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Investment banking
Investment banking
from Wikipedia

Investment banking is an advisory-based financial service for institutional investors, corporations, governments, and similar clients. Traditionally associated with corporate finance, such a bank might assist in raising financial capital by underwriting or acting as the client's agent in the issuance of debt or equity securities. An investment bank may also assist companies involved in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and provide ancillary services such as market making, trading of derivatives and equity securities, FICC services (fixed income instruments, currencies, and commodities) or research (macroeconomic, credit or equity research). Most investment banks maintain prime brokerage and asset management departments in conjunction with their investment research businesses. As an industry, it is broken up into the Bulge Bracket (upper tier), Middle Market (mid-level businesses), and boutique market (specialized businesses).

Unlike commercial banks and retail banks, investment banks do not take deposits. The revenue model of an investment bank comes mostly from the collection of fees for advising on a transaction, contrary to a commercial or retail bank. From the passage of Glass–Steagall Act in 1933 until its repeal in 1999 by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, the United States maintained a separation between investment banking and commercial banks. Other industrialized countries, including G7 countries, have historically not maintained such a separation. As part of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank Act of 2010), the Volcker Rule asserts some institutional separation of investment banking services from commercial banking.[1]

All investment banking activity is classed as either "sell side" or "buy side". The "sell side" involves trading securities for cash or for other securities (e.g., facilitating transactions, market-making), or the promotion of securities (e.g., underwriting, research, etc.). The "buy side" involves the provision of advice to institutions that buy investment services. Private equity funds, mutual funds, life insurance companies, unit trusts, and hedge funds are the most common types of buy-side entities.

An investment bank can also be split into private and public functions with a screen separating the two to prevent information from crossing. The private areas of the bank deal with private insider information that may not be publicly disclosed, while the public areas, such as stock analysis, deal with public information. An advisor who provides investment banking services in the United States must be a licensed broker-dealer and subject to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) regulation.[2]

History

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Early history

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The Dutch East India Company was the first company to issue bonds and shares of stock to the general public. It was also the first publicly traded company, being the first company to be publicly listed.[3][4]

Further developments

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Investment banking has changed over the years, beginning as a partnership firm focused on underwriting security issuance, i.e., initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary market offerings, brokerage, and mergers and acquisitions, and evolving into a "full-service" range including securities research, proprietary trading, and investment management.[5] In the 21st century, the SEC filings of the major independent investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley reflect three product segments:

  1. investment banking (mergers and acquisitions, advisory services, and securities underwriting),
  2. asset management (sponsored investment funds), and
  3. trading and principal investments (broker-dealer activities, including proprietary trading ("dealer" transactions) and brokerage trading ("broker" transactions)).[6]

In the United States, commercial banking and investment banking were separated by the Glass–Steagall Act, which was repealed in 1999. The repeal led to more "universal banks" offering an even greater range of services. Many large commercial banks have therefore developed investment banking divisions through acquisitions and hiring. Notable full-service investment banks with a significant investment banking division (IBD) include JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, UBS (Acquired Credit Suisse), and Barclays.

After the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, regulations have limited certain investment banking operations, notably with the Volcker Rule's restrictions on proprietary trading.[7]

The traditional service of underwriting security issues has declined as a percentage of revenue. As far back as 1960, 70% of Merrill Lynch's revenue was derived from transaction commissions while "traditional investment banking" services accounted for 5%. However, Merrill Lynch was a relatively "retail-focused" firm with a large brokerage network.[7]

Organizational structure

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Core investment banking activities

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Investment banking is split into front office, middle office, and back office activities. While large service investment banks offer all lines of business, both "sell side" and "buy side", smaller sell-side advisory firms such as boutique investment banks and small broker-dealers focus on niche segments within investment banking and sales/trading/research, respectively.

For example, Evercore (NYSE:EVR) acquired ISI International Strategy & Investment (ISI) in 2014 to expand their revenue into research-driven equity sales and trading.[8]

Investment banks offer services to both corporations issuing securities and investors buying securities. For corporations, investment bankers offer information on when and how to place their securities on the open market, a highly regulated process by the SEC to ensure transparency is provided to investors. Therefore, investment bankers play a very important role in issuing new security offerings.[7][9]

Front office

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Front office is generally described as a revenue-generating role. There are two main areas within front office: investment banking and markets.[10]

  • Investment banking involves advising organizations on mergers and acquisitions, as well as a wide array of capital raising strategies.[11]
  • Markets is divided into "sales and trading" (including "structuring"), and "research".
Corporate finance
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Corporate Finance transactions[12]

Corporate finance is the aspect of investment banks which involves helping customers raise funds in capital markets and giving advice on mergers and acquisitions (M&A);[12] transactions in which capital is raised for the corporation include those listed aside.[12]

This work may involve, subscribing investors to a security issuance, coordinating with bidders, or negotiating with a merger target. A pitch book, also called a confidential information memorandum (CIM), is a document that highlights the relevant financial information, past transaction experience, and background of the deal team to market the bank to a potential M&A client; if the pitch is successful, the bank arranges the deal for the client.[13]

Recent legal and regulatory developments in the U.S. will likely alter the makeup of the group of arrangers and financiers willing to arrange and provide financing for certain highly leveraged transactions.[14][15]

Sales and trading
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On behalf of the bank and its clients, a large investment bank's primary function is buying and selling products.[16]

Sales is the term for the investment bank's sales force, whose primary job is to call on institutional and high-net-worth investors to suggest trading ideas (on a caveat emptor basis) and take orders. Sales desks then communicate their clients' orders to the appropriate bank department, which can price and execute trades, or structure new products that fit a specific need. Sales make deals tailored to their corporate customers' needs, that is, their terms are often specific. Focusing on their customer relationship, they may deal on the whole range of asset types. (In distinction, trades negotiated by market-makers usually bear standard terms; in market making, traders will buy and sell financial products with the goal of making money on each trade. See under trading desk.)

Structuring has been a relatively recent activity as derivatives have come into play, with highly technical and numerate employees working on creating complex financial products which typically offer much greater margins and returns than underlying cash securities, so-called "yield enhancement". In 2010, investment banks came under pressure as a result of selling complex derivatives contracts to local municipalities in Europe and the US.[17]

Strategists advise external as well as internal clients on the strategies that can be adopted in various markets. Ranging from derivatives to specific industries, strategists place companies and industries in a quantitative framework with full consideration of the macroeconomic scene. This strategy often affects the way the firm will operate in the market, the direction it would like to take in terms of its proprietary and flow positions, the suggestions salespersons give to clients, as well as the way structurers create new products.

Banks also undertake risk through proprietary trading, performed by a special set of traders who do not interface with clients and through "principal risk"—risk undertaken by a trader after he buys or sells a product to a client and does not hedge his total exposure. Here, and in general, banks seek to maximize profitability for a given amount of risk on their balance sheet. Note here that the FRTB framework has underscored the distinction between the "Trading book" and the "Banking book" - i.e. assets intended for active trading, as opposed to assets expected to be held to maturity - and market risk capital requirements will differ accordingly.

The necessity for numerical ability in sales and trading has created jobs for physics, computer science, mathematics, and engineering PhDs who act as "front office" quantitative analysts.

Research
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The securities research division reviews companies and writes reports about their prospects, often with "buy", "hold", or "sell" ratings. Investment banks typically have sell-side analysts which cover various industries. Their sponsored funds or proprietary trading offices will also have buy-side research. Research also covers credit risk, fixed income, macroeconomics, and quantitative analysis, all of which are used internally and externally to advise clients; alongside "Equity", these may be separate "groups". The research group(s) typically provide a key service in terms of advisory and strategy.

While the research division may or may not generate revenue (based on the specific compliance policies at different banks), its resources are used to assist traders in trading, the sales force in suggesting ideas to customers, and investment bankers by covering their clients.[18] Research also serves outside clients with investment advice (such as institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals) in the hopes that these clients will execute suggested trade ideas through the sales and trading division of the bank, and thereby generate revenue for the firm.

With MiFID II requiring sell-side research teams in banks to charge for research, the business model for research is increasingly becoming revenue-generating. External rankings of researchers are becoming increasingly important, and banks have started the process of monetizing research publications, client interaction times, meetings with clients etc.

There is a potential conflict of interest between the investment bank and its analysis, in that published analysis can impact the performance of a security (in the secondary markets or an initial public offering) or influence the relationship between the banker and its corporate clients, and vice versa regarding material non-public information (MNPI), thereby affecting the bank's profitability.[19] See also Chinese wall § Finance.

Middle office

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This area of the bank includes treasury management, internal controls (such as Risk), and internal corporate strategy.

Corporate treasury is responsible for an investment bank's funding, capital structure management, and liquidity risk monitoring; it is (co)responsible for the bank's funds transfer pricing (FTP) framework.

Internal control tracks and analyzes the capital flows of the firm, the finance division is the principal adviser to senior management on essential areas such as controlling the firm's global risk exposure and the profitability and structure of the firm's various businesses via dedicated trading desk product control teams. In the United States and United Kingdom, a comptroller (or financial controller) is a senior position, often reporting to the chief financial officer.

Risk management
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Risk in banking

Risk management involves analyzing the market and credit risk that an investment bank or its clients take onto their balance sheet during transactions or trades.

Middle office "Credit Risk" focuses around capital markets activities, such as syndicated loans, bond issuance, restructuring, and leveraged finance. These are not considered "front office" as they tend not to be client-facing and rather 'control' banking functions from taking too much risk. "Market Risk" is the control function for the Markets' business and conducts review of sales and trading activities utilizing the VaR model. Other Middle office "Risk Groups" include country risk, operational risk, and counterparty risks which may or may not exist on a bank to bank basis.

Front office risk teams, on the other hand, engage in revenue-generating activities involving debt structuring, restructuring, syndicated loans, and securitization for clients such as corporates, governments, and hedge funds. Here "Credit Risk Solutions", are a key part of capital market transactions, involving debt structuring, exit financing, loan amendment, project finance, leveraged buy-outs, and sometimes portfolio hedging. The "Market Risk Team" provides services to investors via derivative solutions, portfolio management, portfolio consulting, and risk advisory.

