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Blue flu
Blue flu
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A blue flu is a type of strike action undertaken by police officers in which a large number simultaneously use sick leave.[1] A blue flu is a preferred strike action by police in some parts of the United States where police strikes are prohibited by law.[1][2][3][4] At times, the matter goes to court,[5] such as when officers need to undergo medical examination to prove genuine illness.[6] A 2019 opinion piece in The New York Times contrasted blue flu with a strike, calling it "a quiet form of protest, with no stated principles or claim for public attention or sympathy."[7] Unlike most strikes, blue flu tends to be focused and of short duration.[6][8][9]

History

[edit]

The term itself[10] has been used where unions could be heavily penalized. Alternatives include "slowdown" and "virtual work stoppage."[11]

In the United States blue flu work stoppages have been used many times:

  • In 1919, one of the first strikes by police officers in the US (which was legal at the time) was stopped by then-Governor Calvin Coolidge using the state's militia.[11][relevant?]
  • During the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s, the blue flu was a ubiquitous and highly effective tactic in Baltimore, Memphis, San Francisco, Cleveland, New Orleans, Chicago, Newark, New York and many other cities.[12][11]
  • In 1971, between January 14 and January 19, around 20,000 New York City police officers refused to report for regular duty partly in response to dismissal of a lawsuit that would have increased pay for both police and firefighters, and entitle them to back pay up to the point of their last negotiated contract.
  • In 1981, from December 23 to December 24, officers of the 1700-person Milwaukee Police Department conducted a work stoppage, citing disregard they claimed city officials showed for the police.
  • In 2020, from June 17 to 20, an undisclosed number of officers of the Atlanta Police Department staged a sick-out to protest the criminal charges brought against the officers involved in the killing of Rayshard Brooks.[13][14]
  • In the Republic of Ireland on 1 May 1998, 5,000 Gardaí (police) reported sick; public order was maintained by putting the Irish Army on standby and removing Gardaí from training and administrative work.[15] It is illegal in Ireland for police to strike or form unions.[16][17]

Reasons

[edit]

Some of the common reasons for these actions are:

  • discipline actions that they feel are unjust,[18] such as in 2011, when NYC reduced numerous police officers' vacation days by ten when tickets they had issued were tossed as being incomplete. The police blamed the situation on having to fill out a form while amidst confronting the person being ticketed. Technology solved much of this by having scanners reduce the amount of information that had to be recorded manually.
  • deadlocked contract talks,[19][5] or frustration due to extended periods of working without a contract.[20] These are sometimes made worse when mixed with ongoing budget cutbacks.[21]
  • work conditions perceived as unsafe.[22]

Sometimes the proclaimed reason masks something else, such as when enforcing an unpopular decision is claimed to be a contract violation.[23]

In the view of police abolitionist Josie Duffy Rice blue flu is the result of: calls for police accountability or a perceived public critique of policing or police culture of any kind, of in an attempt to blackmail the public into abandoning attempts at police reform and/or removing public officials who advocate accountability.[24]

[edit]

In Mr. Monk and the Blue Flu, a novel based on the TV series Monk, the main character is given a chance to return to his city's police force during a labor dispute. It's distasteful to him that "he'll be a 'scab'."[25] A blue flu strike was also a background premise to "The Party's Over", a season 5 episode of CSI NY, aired in 2009; as well as an eponymous episode of Brooklyn Nine-Nine in 2021.

The idea of the Blue Flu was referenced in the Babylon 5 episode By Any Means Necessary in 1995, with respect to a labour strike.

"Barney Miller", a sitcom about NYPD detectives in a Greenwich Village precinct, ran a two-part Blue Flu episode called "Strike" in March 1977.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Blue flu

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from Grokipedia
Blue flu denotes a form of collective labor protest in which police officers engage in a coordinated sick-out, reporting illness en masse to disrupt operations and compel concessions on wages, benefits, or working conditions, as direct strikes are often prohibited under laws or union agreements. The term, first recorded in 1967, alludes to the traditional blue hue of police uniforms and emerged amid rising union militancy in law enforcement during the mid-20th century. This tactic has recurred across American municipalities, serving as a workaround to legal barriers against striking while leveraging the perceived indispensability of policing to public order. A prominent early instance occurred in in late 1970 and early 1971, when over 20,000 NYPD patrolmen refused duty for six days amid stalled contract talks over pay raises, prompting city officials to eventually grant improvements without a marked surge in reported or major civil unrest. Similar actions have surfaced in cities like , in 1971 and various departments in subsequent decades, often coinciding with budget constraints or policy disputes. Blue flu underscores the robust bargaining position of police unions, which have historically extracted favorable terms by exploiting municipal fears of service breakdowns, even when data from specific episodes indicate negligible immediate threats to safety metrics like crime rates. Despite its efficacy in negotiations, the practice remains contentious, frequently deemed unlawful and prompting disciplinary probes, as it circumvents statutory duties to maintain and raises questions about in public-sector employment.

