the morning of , 1941, at the outset of the Japanese surprise attack. These vessels—USS Arizona (BB-39), USS California (BB-44), USS Maryland (BB-46), USS Nevada (BB-36), USS Oklahoma (BB-37), USS Tennessee (BB-43), and USS West Virginia (BB-48)—represented the core of American battleship strength in the Pacific Fleet and were moored in pairs, with outer ships exposed to torpedoes. The strategic positioning along Battleship Row, chosen for the deepest water in the harbor, made these capital ships prime targets for the Imperial Japanese Navy's , which struck in two waves to neutralize U.S. naval power. The assault inflicted severe damage: Arizona suffered a catastrophic magazine explosion that killed 1,177 crewmen and rendered her a total loss, while Oklahoma capsized after multiple torpedo hits, claiming 429 lives; California and West Virginia also sank but were later salvaged. Nevada, the sole battleship to attempt escape under fire, was heavily bombed and beached to avoid blocking the channel; Maryland and Tennessee endured bomb damage but remained afloat. Remarkably, six of the seven battleships on Battleship Row were eventually repaired and returned to service, underscoring the resilience of U.S. naval infrastructure despite the initial devastation that propelled America into World War II. The USS Pennsylvania (BB-38), though not on the row proper but in nearby drydock, was also struck, highlighting the concentrated vulnerability of the fleet's heavy units. This event transformed Battleship Row from a symbol of prewar complacency into a memorial site, with the submerged remains of designated a national cemetery and enduring for over 900 unidentified sailors. The attack's tactical success in crippling operations—yet failure to destroy carriers, repair facilities, or fuel depots—shifted paradigms toward carrier dominance, influencing Allied throughout the Pacific campaign.

Origins and Strategic Context

Establishment and Composition

was initially surveyed for potential naval use in 1873, but significant development began after the annexed in 1898, with authorizing the in May 1908 and allocating nearly $3 million for construction. The base expanded steadily through 1919, including dredging the channel and constructing facilities around , which became central to operations due to its position in the harbor. emerged as the designated mooring area along the southeast shore of in the , optimized for berthing capital ships where water depths allowed safe anchoring for large vessels. By late 1941, Battleship Row hosted seven U.S. Navy battleships from the Pacific Fleet's Battle Force: the USS Arizona (BB-39), USS California (BB-44), USS Maryland (BB-46), USS Nevada (BB-36), USS Oklahoma (BB-37), USS Tennessee (BB-43), and USS West Virginia (BB-48). These ships, representing the core of American battleship strength in the Pacific, were moored in a linear arrangement along the quays, with the USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) stationed separately in drydock at the nearby shipyard. The tight clustering of battleships on Battleship Row stemmed from the harbor's constrained , which limited dispersal options and necessitated grouped moorings to maximize use of available deep-water berths. This arrangement facilitated , including shared access to facilities, lines, and handling, aligning with interwar U.S. naval that emphasized concentrated formations for fleet maneuvers and readiness exercises.

Pre-War Role in Pacific Defense

Battleship Row served as the primary mooring for the U.S. Pacific Fleet's battleships, embodying the core of American naval power projection in the Pacific theater during the . Under the of 1922, which capped U.S. at 525,000 tons and restricted new construction to promote stability among signatories including , these vessels symbolized restrained yet formidable deterrence against expansionist threats. By the late 1930s, the fleet's eight to nine , including Colorado-class and Pennsylvania-class ships, formed the striking nucleus for , which envisioned a trans-Pacific advance to engage Japanese forces in a decisive surface battle near the . Annual Fleet Problems from the 1920s through 1930s simulated defensive operations for and the , with battleships leading formations to counter hypothetical Japanese incursions, as in Fleet Problem IX of 1929 where 72 percent of available battleships tested scouting and fleet maneuvers across vast ocean distances. These exercises underscored the Row's operational centrality in deterring Japanese aggression amid escalating tensions over and , culminating in the U.S. oil embargo of July 1941, which froze Japanese assets and aimed to curb expansion without immediate war, positioning the Pearl Harbor-based fleet as a visible check on Tokyo's ambitions. The of July 19, 1940, authorized seven additional battleships among 257 warships to bolster two-front capabilities, reinforcing battleships' doctrinal primacy despite emerging carrier roles. While 1930s wargames, such as those demonstrating carrier strikes on anchored fleets, highlighted vulnerabilities to air power—evident in simulated attacks on analogs—U.S. retained battleships as fleet anchors, with peacetime berthing in tight formation on the Row reflecting overconfidence in their armored invulnerability and harbor defenses. This persistence, even as carriers proved scouting and strike efficacy in exercises like Fleet Problem XII, contributed to strategic complacency against aerial threats from a peer adversary.