Well-known "Risk Groups" are at JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Barclays. J.P. Morgan IB Risk works with investment banking to execute transactions and advise investors, although its Finance & Operation risk groups focus on middle office functions involving internal, non-revenue generating, operational risk controls.[20][21][22] The credit default swap, for instance, is a famous credit risk hedging solution for clients invented by J.P. Morgan's Blythe Masters during the 1990s. The Loan Risk Solutions group[23] within Barclays' investment banking division and Risk Management and Financing group[24] housed in Goldman Sach's securities division are client-driven franchises.

Risk management groups such as credit risk, operational risk, internal risk control, and legal risk are restrained to internal business functions — including firm balance-sheet risk analysis and assigning the trading cap — that are independent of client needs, even though these groups may be responsible for deal approval that directly affects capital market activities. Similarly, the Internal corporate strategy group, tackling firm management and profit strategy, unlike corporate strategy groups that advise clients, is non-revenue regenerating yet a key functional role within investment banks.

This list is not a comprehensive summary of all middle-office functions within an investment bank, as specific desks within front and back offices may participate in internal functions.[25]

Back office

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The back office data-checks trades that have been conducted, ensuring that they are not wrong, and transacts the required transfers. Many banks have outsourced operations. It is, however, a critical part of the bank.[citation needed]

Technology
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Every major investment bank has considerable amounts of in-house software, created by the technology team, who are also responsible for technical support. Technology has changed considerably in the last few years as more sales and trading desks are using electronic processing. Some trades are initiated by complex algorithms for hedging purposes.

Firms are responsible for compliance with local and foreign government regulations and internal regulations.

Other businesses

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Industry profile

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The investment banking industry can be broken up into Bulge Bracket (upper tier), Middle Market (mid-level businesses), and boutique market (specialized businesses) categories. There are various trade associations throughout the world which represent the industry in lobbying, facilitate industry standards, and publish statistics. The International Council of Securities Associations (ICSA) is a global group of trade associations.

In the United States, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) is likely the most significant; however, several of the large investment banks are members of the American Bankers Association Securities Association (ABASA),[27] while small investment banks are members of the National Investment Banking Association (NIBA).

In Europe, the European Forum of Securities Associations was formed in 2007 by various European trade associations.[28] Several European trade associations (principally the London Investment Banking Association and the European SIFMA affiliate) combined in November 2009 to form the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME).[29]

In the securities industry in China, the Securities Association of China is a self-regulatory organization whose members are largely investment banks.

Global size and revenue mix

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Global investment banking revenue increased for the fifth year running in 2007, to a record US$84 billion, which was up 22% on the previous year and more than double the level in 2003.[30] Subsequent to their exposure to United States sub-prime securities investments, many investment banks have experienced losses. As of late 2012, global revenues for investment banks were estimated at $240 billion, down about a third from 2009, as companies pursued fewer deals and traded less.[31] Differences in total revenue are likely due to different ways of classifying investment banking revenue, such as subtracting proprietary trading revenue.

In terms of total revenue, SEC filings of the major independent investment banks in the United States show that investment banking (defined as M&A advisory services and security underwriting) made up only about 15–20% of total revenue for these banks from 1996 to 2006, with the majority of revenue (60+% in some years) brought in by "trading" which includes brokerage commissions and proprietary trading; the proprietary trading is estimated to provide a significant portion of this revenue.[6]

The United States generated 46% of global revenue in 2009, down from 56% in 1999. Europe (with Middle East and Africa) generated about a third, while Asian countries generated the remaining 21%.[30]: 8  The industry is heavily concentrated in a small number of major financial centers, including New York City, City of London, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Tokyo. The majority of the world's largest Bulge Bracket investment banks and their investment managers are headquartered in New York and are also important participants in other financial centers.[32] The city of London has historically served as a hub of European M&A activity, often facilitating the most capital movement and corporate restructuring in the area.[33][34] Meanwhile, Asian cities are receiving a growing share of M&A activity.

According to estimates published by the International Financial Services London, for the decade prior to the 2008 financial crisis, M&A was a primary source of investment banking revenue, often accounting for 40% of such revenue, but dropped during and after the 2008 financial crisis.[30]: 9  Equity underwriting revenue ranged from 30% to 38%, and fixed-income underwriting accounted for the remaining revenue.[30]: 9 

Revenues have been affected by the introduction of new products with higher margins; however, these innovations are often copied quickly by competing banks, pushing down trading margins. For example, brokerages commissions for bond and equity trading is a commodity business, but structuring and trading derivatives have higher margins because each over-the-counter contract has to be uniquely structured and could involve complex pay-off and risk profiles. One growth area is private investment in public equity (PIPEs, otherwise known as Regulation D or Regulation S). Such transactions are privately negotiated between companies and accredited investors.

Banks also earned revenue by securitizing debt, particularly mortgage debt prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Investment banks have become concerned that lenders are securitizing in-house, driving the investment banks to pursue vertical integration by becoming lenders, which has been allowed in the United States since the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in 1999.[35]

Top 10 banks

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Many of the largest investment banks, including JPMorgan Chase, belong to the Bulge Bracket.

According to The Wall Street Journal, in terms of total M&A advisory fees for the whole of 2020, the top ten investment banks were as listed in the table below.[36] Many of these firms belong either to the Bulge Bracket (upper tier), Middle Market (mid-level businesses), or are elite boutique investment banks (independent advisory investment banks).

Rank Company Ticker Fees ($bn)
1. United States Goldman Sachs GS 287.1
2. United States Morgan Stanley MS 252.2
3. United States JPMorgan Chase JPM 208.1
4. United States Bank of America Merrill Lynch BAC 169.9
5. United Kingdom Rothschild & Co ROTH 94.6
6. United States Citi C 91.8
7. United States Evercore EVR 90.3
8. Switzerland Credit Suisse CS 90.2
9. United Kingdom Barclays BCS 71.7
10. Switzerland UBS UBS 65.9

The above list is just a ranking of the advisory arm (M&A advisory, syndicated loans, equity capital markets, and debt capital markets) of each bank and does not include the generally much larger portion of revenues from sales & trading and asset management. Mergers and acquisitions and capital markets are also often covered by The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg.

Global market share of revenue of leading investment[37]
institutions percentage
JPMorgan Chase
8.1
Goldman Sachs
7.2
Bank of America Merrill Lynch
6.1
Morgan Stanley
5.8
Citi
5.3
Credit Suisse
4.5
Barclays
4.3
Deutsche Bank
3.2
UBS
2.2
RBC Capital Markets
2.2
(as of December 2017)

2008 financial crisis

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The 2008 financial crisis led to the collapse of several notable investment banks, such as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (one of the largest investment banks in the world) and the hurried fire sale of Merrill Lynch and the much smaller Bear Stearns to much larger banks, which effectively rescued them from bankruptcy. The entire financial services industry, including numerous investment banks, was bailed out by government taxpayer funded loans through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Surviving U.S. investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to traditional bank holding companies to accept TARP relief.[38] Similar situations have occurred across the globe with countries rescuing their banking industry. Initially, banks received part of a $700 billion TARP intended to stabilize the economy and thaw the frozen credit markets.[39] Eventually, taxpayer assistance to banks reached nearly $13 trillion—most without much scrutiny—[40] lending did not increase,[41] and credit markets remained frozen.[42]

The crisis led to questioning of the investment banking business model[43] without the regulation imposed on it by Glass–Steagall.[neutrality is disputed] Once Robert Rubin, a former co-chairman of Goldman Sachs, became part of the Clinton administration and deregulated banks, the previous conservatism of underwriting established companies and seeking long-term gains was replaced by lower standards and short-term profit.[44] Formerly, the guidelines said that in order to take a company public, it had to be in business for a minimum of five years and it had to show profitability for three consecutive years. After deregulation, those standards were gone, but small investors did not grasp the full impact of the change.[44]

A number of former Goldman Sachs top executives, such as Henry Paulson and Ed Liddy, were in high-level positions in government and oversaw the controversial taxpayer-funded bank bailout.[44] The TARP Oversight Report released by the Congressional Oversight Panel found that the bailout tended to encourage risky behavior and "corrupt[ed] the fundamental tenets of a market economy".[45]

Under threat of a subpoena, Goldman Sachs revealed that it received $12.9 billion in taxpayer aid, $4.3 billion of which was then paid out to 32 entities, including many overseas banks, hedge funds, and pensions.[46] The same year it received $10 billion in aid from the government, it also paid out multimillion-dollar bonuses; the total paid in bonuses was $4.82 billion.[47][48] Similarly, Morgan Stanley received $10 billion in TARP funds and paid out $4.475 billion in bonuses.[49]

Criticisms

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The investment banking industry, including boutique investment banks, have come under criticism for a variety of reasons, including perceived conflicts of interest, overly large pay packages, cartel-like or oligopolistic behavior, taking both sides in transactions, and more.[50] Investment banking has also been criticized for its opacity.[51] However, the lack of transparency inherent to the investment banking industry is largely due to the necessity to abide by the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) signed with the client. The accidental leak of confidential client data can cause a bank to incur significant monetary losses.

Conflicts of interest

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Conflicts of interest may arise between different parts of a bank, creating the potential for market manipulation, according to critics. Authorities that regulate investment banking, such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the United Kingdom and the SEC in the United States, require that banks impose a "Chinese wall" to prevent communication between investment banking on one side and equity research and trading on the other. However, critics say such a barrier does not always exist in practice. Independent advisory firms that exclusively provide corporate finance advice argue that their advice is not conflicted, unlike bulge bracket banks.

Conflicts of interest often arise in relation to investment banks' equity research units, which have long been part of the industry. A common practice is for equity analysts to initiate coverage of a company to develop relationships that lead to highly profitable investment banking business. In the 1990s, many equity researchers allegedly traded positive stock ratings for investment banking business. Alternatively, companies may threaten to divert investment banking business to competitors unless their stock was rated favorably. Laws were passed to criminalize such acts, and increased pressure from regulators and a series of lawsuits, settlements, and prosecutions curbed this business to a large extent following the 2001 stock market tumble after the dot-com bubble.

