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Ejectment
Ejectment
Ejectment
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Ejectment is a common law term for civil action to recover the possession of or title to land.[1] It replaced the old real actions and the various possessory assizes (denoting county-based pleas to local sittings of the courts) where boundary disputes often featured. Though still used in some places, the term is now obsolete in many common law jurisdictions, in which possession and title are sued by the actions of eviction (also called possession proceedings) and quiet title (or injunctive and/or declaratory relief), respectively.

Originally, successful ejectment meant recovery of possession of land, for example against a defaulting tenant or a trespasser, who did not have (or once had but no longer does) any right to remain there. It has continued to be used for this, though in some jurisdictions the terminology has changed.

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Over time, actions of ejectment were applied to try land claims in place of older real actions such as the assize of novel disseisin. A practice developed of trying the title to ownership of land by means of a special ejectment chiefly for ensuring a low court and had the added advantage of some confidentiality among the landed gentry.

The claimant granted (or so professed) a lease to a friend which had passed to a fictitious person (such as John Doe), who became the nominal plaintiff: the real claimant (plaintiff) was thereby the "lessor of the plaintiff". The action was vicarious. The action was brought against the real defendant or, more usually, for semi-secrecy and to ensure the low court, against another fictitious person (e.g. William Styles), in many papers termed the "casual ejector",[2] who both sides' papers would state evicted the first fictitious tenant(s) by virtue of an (equally fictitious) lease granted by the real defendant. The title of the action would then be "Doe dem. [name of real claimant] v. [Defendant] or [fictitious counter-tenant]". E.g. Doe dem. John Hurrell Luscombe v Yates, Hawker, and Mudge (1822) 5 B. & Ald. 544 (England; 1822),[3]

A letter was sent in the name of the casual ejector to the real defendant, inviting him to defend the case on behalf of his supposed tenant. The defendant's right to appear depended on the existence of the fictitious lease (an existence he would willingly assert or, failing to do, lose by default). This enabled the rights of the real parties to be litigated in a low court.

As explained by Maitland:

A claims land against X, why should he be compelled to say that he, A, demised the land to John Doe, who was ejected, and bring the action in John Doe's name---why should it not be enough, in an action of trespass, to say that A himself was ejected? The answer to that is I think this--if you are a freeholder claiming land you should bring a writ of entry, or a writ of right. If you, being freeholder, have been ejected, that is a disseisin, you should bring the assize of novel disseisin. The law has provided you with abundant remedies, both proprietary and possessory---you must use them. If to us it seems that such an answer as this is unsatisfactory we should try to look at the matter from X's point of view. Has he not, so to speak, a vested interest in the maintenance of the old procedure? You are proposing to use against him an action in which he may be imprisoned and outlawed, while, supposing that he is in the wrong, the law has provided other forms of action which do not permit this procedure against his person...

[A] dodge was discovered by which the action of ejectment (ejectione firmae) could be made generally available as a means of enabling any claimant to recover possession of land... You are in possession of land of which I say that I am the true owner, the tenant in fee simple. If this is correct I have as a general rule a right to enter... I do in fact enter and then and there make a lease for years to a third person, John Doe. John Doe stays on the land until ousted by you, and then brings the action, trespass in ejectment or, briefly, ejectment. To succeed in his action he must prove (1) my right to enter, (2) the lease, (3) his entry under the lease and (4) his ouster by you. When all this is proved he recovers his term with damages. Upon this form there is a variation. I put John Doe as tenant upon the land and he is ousted not by you but by a fourth person, William Stiles. Doe then has the action of ejectment against Stiles, but there is a rule that no plaintiff shall proceed in ejectment without notice being given to the person actually in possession and an opportunity being given him to appear as a defendant if he pleases. Where Doe sues Stiles, Stiles informs you of the action and you, if you do not want to see the land adjudged to Doe, defend the action in Stiles's stead. In the end my title as against you is put in issue in the action.[4]

Such fictitious actions have been abolished in many jurisdictions as a result of the provision of alternative remedies.

