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The Borotbists (Ukrainian: боротьбисти, romanized: Borotbysty, lit. 'Fighters') were a left-nationalist political party in Ukraine that existed from 1918 to 1920. It is not to be confused with its Russian affiliated counterparts – the Ukrainian Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Borbysts) and the Ukrainian Communist Party (Ukapists).

Key Information

It arose in May 1918 after the split in the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party on the basis of supporting the Soviet regime in Ukraine. The Borotbists are often associated with the Russian party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who in Ukraine also called themselves borotbists.

In March 1919 it assumed the name Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionary-Borotbists (Communists) (Ukrainian: Українська партія соціалістів-революціонерів-боротьбістів (комуністів), Ukrayins'ka partiya sotsialistiv-revolyutsioneriv-borot'bistiv (komunistiv)), and in August the same year the name was changed to Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) (Ukrainian: Українська комуністична партія (боротьбистів), romanized: Ukrayinska komunistychna partiya (borotbistiv)). Its leaders, among others, were Vasyl Ellan-Blakytny, Hryhoriy Hrynko, Ivan Maistrenko and Oleksander Shumsky.[1]

The Borotbists twice applied to the Executive Committee of the Communist International to be allowed to affiliate with the Communist International. On 26 February 1920, the Communist International by a special decision called on the Borotbists to dissolve their party and merge with the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, the CP(b)U.[citation needed]

At the Borotbists' conference in the middle of March 1920, a decision was passed to dissolve the party. A decision to admit the Borotbists to membership of the CP(b)U was adopted at the Fourth All-Ukraine Conference of the CP(b)U, which was held in Kharkiv on 17–23 March.[2][3] After the dissolution, many Borotbists joined the Ukrainian Communist Party (Ukapists), rather than the Bolshevik party which was more closely tied to Moscow.[4]

After 1920 the history of the Borotbists took the form of a struggle between the two trends: the centralist Russophile element, and the 'universal current' of Ukrainian communists.

Ukrainization heralded an unprecedented national renaissance in the 1920s. The Ukrainian communists, including prominent ex-Borotbisty, carried forward Ukrainization, a "weapon of cultural revolution in Ukraine". Ukrainization meant efforts to assert autonomy and counter ascendant Stalinism. Stalinist centralism and its partner Russian nationalism destroyed senses of equality between the republics. The Ukrainian communists and intelligentsia were annihilated. The Borotbist "co-founders of the Ukrainian SSR" were amongst the last remnants of opposition purged under the guise of the destruction of the fake "Borotbist Center" in 1936. They were still being subjected to official attack in 1938.[5]

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Borotbists

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The Borotbists, also known as the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists), were a left-wing Ukrainian political faction active during the 1917–1921 Ukrainian Revolution, originating as the radical wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and promoting socialist revolution intertwined with Ukrainian national . Emerging from a split at the Fourth Congress of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1918, the group took its name from the newspaper Borot'ba ("Struggle") and formalized as a distinct party in , mobilizing peasant support against occupations by the Hetmanate regime and forces under Denikin. Their ideology emphasized class struggle for land redistribution and alongside the establishment of an autonomous , federated rather than subordinated to , viewing national liberation as a prerequisite for genuine international rather than a bourgeois diversion. Key figures included Oleksandr Shumsky, who later contributed to cultural policies in the 1920s, and the group sought affiliation with the while resisting direct Bolshevik military control. In 1920, under pressure from Bolshevik authorities wary of their federalist demands and independent army proposals, the Borotbists dissolved and merged into the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, initially bolstering its ranks with thousands of members but ultimately facing systematic repression as suspected nationalists during Stalin's purges of the 1930s. This absorption highlighted tensions between centralized Bolshevik authority and regional socialist variants rooted in local agrarian realities, with Soviet historiography later distorting Borotbism as petty-bourgeois deviationism to justify eliminations. Their brief prominence underscored efforts to adapt Marxism to Ukraine's distinct historical context of imperial subjugation, influencing early Soviet nationalities policy before being erased.