Philip Augar, author of The Greed Merchants, said in an interview that, "You cannot simultaneously serve the interest of issuer clients and investing clients. And it’s not just underwriting and sales; investment banks run proprietary trading operations that are also making a profit out of these securities."[50]

Many investment banks also own retail brokerages. During the 1990s, some retail brokerages sold consumers securities which did not meet their stated risk profile. This behavior may have led to investment banking business or even sales of surplus shares during a public offering to keep public perception of the stock favorable.

Since investment banks engage heavily in trading for their own account, there is always the temptation for them to engage in some form of front running—the illegal practice whereby a broker executes orders for their own account before filling orders previously submitted by their customers, thereby benefiting from any changes in prices induced by those orders.

Documents under seal in a decade-long lawsuit concerning eToys.com's IPO but obtained by New York Times' Wall Street Business columnist Joe Nocera alleged that IPOs managed by Goldman Sachs and other investment bankers involved asking for kickbacks from their institutional clients who made large profits flipping IPOs which Goldman had intentionally undervalued. Depositions in the lawsuit alleged that clients willingly complied with these demands because they understood it was necessary to participate in future hot issues.[52] Reuters Wall Street correspondent Felix Salmon retracted his earlier, more conciliatory statements on the subject and said he believed that the depositions show that companies going public and their initial consumer stockholders are both defrauded by this practice, which may be widespread throughout the IPO finance industry.[53] The case is ongoing, and the allegations remain unproven.

Nevertheless, the controversy around investment banks intentionally underpricing IPOs for their self-interest has become a highly debated subject. The cause for concern is that the investment banks advising on the IPOs have the incentive to serve institutional investors on the buy-side, creating a valid reason for a potential conflict of interest.[54]

The post-IPO spike in the stock price of newly listed companies has only worsened the problem, with one of the leading critics being high-profile venture capital (VC) investor, Bill Gurley.[55]

Compensation

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Investment banking has been criticized for the enormous pay packages awarded to those who work in the industry. According to Bloomberg Wall Street's five biggest firms paid over $3 billion to their executives from 2003 to 2008, "while they presided over the packaging and sale of loans that helped bring down the investment-banking system".[56]

In 2003-2007, pay packages included $172 million for Merrill Lynch CEO Stanley O'Neal before the bank was bought by Bank of America, and $161 million for Bear Stearns' James Cayne before the bank collapsed and was sold to JPMorgan Chase.[56]Such pay arrangements attracted the ire of Democrats and Republicans in the United States Congress, who demanded limits on executive pay in 2008 when the U.S. government was bailing out the industry with a $700 billion financial rescue package.[56]

Writing in the Global Association of Risk Professionals journal, Aaron Brown, a vice president at Morgan Stanley, says "By any standard of human fairness, of course, investment bankers make obscene amounts of money."[50]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Investment banking encompasses the specialized offered by investment banks, which act as intermediaries in large-scale transactions, including the of securities issuances such as initial public offerings (IPOs) and bonds, advisory on (M&A), and facilitation of trading in equities, , and derivatives for institutional clients. These institutions connect issuers of capital—corporations, governments, and municipalities—with investors, enabling efficient allocation of resources across the through mechanisms like equity and financing, though their activities often concentrate risks in leveraged structures. Historically rooted in 19th-century merchant banking practices that evolved into formalized securities by the early , investment banking expanded post-World War II amid and , with U.S. firms like and dominating global deal flow. Key functions include , where banks assume risk by purchasing and reselling securities to mitigate issuer exposure; M&A advisory, providing valuation and support for transactions averaging billions in value; and sales and trading, which generates but has drawn scrutiny for positions amplifying market volatility. Empirical analyses indicate that investment banks enhance firm value in securities issuance by reducing information asymmetries, yet their fee-based incentives—typically 1-2% of transaction values—can foster conflicts, such as biased favoring clients. Defining characteristics include high-stakes compensation structures tying analyst and managing director pay to deal volume, fostering intense among , while smaller boutiques specialize in niche advisory. Achievements encompass fueling industrial growth via capital raises—e.g., major IPOs that propelled tech booms—and stabilizing markets through provision, but controversies persist over systemic risks, as evidenced by the 2008 collapse of pure-play investment banks like , which highlighted leverage excesses absent empirical safeguards against correlated failures. Post-crisis regulations, including Dodd-Frank stress tests, compelled many to adopt status for access, blending commercial and investment operations despite Glass-Steagall's original separation to curb . Such integrations have empirically reduced standalone failures but raised concerns over from implicit bailouts, underscoring investment banking's dual role in and potential fragility.

Definition and Core Functions

Overview and Distinction from Other Banking

Investment banking refers to a specialized segment of the industry that primarily assists large corporations, governments, and institutional investors in raising capital and managing complex financial transactions. Core functions include new issuances of and bonds, providing advisory services for mergers, acquisitions, and restructurings, and engaging in , trading, and of securities. These activities generate revenue through fees, commissions, and spreads rather than interest income from lending, with global investment banking fees totaling approximately $130 billion in 2022, driven largely by equity and markets. In distinction from commercial banking, which centers on accepting deposits from individuals and businesses while extending loans and offering services to retail and small-to-medium enterprise clients, investment banking avoids deposit-taking and focuses exclusively on wholesale markets. Commercial banks operate under and lending regulations emphasizing management, whereas investment banks face market and risks inherent to securities and trading, often leading to higher volatility in earnings—evident in the where investment divisions amplified losses for universal banks like . Regulatory separations have underscored these differences; the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 explicitly barred commercial banks from investment banking to prevent conflicts of interest and speculative excesses that contributed to the , a prohibition repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, enabling integrated "universal" banking models. Despite convergence, functional specialization endures due to expertise requirements and risk appetites, with investment banks subject to securities regulations like those from the SEC rather than primary reliance on banking charters for deposit activities. This delineation persists globally, as seen in Europe's MiFID II framework, which mandates transparency in trading to mitigate risks distinct from commercial lending oversight.

Primary Services

Investment banks offer three core services: underwriting securities issuances, advisory on (M&A), and sales and trading of financial instruments. Underwriting entails the bank purchasing securities from issuers—such as corporations or governments—and reselling them to investors, thereby assuming the risk of unsold portions to facilitate capital raising through mechanisms like initial public offerings (IPOs) or debt placements. This service dominated investment banking revenues historically, with firms like and leading in global equity and debt underwriting leagues as of 2023, handling trillions in annual issuance volume. M&A advisory involves providing strategic to clients on corporate transactions, including valuation analyses, , negotiation support, and deal structuring for acquisitions, divestitures, or mergers. Investment banks earn fees typically as a of deal value—often 0.5% to 2%—with bulge-bracket firms advising on over 80% of large-cap deals exceeding $1 billion in 2024. This service emphasizes expertise in antitrust considerations and financing synergies, as evidenced by JPMorgan's role in facilitating high-profile transactions like the 2023 Microsoft-Activision acquisition. Sales and trading operations enable the buying, selling, and market-making of equities, , currencies, and , serving institutional clients while generating through commissions, spreads, and proprietary positions. These activities rely on global trading desks and electronic platforms, with U.S. banks like reporting billions in fixed-income trading revenues amid volatile markets in 2024. Supporting these primary functions, banks conduct equity research to inform trading and advisory, producing analyst reports on company fundamentals and market trends, though post-2008 regulations like the have curtailed to mitigate systemic risks.

Historical Development

Origins and Early Modern Period

The precursors to modern investment banking emerged in medieval Europe through merchant banking houses that facilitated international trade, credit extension, and sovereign lending via instruments like bills of exchange and letters of credit. In 12th- and 13th-century Italy, particularly Florence and Genoa, merchant bankers distinguished themselves by pooling resources for large-scale remittances and loans, often financing papal and royal expenditures across Europe. By the 14th century, Florentine super-companies such as the Bardi and Peruzzi families dominated, establishing branches in major cities like London and Bruges; the Bardi lent over 900,000 gold florins to Edward III of England between 1327 and 1345 for military campaigns, while the Peruzzi extended similar sums. These operations collapsed in 1343-1345 due to sovereign defaults, including Edward III's refusal to repay amid the Hundred Years' War, triggering a broader European credit crisis that underscored the risks of unsecured lending to monarchs. The , founded in 1397 by , represented a more resilient model, growing into Europe's largest by the with branches in , , , , and ; it innovated through and diversified revenue from , currency exchange, and discreet loans to figures like the popes and English crown, amassing profits equivalent to millions in modern terms while avoiding the over-reliance on sovereign debt that doomed its predecessors. These Italian merchant banks laid foundational practices for investment banking by risks in long-distance and , though their activities remained intertwined with rather than specialized securities issuance. In the , the pioneered mechanisms closer to contemporary investment banking with the formation of joint-stock companies and organized securities markets. The (VOC), chartered on March 20, 1602, issued the world's first publicly traded shares, raising 6.4 million guilders through an initial offering to fund Asian trade expeditions, introducing permanent capital structures and transferable ownership that separated investors from operational control. Trading of VOC shares on the , established informally around 1602 and formalized by the 1610s, fostered secondary markets with forward contracts and options by the 1680s, enabling price discovery and for equity investments. Amsterdam's merchant bankers, supported by institutions like the (founded 1609), underwrote VOC voyages and government annuities, channeling Dutch savings into colonial ventures and public debt, which by the mid-17th century positioned the city as Europe's premier . By the emerged as a rival center, with merchant houses like Barings and Rothschilds precursors engaging in bond underwriting for British during the (1701-1714) and beyond; the London Stock Exchange, evolving from coffee house dealings by 1698, facilitated trading in shares and lottery annuities, reflecting a shift toward market-based capital raising amid growing public debt from imperial expansion. These developments in and marked the transition from ad hoc merchant lending to institutionalized securities issuance and trading, driven by the needs of expansive trade empires and fiscal demands of warfare, though vulnerabilities to speculation and defaults persisted, as seen in the 1720 South Sea Bubble.

