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Hub AI
Illocutionary act AI simulator
(@Illocutionary act_simulator)
Hub AI
Illocutionary act AI simulator
(@Illocutionary act_simulator)
Illocutionary act
The concept of illocutionary acts was introduced into linguistics by the philosopher J. L. Austin in his investigation of the various aspects of speech acts. In his framework, locution is what was said and meant, illocution is what was done, and perlocution is what happened as a result.
When somebody says "Is there any salt?" at the dinner table, the illocutionary act is a request: "please give me some salt" even though the locutionary act (the literal sentence) was to ask a question about the presence of salt. The perlocutionary act (the actual effect), might be to cause somebody to pass the salt.
The notion of an illocutionary act is closely connected with Austin's doctrine of the so-called "performative" and "constative utterances": an utterance is "performative" if, and only if it is issued in the course of the "doing of an action" (1975, 5), by which, again, Austin means the performance of an illocutionary act (Austin 1975, 6 n2, 133). According to Austin's original exposition in How to Do Things With Words, an illocutionary act is an act:
Thus, for example, in order to make a promise one must make clear to their audience that the act one is performing is the making of a promise, and in the performance of the act one will be undertaking a conventional obligation to do the promised thing: the promisee will understand what it means to make a promise and fulfill it. Thus, promising is an illocutionary act in the present sense. Since Austin's death, the term has been defined differently by various authors.
One way to think about the difference between an illocutionary act (e.g., a declaration, command, or a promise), and a perlocutionary act (e.g., a listener's reaction) is to note how in the former case, by uttering the object – for example, "I hereby promise you" – (and assuming that all other necessary features of the performative situation pertain), then the act has taken place: a promise was made. The perlocutionary result (how the promisee reacts) might be acceptance, or skepticism, or disbelief, but none of these reactions alter the illocutionary force of the statement: the promise was made.
That is to say, in each case a declaration, command, or promise has necessarily taken place in virtue of the utterance itself, whether the hearer believes in or acts upon the declaration, command, or promise or not.
On the other hand, with a perlocutionary act, the object of the utterance has not taken place unless the hearer deems it so — for example, if one utters, "I hereby insult you," or "I hereby persuade you" — one would not assume an insult has necessarily occurred, nor persuasion has necessarily taken place, unless the hearer were suitably offended or persuaded by the utterance.
Whereas Austin used performative to talk about certain kinds of utterances as having "force," his term illocution rather names a quality or aspect of all utterances. They will have a locutionary sense or meaning, an illocutionary force, and a perlocutionary result. This approach has encouraged the view that even true/false constative statements have illocutionary force (as in "I hereby state and affirm") and even performatives can be evaluable as true–false statements (as "guilty" verdict might be right or wrong).
Illocutionary act
The concept of illocutionary acts was introduced into linguistics by the philosopher J. L. Austin in his investigation of the various aspects of speech acts. In his framework, locution is what was said and meant, illocution is what was done, and perlocution is what happened as a result.
When somebody says "Is there any salt?" at the dinner table, the illocutionary act is a request: "please give me some salt" even though the locutionary act (the literal sentence) was to ask a question about the presence of salt. The perlocutionary act (the actual effect), might be to cause somebody to pass the salt.
The notion of an illocutionary act is closely connected with Austin's doctrine of the so-called "performative" and "constative utterances": an utterance is "performative" if, and only if it is issued in the course of the "doing of an action" (1975, 5), by which, again, Austin means the performance of an illocutionary act (Austin 1975, 6 n2, 133). According to Austin's original exposition in How to Do Things With Words, an illocutionary act is an act:
Thus, for example, in order to make a promise one must make clear to their audience that the act one is performing is the making of a promise, and in the performance of the act one will be undertaking a conventional obligation to do the promised thing: the promisee will understand what it means to make a promise and fulfill it. Thus, promising is an illocutionary act in the present sense. Since Austin's death, the term has been defined differently by various authors.
One way to think about the difference between an illocutionary act (e.g., a declaration, command, or a promise), and a perlocutionary act (e.g., a listener's reaction) is to note how in the former case, by uttering the object – for example, "I hereby promise you" – (and assuming that all other necessary features of the performative situation pertain), then the act has taken place: a promise was made. The perlocutionary result (how the promisee reacts) might be acceptance, or skepticism, or disbelief, but none of these reactions alter the illocutionary force of the statement: the promise was made.
That is to say, in each case a declaration, command, or promise has necessarily taken place in virtue of the utterance itself, whether the hearer believes in or acts upon the declaration, command, or promise or not.
On the other hand, with a perlocutionary act, the object of the utterance has not taken place unless the hearer deems it so — for example, if one utters, "I hereby insult you," or "I hereby persuade you" — one would not assume an insult has necessarily occurred, nor persuasion has necessarily taken place, unless the hearer were suitably offended or persuaded by the utterance.
Whereas Austin used performative to talk about certain kinds of utterances as having "force," his term illocution rather names a quality or aspect of all utterances. They will have a locutionary sense or meaning, an illocutionary force, and a perlocutionary result. This approach has encouraged the view that even true/false constative statements have illocutionary force (as in "I hereby state and affirm") and even performatives can be evaluable as true–false statements (as "guilty" verdict might be right or wrong).