Ideology and Program

Core Principles

The Borotbists' ideological foundation combined Marxist-influenced with agrarian rooted in the narodnik tradition, prioritizing the majority in Ukraine's economy. Central to their program was the socialization of land, entailing its redistribution to toiling s without compensation or redemption payments, as articulated in their platform to address the dominance of rural laborers over urban proletarians. This policy adapted Socialist Revolutionary emphases on agrarian reform to Ukraine's specific conditions, where over 80 percent of the population engaged in by 1917, rejecting both retention and Bolshevik-style forced collectivization in favor of committees managing land use. Their commitment to extended to establishing a and peasantry, implemented via workers' and peasants' soviets as organs of toiling democracy, rather than a strictly proletarian vanguard detached from rural realities. This framework aimed at a transitional phase toward , with councils ensuring involvement in to prevent urban proletarian dominance from alienating Ukraine's agrarian base, as outlined in memoranda emphasizing local proletarian forces over imported Russian Bolshevik structures. Opposing Russification policies, the Borotbists rejected Great Russian chauvinism as a form of that suppressed Ukrainian development, advocating instead for comprehensive —including mandatory Ukrainian-language instruction, administrative localization, and promotion of national culture—within an independent or federated Soviet Ukrainian . This national policy was framed as essential for genuine socialist emancipation, countering Bolshevik centralism's tendency toward linguistic and ethnic homogenization, and drawing from their draft decrees that prioritized indigenous cultural to mobilize Ukrainian masses.

Nationalist Elements and Autonomy Demands

The Borotbists integrated Ukrainian national identity into their communist ideology by advocating for the establishment of a sovereign Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, distinct from the centralized Bolshevik model, as outlined in their party program adopted at the founding congress in late 1918 and reaffirmed in subsequent resolutions. This vision emphasized federation with the Russian Soviet Republic rather than subordination, positioning Ukrainian sovereignty as essential to authentic proletarian revolution, where national liberation would enable effective class struggle against imperialism and feudal remnants. Central to their demands was the call for independent Ukrainian armed forces, including a national , to defend and prevent external domination, a position articulated in party congress resolutions that rejected Bolshevik integration of units under Moscow's command. They argued that without such autonomy, Ukrainian workers and peasants could not fully realize socialist goals, viewing centralized control as a continuation of tsarist tactics that suppressed local agency. Borotbist opposition to extended to cultural and administrative spheres, insisting on Ukrainian as the official state language in government, , and public life to foster proletarian rooted in native identity rather than imposed Russian norms. Leaders like Oleksander Shumsky promoted de-Russification of the urban through into Ukrainian traditions, contending that linguistic and cultural was a prerequisite for genuine internationalism, in contrast to Bolshevik policies that prioritized Russian as the of soviets. This stance distinguished Borotbism from by subordinating universal class unity to the causal reality of national oppression as a barrier to progress.

Economic and Social Policies

The Borotbists advocated a peasant-centric approach to economic transformation, emphasizing land socialization and redistribution to address Ukraine's agrarian structure, where in 1917–1918 smallholders and landless s comprised the majority amid fragmented holdings averaging around 1.75 desyatins per person regionally (e.g., 1.2 in gubernia, 2.9 in ). Their program called for abolishing in , forests, waters, and minerals, transferring to a Ukrainian Land Reserve without compensation for use by toiling s under elected village, , county, provincial, and national committees. Large were to transition to communal farming managed by agricultural associations for efficient production, while resisting compulsory amalgamation of holdings into communes, favoring voluntary to protect smallholders from urban-imposed models. In industry, the Borotbists proposed of large-scale enterprises, including idle factories, banks, and , placing them under state-worker control to align production with worker-peasant needs, as seen in support for takeovers in mines and Kharkiv plants. Regulation of output and distribution was to occur through cooperatives, fostering worker-peasant alliances via soviets and revolutionary committees rather than centralized proletarian dictatorship, reflecting their view that Ukraine's rural majority required policies bridging urban industry and agrarian realities over abstract Marxist orthodoxy. This included heavy taxation on prosperous peasants (e.g., over 3,000 rubles per homestead) to fund proletarian state apparatus while prioritizing national economic autonomy. Social policies centered on cultural and educational reforms to elevate the toiling masses, promoting through native-language instruction and Prosvity enlightenment societies established in most communities to counter and urban elitism. They sought proletarian culture in national forms, addressing disparities like ' mere 10.8% access to higher education versus ' 84.7%, via decrees encouraging Ukrainian cultural development. of women was implied in broader socialist equality for toilers, evidenced by female participation in and committees, though tied to peasant mobilization rather than standalone urban feminist agendas.