Expansion in the 19th and 20th Centuries

The expansion of investment banking in the 19th century was driven by the demands of the Industrial Revolution, which required substantial capital for infrastructure projects such as railroads and mining operations that exceeded the capacity of traditional commercial lending. In Europe, merchant banking houses evolved into specialized investment firms, with the Rothschild family establishing a pan-European network by the early 1800s to underwrite government bonds, war financing, and industrial ventures, including major railway developments across Britain, France, and Austria. Their operations capitalized on family branches in key cities like London, Paris, and Frankfurt, enabling coordinated large-scale syndication of loans that facilitated cross-border investments in emerging sectors. In the United States, investment banking emerged prominently during the Civil War era, with firms initially focused on underwriting government bonds to fund the conflict, followed by postwar railroad expansion that necessitated bond issuances totaling billions in the 1870s and 1880s. Key institutions like Drexel, Morgan & Co., founded in 1871, played a central role in consolidating railroads and financing industrial giants, such as the formation of U.S. Steel Corporation in 1901 through a $1.4 billion merger orchestrated by J.P. Morgan. Other prominent U.S. firms, including Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and Goldman Sachs (established 1869 as commodity traders), specialized in syndicating securities for steel, oil, and utilities, reflecting a shift from merchant trading to corporate finance amid rapid urbanization and technological adoption like the telegraph, which enhanced market coordination. The early 20th century saw further institutionalization, with J.P. Morgan & Co. intervening decisively in the by organizing private liquidity pools to stabilize failing trusts and brokerages, averting a broader collapse and underscoring investment banks' systemic influence. This period's growth accelerated during , as U.S. firms like Morgan provided over $2 billion in loans to Allied governments between 1915 and 1918, expanding their role in international bond markets. The marked a peak in U.S. investment banking expansion, fueled by post-war economic recovery and speculative fervor, with securities volumes surging as entered the field, leading to more than 6,000 investment entities competing in stock and bond issuances by 1929. Innovations in foreign lending and equity flotations supported industrial output growth, but the 1929 exposed risks from leveraged , prompting regulatory intervention via the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibited from investment activities to mitigate conflicts of interest and deposit risks. Despite this separation, dedicated investment houses adapted by focusing on advisory and securities distribution, sustaining the sector's evolution amid the .

Post-World War II to Deregulation Era

Following , investment banking in the United States operated under the constraints of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibited commercial banks from engaging in securities and dealing, thereby preserving a distinct sector of specialized investment houses. Firms such as , , and Corporation dominated the industry, focusing primarily on corporate bonds and equities to finance the postwar economic expansion, including industrial rebuilding and consumer goods production. This period saw robust demand for capital as U.S. GDP grew at an average annual rate of approximately 3.8% from 1946 to 1960, supported by government infrastructure spending and private sector investment. Investment banks facilitated this through public offerings, with corporate securities issuance rising steadily; for instance, the volume of new stock issues on the increased from about $2 billion in 1945 to over $10 billion by the late 1950s. The marked a period of innovation and growth, often termed the "go-go years," characterized by conglomerate formations and aggressive expansion, where investment banks advised on mergers and initial public offerings (IPOs). syndicates led by these firms handled a surge in equity offerings, with total IPO proceeds reaching peaks like $1.5 billion in before the market correction. However, the decade ended with challenges, including the 1970 Penn Central Railroad bankruptcy—the largest corporate failure in U.S. history at the time—which exposed risks in railroad financing and led to temporary caution in bond . The 1970s brought further pressures from , the 1971 collapse of the , and oil price shocks, prompting investment banks to diversify into international markets, such as the Eurobond issuance, which grew from negligible volumes in the early to over $10 billion annually by 1979. A pivotal deregulatory shift occurred on May 1, 1975, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented Rule 19b-3, abolishing fixed commission rates on the that had been in place since 1792. This "" event fostered competition, reducing trading costs by up to 50-70% initially and shifting revenue models from fixed fees to negotiated, volume-based structures, compelling investment banks to prioritize high-value services like block trades for institutional clients. Into the 1980s, broader financial deregulation, including the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, eroded some Glass-Steagall boundaries and enabled expanded activities. This era witnessed the explosion of (M&A) and leveraged buyouts (LBOs), with investment banks earning substantial advisory fees; M&A deal volume surged from $34 billion in 1980 to over $200 billion by 1988, fueled by junk bond financing pioneered by firms like . LBO debt levels escalated dramatically, with average long-term debt in sampled deals rising 262% from 1980 to 1984, transforming investment banking into a more transaction-oriented, high-stakes industry.

Modern Globalization and Challenges

The deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s propelled investment banking toward greater globalization. In the United Kingdom, the "Big Bang" reforms on October 27, 1986, abolished fixed commissions on securities trading, permitted dual-capacity operations (allowing firms to act as both agents and principals), and dismantled barriers separating brokers, jobbers, and merchant banks, fostering mergers and intensifying competition that elevated London as a premier international financial center. In the United States, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of November 12, 1999, repealed key provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, enabling affiliations between commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies under financial holding company structures, which expanded the scope of cross-border activities and integrated global capital flows. These changes, alongside technological advances in electronic trading and the rise of Eurobond markets, allowed investment banks to underwrite and distribute securities worldwide, with firms like Goldman Sachs establishing primary dealerships in foreign government securities and expanding operations across Europe and Asia. By the early 2000s, global investment banking revenues had surged, reflecting increased international mergers and acquisitions as well as syndicated lending, though this integration amplified interconnected risks across borders. The 2008 global financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities in this expanded model, culminating in the on September 15, 2008, and the near-failures of other investment banks, which prompted a shift from pure-play models to holding companies for access to liquidity. Resulting regulations, including the Dodd-Frank Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed on July 21, 2010, imposed stricter oversight on derivatives trading, proprietary activities via the , and through enhanced capital and standards, constraining investment banks' leverage and profitability. The framework, phased in from 2013, mandated higher common equity ratios (at least 4.5% plus buffers) and liquidity coverage ratios, elevating risk-weighted assets calculations and reducing returns on trading and by limiting expansion, with ongoing "Endgame" proposals in 2025 projecting up to 21% capital increases for globally systemically important banks. These measures, while aimed at mitigating taxpayer-funded bailouts, have been critiqued for unintended consequences like reduced market-making and lending to non-banks. In the 2020s, investment banking faces compounded challenges from technological disruption, geopolitical tensions, and persistent low-interest environments. innovations, including blockchain-based settlements and platforms, erode traditional revenue streams in areas like payments and advisory, compelling banks to invest heavily in digital infrastructure amid cybersecurity threats. Geopolitical frictions, such as U.S.- trade restrictions since 2018 and sanctions following Russia's 2022 invasion of , fragment cross-border deal flows and heighten compliance costs, with 47% of surveyed banks reporting negative asset growth impacts in 2024. Despite these headwinds, global investment banking fees reached approximately $395 billion in 2025 projections, buoyed by recovering M&A volumes up 27% year-over-year, though long-term growth remains modest at a 1.2% CAGR through 2030 amid regulatory and competitive pressures.

Organizational Framework

Front Office Operations

The front office in investment banking comprises the revenue-generating divisions that directly engage with clients, originate deals, and execute transactions. These operations focus on activities such as advisory, securities , , and trading, which produce income through advisory fees, underwriting spreads, trading commissions, and proprietary profits. Unlike support functions, roles prioritize client relationships and market opportunities to drive firm profitability, often in high-pressure environments with performance tied to deal volume and market conditions. Key divisions within the front office include the investment banking division (IBD), which advises on matters like initial public offerings (IPOs), debt issuances, and M&A transactions, earning fees typically as a percentage of deal value—such as 1-2% for advisory mandates. and trading teams handle client orders for equities, , currencies, and commodities, generating via bid-ask spreads, commissions, and market-making activities that provide liquidity. In banks like or , these divisions operate globally, with traders and salespeople leveraging proprietary models to capitalize on market inefficiencies while managing client flows. Personnel in front office roles typically follow a hierarchical structure with age ranges reflecting standard career progression timelines: analysts (22-27), associates (25-35), vice presidents (28-40), and managing directors (35-50); analysts and associates perform , pitch book preparation, and , while vice presidents and managing directors lead client pitches and negotiate terms—for example, in leveraged finance, managing directors focus on winning business from private equity sponsors or corporates, leading pitches, and overseeing strategy, with an emphasis on networking and high-level advice rather than detailed modeling. Compensation structures emphasize variable pay, including bonuses linked to personal and group performance, reflecting the direct impact on revenue—front office professionals often receive the highest payouts due to their role in fee generation. functions, when client-facing, support these efforts by producing equity or debt analysis to inform trading and advisory decisions, though independence is maintained to comply with regulatory standards like those from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Front office operations are distinguished by their emphasis on origination—identifying and securing mandates from corporations, institutions, or governments—followed by execution, where interdisciplinary teams collaborate to close deals. This client-centric model contrasts with internal risk or compliance oversight, enabling rapid adaptation to market cycles, such as increased M&A activity during economic expansions. However, these activities expose banks to reputational and market risks, mitigated through firm-wide controls rather than front office discretion alone.

Middle and Back Office Functions

The middle office in investment banking encompasses functions that support front office revenue-generating activities by focusing on , compliance, and operational oversight, without directly contributing to . Key responsibilities include managing on trades, ensuring , and monitoring positions to mitigate potential losses from front office dealings. Additionally, middle office teams handle valuation and pricing of financial instruments, performance reporting, and trade support, acting as a bridge between trading desks and back office to verify transaction accuracy. In practice, this involves tasks such as adjusting records for corporate actions like stock splits and tracking cash flows from dividends or interest payments. Risk management stands as a core middle office pillar, involving quantitative analysis to profile exposures across portfolios and stress testing against market volatilities, which became critically emphasized following the to prevent systemic failures observed in under-regulated environments. Compliance functions ensure adherence to evolving regulations, such as those from the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, which mandate enhanced reporting and internal controls to curb excessive risk-taking by banks. These roles demand expertise in financial modeling and regulatory frameworks, often filled by professionals with backgrounds in quantitative finance or law, underscoring the office's role in safeguarding institutional stability over profit maximization. The back office handles essential administrative and operational tasks that enable seamless execution of investment banking activities, including trade settlement, clearing, and record-keeping to confirm that transactions are finalized without discrepancies. Responsibilities extend to accounting for positions, human resources for staffing support, and information technology infrastructure maintenance, which collectively underpin the bank's daily operations irrespective of market conditions. Settlement processes, for instance, involve reconciling trades with counterparties and custodians, typically within T+2 timelines for equities under standard market protocols, to minimize counterparty risk and ensure capital efficiency. Back office functions also encompass regulatory reporting and data management, where teams compile and submit filings to authorities like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), maintaining audit trails that demonstrate compliance with capital adequacy rules such as Basel III accords implemented globally since 2013. These operations, often automated through proprietary systems, reduce operational errors that could lead to financial penalties or reputational damage, as evidenced by fines exceeding $10 billion imposed on major banks for settlement failures in the early 2010s. By providing the foundational infrastructure, the back office allows front and middle offices to focus on client services and risk controls, contributing to overall institutional resilience amid complex, high-volume trading environments.