Definition and Overview

Core Definition

The blue flu denotes an organized tactic employed by police officers, whereby a significant number simultaneously call in sick to protest labor conditions, policy reforms, or contractual grievances, effectively simulating a work stoppage. This approach serves as a for statutory bans on formal strikes by public safety personnel in numerous U.S. states and municipalities, where such actions are deemed prohibited from disrupting public order. The nomenclature "blue flu" alludes to the blue attire historically associated with uniforms, evoking an epidemic-like surge in absences that hampers departmental operations without overt admission of . Unlike sporadic individual sick calls, blue flu incidents feature coordinated participation, often yielding rates exceeding 50% in affected units, as documented in various municipal cases. While primarily linked to police, the term has occasionally applied to firefighters facing analogous restrictions.

Characteristics and Tactics

Blue flu manifests as a sudden and substantial surge in reported illnesses among police officers, resulting in widespread that hampers departmental operations and services. This phenomenon typically involves officers collectively invoking entitlements, often coinciding with labor disputes over wages, working conditions, or policy changes, thereby creating operational bottlenecks without overt admission of . rates can escalate dramatically, as evidenced by instances where over 60% of patrol officers failed to report for duty on targeted days, compelling departments to reallocate resources, impose mandatory on remaining staff, or curtail non-emergency responses. Tactically, blue flu relies on informal coordination to evade detection and legal repercussions, with officers encouraged via anonymous channels such as circulated flyers, internal messaging, or union-adjacent networks to synchronize sick calls on high-impact dates like holidays or amid escalating tensions. This approach circumvents statutory prohibitions on police strikes in many jurisdictions by framing absences as individual health claims, though patterns of simultaneity often betray orchestration. Departments may respond with investigations into suspected , but the tactic's deniability preserves participant anonymity and bargaining leverage, pressuring administrations to concede demands to restore functionality. Unlike sporadic individual absences, blue flu's defining trait is its scale and intent to disrupt service delivery proportionally to grievances, such as contract negotiations or perceived threats to officer protections, thereby amplifying visibility without formal union endorsement in most cases. It functions as a de facto slowdown, prioritizing selective enforcement—focusing on critical incidents while deprioritizing routine patrols—to underscore vulnerabilities in understaffed forces. Historical patterns indicate its efficacy in extracting concessions, though it risks eroding public trust and inviting countermeasures like court injunctions or disciplinary probes.

Distinction from Formal Strikes

The blue flu differs from formal strikes primarily in its covert nature and legal circumvention, as police officers in many U.S. jurisdictions are prohibited from engaging in overt work stoppages due to public safety imperatives. Formal strikes involve an announced, collective refusal to work, often accompanied by and explicit union endorsement, which can trigger severe penalties including dismissal, fines, or legal injunctions under laws like the Taft-Hartley Act or state-specific bans on public employee strikes. In contrast, the blue flu relies on coordinated disguised as individual illnesses, allowing officers to withhold services without formally declaring a labor action, thereby exploiting policies to generate pressure on employers. This tactic emerged as a for no-strike clauses in contracts, preserving for participants while achieving similar operational disruptions. Legally, formal strikes by police are often deemed illegal because they endanger public welfare, as affirmed in cases like City of Santa Ana v. Santa Ana Police Benevolent Assn. (1989), where courts scrutinized sick-outs but distinguished them from explicit strikes unless proven as organized refusals. Blue flu actions, while potentially subject to discipline if coordination is evidenced—such as through internal investigations or patterns of simultaneous absences—avoid the immediate classification as strikes, enabling unions to negotiate without invoking statutory prohibitions. This distinction has empowered police bargaining by creating leverage that formal strikes cannot, as cities face service breakdowns without clear grounds for mass terminations. Operationally, formal strikes signal clear intent and invite countermeasures like hiring replacements or orders, whereas blue flu maintains the facade of routine staffing shortages, complicating attribution and response. Both methods seek economic or policy concessions, but the blue flu's subtlety has historically amplified police unions' influence, as employers hesitate to impose widespread sanctions amid ambiguity over genuine illness claims.

Historical Development

Origins in the Early 20th Century

The prohibition of formal strikes by police officers, which spurred the development of alternative protest tactics like mass sickouts, originated amid widespread labor unrest in the early . Prior to widespread legal bans, police engaged in overt walkouts, as exemplified by the first documented U.S. police strike in , on April 3, 1889, where officers protested a reduction in daily pay. Such actions highlighted growing tensions over wages, hours, and working conditions but also raised concerns about public safety disruptions. The 1919 Boston Police Strike marked a turning point, intensifying national opposition to police labor militancy and establishing precedents for strike prohibitions that later fostered covert tactics. On September 9, 1919, 1,117 of 's 1,544 patrolmen walked off the job, seeking formal union recognition, higher wages amid inflation, and an end to deductions for a department-run . The action, organized through the (a union), led to three days of riots, nine fatalities, and an estimated $4 million in (equivalent to over $60 million in 2023 dollars), prompting Governor to mobilize 5,000 state guardsmen and famously assert that "there is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime." In the strike's aftermath, Coolidge's handling elevated him to vice-presidential candidacy and catalyzed legislative responses across the U.S., including ' 1919 law barring police from affiliating with external unions and similar no-strike mandates in over a states by the . These measures framed police as uniquely obligated public servants, incompatible with traditional weapons like strikes, thereby incentivizing subtler forms of job action—such as synchronized absences under the guise of illness—to pressure authorities without breaching explicit bans. While the specific moniker "" first appeared in the , the early 20th-century entrenchment of strike prohibitions created the structural incentives for its eventual adoption as a , distinguishing it from earlier, riskier overt refusals to work.