The Japanese Assault

Planning and Execution

Admiral , commander of the , advocated for a preemptive carrier-based air strike on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at to neutralize its force and secure Japan's initial conquests in , recognizing that a prolonged war with the industrial superior would likely end in defeat without such a decisive blow. Influenced by the British Royal Navy's successful November 1940 carrier raid on , which demonstrated the vulnerability of anchored s to aerial torpedo attacks in confined harbors, Yamamoto's planners adapted similar tactics, emphasizing surprise and coordination to target Battleship Row where the U.S. battleships were routinely moored. The Japanese strike force, designated Kido Butai and commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, departed secretly from Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands on November 26, 1941, maintaining strict and a northerly route across the North Pacific to evade detection, arriving within striking range undetected by December 7. Planning incorporated intelligence on U.S. routines, anticipating that battleships would be in port over the weekend with reduced readiness, allowing the first wave to exploit initial shock. Reconnaissance efforts relied heavily on Takeo Yoshikawa, a Japanese naval reserve officer posing as a in , who from March 1941 systematically observed and cabled details of ship movements, berthings on Battleship Row, and anti-submarine defenses via the Japanese consulate's diplomatic codes, confirming the presence of eight battleships including their positions along the southeast shore of . Supplementary aerial overflights by Japanese floatplanes from submarines provided last-minute verification of the fleet's disposition on December 6-7, while the "East Wind Rain" code phrase transmitted through Japanese diplomatic channels on December 1 signaled embassy staff, including in , of imminent hostilities with the , though it did not specify the attack's timing or target. The assault force consisted of six fleet carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku—escorted by battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, launching a total of 353 across two , with the initial 183 planes prioritizing high-level bombing, dive-bombing, and low-level runs on Battleship Row. To counter Pearl Harbor's shallow waters (approximately 40 feet deep), Japanese engineers modified Type 91 aerial es by adding wooden stabilizing fins, reducing drop altitude to 50 feet, and adjusting the for shallower runs, enabling effective strikes against the moored capital ships despite environmental challenges proven in tests at Kagoshima Bay.

Sequence of Attacks on the Row

The first wave of the Japanese assault struck Battleship Row at 7:55 a.m. Hawaiian Standard Time on December 7, 1941, comprising 183 aircraft including torpedo bombers and high-level bombers. Approximately 24 Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo planes, with five additional aircraft diverted from other targets, executed low-level attacks primarily against the outer battleships Oklahoma and West Virginia, releasing modified Type 91 aerial torpedoes designed for shallow-water operations. These torpedo strikes were followed immediately by 49 B5N high-level bombers dropping 14-inch armor-piercing bombs aimed at the ships' decks and superstructure to induce catastrophic internal damage. U.S. forces initially responded with confusion due to the unexpected nature of the raid, mistaking some for U.S. planes, though anti-aircraft batteries soon opened fire as the reality dawned, with machine guns and larger caliber weapons engaging the attackers amid mounting chaos. wave, numbering 171 , commenced around 8:55 a.m., featuring 81 "Val" dive-bombers that targeted the already compromised battleships to exploit fires and trigger ammunition detonations. In this phase, USS Nevada, the sole battleship to attempt getting underway, began moving toward the harbor entrance about 8:40 a.m., attracting concentrated dive-bomber assaults that forced her to beach at Hospital Point to avoid sinking and blocking the channel. The harbor's shallow depths, averaging 30 to 40 feet, enabled rapid sinkings of struck vessels but prevented deeper-water total losses, while ruptured fuel tanks produced expansive oil slicks that ignited into burning patches, generating thick smoke plumes that increasingly obscured targets and hindered Japanese visibility and accuracy in later attack runs. The sequence of strikes on Battleship Row concluded within approximately 90 minutes, as Japanese forces withdrew by 9:45 a.m. to evade anticipated U.S. reinforcements.