Formation and Early Development

Origins in the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries

The Borotbists originated as the radical left faction within the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries (UPSR), a peasant-based formed on April 4–5, 1917, in following the in . The UPSR initially emphasized , land redistribution to peasants without compensation, and Ukrainian national autonomy within a federated , drawing broad support from rural unrest and the revolutionary upheaval of 1917. However, the and ensuing peasant seizures of land in radicalized elements within the party, fostering debates over alignment with Bolshevik-led Soviets versus preservation of the Ukrainian Central Rada's moderate framework. By late 1917, an "Internationalist" wing coalesced in the UPSR, critiquing the party's right-leaning for insufficient commitment to class struggle and , while highlighting perceived Bolshevik deviations from genuine interests. Figures such as Vasyl Blakytny played key roles in these internal debates, advocating for Soviet-style governance adapted to Ukrainian conditions. This faction viewed the civil war's chaos—marked by German occupation and the Hetmanate coup of April 29, 1918—as necessitating a sharper break from populist toward , though retaining demands for cultural and territorial . Tensions peaked at the UPSR's secret Fourth Congress near on May 13–16, 1918, where ideological rifts over supporting Soviet regimes versus national democratic continuity drove the left wing to seize temporary control of the party apparatus before formalizing a split. The resulting faction adopted the name derived from the newspaper ("Struggle"), its primary organ since 1913, which documented the and articulated the shift to communist-leaning positions emphasizing soviet power and anti-imperialist struggle amid Ukraine's wartime fragmentation. This evolution reflected causal pressures from peasant radicalism and Bolshevik influence, diverging from the UPSR's broader SR traditions rooted in Russian populism.

Establishment as Independent Party (1918)

The Borotbist faction, emerging from the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries (UPSR), seized control of the UPSR at its fourth held from 13 to 16 May near , effectively dissolving the parent organization and establishing the group as an independent entity thereafter. This congress marked the formal split along ideological lines favoring Soviet-oriented policies, with the faction adopting the name Borotbists—derived from their weekly newspaper Borot'ba ("Struggle"), edited by Vasyl Blakytny—which had propagated their views on radical peasant mobilization and cooperation with Bolshevik forces. Initial membership numbered approximately 10,000 to 15,000, drawn primarily from poor s in central and alongside urban intellectuals, reflecting the party's agrarian base amid the ongoing upheaval following the April 1918 establishment of the ate under Pavlo Skoropadsky. Early recruitment efforts centered on Borot'ba and affiliated leaflets, which urged peasant uprisings against the German-backed Hetman regime, framing it as a imposition on worker-peasant soviets and calling for armed resistance to restore revolutionary governance. These publications emphasized organizational cells in rural districts to coordinate and land seizures, positioning the Borotbists as a distinct force advocating Ukrainian soviet without yet formalizing a separate party .

Role in the Ukrainian Revolution

Participation in Anti-Bolshevik and Soviet-Allied Struggles (1918–1919)

In late 1918 and early 1919, the Borotbists actively opposed the Directory of the , viewing its leadership under as insufficiently revolutionary and aligned against soviet-style governance, while promoting the establishment of workers' and peasants' councils as the basis of power. This stance positioned them against the Directory's anti-Bolshevik orientation, leading to underground agitation and calls for uprisings to replace it with a proletarian dictatorship. Following the Red Army's occupation of much of in January 1919, including , the Borotbists shifted toward tactical collaboration with , participating in the formation of the and joining the second Soviet government led by Khristian Rakovsky from February to August 1919. At their 5th Congress on 8 March 1919 in , they formalized an independentist communist platform, merging in August 1919 with the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independentists) to form the Ukrainian (Borotbists) with approximately 15,000 members, while advocating for a sovereign allied to but distinct from Soviet . As Anton Denikin's forces advanced and captured in late August 1919, the Borotbists organized partisan guerrilla units and led peasant uprisings in the rear areas of , , and provinces to disrupt White supply lines and defend land reforms against restorationist policies. These actions mobilized poor peasants against Denikin's , emphasizing local resistance to prevent reimposition of landlordism and providing indirect logistical support to retreating elements through sabotage and intelligence. Throughout these engagements, the Borotbists published manifestos and articles in their weekly newspaper Borot'ba, condemning Bolshevik "Moscow-centrism" and as threats to Ukrainian proletarian , as articulated in their 28 August 1919 Memorandum, yet continued aiding Soviet-allied efforts by framing their struggle as part of a broader anti-White front. This dual approach highlighted their commitment to national within a soviet framework, distinguishing them from stricter Bolshevik centralization.