See also

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References

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Ejectment

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Ejectment is a that enables a who holds a superior legal or right to possession of , but is not in actual possession, to sue a who is currently occupying the property in order to recover possession. This action originated in medieval English as a form of , initially allowing lessees or tenants to seek for wrongful dispossession from leased lands. Over time, by the , it evolved to encompass recovery of both possession and , with landowners employing fictitious "straw" lessees—such as —to bring claims on their behalf, effectively transforming it into a mechanism for trying to land. In colonial America and early United States jurisdictions, ejectment was adopted from English common law, often with procedural adaptations; for instance, some colonies combined it with trespass actions or used real rather than fictitious lessees, as seen in appeals to the Privy Council where it served to resolve disputes over land possession. By the 19th century, many states simplified the action through statutes, allowing direct suits by owners without the need for fictional parties and merging claims for possession and damages into a single proceeding, as exemplified in Maryland's reforms of 1870 and 1872. Despite these changes, ejectment retained its character as a tort action, requiring the plaintiff to prove paramount title— a superior right to exclusive possession—and entitling recovery of mesne profits, such as the fair rental value during the period of wrongful occupation. Today, ejectment remains a vital remedy in property law, particularly for reclaiming wrongfully occupied real estate, though it is distinct from summary eviction proceedings used in landlord-tenant disputes; it applies broadly to scenarios like adverse possession challenges or unauthorized encroachments, emphasizing legal title over mere physical control. In modern practice, successful plaintiffs may also seek damages for the defendant's tortious interference with possession, underscoring the action's dual focus on restitution and compensation.

Definition and Scope

Overview

Ejectment is a action through which a who holds superior title to seeks to regain physical possession from a who is wrongfully in actual possession. This remedy originated in English as a means to address dispossession of . The primary purpose of ejectment is to restore possession to the party with the superior right to occupancy, along with recovery of damages for the period of wrongful dispossession, by proving paramount title, distinguishing it from actions like quare clausum fregit that focus on to property. As a legal action at , ejectment is triable by , in contrast to equitable remedies such as , which are handled by courts without jury involvement. To succeed, the must demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession at the time of filing, often through of , a valid , or prior lawful entry, along with proof of the 's paramount entitling them to exclusive . Central to this is the concept of ouster, defined as the wrongful dispossession or exclusion of the rightful possessor, which the must establish to show the defendant's unlawful interference. Thus, ejectment serves to resolve disputes efficiently by prioritizing possessory over comprehensive disputes.

Distinctions from Other Property Actions

Ejectment serves as a distinct remedy focused on recovering actual possession of from a wrongful occupant by establishing the plaintiff's superior title, setting it apart from actions that address interference without dispossession or prioritize summary removal over title . Unlike remedies aimed at , injunctions, or title clarification alone, ejectment combines possessory recovery with incidental for withholding possession, typically requiring a in legal courts. In contrast to , which protects the possessor's interest against unauthorized entry or tangible interference without necessitating dispossession, ejectment applies specifically after an ouster or wrongful withholding of possession, allowing even a titleholder out of possession to reclaim the . Trespass seeks damages or injunctions for the intrusion itself and can be brought by any possessor regardless of , whereas ejectment demands proof of paramount and results in a for possession rather than mere exclusion of future harms. This distinction underscores ejectment's role as a supplement to , enabling recovery where the initial possessory right has been lost. Ejectment differs markedly from unlawful detainer or forcible entry actions, which are statutory summary proceedings designed for expedited resolution of recent, non-title-based holdovers, such as tenant evictions after expiration or to quit. These faster remedies limit defenses to possession issues and avoid full inquiries, often concluding in days or weeks without juries, while ejectment proceeds as a formal suit suitable for complex, long-term claims involving disputed ownership. For instance, unlawful detainer targets landlord-tenant disputes without probing underlying , whereas ejectment resolves broader superior rights to possession. Compared to quiet title actions or equitable ejectment, the ejectment is a emphasizing physical possession recovery through determination of title superiority, rather than equitable to clear clouded ownership or issue injunctions against future claims. Quiet title suits, often equitable, allow plaintiffs out of possession to establish ownership against adverse claimants without immediate ouster, focusing on removing title defects like liens or encumbrances, whereas ejectment requires the defendant to be in actual possession and culminates in a for removal. Equitable variants of ejectment, by contrast, invoke chancery for discretionary relief like when legal ejectment proves inadequate due to or multiplicity of parties. Historically, ejectment emerged as a practical alternative to the writ of right, an ancient and cumbersome real action that comprehensively tried ultimate title through complex feudal procedures. The writ of right demanded strict formalities and was limited to freeholders disputing , often leading to protracted litigation, while ejectment simplified possession trials via fictional scenarios, broadening access for termors and title claimants without archaic rituals. By the , ejectment had largely supplanted the writ of right in English and American practice due to its efficiency in resolving modern possessory disputes.