Mid-Century Instances and Evolution

In the decades following , police unions in the United States experienced significant growth, with membership expanding as officers organized to address grievances over pay, hours, and equipment amid broader labor trends and urban expansion. By the late 1950s, formal recognition of police as union-eligible workers increased, particularly after key legal and political victories that distinguished them from earlier, often suppressed organizing efforts peaking in 1919. This period laid the groundwork for evolving tactics that circumvented statutory bans on strikes for essential public services, shifting from overt work stoppages to subtler methods like coordinated to maintain while exerting leverage. The tactic known as the "blue flu"—a mass sickout simulating an —emerged distinctly in the mid-1960s as unions refined these strategies. In 1966, officers in , initiated the first documented use of the term during a collective sickout protesting inadequate wages, affecting operations and forcing municipal attention without formal strike declaration. This innovation built on prior informal slowdowns but formalized the approach, emphasizing synchronization across shifts to maximize disruption while invoking policies. By 1967, the blue flu had scaled to larger departments, as seen in where thousands of patrolmen called in sick amid contract disputes and heightened tensions from civil unrest, marking one of the most extensive such actions since the early and compelling concessions on pay and conditions. These mid-century instances demonstrated the tactic's maturation: unions increasingly coordinated via internal networks, integrated it with bargaining threats, and leveraged public safety imperatives to amplify pressure, setting precedents for future escalations in the while underscoring its role in enhancing police negotiating power despite legal risks.

Notable Historical and Contemporary Events

1970s New York City Blue Flu

In January 1971, approximately 20,000 (NYPD) officers, representing about 85% of the force, participated in a wildcat mass sickout dubbed the "blue flu" from January 14 to 19. The action was unauthorized by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) leadership but driven by rank-and-file frustration over stalled contract talks under Mayor and Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy. The primary trigger was a dispute over retroactive pay parity with sergeants, with officers demanding $100 per month for the prior 27 months, amid broader grievances including perceived underpayment relative to and risks faced on the job. Lindsay's administration had offered minimal raises, exacerbating low morale in a department already strained by rising crime rates and public scrutiny of police conduct. Officers coordinated the sick calls to circumvent legal bans on public employee strikes under New York's , which imposed penalties like fines and jail time for violations. During the five-day period, only around 6,500 officers—primarily non-patrol ranks like detectives, sergeants, and lieutenants—remained on duty, leaving some shifts with as few as 200 patrolmen citywide. officials, including , reported no significant crime surge, with incidents limited to minor traffic violations like illegal parking and red-light running; the absence prompted observations that New York functioned without widespread disorder, challenging assumptions about constant police necessity. The sickout ended on January 19 without immediate concessions on pay or amnesty for participants, as officers returned amid threats of disciplinary action, though no mass firings occurred. The event highlighted police unions' leverage through informal tactics, influencing future negotiations and contributing to Lindsay's declining popularity, but it yielded no direct financial gains and underscored internal NYPD tensions over reform efforts under Murphy.

2020 Nationwide Incidents Amid Social Unrest

In the wake of George Floyd's death on May 25, 2020, while in custody, protests spread to over 2,000 cities and towns across the , frequently involving , , and that caused billions in and resulted in at least 25 deaths amid clashes. These events fueled demands for defunding or abolishing police departments, alongside swift criminal charges against officers in high-profile use-of-force incidents, which many personnel viewed as politically driven and lacking . A notable blue flu incident unfolded in Atlanta, Georgia, following the June 12, 2020, fatal shooting of Rayshard Brooks during a struggle at a drive-thru, where Brooks had resisted after failing field sobriety tests and reaching for a . On June 13, Garrett Rolfe was charged with murder and aggravated , prompting coordinated absences: records indicate 170 officers called in sick from June 14 to June 18, with over 50% of Zone 3 beat officers absent on peak days, severely straining staffing in the area of the incident. The sickouts, dubbed the "blue flu," led to the cancellation of concerts, festivals, and other public events, with the city responding by offering $500 bonuses for voluntary overtime shifts to maintain coverage. Elsewhere, explicit sickouts were less documented, but work slowdowns—characterized by reduced proactive patrols, arrests, and enforcement—emerged as a parallel tactic in response to the unrest and reform pressures. In , arrests dropped by approximately 50% in the first half of 2020 compared to prior years, coinciding with a 104% surge in shootings from January to July, prompting some officials to attribute the trends to officers adopting a more passive posture amid threats of prosecution and public vilification. The NYPD denied intentional slowdowns, citing absences and protest demands, though union leaders cited low from anti-police as a factor. In , rumors circulated of officers planning sick calls and minimizing engagements during June protests, contributing to perceptions of de-policing as non-emergency response times lengthened and misdemeanor arrests fell sharply. Similar dynamics appeared in other cities like Buffalo and , where voluntary pullbacks from high-risk areas (e.g., the Capitol Hill Organized Protest zone) exacerbated operational gaps without formal sickouts. These actions underscored police unions' use of informal tactics to counter policy threats, though they drew criticism for potentially endangering public safety during a period when homicide rates rose nationwide by 30% in 2020.