Damage Assessment

Battleships Sunk or Destroyed

The USS Arizona (BB-39) was struck by an armor-piercing bomb from a Japanese , which penetrated the forward deck and detonated the forward magazine, causing a massive explosion that split the ship in two and sank it almost immediately. This cataclysmic event resulted in the deaths of 1,177 crew members out of 1,512 aboard, accounting for nearly half of all U.S. fatalities during the attack. The hull remains submerged at its berth on Battleship Row as a protected and memorial site, with ongoing leakage of fuel oil from the wreck. The USS Oklahoma (BB-37), moored outboard of the USS Maryland, absorbed the brunt of the initial torpedo attack, sustaining hits from up to nine torpedoes that caused progressive flooding and a rapid list. Within 12 minutes of the first impacts at approximately 7:55 a.m., the capsized completely, trapping hundreds inside the inverted hull and resulting in 429 drownings or suffocations among the crew. Although partially raised during salvage operations, the extensive structural damage rendered it a constructive , leading to its decommissioning and eventual scrapping without return to combat service. In contrast, the USS West Virginia (BB-48) and USS California (BB-44) also sank from and damage but settled upright on the harbor bottom due to damage control efforts that partially contained flooding, initially classifying them as probable total losses pending assessment. The took at least six hits and two , while the suffered two , a , and uncontrolled flooding over three days, but their upright orientation preserved potential for recovery unlike the inverted or exploded . These four represented the primary sinkings among the eight battleships on Battleship Row, with Arizona and Oklahoma confirmed as irrecoverable for wartime use.

Battleships Damaged but Salvaged

The USS Nevada (BB-36), moored at the north end of Battleship Row, sustained a hit to her port bow and multiple bomb strikes during the attack on December 7, 1941, prompting her to get underway in an attempt to reach open water, though she was ultimately beached near Hospital Point to prevent blocking the harbor channel. Salvage operations involved over 400 workers who refloated the vessel on February 12, 1942, and placed her in Drydock Number Two on February 18 for initial repairs at Yard. Following temporary fixes, she transited to the West Coast for modernization, including enhanced anti-aircraft batteries, and rejoined the fleet by late 1942, enabling her participation in operations such as the on June 6, 1944. The USS Tennessee (BB-43) and USS Maryland (BB-46) endured bomb penetrations and ensuing fires amid the chaos on Battleship Row, with Tennessee trapped between the sunken West Virginia and the quay, requiring explosives to free her, while Maryland absorbed two armor-piercing bombs causing forward flooding but limited structural compromise. Both received provisional repairs at sufficient for transit; Tennessee departed by December 20, 1941, for Navy Yard, where comprehensive overhauls addressed hull breaches, fire damage, and incorporated upgraded armor and weaponry, allowing recommissioning by May 1943 for Pacific engagements including . Maryland, with comparatively lighter wounds, underwent similar refits starting February 1942, modernizing her armament before supporting the in June 1942 and subsequent island-hopping campaigns. These efforts exemplified rapid industrial mobilization, transforming bomb-ravaged hulls into combat-ready assets within six months despite resource constraints. The most arduous salvages involved the USS California (BB-44) and USS West Virginia (BB-48), both capsized or deeply settled from multiple torpedo and bomb impacts that flooded their engineering spaces and tore hull plating. For California, workers erected extensive wooden cofferdams around the hull to facilitate dewatering and parbuckling, refloating her by March 22, 1942, after which drydock repairs preceded a May 1943 transit to Puget Sound for a full refit featuring new radar-directed anti-aircraft suites and propulsion overhauls, culminating in her return to Pearl Harbor in January 1944 for Leyte Gulf. West Virginia, with her port side eviscerated by at least six torpedoes, demanded over two years of meticulous patching, including 5,000 tons of concrete for buoyancy and cofferdam sealing, before refloating on July 17, 1943; subsequent Hunters Point and East Coast yard work installed advanced fire-control systems, enabling recommissioning in July 1944 and deployment to Iwo Jima by February 1945. These operations, conducted under blackout conditions and with limited diving gear, underscored engineering ingenuity in restoring vessels previously deemed total losses, bolstering U.S. naval projection by mid-1944.

