Brereton Report
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Brereton Report

The Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, commonly known as the Brereton Report (after the investigation head), is a report into war crimes allegedly committed by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) during the War in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2016. The investigation was led by Paul Brereton, who is both a New South Wales Supreme Court judge and a major general in the army reserve. The independent commission was initiated by the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force in 2016, and after a long investigation, delivered its final report on 6 November 2020. The redacted version was released publicly on 19 November 2020.

The report found evidence of 39 murders of civilians and prisoners by (or at the instruction of) members of the Australian special forces, which were subsequently covered up by ADF personnel. The report stated 25 ADF personnel were involved in the killings, including those who were "accessories" to the incident. Some of those believed to be involved were still serving with the ADF. The unlawful killings discussed by the report began in 2009, with most occurring in 2012 and 2013.

The report is divided into three parts. Part one provides background and context of the inquiry, including its genesis. Part two makes up the main body of the report, and examines in detail 57 incidents and issues of note, and makes recommendations in regards to each of them. Part three discusses systemic issues that may have contributed to the environment in which the kind of conduct detailed in the report could take place. The entirety of part two is redacted, and Brereton recommends it "ought not be publicly released, at least until [criminal] proceedings are finalised". Glenn Kolomeitz, a former army officer and lawyer, explained to ABC News that redactions might be intended to avoid prejudice in future criminal investigations and prosecutions, to avoid contaminating those investigations with information obtained from witnesses compelled to cooperate, and to not expose gruesome information that could traumatise or enrage the public.

Although the details were redacted in the public version of the report, it described a 2012 incident as "possibly the most disgraceful episode in Australia's military history" and noted that "the commanders at troop, squadron and task group level bear moral command responsibility" for those events. In July 2021, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that this statement in the report was a reference to allegations that a team of special forces soldiers killed multiple prisoners and civilians over several months.

The 39 murders do not appear to include additional alleged killings previously described off the record to Dr Samantha Crompvoets, a sociologist working for the army.

The report found evidence of the practice of "throwdowns", where Australian troops would carry weapons and equipment not issued by the ADF for the purposes of planting on civilians killed in combat. The weapons were then used in photographic and other evidence to give the illusion that the civilians were legitimate combatants. The report speculates that throwdowns started for the "less egregious though still dishonest" purpose of avoiding scrutiny when legitimate combatants were later found to not be armed, but later evolved into the concealment of intentional unlawful murders.

The inquiry found that junior soldiers were often required by their superiors to murder prisoners to get their first kill, a practice known as "blooding". Brereton described the practice as such: "Typically, the patrol commander would take a person under control and the junior member [...] would then be directed to kill the person under control". Throwdowns were then placed and a cover story created to conceal the practice. The killing of passive prisoners of war is a war crime.

The report discusses at length the parties responsible for the criminal acts alleged, concluding that while senior commanders "must bear some responsibility", "it was at the patrol commander level that the criminal behaviour was conceived, committed, continued, and concealed, and overwhelmingly at that level that responsibility resides." The patrol commanders were corporals and sergeants, and the inquiry "found no evidence that there was knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, the commission of war crimes" on the part of commanding officers from the troop/platoon level upward.

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