Historical Development

Origins in English Common Law

The action of ejectment emerged in English as a response to the limitations of earlier medieval remedies, particularly the assize of novel disseisin and the writ of right, which were rigid in form and often time-barred after seisin had been lost for an extended period. The assize of novel disseisin, introduced in the , allowed swift recovery of recent possession but required proof of dispossession within a short timeframe and was limited to possessory claims without fully testing title. Similarly, the writ of right, a proprietary action against the land itself, was solemn and protracted, demanding ancient lineage of title that became impractical amid evolving land tenures. By the late medieval period, these forms proved inadequate for the growing complexity of leaseholds and possession disputes, prompting the development of more flexible personal actions rooted in . Ejectment's foundational form took shape in the 13th century as a remedy for tenants, evolving from the writ quare ejecit infra terminum invented around 1237 by William Raleigh, which enabled a lessee to sue an ejector for recovery during the term. By the late , it manifested as trespass de ejectione firmae, initially awarding damages for wrongful ousting of a termor, as seen in early precedents like Pasch. 6 Ric. II (1383). This action gained the power to restore possession in the mid-15th century through cases such as Pasch. 7 Edw. IV (1467) and Mich. 21 Edw. IV (1481), culminating in its recognition as a viable possessory remedy by 1491–1492 under 14 Hen. VII. In the , during the Tudor era, ejectment matured into a general tool for litigating title indirectly, employing the innovative of a claimant granting a short-term to a fictitious lessee (typically "") who is then ousted by a "casual ejector" (e.g., "Richard Roe"), allowing the real parties to join issue on possession and title. This evolution occurred against a backdrop of intensifying land disputes in 16th-century , fueled by the Henrician Reformation's (1536–1541), which flooded the market with former church lands and created confusion in leaseholds and titles, alongside the early waves of that privatized common fields and sparked conflicts over possession. These social and economic shifts, including rising agricultural commercialization and population pressures, generated a surge in property litigation, making ejectment's adaptable, jury-based procedure an essential alternative to the obsolete real actions for tenants, lessors, and owners seeking practical redress.

Evolution and Reforms in the 19th Century

In the mid-19th century, England underwent significant procedural reforms to the action of ejectment, driven by criticisms of its reliance on legal fictions such as the fictional lessee "John Doe" and the simulated entry and ouster. The Common Law Procedure Act 1852 marked a pivotal shift by abolishing these fictions, allowing claimants to issue a writ directly against named persons in possession or those entitled to defend the property, thereby streamlining the process into a more straightforward action for recovery of land. This reform eliminated the need for contrived pleadings and appearances, reducing delays and costs while preserving the action's core function as the primary remedy for possessory disputes. A notable early critique of these fictions appeared in the 1820 case of Doe dem. Perkes v. Perkes, an ejectment brought to resolve a title dispute arising from an alleged partial revocation of a will, where the procedural artifice highlighted the growing judicial impatience with the form's artificiality. The of 1873 and 1875 further modernized ejectment by fusing the administration of and equity within the new of Judicature, enabling actions like ejectment to incorporate equitable defenses previously unavailable, such as those based on , mistake, or trust interests in the . This merger allowed defendants to plead equitable matters directly in ejectment proceedings, mitigating the need for parallel suits in Chancery and promoting a more holistic resolution of possession claims intertwined with equitable rights. These changes reflected broader Victorian efforts to rationalize the legal system amid industrial expansion, where ejectment increasingly addressed leasehold disputes fueled by rapid and rising tenement conflicts in cities like and . In the United States, ejectment evolved from its English roots but diverged through state-specific reforms tailored to growing urban populations and commercial pressures. Early American courts mirrored the English form, but by the 1820s, states began simplifying procedures; New York's 1848 Field Code, drafted by David Dudley Field, exemplified this by abolishing distinct forms of action and technical pleadings, merging and equity to permit a unified for possession that incorporated equitable considerations without fictions. This code transformed ejectment into a flexible remedy for real recovery, influencing over two dozen states and facilitating its application to surging leasehold evictions in industrializing cities like New York, where nonpayment and violations became commonplace amid overcrowding. By mid-century, these adaptations emphasized substantive rights over procedural hurdles, enabling ejectment to handle the era's escalating urban land conflicts more efficiently.