Key Activities and Services

Underwriting and Securities Issuance

Underwriting in investment banking refers to the process by which banks facilitate the issuance of new securities, such as or bonds, enabling issuers like corporations or governments to raise capital from investors. Investment banks act as intermediaries, conducting to assess the issuer's financial health and market s, preparing regulatory filings (such as SEC registration statements in the United States), pricing the securities, and distributing them through syndicates of brokers and dealers. This service generates revenue primarily through the underwriting spread—the difference between the price at which the bank purchases securities from the issuer and the price—typically ranging from 3% to 7% for equity issuances, depending on deal size and . The underwriting process begins with advisory services where the bank evaluates the issuer's objectives and market conditions, followed by structuring the offering, including roadshows to gauge investor interest. Securities are then priced based on book-building mechanisms, where underwriters collect bids to determine demand, and allocated to institutional and retail investors. For equity offerings like initial public offerings (IPOs), this culminates in listing on exchanges such as the NYSE, while issuances involve rating agency assessments for creditworthiness. In 2024, global investment banking revenues from origination and advisory, including , reached significant levels, with underwriting fees alone estimated at $39.3 billion, reflecting a 24% year-over-year increase driven by favorable interest rate environments. Underwriting commitments vary by type, with firm commitment being the predominant structure for larger, established , where the lead underwriter (often termed the bookrunner) purchases the entire issue from the at a fixed price and assumes the of reselling to investors, profiting from any excess proceeds. In contrast, best efforts involves the committing only to market the securities using its distribution network without guaranteeing the full amount raised, shifting more to the ; this is common for smaller or riskier offerings, such as mini-maxi deals with minimum and maximum raise thresholds. All-or-none arrangements require the full issue to be sold or the deal cancels, minimizing partial exposure. Syndicates, comprising multiple , distribute and leverage broader sales networks, with the lead coordinating pricing and allocation. Equity securities issuance, including IPOs and secondary offerings, allows companies to access public markets for , though empirical data shows persistent underpricing—where first-day trading prices exceed offering prices—averaging around 7% in the 1980s but rising to peaks of 65% during the 1999-2000 due to speculative demand and reduced issuer focus on proceeds maximization. issuance, such as corporate bonds, focuses on fixed-income investors and involves yield determination based on ratings, with investment banks tranches to match investor preferences for investment-grade or high-yield securities. Global equity capital markets (ECM) and markets (DCM) fees constituted key portions of investment banking income in 2023, with ECM recovering post-pandemic but remaining below historical averages in deal value. Risks in underwriting stem primarily from market volatility, where adverse conditions can lead to unsold inventory in firm commitments, forcing banks to hold securities at potential losses—a hazard mitigated by syndication but evident in events like the when underwriting volumes plummeted. risks, including liability for material misstatements in prospectuses under laws like the U.S. , necessitate rigorous , while competitive pressures can compress spreads, impacting profitability. Despite these, underwriting remains central to , channeling funds efficiently from savers to productive investments.

Mergers, Acquisitions, and Advisory

Investment banks provide advisory services for (M&A), assisting clients in strategic transactions such as consolidations, buyouts, divestitures, and hostile takeovers by offering expertise in valuation, , due diligence, and financing arrangements. These services enable corporations to achieve growth, market expansion, or operational synergies, with banks often representing either the buyer (sell-side) or seller (buy-side) to maximize transaction outcomes. The M&A advisory process typically spans 6 to 24 months and follows structured steps: initial development and target identification, where banks assess client objectives and screen potential partners using and ; preparation of materials like teasers and confidential information memoranda (CIMs); solicitation of bids through auctions or targeted outreach; to verify financials, legal compliance, and risks; negotiation of terms including and contingencies; and final closing with regulatory approvals from bodies like the FTC or EU Commission. Bulge-bracket firms such as and JPMorgan dominate large deals due to their global networks and specialized teams, handling complex cross-border elements like hedging and antitrust reviews. Advisory fees are predominantly success-based, structured as a percentage of the transaction value—typically 1% to 5% for deals exceeding $1 billion, with lower percentages for mega-deals and higher for mid-market transactions under $100 million, often following tiered models like the (e.g., 5% on the first $1 million, declining to 1% above $5 million). Retainers of $50,000 to $250,000 cover initial work, with milestones triggering additional payments, ensuring alignment with deal completion amid rising costs noted in 37% of U.S. middle-market advisors increasing fees in 2023. Global M&A activity fluctuated post-2020, with deal volumes peaking amid low interest rates before declining 9% in the first half of 2025 versus 2024, while values rose 15% due to larger strategic deals; 2024 saw a 9% volume increase to 2,763 transactions with average sizes at $648 million. Notable examples include JPMorgan's advisory on Chevron's $53 billion acquisition of Hess in 2023, emphasizing sector consolidation, and ' role in Mars' $35.9 billion purchase of Kellanova in 2024, one of the year's largest U.S. mergers generating $92 million in fees. These transactions underscore banks' certification value in reducing , as evidenced by top-tier advisors involved in 50% of complex deals.

Sales, Trading, and Market-Making

Sales and trading divisions within investment banks facilitate the buying and selling of securities, , and other financial instruments between institutional clients, such as funds, funds, and corporations, primarily in secondary markets. These operations connect buyers and sellers, enabling efficient execution of large-volume trades while managing associated risks like market volatility and exposure. Trading desks are typically organized by —including equities, , currencies, and commodities (often grouped as FICC)—and further subdivided by product types such as cash instruments, , or futures, with dedicated teams for sales, execution, and structuring. Sales professionals maintain client relationships, pitch trading opportunities based on and inventory, and relay client orders to traders, acting as intermediaries to match without taking principal risk. Traders, in contrast, execute these orders on exchanges or over-the-counter markets, monitor positions for profitability, and risks using models that account for factors like interest rates, volatility, and . Market-making, a core trading function, involves continuously quoting bid (buy) and ask (sell) prices for assets to provide , profiting from the bid-ask spread while absorbing temporary imbalances in order flow to ensure markets function smoothly even during stress periods. This activity enhances and reduces transaction costs for clients, as market makers commit capital to stand ready to , thereby mitigating wider spreads that could otherwise deter participation. The interplay of , trading, and market-making generates through commissions, spreads, and fees, with U.S. reporting $13.7 billion in trading for the second quarter of 2023 alone, though figures fluctuate with market conditions like rising interest rates and volatility. In , global markets trading at major banks rose 8.9% year-over-year, driven by equities gains amid recovering volumes post-2022 downturns. These functions also support broader market stability by intermediating customer flows across , as evidenced by bank trading desks handling substantial order volumes to capture intermediation profits rather than directional bets. Post-2008 regulations like the curtailed but preserved market-making for client facilitation, underscoring its role in provision without excessive risk-taking.

Research and Asset Management

In investment banking, research departments primarily conduct sell-side analysis, including equity, , and macroeconomic , to produce reports that inform institutional clients' investment decisions and support internal trading and sales activities. Equity research analysts focus on specific companies or sectors, building models, forecasting earnings, and issuing buy, hold, or sell recommendations with price targets derived from comparable company valuations and precedent transactions. These reports facilitate informed trading by clients, generating revenue for banks through commissions on executed trades rather than direct fees, as enhances and volume in supported securities. To address conflicts of interest where research analysts historically issued overly optimistic coverage to secure investment banking deals, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission enforced the 2003 Global Analyst Research Settlement, requiring ten major firms to pay $1.4 billion in penalties and restitution while mandating structural separations, such as prohibiting analysts from participating in pitching banking business and tying compensation less to deal flow. This reform aimed to ensure research integrity, though empirical studies indicate persistent subtle influences from banking relationships on coverage optimism. Research also aids core banking functions by providing valuation insights for mergers and acquisitions advisory and underwriting, where accurate sector analysis informs deal pricing and feasibility. Asset management within investment banks encompasses discretionary portfolio management, investment advisory, fiduciary services, and custody for institutional and high-net-worth clients, often through dedicated divisions like JPMorgan Asset Management, which oversaw approximately $1.48 trillion in as of recent rankings. These activities involve developing strategies for across equities, bonds, and alternatives to optimize returns relative to risk, with banks earning fees typically as a of (around 0.5-1% for active strategies) plus performance incentives. For instance, ' asset and segment reported $16.14 billion in net revenues for 2024, reflecting growth from recurring fee-based income amid rising global totaling $128 trillion industry-wide in 2023. Unlike core investment banking, emphasizes long-term capital preservation and growth, subject to duties under regulations like the , though banks face risks from market volatility and redemption pressures during downturns. This function diversifies bank revenues, contributing stability as markets fluctuate, with North American managers alone handling over 60% of global assets.

Industry Scale and Composition

Global Revenue and Market Size

Investment banking revenues worldwide, derived predominantly from advisory fees on , of equity and securities, and related services, experienced volatility in recent years due to macroeconomic factors such as fluctuations and geopolitical tensions. In 2024, global fees grew by 11% year-over-year, reversing a 5% decline recorded in 2023, amid recovering deal volumes in equity capital markets and increased issuance activity. This rebound contributed to an estimated industry revenue of approximately $120 billion for the full year, inferred from first-half figures and growth trends. The market size for 2025 is projected at $110.12 billion, with expectations of further expansion at a of 7.5% through 2032, fueled by rising demand for capital in , , and emerging economies. EY anticipates a 13% increase in 2025, supported by projected loan growth of 6% globally and stabilizing impairment rates around 50 basis points, though tempered by potential regulatory hurdles and uneven regional recovery. However, the first half of 2025 saw fees dip 1% to $60.5 billion compared to the prior year's equivalent period, signaling short-term caution amid elevated valuations and selective deal execution.
YearRevenue GrowthKey Drivers
2023-5%Reduced M&A and issuance due to high rates
2024+11%Equity trading peaks and deal rebound
(proj.)+13%Lower rates, higher issuance
North America accounts for the largest share, with the U.S. alone projected to generate $134.42 billion in investment banking revenue in 2025, underscoring the region's dominance in global activity. Alternative estimates place the 2025 market size higher, at $150.49 billion, highlighting variances in scope across methodologies but consensus on sustained expansion.