Military and Peasant Mobilization Efforts

The Borotbists formed partisan units primarily from rural volunteers to resist the Hetmanate regime and subsequent anti-Bolshevik forces, with the Ohiy-Matyash unit emerging in mid-1918 in the and districts as a key example. These detachments, often numbering in the hundreds initially, engaged in guerrilla tactics such as disrupting rail lines near Kobeliaky and planning assaults on strategic towns like in December . By , Borotbist-led efforts had coalesced into around 20 units totaling approximately 23,000 fighters across , reflecting recruitment from agrarian unrest in provinces like , , and . Peasant mobilization drew on Ukraine's predominantly rural demographics, where poor and semi-proletarian s constituted about 30–45% of the and provided a receptive base for socialist-nationalist appeals. Borotbists convened mass gatherings, such as the Second All-Ukrainian Peasants’ Congress from May 8–10, 1918, which drew 12,000 delegates to endorse land without full collectivization and armed defense of revolutionary gains. campaigns, disseminated through underground outlets like the newspaper and leaflets proclaiming "Brother peasants! Land and freedom are in peril!", framed Borotbists as "Ukrainian Bolsheviks" safeguarding peasant holdings against Russian Bolshevik grain requisitions perceived as exploitative. This messaging countered Bolshevik centralism by emphasizing local in soviets and cultural-national elements, fostering enlistments and temporary dominance in rural councils during the second (February–August 1919). Despite initial successes in securing peasant loyalty and controlling village-level soviets in areas like and by February 1919, Borotbist forces faced structural limitations inherent to irregular peasant militias lacking heavy armament and disciplined command. Vulnerabilities manifested acutely against Denikin's offensive in mid-1919, which overran exposed rural positions, and Polish advances in late 1919, compelling retreats, desertions (e.g., Yakiv Ohiy's unit), and tactical shifts toward integration for survival. These incursions highlighted the causal fragility of peasant-based mobilization in a theater dominated by conventional armies, yielding short-term rural footholds but no sustained territorial defense.

Relations with Bolsheviks and Other Factions

Initial Cooperation and Tensions

In early , following the Red Army's occupation of much of , the Borotbists entered into pragmatic cooperation with to combat common enemies, particularly the White forces under . This alliance was driven by the shared goal of defeating anti-Bolshevik armies during the chaotic phase of the , with Borotbists providing essential local support through peasant mobilization and Ukrainian-language agitation to rally support in rural areas where Bolshevik propaganda in Russian had limited reach. Borotbist participation included integrating some members into provisional revolutionary committees and soviets, where they contributed to administrative efforts amid ongoing military campaigns. For instance, during the defense against Denikin's advance in late 1919, Borotbist activists worked alongside in bodies like the Revolutionary Committee, emphasizing joint anti-White fronts while leveraging their influence among Ukrainian socialists and peasants. However, this cooperation did not extend to full ideological alignment, as Borotbists maintained distinct units that operated with relative independence, such as in the fluctuating battles around , where Red forces recaptured the city from Denikin in December 1919 after earlier losses. Tensions arose primarily over organizational control and , with Borotbists insisting on greater for Ukrainian soviets from direct oversight by the (RSFSR), viewing Bolshevik centralization as a threat to local . They demanded that command structures prioritize Ukrainian-specific needs, including peasant-led committees free from Moscow's directives, which clashed with the Bolshevik preference for unified military and political authority under RSFSR influence. These frictions manifested in debates within joint councils, where Borotbists criticized the subordination of Ukrainian forces and resisted full integration into Bolshevik hierarchies, foreshadowing deeper conflicts despite tactical alliances.