Procedural Elements

In the traditional action of ejectment under English , the core legal fiction involved framing the plaintiff's claim as that of a fictional lessee who had been ousted from possession by a "casual ejector," a nominal wrongdoer. The plaintiff would that a fictitious lessor, often named , had demised (leased) the property to a fictional lessee, who then entered into possession only to be ejected by the casual ejector, typically Richard Roe. This allowed the real claimant to proceed indirectly while the actual in possession could intervene and defend as the supposed ejector, thereby testing the to the land without directly challenging the rigid rules of actions. The primary purpose of these fictions was to circumvent the formalities and limitations of ancient real actions, such as writs of right or novel disseisin, by converting the dispute into a possessory action resembling , which permitted recovery of (damages for interim use of the ) and enabled rather than the more cumbersome wager of or battle. By treating the case as a personal injury to the fictional lessee's possession, the procedure introduced flexibility, allowing of to be introduced indirectly while avoiding the need for strict feudal proofs. This mechanism proved essential for resolving modern disputes within the constraints of medieval procedural forms. Variations in the fictions evolved over time, particularly in the 17th and 18th centuries, transitioning from single fictions—where the lease might be based on a real or implied demise—to double fictions incorporating the "Doe dem" form, in which the action was styled as "John Doe on the demise of [the real plaintiff] against [the casual ejector]." This "Doe dem" nomenclature standardized the process, with the fictional lessee (Doe) claiming under a supposed demise from the actual party in interest, further insulating the title inquiry from direct attack. In colonial American practice, creative names like "Timothy Thrustout" or "Crispin Heeltap" sometimes replaced Doe and Roe, but the underlying structure remained consistent. These fictions persisted as formalities into the , despite growing criticism for their artificiality, until reforms under the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 abolished the forms of action, including the need for fictional parties and declarations in ejectment. Although the procedural fictions were largely eliminated, remnants of indirect title-testing approaches lingered in some pleadings and related actions for in subsequent jurisdictions.

Filing and Proof Requirements

To initiate an ejectment action under principles, the files a alleging their seizin in fee or right to possession of the , the defendant's wrongful entry or ouster, and a demand for immediate restitution of possession. The must specify facts such as the 's possession or seizin on a particular day prior to the defendant's interference and the defendant's subsequent withholding of the property. This establishes the substantive basis for the claim without reliance on outdated legal fictions in modern practice. At trial, the bears the initial burden to prove: (1) a or leasehold sufficient to confer a right to possession, and (2) the 's ouster or unlawful withholding of the . Proof of paramount —meaning a superior possessory right relative to the 's—is required, but absolute in is not necessary; a partial , such as an undivided share in tenancy in common, suffices if it entitles the to possession. Once the demonstrates through , the burden shifts to the to establish a better right or , as possession is presumed subordinate to the shown . Acceptable evidence includes deeds, leases, or prior judicial judgments confirming the plaintiff's , with the focus on establishing a better possessory claim than the defendant's rather than unchallenged against the world. Documentary proof like recorded s or agreements demonstrating the unlawful detention is typically presented, and the plaintiff need not prove the defendant's possession if unchallenged, though actual ouster or denial of must be shown. Upon success, the court enters for restoration of possession to the , potentially including for the period of wrongful detention and for any or injury to the property. A of possession issues to enforce the , directing the to remove the and restore the , ensuring practical execution of the decree.