Human Element and Immediate Response

Casualties and Survivor Accounts

The Japanese attack on Battleship Row on December 7, 1941, inflicted severe human losses, with approximately 2,008 U.S. Navy personnel killed aboard the seven , comprising the bulk of the 2,403 total American fatalities at . The USS alone accounted for 1,177 deaths when a penetrated its forward , igniting a catastrophic that killed over half of all battleship casualties in an instant. Other vessels suffered heavily as well, including the USS with 429 fatalities among its crew trapped during the rapid capsizing.
BattleshipFatalities
USS Arizona1,177
USS Oklahoma429
USS California98
USS West Virginia106
USS Nevada50
USS Maryland4
USS Pennsylvania0 (drydock)
Survivor accounts from Battleship Row emphasize the chaos of entrapment and environmental hazards. On the USS Oklahoma, which rolled over after multiple hits, hundreds of sailors were trapped in inverted compartments; rescuers heard tapping and banging on the hull from 32 men who survived for up to 16 days before extraction via torches, though many others perished from , suffocation, or injuries. Crews on ships like the USS Arizona and USS West Virginia described abandoning deck amid decks awash in burning from ruptured tanks, with survivors jumping into harbors where flames spread across oil slicks, complicating swims to shore while exposed to ongoing . Damage control parties faced overwhelming fires and flooding, often unable to contain breaches due to the assault's ferocity and lack of warning, leading to rapid abandonments as ammunition detonations added to the pandemonium.

Defensive Actions and Heroism

Despite the surprise nature of the Japanese assault on December 7, 1941, crews aboard Battleship Row rapidly responded by manning anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, contributing to the downing of enemy aircraft amid the chaos of torpedo and dive-bombing attacks. On USS Maryland, sailors activated .50-caliber machine guns and 5-inch anti-aircraft batteries, crediting their fire with downing seven Japanese planes, four of which were confirmed destroyed through direct observation of crashes and flames. Similarly, USS Tennessee's crew, despite being trapped temporarily under protective matting, reached their stations and fired on low-flying attackers, adding to the defensive volume that inflicted losses on the first wave. USS Nevada, moored at the end of the row, provided one of the most notable acts of resistance by attempting to get underway—the only to do so during the attack—to evade further hits and draw fire away from the harbor. Under direction from onboard officers after her captain was ashore, the ship cast off lines, raised steam, and maneuvered at up to 15 knots toward the channel, prompting concentrated Japanese dive-bomber attacks that forced her to beach near Hospital Point to prevent sinking; this movement nonetheless compelled the enemy to expend ordnance on a moving target. Heroism amid these efforts was recognized through 15 Medals of Honor awarded for actions during the attack, with many recipients from Battleship Row ships for maintaining fire control, combating fires, and aiding wounded under direct threat. Notable among them was Captain Franklin C. Van Valkenburgh of USS Arizona, who posthumously received the Medal for rushing to the bridge, directing anti-aircraft fire, and refusing to evacuate despite mortal wounds from bomb impacts, exemplifying leadership that sustained defensive posture until the ship's magazine explosion. Overall, shipboard gunners' claims of downing 29 Japanese aircraft aligned with verified enemy losses of that number, increasing resistance during the second wave and reducing its precision despite initial U.S. disarray from unprepared ammunition and dispersed crews.