Other Key Examples

In , July 2014 saw over 550 officers—approximately one-quarter of the —call in sick over several days to protest city-mandated changes to benefits, which were implemented to comply with the and included higher deductibles and copays. The action, dubbed a "blue flu" by media and officials, prompted the city to bolster shifts with supervisors, neighboring agencies, and federal support, with Mayor stating public safety remained uncompromised despite strained operations. The police association denied orchestrating the sickout, but it pressured negotiations, leading to partial reversals on benefit cuts. In , , November 2011 featured a smaller-scale blue flu involving at least 17 officers who called in sick amid fiscal crisis talks, protesting Mayor Dave Bing's demand for a 10% reduction to address the city's budget shortfall. The department investigated the coordinated absences as a work stoppage, suspending the officers without pay pending outcomes; no widespread disruption occurred, but it highlighted tensions over concessions in a city facing proceedings two years later. Other instances include a 1976 sickout in , where police invoked the blue flu tactic earlier that year over pay and benefits disputes, contributing to a subsequent 3.5% raise and improved terms before a formal strike vote. These cases illustrate blue flu's use in contract negotiations, often yielding concessions without formal strikes, though outcomes varied by local fiscal pressures and legal responses.

Underlying Causes

Economic and Contractual Disputes

Economic and contractual disputes frequently underlie blue flu incidents, as police unions leverage mass to pressure municipalities during stalled negotiations over wages, pensions, and benefits, circumventing legal prohibitions on strikes. These actions typically occur when contracts expire without renewal, leading to frozen pay scales amid or when proposed raises fall short of union demands, effectively reducing real compensation. For instance, officers may invoke to highlight grievances such as inadequate adjustments for cost-of-living increases or cuts to eligibility, which unions argue undermine and retention in high-risk professions. A prominent early example unfolded in in January 1971, when approximately 20,000 patrolmen engaged in a six-day sickout from January 14 to 19, protesting an expired that left base pay at $10,950 annually while claiming entitlement to an additional $100 monthly for the prior 27 months under disputed provisions. The action stemmed from failed talks with city officials, who resisted wage hikes amid fiscal constraints, prompting unions to frame the sickouts as enforcement of contractual pay parity with firefighters. Similar tactics appeared in that month, where a four-day blue flu ended via court after disputes over pay increases, with officers rejecting the city's offers as insufficient. In the late 1980s, such disputes intensified in amid broader municipal budget pressures. Santa Ana police conducted a two-day rolling sickout in July 1987, involving dozens of officers, in response to a where the union sought 11.9% raises for patrol officers and 24.9% for sergeants, countered by the city's 8.5% proposal over two years. Concurrently, Orange County sheriff's deputies initiated an eight-day —complementing sickouts—over rejected demands for a 16% raise across three years, against the county's 12.5% offer, delaying court proceedings to amplify economic leverage. These episodes illustrate how blue flu functions as a calibrated escalation in , often yielding concessions without formal work stoppages, though outcomes vary based on local fiscal realities and legal repercussions. Later instances reinforce this pattern. The 1997 New York City Police Department slowdown, triggered by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's imposition of a two-year wage freeze post-arbitration ruling, involved reduced enforcement productivity over nine months to protest contract terms that unions viewed as eroding . In smaller departments, such as a 1995 California municipality where nearly 50 officers called in sick immediately after a 10.75% raise request was denied, blue flu directly tied to breakdowns, underscoring its role in highlighting perceived undervaluation of labor costs relative to public demands on policing. Empirical analyses of these events link blue flu prevalence to failures and economic clauses in , where absent binding resolutions, informal actions fill the void to realign incentives.