Comintern Influence and Negotiations (1919–1920)

The Comintern, established in March 1919, issued directives emphasizing the unification of communist parties under centralized discipline to combat fragmentation, viewing separate national formations as deviations from proletarian internationalism. The Borotbists, seeking recognition as an autonomous entity, applied for membership in the Comintern as the independent Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) following their fifth congress on 8 March 1919 in Kharkiv, advocating a "national-communist" framework with proposals for a confederation of Soviet republics to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty within a loose federation, submitted to the Comintern in June–July 1919. These counter-proposals clashed with the Comintern's insistence on democratic centralism, leading to rejections that labeled Borotbist positions—such as emphasizing peasant mobilization and opposing strict subordination to Russian Bolshevik structures—as conducive to splitting revolutionary forces. On 26 February , the Comintern Executive, via a special decision drafted by Lenin, rejected parallel party structures in and demanded the Borotbists dissolve their organization and unconditionally merge with the Communist Party () of Ukraine (CP(b)U), critiquing them as a "left-nationalist petty-bourgeois party" rooted in peasant elements that had violated communist principles through splitting units and tolerating "banditism" under the guise of national struggle. Lenin's resolution acknowledged tactical concessions to in Ukraine's multi-ethnic context but insisted on purging disloyal elements and reregistering members to ensure proletarian dominance, warning that Borotbist would aid imperialist and forces by undermining Soviet unity. This stance reflected broader Bolshevik prioritization of centralized control over federalist experiments, despite Borotbist arguments for cultural and administrative to mobilize Ukrainian masses effectively. At their congress, Borotbist leaders debated the merger amid internal divisions, with proponents arguing it would strengthen Soviet power in under negotiated terms, while opponents feared absorption and loss of national emphasis; ultimately, the party voted to dissolve, enabling approximately 4,000 members—out of a total exceeding this figure—to integrate into the CP(b)U during its Fourth from 17 to 23 1920, though a minority refused and continued oppositional activities. The merger proceeded under Comintern pressure, marking a conditional acceptance but highlighting persistent tensions over centralism versus national self-determination.

Merger, Dissolution, and Aftermath

Conditions of Integration into CP(b)U (1920)

In March 1920, the Borotbist congress convened and voted for the party's voluntary dissolution, enabling its members to integrate into the (Bolsheviks) of (CP(b)U) through a process of reregistration that ensured adherence to Bolshevik organizational discipline. This merger transferred the Borotbists' rank-and-file membership—estimated at around 6,000 active adherents, predominantly from backgrounds—and residual organizational resources to the CP(b)U, but subordinated them to the latter's centralized command structure, effectively eroding the Borotbists' independent decision-making authority. The Fourth Conference of the CP(b)U, held from March 17 to 23, , formalized the admission of qualified Borotbist elements, stipulating that integration required unequivocal commitment to communist policy and rejection of prior deviations such as tolerance for banditism or opposition to alliance with the Russian SFSR. Lenin endorsed this framework, advocating "maximum concessions" to the Borotbists on the condition of their full alignment with Bolshevik tactics, a maneuver aimed at bolstering Soviet control in by co-opting their peasant mobilization capacity amid ongoing civil war pressures. To facilitate the merger, Lenin extended a tactical assurance of an independent , leveraging the Borotbists' strong rural base to preempt resistance and secure loyalty, though this pledge prioritized short-term unification over substantive of power. Post-integration, Borotbist-affiliated cells persisted nominally within the CP(b)U to maintain continuity, but immediate enforcement of reregistration and oversight accelerated centralization, subordinating local initiatives to directives from Christian Rakovsky's leadership and .

Internal Resistance and Bolshevik Purges

Some Borotbist leaders, adhering to their platform for an autonomous , refused to fully dissolve parallel party structures after the March 1920 merger with the CP(b)U, maintaining informal networks that preserved their factional identity. This resistance, documented in CP(b)U records as undermining centralized discipline, led to early expulsions by mid-1921, as Bolshevik authorities viewed such actions as subversive to proletarian unity under Moscow's direction. The CP(b)U's participation in the All-Russian party's 1921 verification and purge campaign, initiated in to eliminate "alien elements," systematically targeted Borotbist remnants accused of nationalist deviations, with former members comprising a disproportionate share of those deemed unreliable. Official Soviet data reported 22.5% of CP(b)U membership expelled overall, though internal estimates indicated up to 50% among ex-Borotbists, reflecting scrutiny of their prior advocacy for Ukrainian independence within . This process, aligned with NEP stabilization efforts to consolidate Bolshevik control, involved commissions reviewing cadre loyalty, resulting in the marginalization of thousands who had initially bolstered the party's Ukrainian contingent. By 1922, the Borotbist presence had dwindled from approximately 4,000 entrants at merger to just 118 verified members, a decline driven by expulsions, voluntary withdrawals, and arrests for alleged factionalism. Purges persisted into , with trials under party control organs framing remnants as threats to Soviet orthodoxy, ultimately eradicating organized resistance through enforced assimilation or elimination, as causal tensions between Borotbist and Bolshevik centralism proved insurmountable.