Aftermath and Investigations

Salvage and Repair Operations

Salvage operations at commenced immediately after the December 7, 1941, attack, prioritizing the recovery of sunk battleships USS California, USS West Virginia, and capsized USS Oklahoma to restore naval capabilities. Under Captain Homer N. Wallin, the efforts involved innovative to address severe flooding, structural damage, and environmental hazards, ultimately refloating ships that contributed to later Pacific campaigns despite the U.S. 's shift toward carrier-centric warfare. For USS California, which sank upright after multiple torpedo hits, salvage teams installed cofferdams and patches while using electric and -driven pumps to remove a of 2.5 million gallons of oil and water, yielding about 200,000 gallons of free oil. Challenges included toxic gas concentrations up to 1,000 ppm and a vapor that ruptured a hull patch, but the ship was refloated on March 24-25, 1942, after counterflooding and dewatering. USS West Virginia, also upright but heavily flooded from torpedoes, required 325 cubic yards of patches and pumping of 1.5 million gallons of oil-water , including 800,000 gallons of , amid gas hazards up to 200,000 ppm H₂S; it was refloated on May 17, 1942. The capsized USS Oklahoma demanded the most complex work, with parbuckling using 21 shore-based winches and cables to right the vessel from its 150-170 degree list, completed by mid-June 1943 after removing , machinery, and about 500,000 gallons of oil. hurdles included mud burial, sliding risks mitigated by coral fill, and 1,850 dives totaling 10,300 hours; the ship refloated in early November 1943 but was later deemed uneconomical for full repair and sold for scrap in 1946. Pearl Harbor Navy Yard capacities were severely strained, with operations requiring up to 500 workers per ship, imported divers from Pacific Bridge Company, and prioritization of drydocks that delayed other repairs; some vessels were towed to West Coast yards like Bremerton for final refits. Extensive oil recovery across wrecks prevented major spills, underscoring the logistical focus on resource preservation amid wartime shortages.

Inquiries into Intelligence and Command Failures

The Roberts Commission, appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 15, 1941, and reporting on January 24, 1942, attributed primary responsibility for the unpreparedness of Battleship Row to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, citing their failure to maintain adequate vigilance despite general warnings of Japanese aggression. The commission highlighted deficiencies in reconnaissance patrols, which were not conducted as directed in prior Navy directives, leaving the harbor vulnerable to undetected approach; it also faulted the commanders for not enforcing higher states of readiness on weekends, when the fleet was concentrated in port for maintenance and liberty. These lapses stemmed from a prioritization of sabotage prevention over aerial threats, as Short interpreted ambiguous directives from Washington to focus defenses against internal subversion rather than external air attack. Subsequent investigations, including the Army Pearl Harbor Board (1944) and Navy Court of Inquiry (1944), echoed criticisms of local command but expanded scrutiny to systemic issues, such as the Army-Navy Joint Board's failure to integrate intelligence sharing and the withholding of complete "bomb plot" message details from Hawaiian commanders until after the attack began. The Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Attack (1945–1946) concluded that Kimmel and Short committed dereliction by not dispersing the battleships or implementing full anti-aircraft readiness, despite receiving a , 1941, "war warning" message indicating imminent hostilities; however, it also documented delays in Washington, where George C. Marshall's final alert on arrived via commercial telegraph after the first wave struck at 7:55 a.m. . Empirical analysis reveals a causal chain of fragmented intelligence: U.S. cryptanalysts had decrypted Japanese diplomatic traffic via the program, revealing intent to sever relations by , but lacked specifics on carrier strike forces or as the target, leading to diffused alerts across potential theaters like the and . Tactical oversights compounded strategic gaps, notably the dismissal of Opana Point radar detection of the incoming raid at 7:02 a.m. on , when private George Elliott and Joseph Lockard observed a massive formation approaching from the north; Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, on duty, attributed it to expected B-17 bombers from the mainland, reflecting complacency from routine false alarms and incomplete on radar interpretation. The battleship-centric prevalent in U.S. naval planning underestimated carrier-based air power, contributing to the decision not to disperse the Pacific Fleet despite Kimmel's awareness of Japanese capabilities; exercises had demonstrated vulnerability to air strikes, yet weekend routines prioritized crew rest over dispersal or fueled arming. While inquiries absolved higher echelons like Roosevelt of direct culpability, later reviews such as the 1995 Dorn Report critiqued Washington's selective dissemination—e.g., not sharing full summaries or challenging Hawaii's readiness reports—as enabling local misprioritization without triggering accountability beyond demotions for Kimmel and Short.