Responses to Policy Changes and Anti-Police Sentiments

In the wake of high-profile incidents sparking widespread protests and calls for police reform, officers in several departments resorted to blue flu tactics to protest perceived punitive policy responses and escalating anti-police rhetoric. Following the June 12, 2020, fatal shooting of Rayshard Brooks by Atlanta Police Department officer Garrett Rolfe during an arrest attempt at a Wendy's restaurant, Rolfe was charged with murder and felony aggravated assault on June 13, 2020, and fired the same day. In response, starting June 16, 2020, more than half of the Atlanta force—approximately 800 officers—called in sick over three consecutive days, resulting in suspended patrols in several precincts and heightened public safety concerns amid ongoing unrest. This action was explicitly framed by police union representatives as a stand against what they viewed as politically motivated prosecutions that prioritized public outrage over due process for officers. Similar patterns emerged in other cities grappling with the "defund the police" movement and rapid legislative pushes for accountability measures post-George Floyd's death on May 25, 2020. In , the Police Protective League urged members against participation, but an anomalous spike occurred over the July 4-5, 2020, weekend, with hundreds of officers reporting sick, reducing on-duty strength by up to 10-15% in some divisions and prompting an internal investigation into potential organized protest against defunding proposals and heightened scrutiny of use-of-force incidents. In , a circulated text message in late June 2020 explicitly called for a blue flu, encouraging officers to call in sick and minimize arrests to signal discontent with city leadership's response to protests, including vows to investigate every police shooting and broader anti-police sentiments amplified by local activists. These episodes coincided with policy shifts, such as New York state's June 8, 2020, ban on chokeholds despite opposition, which fueled threats of slowdowns nationwide as unions positioned blue flu as leverage against reforms seen as eroding operational discretion. Such responses highlight officers' use of informal work actions to counter what they describe as existential threats from environments prioritizing rapid decertification, cuts, and cultural vilification, often in the absence of formal strike rights. Critics, including advocates, argue these tactics undermine public safety to resist accountability, as evidenced by temporary upticks during the absences, while supporters contend they reflect rational amid biased media portrayals and prosecutorial overreach that ignore like officer safety risks. Empirical data from the period shows these blue flus correlated with morale erosion, with surveys indicating over 70% of officers in affected departments feeling unsupported by leadership amid the 2020 unrest.

Impacts on Public Safety and Operations

Short-Term Effects on Crime and Response

Blue flu incidents typically result in significant short-term reductions in police staffing levels, often exceeding 50-65% in frontline units, straining operational capacity and necessitating reallocations of available personnel. In during June 2020, following the charging of an officer in the Rayshard Brooks , over 61% of beat officers missed shifts on June 17 and 65% on June 18, leading departments to prioritize emergency calls while deferring non-urgent responses. Such compels supervisors to reassign officers from specialized duties to , reducing overall efficiency and increasing the risk of delayed interventions in time-sensitive situations. Emergency response times lengthen under these conditions due to diminished on-street presence and overburdened remaining forces, though direct quantitative data remains limited. Analogous police slowdowns, which mimic the reduced activity of sickouts, demonstrate drops in proactive enforcement—such as tickets falling 38% (109,000 fewer per month) and traffic tickets declining 39% (29,000 fewer per month)—while arrest activity shifts unevenly, with misdemeanor arrests rising modestly but overall enforcement capacity constrained. In during a 1997 nine-month , these enforcement reductions correlated with slower handling of low-level incidents, underscoring how sustained erodes deterrent presence without immediate offsets from auxiliary agencies. Crime levels exhibit short-term elevations in minor and opportunistic offenses during blue flu periods, attributable to weakened deterrence from lowered visibility. An empirical analysis of the 1997 New York City police slowdown found misdemeanors rising 9% (2,800 additional crimes per month), violations increasing 9-11% (800-1,000 per month), felony assaults up 5-6% (120-150 per month), and larcenies climbing 3-6% (130-300 per month), with no significant changes in major felonies like or . In Atlanta's 2020 blue flu episode, citywide homicides surged to 157 for the year—the highest in over two decades—compared to 99 in 2019, coinciding with the June absenteeism peak and broader depolicing trends amid unrest, though multiple factors including pandemic effects contributed. Historical cases, such as 's 1971 five-day blue flu involving 20,000 officers, showed no apparent overall crime spike despite near-total patrol absences in some shifts, suggesting variability based on duration and compensatory measures.

Long-Term Consequences for Policing

Blue flu incidents have historically strengthened police unions' bargaining positions, leading to enhanced compensation and formalized grievance processes that reduce overt strikes but diminish administrative flexibility in discipline and operations. In Detroit's 1967 blue flu, involving mass sick calls and a 71% drop in citations, unions secured wage increases from $7,335 in 1965 to $15,000 by the early 1970s, alongside improved documentation and communication, though early hostilities created lasting tensions in . These events catalyzed similar actions nationwide, embedding work slowdowns as a recurring tactic that expands union leverage while complicating oversight and reform efforts. In the post-2020 context, amid widespread blue flu responses to charges against officers and shifts, departments experienced acute attrition that persists into sustained staffing deficits. Resignations surged 40% in compared to , with retirements rising 30% that year, contributing to a net sworn officer decline; large agencies remain over 5% below January 2020 levels as of early 2024. lagged initially, dropping 18% in from 2019 levels, though partial recovery occurred by 2023 with hiring up 30% from lows, still challenged by heightened scrutiny and morale erosion from public criticism. These shortages have compelled operational adaptations, including elevated overtime reliance—often exceeding 10-15% of budgets in affected departments—heightening officer fatigue and burnout risks, while curtailing proactive patrols and programs. Long-term, depolicing tendencies observed during slowdowns correlate with reduced intensity, potentially normalizing minimal-effort policing and straining inter-agency cooperation, as evidenced by academic analyses linking such actions to enduring dips and resistance. Departments have responded with incentives like signing bonuses and relaxed hiring standards, yet underlying union entrenchment from prior blue flus limits structural reforms, perpetuating cycles of leverage through informal protests.