Leading Institutions and Rankings

The leading investment banks are primarily the firms, which command the largest market shares in advisory, , and trading activities due to their global scale, extensive client networks, and diversified streams across regions and product lines. These include , , , Bank of America Merrill Lynch, , , and , which collectively handle the majority of high-value deals and securities issuances worldwide. UBS's position strengthened following its 2023 acquisition of , expanding its footprint in wealth management-integrated investment banking. Rankings of these institutions derive from league tables compiled by data providers such as Dealogic and LSEG, which track metrics like completed M&A transactions, equity capital markets (ECM) issuances, and debt capital markets (DCM) volumes by fees generated or deal count. In 2024, led in overall investment banking fees in several categories, followed closely by and in global M&A advisory, where they ranked in the top three for deal volume and value amid a rebound in activity. and excelled in DCM and syndicated loans, benefiting from higher environments that boosted bond underwriting. Investment banking income for firms surged in 2024, with reporting a 48% year-over-year increase and a 44% rise, driven by renewed M&A and capital markets demand. Elite boutiques such as Centerview Partners, Lazard, and Evercore increasingly compete in high-profile M&A advisory, often securing top spots in league tables for completed deals despite smaller overall scale; for instance, Centerview ranked seventh globally in M&A in Q3 2024, its highest since at least 2017. Euromoney's 2025 MarketMap ranked Morgan Stanley first overall among investment banks, citing its platform coherence and leadership in M&A and equity markets. Prestige-based assessments, such as Vault's rankings, consistently place Goldman Sachs at the top for its training programs and deal prestige, though such surveys incorporate subjective recruiter and junior banker input alongside objective deal data.
Category (2024 Global Rankings)Top Firms
M&A Advisory, ,
ECM Issuances, ,
DCM Volumes, ,
These rankings fluctuate annually based on market conditions, regulatory changes, and firm-specific strategies, with no single metric capturing overall dominance; for example, European firms like Barclays and Deutsche Bank maintain strong positions in cross-border deals but lag U.S. peers in total fees. Investment banks derive revenue primarily from origination and advisory activities, which include fees for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) advisory, equity capital markets (ECM) underwriting such as initial public offerings, and debt capital markets (DCM) issuance including syndicated loans, alongside markets activities encompassing sales, trading, and market-making in equities, fixed income, currencies, and commodities (FICC). These sources reflect a client-service model where advisory fees are earned as percentages of transaction values (typically 0.5-2% for M&A), underwriting spreads (around 3-7% for equities, lower for debt), and trading revenues from bid-ask spreads, commissions, and facilitation of client flows, though proprietary trading has been curtailed since 2014 under the Volcker Rule. In typical cycles, trading and markets activities account for 40-50% of total revenues, with the remainder from investment banking fees like advisory and , though proportions fluctuate with market volatility and deal volumes; for instance, in low-volatility environments, fee-based origination dominates due to stable client , while high-volatility periods boost trading gains from hedging and flow facilitation. Among leading firms, reported investment banking fees of $2.05 billion in Q4 2024, up 24% year-over-year, driven by equity , illustrating segment-specific resilience. Globally, the investment banking market revenue reached approximately $396 billion in 2025 projections, underscoring the scale of these streams amid competition from non-bank financial institutions. Profitability trends post-2008 have exhibited cyclical volatility, with regulatory reforms like the Dodd-Frank Act and shifting emphasis from high-risk — which generated outsized profits pre-crisis but amplified losses—toward more stable, client-oriented fee income, resulting in compressed margins but reduced exposure. The global top 100 investment banking and markets revenue pool peaked at $350 billion in 2020 amid low rates and stimulus-fueled dealmaking, but contracted steadily to $294 billion by 2023—an 8% year-over-year decline—due to geopolitical tensions, , and elevated interest rates suppressing M&A (-16% in 2023) and DCM (-9%), partially offset by ECM gains (+8%). Cost-income ratios averaged 67% in the versus 83% in in 2023, reflecting higher operational efficiencies in American firms, while (RoTE) ranged from -5% to +5% in cash equities to 15-20% in M&A, highlighting segment disparities. Recovery signals emerged in 2024, with corporate and investment banking revenues rising 4% to $827 billion globally, propelled by advisory and rebound amid stabilizing monetary policies and prospects, though trading revenues provided critical support during prior downturns, up nearly 10% year-over-year at major banks in mid-2025. Forecasts for 2025 anticipate M&A growth of 15-25%, contingent on policy shifts favoring deal activity, yet persistent challenges like rising costs (up 5% since 2019) and from non-bank intermediaries could pressure margins if fee pools fail to expand proportionally. Overall, profitability remains tied to macroeconomic cycles, with showing inverse correlations between hikes and fee-based revenues, underscoring the causal link between and deal flow.

Economic Contributions

Capital Formation and Allocation

Investment banks facilitate capital formation primarily through underwriting services, where they assume the risk of purchasing newly issued securities from issuers and reselling them to investors, thereby enabling corporations, governments, and other entities to access large-scale funding without directly marketing to the public. This process supports equity capital raising via initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary offerings, as well as debt instruments such as corporate bonds and syndicated loans, which in 2023 totaled approximately $8.9 trillion in global debt capital market activity, marking a 6% increase from the prior year. By structuring these transactions, investment banks mitigate information asymmetries and provide pricing expertise, allowing issuers to raise funds efficiently for expansion, research, or infrastructure projects that might otherwise rely on limited internal resources or bank loans. In capital allocation, investment banks enhance efficiency by directing savings from investors—such as pension funds, mutual funds, and high-net-worth individuals—toward opportunities with the highest expected returns, often through rigorous , valuation models, and market distribution networks. indicates that economies with developed financial intermediaries, including investment banks, allocate capital more effectively, increasing investment responsiveness in high-growth industries by up to 40% compared to less developed systems, as measured across 65 countries from 1980 to 1997. This allocation mechanism reduces misallocation by channeling funds away from unproductive uses, with banks' role in securities issuance and advisory services promoting a market-driven selection of projects based on risk-adjusted profitability rather than administrative fiat. The overall economic impact manifests in heightened levels and productivity gains, as mobilized capital funds innovations and that drive long-term growth; for instance, financial development correlates positively with efficient resource distribution, mitigating capital misallocation that can shave 1-2% off GDP in underdeveloped markets. In the first half of , global securities issuance reached a three-year high, underscoring investment banks' ongoing contribution to and allocation amid varying economic conditions. However, this efficiency depends on transparent markets and prudent , as distortions from excessive leverage or regulatory interventions can impair optimal flows.

Facilitation of Growth and Innovation

Investment banks facilitate corporate growth by equity and issuances, channeling capital from savers to enterprises pursuing expansion and novel projects. Through initial public offerings (IPOs) and follow-on offerings, they enable high-growth firms, particularly in technology and sectors, to access vast pools of public capital for (R&D) investments that would otherwise be constrained by limited internal funds or venture financing. For instance, served as a bookrunner for the 2025 IPOs of innovator Chime and AI infrastructure provider CoreWeave, allowing these companies to raise billions for scaling operations and advancing proprietary technologies. This mechanism supports innovation by reducing reliance on bank loans, which innovative firms often avoid due to high debt aversion stemming from uncertain cash flows and intangible assets. Empirical analyses confirm that well-developed capital markets, intermediated by investment banks, correlate with heightened , as they specialize in financing ventures with long gestation periods and high failure risks. Beyond direct funding, investment banks advise on strategic transactions that embed innovation into broader ecosystems, such as (M&A) where acquirers integrate startups' breakthroughs to accelerate product development. This advisory role extends to cross-border deals, where banks structure financing for global enhancements and R&D collaborations, particularly benefiting emerging high-tech industries in both developed and developing economies. Studies indicate that investment banking activity uniquely bolsters toward "high and new" technologies, with U.S. data showing positive impacts on GDP growth via efficient capital deployment to innovative sectors rather than mature industries. In developing contexts, such intermediation has been linked to increased firm-level outputs, as banks bridge informational asymmetries and mobilize domestic savings for entrepreneurial ventures. However, the efficacy of this facilitation depends on market conditions; during liquidity crunches, reliance on investment banks can amplify volatility, potentially curtailing funding. Nonetheless, historical trends demonstrate that robust investment banking ecosystems, by pricing risks accurately and diversifying investor bases, sustain long-term growth trajectories, with evidence from efforts showing sustained boosts to corporate patenting and R&D expenditures. This underscores investment banks' causal role in not merely as financiers but as catalysts for scalable technological .

Efficiency in Price Discovery and Risk Transfer

Investment banks enhance in capital markets by underwriting securities issuances, which aggregate diverse investor valuations to establish initial market prices reflective of dynamics. Through activities like initial public offerings and bond placements, they facilitate the incorporation of firm-specific information into traded asset values, reducing information asymmetries between issuers and investors. In secondary trading, their market-making operations provide continuous , narrowing bid-ask spreads and enabling swift adjustments to new economic data or events, as evidenced by U.S. average daily equity trading volumes reaching 12.2 billion shares in 2024, a 24% year-over-year increase that supports rapid . Empirical analyses indicate that larger financial institutions, including investment banks, contribute to price accuracy via diversified portfolios and intermediary roles, though regulatory constraints like the have occasionally diminished , potentially hindering discovery in fixed-income segments. For instance, studies on bank scale show that geographic and activity diversification lowers funding costs by up to 9.5 basis points per percentage point reduction in capital requirements, indirectly bolstering competitive pricing mechanisms. In risk transfer, investment banks structure instruments such as securitizations, , and transfers (CRT) that allow originators to offload exposures to specialized investors, optimizing capital allocation and mitigating systemic concentrations. Securitization, for example, transfers off bank balance sheets to capital markets, enabling continued lending while dispersing potential losses, a mechanism that gained prominence post-2008 reforms. CRT transactions, including synthetic forms via credit default swaps, have expanded to align bank origination with investor risk appetites, with U.S. agencies reporting ongoing progress in transferring mortgage quarterly through 2023. This process enhances overall efficiency by matching risks to those best equipped to bear them, though interdependence among bank units can propagate shocks if not managed. Quantitative evidence from European data reveals that a 1% hike correlates with a 10% lending contraction, underscoring how risk transfer mitigates such constraints by facilitating external absorption.

