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Ethical naturalism
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Ethical naturalism
Ethical naturalism (also called moral naturalism or naturalistic definism) is a position in metaethics that holds that moral properties or facts are reducible to, or constituted by, natural properties (as understood within philosophical naturalism) and can in principle be investigated using empirical or scientific methods. It is generally regarded as a form of moral realism, since it maintains that moral statements can be true or false depending on features of the natural world.
Ethical naturalism contrasts with ethical non-naturalism, which maintains that moral properties are not reducible to, or constituted by, natural properties, and with forms of moral anti-realism, which deny the existence of objective moral facts.
Different versions of ethical naturalism identify moral properties with different kinds of natural properties, such as human well-being, preferences, or pleasure.
The position has appeared in several ethical traditions, including some forms of utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and evolutionary ethics. In contemporary metaethics it is often associated with views such as Cornell realism. Ethical naturalism has also been the subject of significant criticism, most notably G. E. Moore's open-question argument, which challenges the claim that moral properties can be fully defined in natural terms.
Debates about ethical naturalism also concern whether moral inquiry can be continuous with empirical investigation and scientific explanation, or whether moral concepts cannot be fully reduced to descriptive accounts of the natural world.
The terms ethical naturalism and moral naturalism are generally used interchangeably in contemporary metaethics. The label naturalistic definism was historically used in discussions of attempts to define moral concepts such as "good" in naturalistic terms, particularly in debates following Moore's criticisms.
Ethical naturalism typically involves several related claims: that moral sentences express propositions, that some of these propositions are true, and that their truth depends on objective features of the world which are independent of human opinion and reducible to empirical or natural properties.
Ethical naturalism encompasses a range of views that attempt to reduce ethical properties, such as "goodness", to non-ethical properties. Different versions of ethical naturalism identify moral properties with different natural features, such as pleasure, human flourishing, or the satisfaction of preferences.
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Ethical naturalism
Ethical naturalism (also called moral naturalism or naturalistic definism) is a position in metaethics that holds that moral properties or facts are reducible to, or constituted by, natural properties (as understood within philosophical naturalism) and can in principle be investigated using empirical or scientific methods. It is generally regarded as a form of moral realism, since it maintains that moral statements can be true or false depending on features of the natural world.
Ethical naturalism contrasts with ethical non-naturalism, which maintains that moral properties are not reducible to, or constituted by, natural properties, and with forms of moral anti-realism, which deny the existence of objective moral facts.
Different versions of ethical naturalism identify moral properties with different kinds of natural properties, such as human well-being, preferences, or pleasure.
The position has appeared in several ethical traditions, including some forms of utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and evolutionary ethics. In contemporary metaethics it is often associated with views such as Cornell realism. Ethical naturalism has also been the subject of significant criticism, most notably G. E. Moore's open-question argument, which challenges the claim that moral properties can be fully defined in natural terms.
Debates about ethical naturalism also concern whether moral inquiry can be continuous with empirical investigation and scientific explanation, or whether moral concepts cannot be fully reduced to descriptive accounts of the natural world.
The terms ethical naturalism and moral naturalism are generally used interchangeably in contemporary metaethics. The label naturalistic definism was historically used in discussions of attempts to define moral concepts such as "good" in naturalistic terms, particularly in debates following Moore's criticisms.
Ethical naturalism typically involves several related claims: that moral sentences express propositions, that some of these propositions are true, and that their truth depends on objective features of the world which are independent of human opinion and reducible to empirical or natural properties.
Ethical naturalism encompasses a range of views that attempt to reduce ethical properties, such as "goodness", to non-ethical properties. Different versions of ethical naturalism identify moral properties with different natural features, such as pleasure, human flourishing, or the satisfaction of preferences.