Modern Applications

Use in United States Jurisdictions

In the , ejectment actions are primarily governed by state law as remedies for recovering possession of when is disputed, but they may be adjudicated in federal courts under pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 if the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. For instance, in Malone v. Bowdin, the U.S. reviewed an ejectment action removed from state court to federal district court on diversity grounds, affirming the federal court's authority to resolve such state-law claims. Ejectment against government entities is limited, as claims involving regulatory takings or typically proceed under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause through inverse condemnation suits rather than traditional ejectment, requiring just compensation before dispossession. State variations reflect adaptations of the form to local statutes and procedures. In , ejectment serves as a possessory action to recover , subject to a five-year under Code of Civil Procedure § 318 for actions to recover possession of real property, and it may be combined with a quiet title action under Code of Civil Procedure §§ 760.010–764.080 to resolve both possession and title disputes in a single proceeding. In New York, statutory ejectment is codified in Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) Article 6, allowing plaintiffs to seek recovery of possession and for withholding under RPAPL § 601, often as a summary proceeding for expedited resolution when no landlord-tenant relationship exists. Contemporary applications of ejectment extend to disputes over , where property owners file to eject claimants asserting title through continuous occupation, as seen in states like and , where courts require proof of the owner's superior title to prevail. Similarly, ejectment is commonly employed in post- scenarios to remove former owners or holdover occupants, particularly in judicial foreclosure states like and New York, where the purchaser must demonstrate ownership and the defendant's refusal to surrender possession. Procedural reforms, such as 's 2011 amendments to the Rules of (Pa.R.C.P. 1051 et seq.), have expedited ejectment proceedings by streamlining filing requirements and emphasizing prompt resolution of possession issues. Ejectment remains a persistent tool in rural land disputes, where fragmented and heirship issues often lead to possession challenges, with rural filing rates averaging 4.3% annually—lower than urban areas but still affecting over 200,000 households yearly. In the , amid the exacerbated by post-COVID economic recovery, ejectment filings have risen in conjunction with broader trends, with national eviction cases increasing 78% from 2020 to 2021, remaining elevated through 2023 before a small decline in , driven by rent and foreclosure backlogs in states like those in the Southeast (as of ).

Variations in Other Common Law Countries

In the , the traditional action of ejectment, which historically allowed recovery of possession through fictional procedural devices, underwent significant simplification following the , which consolidated and reformed and property rights to reduce complexity in land transactions. Subsequent procedural changes, particularly under the (CPR) Part 55 introduced in 1999, replaced the formal ejectment process with streamlined "possession claims" for recovering land from trespassers, tenants, or other unauthorized occupiers, emphasizing expedited hearings and standardized forms. This modern framework applies broadly to residential and commercial properties but retains vestiges of ejectment in disputes involving leasehold interests where title superiority must be established, such as in cases of forfeiture or breach by lessees. In , ejectment persists as a substantive action for obtaining possession based on superior , adapted through provincial that govern its filing and proof. For instance, 's Rules of Civil Procedure permit ejectment suits in the for title-based recovery, often combined with claims for to compensate for interim occupation. Historical English influences, such as the 1824 case of Partridge v. Lang, which addressed procedural fictions in ejectment, continue to shape its doctrinal foundations, while modern applications reflect provincial variations; the has addressed related issues in cases like Montreuil v. The Ontario Asphalt Co. (1922), affirming set-offs for improvements in ejectment proceedings, and Minaker v. Minaker (1949), distinguishing ejectment from contractual claims like use and occupation. Unlike summary processes for tenancies, ejectment in requires evidentiary focus on title strength, with no direct equivalent in streamlined possession orders seen elsewhere. Australia maintains the ejectment action, reframed as a claim for recovery of possession, particularly effective against trespassers asserting no , as upheld by the in cases like Mathieson v. Burton (1971), where the court confirmed the claimant's right to immediate possession upon proving prior against a in wrongful occupation. This remedy operates alongside statutory modifications in states like , where the Real Property Act 1900 integrates Torrens system principles, prioritizing registered in ejectment-like proceedings while allowing indefeasibility defenses against unregistered interests. precedents, such as those emphasizing the claimant's onus to demonstrate possession strength without reliance on the 's weakness, ensure ejectment's role in resolving trespassory disputes efficiently, distinct from tenancy evictions under residential laws. In other common law jurisdictions like , ejectment is codified under the , specifically section 6, which enables a summary suit for restoring possession to any person dispossessed without consent or of law, without necessitating proof of —focusing instead on prior possession within six months of dispossession. This provision, as applied in cases like Smt. Arati Ghosh v. Smt. Kalpana Pathak (2013), prioritizes possessory rights to prevent self-help s and provides expedited relief compared to full suits under section 5. In contrast, civil law systems such as those in or lack a direct ejectment equivalent, relying instead on general possessory actions or judicial orders that integrate inquiries from the outset, without the common law's historical procedural fictions.