Regulatory Landscape

Historical Regulations and Reforms

The Securities Act of 1933 established federal requirements for the registration of securities offerings, mandating disclosure of financial information to protect investors from fraudulent practices uncovered during the 1929 stock market crash and ensuing Depression-era bank runs. This legislation shifted oversight from state "blue sky" laws to a national framework, aiming to ensure transparency in initial public offerings central to investment banking activities. Complementing this, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the primary regulator of secondary market transactions, empowering it to oversee stock exchanges, broker-dealers, and insider trading prohibitions to foster fair markets. The Banking Act of 1933, known as Glass-Steagall, imposed a strict separation between commercial banking—focused on deposit-taking and lending—and investment banking, which involves securities and advisory services, to mitigate risks from speculative activities that exacerbated the 1930-1933 banking panics, during which over 9,000 banks failed. Section 16 prohibited commercial banks from corporate securities, while Section 21 barred investment banks from accepting deposits; violations could result in loss of membership. The Act also established the (FDIC) to insure deposits up to $2,500 initially, stabilizing public confidence but indirectly constraining investment banks' access to low-cost deposit funding. Empirical data from the era shows this bifurcation reduced interconnected failures, as investment houses like split into commercial (J.P. Morgan) and investment (Morgan Stanley) entities by September 1934. Subsequent reforms refined but did not fundamentally alter this structure until the late . The regulated mutual funds and investment advisors, curbing abuses like excessive leverage in pooled investment vehicles often originated by investment banks. In the 1970s-1980s, amid inflation and competition from money market funds, regulatory adjustments like the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 phased out interest rate caps (), indirectly pressuring investment banks to innovate in and without direct deposit access. By the 1990s, loopholes—such as Section 20 subsidiaries allowing limited by bank holding companies under approval—eroded Glass-Steagall's barriers, with approvals expanding from 5% to 25% of subsidiary revenue by 1996. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 marked a pivotal deregulation, repealing Glass-Steagall's core separations (Sections 20 and 32) and permitting financial holding companies to affiliate commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance firms, enabling "universal banking" models akin to European counterparts. Signed by President Clinton on November 12, 1999, it responded to two decades of globalization and technological convergence, with proponents citing efficiency gains; Citigroup's 1998 merger of Citibank and Travelers exemplified preemptive market pressures. Critics, including some economists analyzing pre-repeal data, argued it amplified moral hazard by blurring risk profiles, though causal links to later instability remain debated given prior erosions. This reform facilitated mergers like J.P. Morgan Chase's expansion but preserved SEC oversight of investment banking core functions.

Post-2008 Framework and Dodd-Frank

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, enacted on July 21, 2010, established a comprehensive regulatory framework in response to the , targeting systemic risks in financial institutions including investment banks. The legislation created the (FSOC) to identify and monitor systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), many of which encompassed major investment banks that had converted to bank holding companies, such as and in September 2008. It imposed enhanced prudential standards on these entities, including annual stress testing under the (CCAR) program, initiated in 2011 by the , to assess capital adequacy under adverse economic scenarios. Central to its impact on investment banking was the Volcker Rule, codified in Section 619 and finalized in December 2013 with implementation phased through 2014-2017, which prohibited banking entities from engaging in —using their own capital for short-term trading in securities, , or commodities—and limited or sponsorship of funds and funds to 3% of . This rule aimed to curb the risky, self-interested trading that amplified losses during the crisis, where proprietary desks at firms like and contributed to vulnerabilities. For investment banks, it reduced revenue from prop trading, which had accounted for 20-30% of trading income at some firms pre-crisis, prompting restructurings such as the spin-off or scaling back of such activities. Additional provisions reformed markets, relevant to investment banking's and advisory roles, by mandating central clearing and exchange trading for standardized over-the-counter derivatives through entities like swap data repositories, with rules effective from 2012 onward under the and SEC. The act also introduced orderly liquidation authority, requiring large firms to submit "living wills" for resolution plans to facilitate non-taxpayer-funded wind-downs, first mandated in 2012 and tested through annual reviews. These measures increased capital requirements under integration, with U.S. banks raising ratios from an average of 10.5% in 2010 to over 13% by 2015. Empirical assessments of Dodd-Frank's effects on investment banking reveal mixed outcomes, with compliance costs estimated at $24 billion annually across the industry by 2015, disproportionately burdening large banks and correlating with a 10-15% decline in for SIFIs between 2010 and 2016. Studies indicate reduced through lower leverage and improved market discipline, as evidenced by heightened bond yield spreads reacting to bank disclosures post-2010, yet critics argue it failed to address shadow banking channels, where non-bank entities absorbed displaced activities, potentially sustaining hidden risks without corresponding safeguards. Furthermore, while intended to end "," the framework's designation of 8 U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) as of 2011 perpetuated implicit guarantees, as bail-in mechanisms remained untested in major failures. Subsequent rollbacks, such as the 2018 , Regulatory Relief, and Act, raised asset thresholds for enhanced supervision from $50 billion to $250 billion, easing burdens on mid-tier firms but sparking debate over reinstated vulnerabilities.

Ongoing Debates on Overregulation

Critics of post-2008 financial regulations, including the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and accords, contend that these measures have imposed excessive compliance burdens on investment banks, diverting resources from core activities like deal-making and capital allocation to regulatory adherence. Industry analyses estimate that global compliance costs for financial institutions rose by 12% in 2023 alone, with U.S. banks allocating 13.4% of their IT budgets to compliance by that year, up from 9.6% in 2016. These elevated expenses, often exceeding billions annually across major firms, are argued to erode profitability margins and constrain risk-taking essential for and advisory services, potentially hampering in areas like fixed-income securitizations. Proponents of , including Republican lawmakers and think tanks, highlight how stringent capital and liquidity rules under —particularly the ongoing "endgame" proposals finalized in phases through 2025—disproportionately burden larger banks by mandating higher equity buffers that limit leverage for trading and lending activities. In April 2025, U.S. hearings emphasized failures in tailoring regulations to bank size and profiles, with evidence showing smaller institutions facing compliance costs as a higher of assets, fostering industry consolidation and reduced competition. Empirical studies link these rules to diminished innovation, as compliance demands slow the development of new financial products and heighten for integrations in investment banking. Defenders of the framework, including officials, maintain that such regulations enhance systemic resilience by addressing unresolved risks in derivatives and operational exposures, as refined in endgame updates assessed in early 2025. However, even regulatory proponents acknowledge trade-offs, with policy uncertainty from evolving rules—such as potential rollbacks under shifting administrations—further impacting bank profitability forecasts. Debates persist over simplification, as advocated by analyses calling for streamlined capital rules to restore efficiency without compromising stability, amid evidence that overreliance on complex mandates may inadvertently amplify concentration risks in dominant investment banking hubs.

Major Crises and Responses

The 2008 Financial Crisis

Investment banks amplified the through their extensive involvement in originating, securitizing, and trading subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which masked risks in the underlying housing loans. These institutions, operating with minimal regulatory capital requirements as non-depository entities, pursued high returns by pooling low-quality mortgages into structured products sold to investors worldwide, often with inflated credit ratings from conflicted agencies. By 2006, investment banks had facilitated the issuance of over $1 trillion in private-label MBS, fueling a that burst when delinquency rates on subprime loans surged from 10% in 2006 to over 25% by mid-2007. Excessive leverage—ratios commonly exceeding 25:1—combined with reliance on short-term secured funding markets like repurchase agreements (repos), created acute vulnerabilities when asset values plummeted. The crisis escalated in early 2008 with the near-collapse of , a prominent investment bank heavily exposed to subprime-related assets. On March 14, 2008, faced a crunch after hedge funds it managed suffered massive losses on MBS and CDOs, eroding confidence and triggering a repo market freeze that drained its $18 billion in cash reserves within days. The facilitated its emergency sale to on March 16, 2008, for $2 per share—down from $170 the prior year—with a $30 billion non-recourse loan to cover potential losses, marking the first major intervention to avert systemic contagion. This event exposed investment banks' maturity mismatches, where long-term illiquid assets were funded by short-term liabilities, amplifying runs when counterparties withdrew funding amid rising defaults. Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, represented the crisis's nadir for pure-play investment banks, with $619 billion in assets and $613 billion in debt at filing, making it the largest U.S. bankruptcy in history. Lehman's leverage reached 30.7:1 by November 2007, sustained by aggressive investments in commercial real estate and subprime CDOs, while maneuvers like temporarily hid $50 billion in liabilities to maintain appearances. Unlike , Lehman received no government rescue, as federal officials deemed risks too high, leading to a disorderly that froze credit markets and precipitated a $700 billion (TARP) authorization on October 3, 2008. The collapse stemmed from overreliance on unstable , inadequate capital buffers, and to hedge against correlated risks, despite internal warnings. In response, surviving major investment banks and converted to bank holding companies on September 21-22, 2008, subjecting them to oversight and enabling access to the and TARP funds. This shift ended the standalone investment bank model, which had thrived on deregulation since the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act but proved unsustainable under crisis pressures, with aggregate industry leverage dropping from 32:1 in 2007 to under 15:1 post-conversion. The episode underscored causal links between investment banks' profit-driven innovation in opaque —totaling $600 trillion in notional value by 2007—and systemic fragility, as uncollateralized exposures and procyclical risk models exacerbated downturns. While bailouts stabilized the sector, they highlighted taxpayer exposure to private risk-taking, prompting reforms like the Dodd-Frank Act's to curb .