Prohibitions on Police Strikes

In the United States, strikes by police officers are statutorily prohibited in virtually all jurisdictions, reflecting the consensus that constitutes an essential whose interruption could endanger public safety and order. This ban applies regardless of federal protections afforded to private-sector workers under the National Labor Relations Act, as no equivalent federal right to strike exists for public employees. State laws typically classify police strikes as illegal work stoppages, with penalties including dismissal from service, fines, or charges to deter actions that withhold critical services. The origins of these prohibitions trace to the 1919 , where 1,117 of the city's 1,544 officers walked off the job on September 9, seeking union recognition and better wages, resulting in riots, , and at least nine deaths amid a breakdown in civil order. The event galvanized public and political opposition, with gaining national prominence by declaring, "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime," and deploying state guards to restore control. In response, states enacted or strengthened laws barring strikes by police and firefighters, embedding the principle that cannot be leveraged in labor disputes, a stance codified in statutes across the country by the mid-20th century. Examples of specific prohibitions include Montana's statute declaring it unlawful for police officers to strike or honor picket lines during duty, punishable by disciplinary action. In , the city charter explicitly forbids strikes by police officers, defining them as concerted refusals to work and subjecting violators to termination or other sanctions. law extends the ban to all public employees, prohibiting strikes, slowdowns, or service withholdings, with courts upholding dismissals for participants. While some states permit limited strike rights for non-essential public workers after procedures, police remain exempt, often with alternatives like mandatory mandated to resolve disputes without service disruptions. These frameworks aim to balance rights—recognized for police unions in most states—with the overriding imperative of uninterrupted public protection.

Enforcement and Consequences of Sick-Outs

Enforcement of sick-outs, often termed "blue flu," primarily occurs through internal departmental investigations triggered by unusual spikes in , where supervisors scrutinize patterns such as simultaneous calls from groups of officers or lack of medical documentation. Departments may demand doctor's notes or conduct interviews to assess legitimacy, and evidence of coordination—via communications or pre-arranged patterns—can reclassify the action as an illegal work stoppage akin to a strike, prohibited under state laws for public safety personnel. In jurisdictions like , appellate courts have upheld that such stoppages inherently endanger public safety and warrant scrutiny beyond mere illness claims. Consequences for participating officers include loss of sick leave pay, mandatory unpaid leave, and formal disciplinary proceedings that may escalate to suspension or termination, particularly if internal affairs finds intent to protest rather than genuine illness. Unions face potential court ; for instance, in June 2025, a U.S. judge issued a temporary against the Police Benevolent Association to halt a sick-out, prohibiting further work stoppages under threat of charges. Similarly, a 2000 federal in St. Thomas-St. John permanently barred police sick-outs after a three-day action crippled operations, enforcing compliance through judicial oversight. Notable cases illustrate variable outcomes: In Los Angeles Police Department investigations following a July 2020 holiday sick-out surge of up to 300 officers, some faced discipline for alleged abuse of leave, but four officers successfully challenged accusations, securing $30,000 settlements each after proving legitimate illnesses. In Atlanta's 2020 blue flu involving 170 officers post-Rayshard Brooks charges, records prompted threats of discipline but no widespread terminations, highlighting enforcement challenges amid staffing pressures. Under statutes like San Francisco's charter, confirmed strikers among police or firefighters risk immediate dismissal, underscoring severe repercussions in strict no-strike regimes. Proving coordination remains evidentiary hurdles, often limiting mass enforcement despite legal prohibitions.

Controversies and Perspectives

Criticisms Regarding Public Duty and Leverage

Critics contend that the blue flu represents a fundamental breach of the and the ethical obligations embedded in the , which typically requires officers to uphold the , enforce laws, and maintain integrity without betraying their badge or character. By feigning illness to stage collective work refusals, participants engage in that erodes the expected of those sworn to protect communities, likening the tactic to the of "whiny children" rather than honorable public servants. This view holds that such actions violate core duties to serve without pettiness, as officers leverage their essential role in maintaining order at the expense of genuine public safety needs. Furthermore, the blue flu is criticized as an abuse of leverage, exploiting the monopoly on legitimate force and public dependence on policing to extract concessions from elected officials, effectively holding communities hostage to union demands. In historical instances, such as police sick-outs, this tactic has been described as an "authoritarian power grab" that resists oversight and reforms while endangering response capabilities during crises, thereby prioritizing over democratic . Analysts argue that threats of reduced staffing—implicitly warning that "’s going up" without compliance—constitute , amplifying police unions' influence disproportionate to their public mandate and undermining the separation between labor tactics and civic responsibilities.