Defenses and Limitations

Common Defenses

In ejectment actions, defendants may raise various defenses to challenge the plaintiff's asserted right to possession of . These defenses typically focus on establishing the defendant's own superior or valid claim to possession, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's case, which requires proof of a better right to the than the . Common defenses include assertions of superior title, , , or , equitable bars such as laches or unclean hands, and specific statutory protections. A primary defense is the defendant's superior or right to possession, where the defendant demonstrates a stronger legal claim to the than the , often through of a valid or chain of title. In ejectment, the bears the burden of proving paramount , but the defendant may counter by introducing their own of , shifting the balance in their favor if it shows a defect in the plaintiff's claim or a clearer path to possession. For instance, if the defendant holds a recorded conveying , this can defeat the action unless the proves otherwise. Adverse possession serves as a substantive defense when the defendant has openly, continuously, and exclusively occupied the for the statutory period required in the , thereby acquiring a possessory interest superior to the plaintiff's. Under principles adopted in many U.S. jurisdictions, this period is often 20 years, during which the possession must be hostile, actual, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous, without the owner's permission. The U.S. Supreme Court in Ward v. Cochran (1893) affirmed that a relying on adverse possession in ejectment must show actual, not merely constructive, possession throughout the period to bar the plaintiff's recovery. This defense effectively extinguishes the original owner's right to immediate possession, converting the defendant's occupancy into a legal entitlement. Estoppel arises as a defense when the 's conduct has induced the to reasonably believe they had a right to possession, precluding the from later asserting ejectment. Equitable , in particular, applies if the made representations or acted in a way that led the to invest in the property or alter their position detrimentally, such as through to the defendant's improvements. The U.S. in Dickerson v. Colgrove (1879) recognized that in pais can support a defense in ejectment, allowing maintenance of the action where the 's prior conduct created a reasonable reliance by the . This doctrine ensures fairness by preventing the from benefiting from their own misleading actions. Defendants may also defend on the grounds of or , asserting that their possession stems from the plaintiff's express or implied permission, which grants a revocable right to occupy but negates any immediate claim for ejectment absent proper . A , distinct from a , is a personal privilege to use the land that does not confer an interest in the property itself and can be terminated at will, though courts require or adherence to any agreed terms before . In property disputes, if the defendant proves entry and were authorized—such as through an oral agreement for temporary use—the plaintiff cannot prevail until the is formally revoked, as possession under permission is not wrongful. Equitable defenses like laches and unclean hands provide bars where the 's delay in asserting rights has prejudiced the or where the has engaged in fraudulent or inequitable conduct. Laches applies if the unreasonably delayed bringing the ejectment action despite knowledge of the 's possession, causing detriment such as the 's substantial improvements to the ; this equitable prevents stale claims that harm the . Unclean hands, meanwhile, disqualifies the if they acted fraudulently, such as by concealing their or inducing the 's through deceit, as courts will not aid a with inequitable conduct in their hands. These defenses, rooted in equity, are available in ejectment proceedings where legal alone does not resolve the dispute. Statutory defenses often protect specific occupants, such as tenants, from ejectment without procedural safeguards under landlord-tenant laws. For example, in many jurisdictions, a tenant cannot be ejected without proper or proceedings, even if the landlord claims superior title, as statutes prioritize leasehold rights during the tenancy term. In New York, § 226-c requires 30-, 60-, or 90-day notices for non-renewal or termination depending on tenancy length. Additionally, for curable lease violations in holdover cases, a 10-day to cure is required, serving as a defense if violated. Since April 2024, New York's Good Cause provides further protections in certain non-rent-regulated units, requiring landlords to show good cause for or rent increases exceeding 5% and allowing tenants to challenge unreasonable increases. Similarly, defenses based on retaliatory or violations allow tenants to counter ejectment by showing the action violates protective statutes, ensuring compliance with in residential contexts.