Long-Term Impact and Legacy

Strategic Shifts in US Naval Power

The attack on Battleship Row on December 7, 1941, temporarily neutralized the U.S. Pacific Fleet's battle line by damaging or sinking eight battleships, yet this proved strategically insignificant in the long term due to the absence of the fleet's three aircraft carriers—Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga—which were at sea or en route from the mainland. These carriers formed the nucleus of early U.S. counteroffensives, including the in April 1942 and the decisive victory at the on June 4–7, 1942, where Enterprise and (along with the damaged Yorktown) sank four Japanese carriers, shifting momentum in the Pacific. By 1943, battleships were increasingly relegated to secondary roles such as shore bombardment and anti-aircraft screening within fast carrier task forces, reflecting a doctrinal pivot toward aviation-centric operations that had been anticipated in pre-war exercises but accelerated by the demonstrated vulnerability of surface fleets to air power. Japanese planners erred by prioritizing battleships over infrastructure, leaving Pearl Harbor's fuel storage tanks—holding approximately 4.5 million barrels of oil—repair yards, and drydocks unscathed, which enabled the swift refueling and repair of surviving vessels and the rapid deployment of carrier forces. This miscalculation stemmed from an overemphasis on the psychological impact of sinking capital ships to demoralize the U.S., underestimating American industrial resilience and the carriers' role in ; Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's decision against a third strike wave, citing aircraft losses and potential U.S. counterattacks, further preserved these assets. The absence of follow-up raids allowed the U.S. to reorganize without prolonged disruption, validating critiques of Japanese operational conservatism. Despite the losses, the U.S. commissioned eight new battleships between 1942 and 1944, including the four -class vessels (e.g., South Dakota in November 1942) and the first four -class ships (e.g., Iowa in June 1943), bolstering fleet strength amid ongoing construction programs. However, wartime experience prioritized carrier task forces, with the U.S. expanding from seven fleet carriers in December 1941 to over 30 by 1945, aligning with pre-war advocacy by figures like Admiral Ernest J. King, who as championed integrated carrier-battleship formations over traditional battle line tactics favored by the "gun club" faction. This evolution, evident in operations like the campaign in November 1943, confirmed carrier dominance as the decisive arm in , rendering battleships supportive rather than central.

Memorials, Preservation, and Recent Developments

The , dedicated on May 30, 1962, functions as a tomb for the remains of 1,177 crew members killed during the attack, with ongoing interments of survivors who choose to join their shipmates. The structure, administered by the as part of , receives approximately 1.4 million visitors annually, providing access via boat tours that emphasize the site's solemnity and . The submerged wreck beneath continues to release oil—known as "black tears"—at a rate of 2 to 9 quarts daily, with an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 gallons remaining onboard; the conducts regular monitoring to assess environmental risks without plans for extraction due to structural instability. The USS Oklahoma Memorial, dedicated on December 7, 2007, on , commemorates the 429 sailors and lost when the ship capsized; it features engraved black granite walls listing names and white posts symbolizing the crew's unity. Accessible via shuttle on the military base, the site integrates with broader tours that highlight the unaltered mooring quays along Battleship Row as rare surviving artifacts from the 1941 configuration, where battleships were secured during the assault. Preservation efforts by the focus on maintaining the physical integrity of Battleship Row remnants, including a multi-year project begun in 2023 to restore six concrete mooring quays through repairs, repainting to their 1941 appearance, and removal of post-war alterations like added ship names. By April 2025, two quays had been completed, with work on the remaining pairs projected through 2026 in collaboration with preservation experts. In September 2025, the U.S. Navy, coordinating with the , removed two World War II-era salvage platforms attached to the USS Arizona's hull to prevent further deterioration of the wreck and enhance long-term stability. These initiatives include periodic closures of memorials, such as those in 2025 for the platform removal and safety assessments during inclement weather or structural evaluations, to prioritize visitor and site protection.