Criticisms and Controversies

Bolshevik Perspectives on Nationalism and Class Composition

Bolshevik leaders critiqued the Borotbists as a petty-bourgeois nationalist formation that elevated Ukrainian ethnic above , thereby fracturing the unified struggle against . Christian Rakovskii, head of the CP(b)U, explicitly labeled the Borotbists a "petit-bourgeois nationalist ," arguing their platform reflected the interests of small property owners resistant to centralized Soviet authority. This perspective rooted in Marxist class analysis posited that such masked underlying economic antagonisms, fostering divisions that benefited imperialist forces rather than resolving contradictions in the . Lenin emphasized the Borotbists' demand for unconditional Ukrainian independence as a deviation from Bolshevik flexibility on or amalgamation, to be determined by an All-Ukraine , warning it invited suspicions of petty-bourgeois national prejudices compromising worker unity. In a February 1920 draft resolution for the , he condemned their propaganda for splitting forces and supporting banditism—irregular peasant insurgencies—as direct violations of communist discipline, aiding armies and foreign intervention by undermining military cohesion in . These actions, Lenin argued, stemmed from the party's non-proletarian composition, dominated by disloyal elements prioritizing local autonomy over alliance with the RSFSR. CP(b)U cadres further accused the Borotbists of drawing support from and petty-bourgeois strata, including middle s and proto-kulak farmers, whose allegiances fueled tactical against Bolshevik policies. During in 1919, Borotbist-influenced units resisted grain requisitions essential for supply, manifesting as undisciplined revolts that Trotsky deemed "ruinous" and warranting harsh suppression to restore order. This class base, less tethered to urban industrial , inclined toward "patriotic" localism—advocating separate Ukrainian armies and opposing RSFSR integration—over internationalist imperatives, exacerbating dual-command frictions resolved only by central Bolshevik intervention in January 1919. From a Bolshevik standpoint, Borotbist exemplified , diverting agrarian laborers from confronting exploitation and state requisitions toward ethnic hegemony, which obscured the primacy of class over national lines in revolutionary dynamics. Such deviations, evident in their December 1919 calls for in Proletarskaya Borba, were seen as , prioritizing bourgeois-national remnants in the countryside against proletarian . Despite tactical mergers, these critiques underscored persistent CP(b)U vigilance against non-proletarian influences eroding Soviet unity in .

Ukrainian Nationalist Critiques of Soviet Alignment

Ukrainian nationalists have accused the Borotbists of betraying national independence by allying with against the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), thereby facilitating Soviet military advances and occupation. In early , the Borotbists collaborated with Bolshevik forces following the Red Army's invasion, directing their partisan detachments to support Soviet efforts rather than bolstering UNR defenses, with the aim of establishing a federated Ukrainian Soviet entity subordinate to Moscow's influence. This tactical alignment weakened the UNR's position amid the chaos of the , as Borotbist units joined Red offensives that recaptured key territories like by February , effectively aiding the erosion of the UNR's sovereignty. The Borotbists' merger into the (Bolsheviks) of (CP(b)U) on 17 March 1920—formalized at the Fourth Conference of the CP(b)U—integrated approximately 4,000 of their members into the Bolshevik apparatus, supplying experienced local organizers and propagandists that enhanced Soviet administrative control in rural and peasant-dominated regions. Nationalists contend this infusion of personnel lent ethnic Ukrainian legitimacy to Bolshevik governance, smoothing the path to 's incorporation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics via the 30 December 1922 , which centralized power in and set the stage for policies diluting Ukrainian autonomy. In modern Ukrainian , the Borotbists are often depicted as "left-bank traitors"—a term evoking their strongholds east of the River and alleged complicity in subverting for ideological gains—contrasted sharply with UNR combatants who resisted Bolshevik incursions irrespective of class rhetoric. Such views emphasize how the party's Soviet orientation causally contributed to the suppression of non-Bolshevik Ukrainian movements, enabling long-term despite initial Borotbist demands for . Academic sources influenced by Soviet-era narratives may understate these tensions due to institutional biases favoring class over national framings, but primary accounts of the alliances underscore the nationalists' causal claims regarding sovereignty's forfeiture.