Statute of Limitations and Bars

The for ejectment actions imposes a temporal restriction on a 's ability to seek recovery of possession, varying significantly by to promote the stability of titles. In , under the , no right of action to recover accrues after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right accrued to the or any predecessor in , with typically occurring upon dispossession or the cessation of the rightful owner's possession. In the United States, these periods are set by state statutes and generally range from 5 to 20 years for recovery actions; for instance, California Code of § 318 bars such claims unless the or a predecessor was seized or possessed of the property within 5 years before filing, while New York CPLR § 212 requires actions to recover within 10 years from when the or a predecessor was last seized or possessed, and Virginia Code § 8.01-236 establishes a 15-year limit for ejectment. A key bar to ejectment arises through , where a defendant's open, notorious, continuous, and hostile possession of the property for the statutory period extinguishes the plaintiff's title, thereby precluding the action. This period aligns with the in most jurisdictions, such as 10 years in under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5527.1 for acquiring title by , or 7 years in for certain recovery actions that bar ejectment claims. In practice, this doctrine ensures that long-term possession cannot be disturbed after the prescribed time, as seen in cases where uninterrupted adverse use for the full period vests legal title in the possessor. Additional bars include tolling provisions for disabilities and exemptions for government-owned land. Many jurisdictions toll the for plaintiffs who are minors, mentally incapacitated, or otherwise at the time the accrues, suspending the running of time until the disability ends; for example, § 8.01-229 extends the period for such individuals by providing that the limitation does not begin until the disability ceases. Furthermore, ejectment claims against public lands are often absolutely barred, as statutes typically do not run against government entities in the majority of U.S. states, preserving from private claims through lapse of time. The calculation of the in ejectment generally begins from the date of the wrongful dispossession (ouster) or the defendant's entry into , marking the of the , though a formal for possession may sometimes reset or clarify the starting point if made after initial entry. This rule ensures the period runs from the moment the plaintiff's possessory right is infringed, preventing indefinite delays in litigation.

References

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  30. https://code.dccouncil.gov/us/dc/council/code/sections/16-1104
  31. https://www.cunninghambounds.com/blogs/2021/june/ejectment-mesne-profits/
  32. https://www.leg.state.fl.us/STATUTES/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0000-0099/0066/Sections/0066.021.html
  33. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/369/643/
  34. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47562
  35. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CCP&sectionNum=318.
  36. https://codes.findlaw.com/ny/real-property-actions-and-proceedings-law/rpa-sect-601/
  37. https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacodefull/title8.01/chapter3/article14/
  38. https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2024/01/alabama-supreme-court-narrows-grounds-to-challenge-mortgage-foreclosure-sales
  39. https://www.pacodeandbulletin.gov/Display/pacode?file=/secure/pacode/data/231/chapter1000/subchapCtoc.html
  40. https://evictionlab.org/more-than-200000-rural-families-face-an-eviction-every-year/
  41. https://thehill.com/business/housing/4076132-post-pandemic-surge-evictions-housing-crisis/
  42. https://evictionlab.org/ets-report-2024/
  43. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part55
  44. https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/commentary/halsburys-laws-of-england/real-property-registration/318-action-of-ejectment-development-of-modern-possession-claim
  45. https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900194
  46. https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1922/1922canlii2/1922canlii2.html
  47. https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/print?DocID=JUD%252F124CLR1%252F00006&PiT=99991231235958
  48. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1583/7/A1963-47.pdf
  49. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138251170/
  50. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/80/92/
  51. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/150/597/
  52. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/100/578/
  53. https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/pdfs/TenantsGuide_holdover.pdf
  54. https://ag.ny.gov/publications/new-york-state-good-cause-eviction-law
  55. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58/section/15
  56. https://www.palegis.us/statutes/consolidated/view-statute?txtType=HTM&ttl=42&div=0&chpt=55&sctn=27&subsctn=1
  57. https://www.justia.com/real-estate/home-ownership/owning-a-home/adverse-possession-laws-50-state-survey/
  58. https://www.calt.iastate.edu/article/can-government-acquire-private-property-adverse-possession
  59. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/132/239/
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