Defenses Based on Necessity and Empirical Outcomes

Proponents of blue flu actions argue that they are necessitated by legal prohibitions on police strikes in most jurisdictions, combined with inadequate responses to chronic understaffing, stagnant wages, and heightened occupational risks. Police unions and officers contend that traditional bargaining fails when municipal budgets prioritize other expenditures amid rising dangers, such as assaults on officers, which increased by 23% nationally from to following high-profile incidents and shifts. In such contexts, mass sick calls serve as a non-confrontational mechanism to signal unsustainable conditions, compelling administrators to address retention crises where departments face 20-50% vacancies in major cities like and post-. Former police chief Joel Shults has defended this tactic as a response to "abusive partners" in that erode trust through punitive measures like diminished protections, asserting that officers must leverage temporary disruptions to realign societal valuation of policing. Empirically, defenders cite instances where blue flu prompted tangible concessions, demonstrating its efficacy in restoring operational viability without indefinite disruption. In , elevated call-out rates in 2020 amid morale collapse led to proposals for retention bonuses and pay hikes to stem officer exodus, averting deeper staffing shortfalls. Similarly, in , a 2016 sick-out focused on safety equipment and compensation demands pressured local officials into negotiations, highlighting how such actions amplify leverage when formal channels stall. Broader patterns post-2020 show blue flu and related slowdowns correlating with reversed "defund" policies; for example, Seattle's secured a 42% pay increase over five years by 2025, including annual raises starting at 5%, amid persistent absenteeism tied to reform disputes. Advocates like Shults argue these outcomes affirm policing's "" value, fostering reforms that enhance and equipment without long-term public safety collapse, as short-term reductions in proactive enforcement underscore dependency on officers rather than enabling unchecked surges. Critics of anti-police sentiments frame blue flu as essential for causal accountability, where empirical staffing declines—exacerbated by morale hits from events like the aftermath—directly link to operational necessities unmet by elected officials. Data from affected departments indicate that while arrests dip during slowdowns, the tactic's brevity allows recovery, with subsequent budget reallocations (e.g., Hawaii's 2025 arbitration granting 5% annual raises through 2028) validating its role in countering decade-long wage stagnation. This perspective prioritizes officer sustainability, arguing that ignoring necessity invites broader de-policing, where voluntary absences reveal systemic underinvestment more effectively than rhetoric alone.