Internal Ideological Inconsistencies

The Borotbist platform endeavored to fuse Ukrainian national self-determination with Marxist socialism, yet this synthesis engendered core contradictions, as the party professed adherence to —asserting that "the has no country"—while simultaneously demanding an autonomous Soviet entitled to "equal partnership among states." This tension was exacerbated by ideological shifts among leaders, such as Vasyl Shakhray's transition from Russian social-democratic roots to emphatic , which underscored the ad hoc adaptation of socialist doctrine to localist imperatives rather than a coherent first-principles derivation. The resulting framework prioritized national liberation as a precondition for class struggle, inverting orthodox Marxist sequencing wherein precedes national resolution, thereby revealing an opportunistic overlay on internationalist commitments. A further inconsistency arose in reconciling demands for peasant autonomy with the imperatives of centralized proletarian . Borotbists drew substantial support from rural constituencies, advocating transfer of to "local self-governing organs" and peasant committees, as evidenced in their backing of initiatives like the Kustolovo councils. However, their program simultaneously endorsed a centralized soviet apparatus and a Ukrainian , creating policy flip-flops: the Third Congress of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (November 21–24, 1917), from which Borotbism emerged, affirmed both decentralized peasant organs and unified soviet centralism. This rural "cult of the peasant" clashed with Marxist emphasis on urban proletarian primacy, prompting internal shifts toward bolstering worker focus amid weak urban penetration, yet empirical outcomes demonstrated unsustainability, as decentralized peasant soviets devolved into fragmented authority amid exigencies without resolute central coordination. Internal fissures over Comintern allegiance exposed these stances as pragmatic expedients rather than principled moorings, culminating in splits that highlighted ideological pliability. At the Fourth of the UPSR (May 13–16, 1918), divisions pitted internationalist revolutionaries against statists favoring institutional continuity, fracturing unity on nationalism's role in . Subsequent debates, such as the Conference (July 14–15, 1918), debated Soviet power versus a , revealing hesitancy in fully committing to centralized internationalism despite initial rejections of Bolshevik cooperation as "impossible." By March 1920, opposition to party dissolution and merger—led by figures like Mykola Poloz, Mykola Lyubchenko, and Oleksandr Panchenko—invoked irreconcilable nationalist and populist ideals against Comintern-mandated integration, contrasting with proponents like Mykola Shumsky and who prioritized tactical alignment, thus laying bare the Borotbists' reliance on contingent maneuvers over doctrinal consistency.

Legacy and Historiography

Impact on Ukrainian Soviet Republic Formation

The integration of Borotbist cadres into the (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP(b)U) in March 1920 augmented party membership by around 4,000 individuals, primarily from rural and intellectual backgrounds, thereby enhancing the CP(b)U's organizational reach in peasant-dominated regions and supporting efforts to solidify control amid lingering threats from remnants and local insurgencies. This influx provided experienced local activists who bolstered and administrative capacity, contributing to the stabilization of Soviet authority in following the Red Army's victories over Denikin's forces in late 1919. Borotbists' established influence among poor peasants, rooted in their origins as a left faction of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries, enabled more effective of rural support during the transition to the (NEP) in 1921, helping to mitigate peasant unrest and integrate agrarian sectors into the Soviet framework. Their emphasis on federative structures and cultural autonomy informed early CP(b)U advocacy for measures, such as expanded use of Ukrainian in administration and , which aimed to legitimize the regime among Ukrainian-speaking populations and facilitate governance during the NEP's partial market concessions. These inputs yielded short-term advantages in regime consolidation, yet were constrained by Bolshevik centralism; by the mid-1920s, escalating internal purges targeted Borotbist elements as "nationalist deviants," undermining their cadres and subordinating to Moscow's priorities, thus limiting enduring structural impacts on the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic's formation.