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  24. https://pearlharbor.org/blog/japanese-war-machines-pearl-harbor-attack/
  25. https://www.nps.gov/articles/pearlattackww2.htm
  26. https://www.pearlharboraviationmuseum.org/news/blog-archives/nakajima-b5n2-kate-type-97-3-carrier-attack-aircraft-at-pearl-harbor/
  27. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-happened-at-pearl-harbor
  28. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/uss-nevadas-run-to-the-sea/
  29. https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-001/h-001-1.html
  30. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/battleship-row-during-the-pearl-harbor-attack/uss-arizona-during-the-pearl-harbor-attack.html
  31. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/fallen-crew-uss-arizona-and-operation-85
  32. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/underwater-archaeology/sites-and-projects/ship-wrecksites/uss-arizona-bb-39.html
  33. https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/historyculture/uss-oklahoma.htm
  34. https://www.nps.gov/valr/uss-oklahoma-casualties-identified.htm
  35. https://www.okhistory.org/learn/ussok2
  36. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/post-attack-ship-salvage/salvage-and-repair-of-uss-west-virginia--december-1941---april-1.html
  37. https://pearlharbor.org/blog/resurrected-giants-battleships-rose-fight/
  38. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/battleship-row-during-the-pearl-harbor-attack/uss-nevada-during-the-pearl-harbor-attack.html
  39. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/post-attack-ship-salvage/salvage-work-on-uss-nevada--december-1941---april-1942.html
  40. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/battleship-row-during-the-pearl-harbor-attack/uss-west-virginia-and-uss-tennessee-during-the-pearl-harbor-atta.html
  41. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/battleship-row-during-the-pearl-harbor-attack/uss-oklahoma-and-uss-maryland-during-the-pearl-harbor-attack.html
  42. https://www.war.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3876824/uss-tennessee-crew-saves-ship-and-shoots-down-enemy-planes-at-pearl-harbor/
  43. https://www.facebook.com/groups/battleshipsbattlecruiserswwii/posts/1756208758277118/
  44. https://pearlharbor.org/blog/pearl-harbor-ships-returned-to-service/
  45. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/post-attack-ship-salvage/salvage-and-repair-of-uss-california--december-1941---october-19.html
  46. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/post-attack-ship-salvage/salvage-and-repair-of-uss-california--december-1941---october-19/NH-83070.html
  47. https://www.navalgazing.net/The-Battleships-of-Pearl-Harbor-Part-2
  48. https://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/Recent/Article-View/Article/2686502/with-a-hat-tip-to-american-shipbuilding-uss-west-virginia-returns-from-the-bott/
  49. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/post-attack-ship-salvage.html
  50. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-civilian-worker-who-spearheaded-pearl-harbors-most-successful-rescue-mission-180979167/
  51. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/lou-conter-last-living-survivor-of-the-uss-arizona-during-the-pearl-harbor-attack-dies-at-102
  52. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/archives/digital-exhibits-highlights/action-reports/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack/ships-m-r/uss-maryland-bb-46-action-report.html
  53. https://www.doncio.navy.mil/chips/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=7187
  54. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/how-many-japanese-planes-were-shot-down-during-pearl-harbor/
  55. https://j-aircraft.com/research/jimlansdale/japanese_losses_ph/Japanese_losses_Pearl_Harbor.htm
  56. https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/war-and-conflict/wwii/pearl-harbor/pearlharborwallin/d767_92_w3.pdf
  57. https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/post-attack-ship-salvage/salvage-of-uss-oklahoma--1942-1944.html
  58. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/us-intelligence-failures-pearl-harbor
  59. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/failure-at-pearl-harbor/
  60. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/december/plenty-blame-go-around
  61. https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/investigations/pearl-harbor.htm
  62. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/kermit-tyler-call-would-live-infamy
  63. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/m/midway-sheer-luck-or-better-doctrine.html
  64. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1945/november/carrier-task-force-world-war-ii
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  66. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1318&context=nwc-review
  67. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA280622.pdf
  68. https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/historyculture/ussarizonainterments.htm
  69. https://ussarizona.navy/history-of-the-u-s-s-arizona-memorial/
  70. https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/management/statistics.htm
  71. https://phys.org/news/2025-10-uss-arizona-blueprint-oil-leakage.html
  72. https://maritime-executive.com/article/study-uss-arizona-is-still-slowly-releasing-fuel-oil
  73. https://www.nps.gov/places/uss-oklahoma-memorial.htm
  74. https://www.nps.gov/valr/getinvolved/partners-in-preservation.htm
  75. https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/news/2025-mooring-quays-restoration.htm
  76. https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/echoes-of-valor-restoring-the-mooring-quays-of-pearl-harbor.htm
  77. https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/display-news/Article/4293553/media-release-us-navy-begins-removal-of-uss-arizona-mooring-platforms/
  78. https://www.nps.gov/valr/planyourvisit/hours.htm
  79. https://www.nps.gov/perl/learn/news/advance-reservations-for-uss-arizona-memorial-will-pause-beginning-july-9-while-preservation-work-continues.htm
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