References

  1. https://wordhistories.net/2023/07/07/blue-flu/
  2. https://www.nydailynews.com/2001/06/25/blue-flu-cops-on-strike-december-1970-january-1971-chapter-384/
  3. https://www.archives.nyc/blog/2021/9/24/nypd-surveillance-of-organized-labor
  4. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/14/archives/blue-flu-hits-policemen.html
  5. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/what-is-blue-flu-how-has-it-increased-police-power/
  6. https://www.untappedcities.com/the-week-without-police-what-we-can-learn-from-the-1971-police-strike/
  7. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/90440NCJRS.pdf
  8. https://dictionary.nolo.com/blue-flu-term.html
  9. https://dictionary.justia.com/blue-flu
  10. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/blue-flu
  11. https://saportareport.com/a-closer-look-at-the-blue-flu-more-than-half-of-atlantas-beat-cops-missed-work-after-ex-officer-charged-with-murder-of-rayshard-brooks/sections/reports/seankeenan/
  12. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/blue_flu
  13. https://nypost.com/2020/06/18/nypd-cops-being-encouraged-to-strike-on-july-4/
  14. https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-07/lapd-investigates-blue-flu-claims-after-officers-call-in-sick-over-july-4-holiday
  15. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/11/leaders-of-blue-flu-protest-unknown/
  16. https://www.police1.com/officer-safety/articles/ala-officers-call-in-sick-in-blue-flu-protest-LzV0GIwhB5VHPPIG/
  17. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/03/how-police-unions-fight-reform
  18. https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/207/1568.html
  19. https://sk.sagepub.com/ency/edvol/lawenforcement/chpt/police-strikes-blue-flu
  20. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/historical-overview-police-unionization-united-states
  21. https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1548&context=law_review
  22. https://files.commons.gc.cuny.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/13230/files/2020/08/McCartin_Bringing-the-States-Workers-In.pdf
  23. https://dokumen.pub/violence-in-the-model-city-the-cavanagh-administration-race-relations-and-the-detroit-riot-of-1967-1nbsped-9781609170295-9780870138157.html
  24. https://csap.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/apppw-swhite-10-26-22.pdf
  25. https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/01/06/a-short-history-of-police-protest
  26. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/18/blue-flu-atlanta-police-call-out-of-work-in-wake-of-charges
  27. https://www.forbes.com/sites/sethcohen/2020/06/18/as-atlanta-police-protest-is-blue-flu-the-next-pandemic/
  28. https://www.ajc.com/news/crime--law/170-atlanta-police-officers-called-out-sick-during-blue-flu-protests-records-show/RIDIMWuApAM0Ytmdiwx01H/
  29. https://www.wrbl.com/news/blue-flu-a-number-of-atlanta-police-officers-walk-out-in-protest/
  30. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/nyregion/nyc-shootings-nypd.html
  31. https://www.businessinsider.com/police-have-historically-protested-by-making-fewer-arrests-its-become-2020-6
  32. https://www.newsweek.com/nypd-mulls-strike-atlanta-police-get-500-bonus-protests-sap-morale-1512017
  33. https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2020/06/9874441/police-going-on-strike-walkout-reason
  34. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/more-than-550-memphis-police-call-in-sick-in-blue-flu-protest-idUSKBN0FE050/
  35. https://www.cnn.com/2014/07/08/us/memphis-police-sickout
  36. https://www.memphisflyer.com/blue-flu-has-not-compromised-memphis-public-safety-says-wharton
  37. https://www.actionnews5.com/story/25955703/blue-flu-outbreak-119-more-mpd-officers-call-out-sick-monday/
  38. https://www.cbsnews.com/detroit/news/blue-flu-for-some-detroit-cops/
  39. https://www.cbsnews.com/detroit/news/blue-flu-cops-suspended-pending-investigation/
  40. https://www.legeros.com/ralwake/raleigh/history/pdf/sick-out-strike-vote.pdf
  41. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/arbitration-and-police-bargaining-prescriptions-blue-flu
  42. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w12202/w12202.pdf
  43. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/28/archives/injunction-ends-a-police-strike-milwaukee-blue-flu-over-after-4day.html
  44. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-08-31-me-3159-story.html
  45. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-06-20-me-15204-story.html
  46. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-atlanta-city-wrestles-with-call-to-transform-policing/
  47. https://nypost.com/2020/07/08/lapd-investigates-if-spike-in-sick-calls-was-blue-flu-protest/
  48. https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/text-message-urges-chicago-police-officers-to-call-in-sick-limit-arrests-in-a-blue-flu/
  49. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/nyregion/floyd-protests-police-reform.html
  50. https://www.officer.com/command-hq/blog/21143565/the-blue-flu-and-a-breach-of-trust
  51. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4689144/
  52. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Andrea-Cann-Chandrasekher-%E2%80%9CThe-Effect-of-Police-Slowdowns-on-Crime%E2%80%9D.pdf
  53. https://www.ajc.com/news/atlantas-deadliest-year-in-decades-has-city-on-edge-and-demanding-change/WAF3MV7AVBD2BO2RZVANXDI6E4/
  54. https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/15497.pdf
  55. https://www.policeforum.org/staffing2024
  56. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Andrea-Cann-Chandrasekher-%25E2%2580%259CThe-Effect-of-Police-Slowdowns-on-Crime%25E2%2580%259D.pdf
  57. https://www.rodtannerlaw.com/news/the-right-to-strike
  58. https://onlabor.org/overview-how-different-states-respond-to-public-sector-labor-unrest/
  59. https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/san_francisco/latest/sf_charter/0-0-0-3302
  60. https://archive.legmt.gov/bills/mca/title_0390/chapter_0310/part_0050/section_0010/0390-0310-0050-0010.html
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  62. https://clje.law.harvard.edu/app/uploads/2024/04/9.17.23_Police-Collective-Bargaining-and-Police-Violence_FINAL.pdf
  63. https://onlabor.org/massachusettss-prohibition-on-public-employee-strikes-warrants-repeal/
  64. https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/1982-97-state-and-local-government-work-stoppages-and-their-legal-background.pdf
  65. https://fop.net/government-and-media-affairs/top-priorities/collective-bargaining-for-public-safety-employees/
  66. https://www.police1.com/chiefs-sheriffs/articles/lapd-investigates-blue-flu-claims-after-hundreds-call-in-sick-over-july-4-holiday-rK3RRmNgTqbnuM8H/
  67. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-02-03-me-2148-story.html
  68. https://www.police1.com/legal/articles/2-lapd-officers-sue-over-blue-flu-discipline-after-calling-out-sick-Ye80EN4GK3euME7Z/
  69. https://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/news/government-takes-police-union-to-court-in-bid-to-end-blue-flu-in-stt-stj/article_8c8886f7-3815-474f-8db3-cd650c058ecf.html
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  71. https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-05-27/l-a-agrees-to-pay-four-lapd-officers-30k-each-over-disputed-blue-flu-claims
  72. https://www.police1.com/police-administration/articles/la-agrees-to-pay-4-officers-30k-each-over-disputed-blue-flu-claims-UOIavf1coMHGB5NI/
  73. https://newrepublic.com/article/159706/police-unions-bully-politicians-new-york-deblasio
  74. https://www.police1.com/george-floyd-protest/articles/officials-atlanta-police-morale-at-all-time-low-PbsQpn9q9Pcqaci6/
  75. https://publicola.com/2025/10/22/new-police-contract-includes-few-accountability-concessions-in-exchange-for-another-hefty-pay-increase/
  76. https://www.police1.com/patrol-issues/articles/state-your-case-is-a-blue-flu-the-right-way-for-officers-to-make-their-voices-heard-BkKr3fLYeys8KV39/
  77. https://theatlantaobjective.substack.com/p/treating-the-blue-flu
  78. https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/local/alabama/2016/08/11/selma-pd-hit-sick-out/88579888/
  79. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/arbitrator-awards-police-officers-largest-160200272.html
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