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Demandingness objection
The demandingness objection is a common argument raised against utilitarianism and other consequentialist ethical theories. The consequentialist requirement that we maximize the good impartially seems to this objection to require us to perform acts that we would normally consider optional.
For example, if our resources maximize utility through charitable contributions rather than spending them on ourselves, we are, according to utilitarianism, morally required to do so. The objection holds that this clashes with our intuitions about morality, since we would normally consider such acts to be "supererogatory" (praiseworthy but not obligatory). It is argued that because consequentialism appears to demand more than common-sense morality, it ought to be revised or rejected.
The most commonly credited influential early statement of the demandingness objection is Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism (1973).
Peter Singer famously made the case for his demanding form of consequentialism in "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" (Singer 1972). Here is the thrust of Singer's argument:
Since it is in our power to prevent suffering without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, and because the third and fourth premises reject two commonly held intuitions about our moral obligations, we are morally required to prevent suffering in any form. Morality as Singer understands it (that is, from a consequentialist perspective) really is (and should be) this demanding.[citation needed]
Bob Corbett argues that Singer's definition of "moral obligation" is too broad, and objects to the simplistic extremity of Singer's concepts of "Absolute Poverty" (anything below survival threshold) and "Absolute Luxury" (anything above survival threshold).
He argues that Singer's definition of what is possible for an individual, while technically adhering to the letter, violates the spirit of the Kantian principle that "ought" implies "can". Citing the fact that Singer himself regards adhering to this "extreme" definition to be impractical, Corbett asserts that it therefore cannot be regarded as holding the force of a moral obligation.[citation needed]
Corbett further argues that his own definition of circumstances that meet the criteria of a "moral obligation" exists only in extreme proximity: for example a car crash directly in the presence of a medical professional. "The practical necessity of having a moral obligation which we can keep requires us to be limited in obligation to those cases that we experience directly in the chances of living, and not to the entire world of suffering which we can know".[citation needed]
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Demandingness objection
The demandingness objection is a common argument raised against utilitarianism and other consequentialist ethical theories. The consequentialist requirement that we maximize the good impartially seems to this objection to require us to perform acts that we would normally consider optional.
For example, if our resources maximize utility through charitable contributions rather than spending them on ourselves, we are, according to utilitarianism, morally required to do so. The objection holds that this clashes with our intuitions about morality, since we would normally consider such acts to be "supererogatory" (praiseworthy but not obligatory). It is argued that because consequentialism appears to demand more than common-sense morality, it ought to be revised or rejected.
The most commonly credited influential early statement of the demandingness objection is Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism (1973).
Peter Singer famously made the case for his demanding form of consequentialism in "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" (Singer 1972). Here is the thrust of Singer's argument:
Since it is in our power to prevent suffering without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, and because the third and fourth premises reject two commonly held intuitions about our moral obligations, we are morally required to prevent suffering in any form. Morality as Singer understands it (that is, from a consequentialist perspective) really is (and should be) this demanding.[citation needed]
Bob Corbett argues that Singer's definition of "moral obligation" is too broad, and objects to the simplistic extremity of Singer's concepts of "Absolute Poverty" (anything below survival threshold) and "Absolute Luxury" (anything above survival threshold).
He argues that Singer's definition of what is possible for an individual, while technically adhering to the letter, violates the spirit of the Kantian principle that "ought" implies "can". Citing the fact that Singer himself regards adhering to this "extreme" definition to be impractical, Corbett asserts that it therefore cannot be regarded as holding the force of a moral obligation.[citation needed]
Corbett further argues that his own definition of circumstances that meet the criteria of a "moral obligation" exists only in extreme proximity: for example a car crash directly in the presence of a medical professional. "The practical necessity of having a moral obligation which we can keep requires us to be limited in obligation to those cases that we experience directly in the chances of living, and not to the entire world of suffering which we can know".[citation needed]