Modern Interpretations and Debates

In post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography, interpretations of the Borotbists diverge along ideological lines, with some scholars rehabilitating them as advocates of a distinctly Ukrainian path to socialism, emphasizing their calls for an autonomous Soviet republic federated with but independent from Russia. This view posits their ideology as a synthesis of Marxism and narodnik traditions, prioritizing peasant mobilization and cultural revival as essential to revolutionary progress in agrarian Ukraine, rather than strict Bolshevik centralism. However, such portrayals often overlook empirical inconsistencies in their programs, where nationalist demands coexisted uneasily with commitments to proletarian internationalism, leading critics to argue that their federation proposals served more as bargaining tools than principled anti-imperialism. Contemporary debates, particularly in works from the , highlight class opportunism as a core flaw, with analyses revealing the Borotbists' heavy reliance on rural socialist-revolutionary elements over urban proletarians, diluting Marxist orthodoxy in favor of broad populist appeals. Serhiy Hirik's surveys of Ukrainian scholarship underscore how post- narratives influenced by national revivalism inflate their "revolutionary purity," yet archival evidence from party congresses (e.g., 1919 platforms stressing Ukrainian ) demonstrates pragmatic concessions to Soviet integration, undermining claims of unyielding . Left-leaning reinterpretations, such as those framing Borotbism as resistance to , face scrutiny for romanticizing deviations; causal examination of their 1920 merger conditions reveals alignment with Bolshevik structures prioritized survival over ideological fidelity, reflecting petty-bourgeois compromises rather than vanguard discipline. These tensions persist in broader discussions of early Soviet nationalities policy, where Borotbist intersects with critiques of Comintern ; while some attribute their dissolution to external purges, internal documents indicate voluntary subordination to secure legitimacy, challenging narratives of victimhood. Recent empirical studies caution against overemphasizing nationalist heroism, citing membership data—predominantly from SR splinter groups with limited industrial base—as evidence of insufficient class alignment for genuine socialist transformation. This has prompted calls for de-ideologized , prioritizing primary sources over politicized rehabilitation in post-Soviet contexts.

References

  1. https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/invasion-and-resistance-borotbism-revolutionary-socialism-in-the-ukrainian-revolution-1917-1921/
  2. https://ukrainesolidaritycampaign.org/2019/01/29/borotbism/
  3. https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Ukraine/_Topics/history/_Texts/KOSSRU/2/2*.html
  4. https://incs.ub.rub.de/index.php/INCS/article/view/198/157
  5. https://uacademic.info/en/document/0415U006093
  6. https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CB%5CO%5CBorotbists.htm
  7. https://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/26128/file.pdf
  8. https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/for-the-independence-of-soviet-ukraine/
  9. https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%255CU%255CK%255CUkrainization.htm
  10. https://dokumen.pub/borotbism-a-chapter-in-the-history-of-the-ukrainian-revolution-3838211073-9783838211077.html
  11. https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/borotbisty
  12. https://ukrainesolidaritycampaign.org/2018/01/10/original-socialist-labour-reports-on-the-ukrainian-revolution/
  13. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/dec/28.htm
  14. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/feb/06b.htm
  15. https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2016/voronovici_alexandr.pdf
  16. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10108826/1/The_Bolsheviks_and_the_nationa.pdf
  17. https://libcom.org/article/poltava-uprising-against-bolsheviks-1920
  18. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/mar/29.htm
  19. https://archive.org/download/socialchangenati00kraw/socialchangenati00kraw.pdf
  20. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9780230377462.pdf
  21. https://marxist.com/what-was-lenin-s-real-position-on-the-ukranian-national-question.htm
  22. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48694966
  23. https://en.topwar.ru/58333-soyuz-konkurentov-batko-mahno-i-ataman-petlyura.html
  24. https://content.e-bookshelf.de/media/reading/L-16572483-138126e121.pdf
  25. https://day.kyiv.ua/node/196231
  26. https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/the-workers-opposition-in-ukraine-1920s1930s/
  27. https://uajs.org.ua/sites/default/files/SerhiyHirik.pdf
  28. http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0000799021
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