Preceding Events and Broader Lessons

The expansion of subprime mortgage lending in the early 2000s, facilitated by investment banks' aggressive securitization practices, laid critical groundwork for the 2008 crisis. Prior to 2000, subprime lending constituted a negligible portion of the mortgage market, but it surged thereafter as originators issued high-risk loans to borrowers with poor credit histories, often with teaser rates and minimal documentation. Investment banks like Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs bundled these loans into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), distributing them globally to investors seeking yield in a low-interest-rate environment. This process amplified the housing bubble, with U.S. home prices rising 124% from 1997 to 2006, driven by lax underwriting standards and the assumption of perpetual appreciation. Securitization masked underlying risks through tranching and overreliance on flawed credit ratings, enabling investment banks to offload exposures while earning substantial fees—global structured finance issuance peaked at $2.1 trillion in 2006. Deregulatory measures in the late 1990s and early 2000s further enabled this risk accumulation by allowing greater integration of commercial and investment banking activities. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of November 1999 repealed key provisions of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, permitting affiliations between deposit-taking banks and securities firms, which spurred consolidation into "too-big-to-fail" entities like Citigroup. In 2004, the SEC approved a consolidated supervisory framework that permitted the five major investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Morgan Stanley) to increase leverage ratios up to 40:1, far exceeding prior limits, based on internal risk models that proved inadequate during stress. However, empirical analyses indicate that these changes did not directly precipitate the crisis; core vulnerabilities stemmed from private-sector incentives for excessive leverage and short-term funding reliance, rather than the absence of outright prohibitions on certain activities. Low Federal Reserve interest rates from 2001 to 2004, combined with government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acquiring $1.5 trillion in subprime and Alt-A mortgages by 2007, further incentivized loose lending. The bursting of the from 2006 onward exposed these fragilities, with delinquencies on subprime loans reaching 20% by mid-2007 and investment banks incurring massive losses on illiquid MBS holdings— alone reported $3.2 billion in write-downs in 2007. This sequence underscores how interconnected leverage and asset illiquidity propagated shocks across the . Broader lessons from these events highlight the perils of unchecked leverage and flawed models in investment banking. Firms' overreliance on short-term wholesale funding, such as repurchase agreements totaling $4.5 trillion daily by 2007, amplified liquidity mismatches that froze markets during panic, demonstrating the need for robust and collateral buffers independent of optimistic internal assessments. The crisis revealed risks from implicit government guarantees, as investment banks operated with equity cushions as low as 2-3% of assets, assuming bailouts would materialize, which incentivized systemic risk-taking absent market discipline. Post-crisis data shows that while advisory revenues rebounded—reaching $96 billion globally by 2014— diminished under constraints, redirecting focus toward client intermediation but underscoring persistent tensions between innovation and stability. Critically, the events affirm that financial crises often stem from euphoria-driven mispricing rather than isolated regulatory lapses, with pointing to credit expansion cycles as recurrent precursors; U.S. nonfinancial sector debt-to-GDP rose from 140% in 1990 to 170% by 2007. Effective responses demand macroprudential tools targeting leverage and interconnectedness, rather than reactive bailouts that perpetuate hazards, while recognizing that overregulation can stifle capital allocation—post-Dodd-Frank compliance costs for banks exceeded $20 billion annually by 2015, potentially constraining lending. These insights emphasize causal realism: investment banks thrive on efficient risk transfer but falter when incentives align with opacity over transparency, necessitating incentives for genuine over fee maximization.

Controversies and Critiques

Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Concerns

Investment banks frequently encounter conflicts of interest arising from their multifaceted roles, including advising clients on while simultaneously securities, trading proprietary positions, or extending credit, which can incentivize prioritizing fee generation over impartial counsel. These tensions were particularly acute in the late and early , when research analysts issued overly optimistic reports on companies to secure lucrative investment banking mandates, such as initial public offerings (IPOs), despite evidence of overvaluation during the . A prominent example involved undue influence on equity research, culminating in the 2003 Global Analyst Research Settlement, where ten major firms—including , Merrill Lynch, and —agreed to pay $1.4 billion in penalties, , and investor restitution to resolve charges of biased research practices. Regulators, including the SEC, NYSE, NASD, and New York Attorney General, documented cases where analysts solicited banking business through promises of favorable coverage and faced pressure to suppress negative findings, as revealed in internal emails; for instance, at , analysts expressed frustration over mandates to promote stocks for underwriting fees. The settlement mandated structural reforms, such as independent research funding ($432.5 million allocated) and physical separation of research and banking units, though enforcement relied on self-policing via compliance officers. Another ethical lapse was "spinning," the allocation of underpriced IPO shares to executives of potential clients to curry favor and win future advisory or business, distorting market fairness and creating by rewarding insiders at the expense of retail investors. This practice, prevalent in the hot IPO market of the , led to investigations revealing that affiliated analysts issued more favorable recommendations for IPOs underwritten by their firms compared to non-affiliated ones, with studies showing poorer long-term performance for hyped issues. Post-2003 reforms, including FINRA rules prohibiting analysts from soliciting banking fees, reduced overt abuses, but subtler conflicts persist, such as in mergers where banks advise both sides indirectly through affiliates or provide financing that influences deal terms. Broader ethical concerns include the incentivization of excessive risk-taking through compensation structures tied to short-term deal volume, which can foster opaque products like collateralized debt obligations sold to clients unaware of underlying risks, as seen in pre- practices. Despite enhanced disclosures under regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act's limiting , critics argue that fee-driven models inherently undermine duties, with banks occasionally facing fines for inadequate conflict disclosures in divestitures. These issues underscore the challenge of aligning banker incentives with long-term market integrity, often requiring vigilant regulatory oversight to mitigate systemic biases toward revenue maximization.

Compensation and Work Conditions

Compensation in investment banking is predominantly performance-driven, consisting of a fixed base salary supplemented by discretionary bonuses that can exceed base pay several times over, particularly for senior roles. Bonuses are tied to individual contributions, team performance, and firm-wide deal flow, often comprising 50-90% of total compensation depending on the level and market conditions. In 2024, average bonuses across U.S. investment banks rose 25% year-over-year to $173,000, reflecting recovering revenues post-2023 slowdowns. Total compensation varies significantly by role, firm prestige (e.g., vs. boutique), location (highest in New York), and experience. Entry-level analysts in 2025 typically earn base salaries of 100,000100,000-125,000, with total compensation ranging from 160,000160,000-210,000 including bonuses of 40,00040,000-90,000. Associates in New York see base salaries of 175,000175,000-225,000 in 2026, with average total compensation approximately $292,000 including variable bonuses and overall ranges from $275,000 to $475,000 depending on firm, experience, and performance. Vice presidents command bases of $250,000-$300,000, with bonuses often $200,000+, yielding 450,000450,000-625,000 or more at top firms like Moelis. Managing directors, focused on client origination, can exceed $1 million annually, though exact figures are opaque due to structures and deferred equity.
RoleBase Salary (USD)Bonus Range (USD)Total Compensation (USD, 2024-2025 Avg.)
Analyst100,000-125,00040,000-90,000160,000-210,000
Associate175,000-225,00090,000-300,000275,000-475,000
250,000-300,000200,000+450,000-625,000+
Managing Director300,000-400,000500,000+ (variable)1,000,000+
Data derived from industry reports; figures higher at elite boutiques and bulge brackets like . Work conditions in investment banking are characterized by extended hours driven by client demands, tight deadlines for pitch books, models, and deals, and a hierarchical structure where juniors execute while seniors oversee. Analysts often log 70-100 hours per week, averaging 80-90 during peak periods like live deals or earnings seasons, with days starting at 8-9 AM and extending past midnight. For instance, in London, a typical day for a junior investment banker (analyst or associate) starts with waking around 8 AM and arriving at the office by 9-9:30 AM after a short commute, involving checking market news, updating financial models, preparing PowerPoint pitch books and presentations, coordinating due diligence, listening to client calls (juniors rarely speak), and making revisions based on senior feedback; lunch and dinner are eaten at the desk, with work commonly extending until midnight or 1 AM and occasionally until 4 AM during busy periods, yielding weekly hours of typically 70-90+—slightly fewer than in New York due to a more relaxed culture and expectations of face time in the office. Associates face 65-80 hours weekly, somewhat mitigated by delegation but still intense due to oversight responsibilities. Senior roles like VPs and MDs average 50-70 hours, shifting toward travel and relationship management, though spikes occur during mandates. These demands contribute to elevated stress levels, with investment bankers reporting higher incidences of anxiety disorders compared to other professions. Burnout is prevalent, exacerbated by 100+ hour weeks in high-pressure environments; a 2025 report found 31% of banking professionals planning industry exit due to unsustainable pressure. Incidents of junior banker exhaustion leading to health crises, including rare fatalities linked to , have prompted internal reforms like mandatory weekends off at firms such as since 2021, though enforcement varies. High turnover—often 80-100% for analysts within two years—reflects the toll, offset by lucrative exit opportunities to or corporate roles.

Alleged Systemic Risks and Bailouts

Investment banks have been criticized for contributing to systemic risks through high leverage ratios, often exceeding 30:1 prior to the 2008 crisis, which amplified losses from subprime mortgage exposures and derivatives like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). This leverage, combined with off-balance-sheet vehicles and reliance on short-term funding markets, created vulnerabilities where distress in one firm could propagate through counterparty exposures, as seen in the rapid devaluation of mortgage-backed securities. Interconnectedness via over-the-counter derivatives markets, totaling trillions in notional value, heightened contagion risks, with investment banks holding significant positions that lacked central clearing. The exemplified these alleged risks when , facing a from $20 billion in margin calls on March 14, 2008, was rescued through a -orchestrated sale to on March 16, 2008, backed by a $30 billion non-recourse loan from the Fed's Maiden facility to absorb toxic assets. In contrast, ' filing on September 15, 2008, without support, triggered a $600 billion loss in market value across global equities and froze credit markets, underscoring the "too big to fail" doctrine where failure of a major player—Lehman had $639 billion in assets—threatens broader stability. and , the remaining independent investment banks, converted to bank holding companies on September 21, 2008, gaining access to lending to avert similar collapses. Government bailouts intensified debates over moral hazard, as interventions like the $85 billion Federal Reserve loan to AIG on September 16, 2008—which had insured investment banks' CDO positions via credit default swaps—prevented immediate contagion but signaled implicit guarantees for systemically important institutions. The Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), enacted on October 3, 2008, authorized $700 billion for asset purchases and capital injections, with $245 billion directed to banks including investment firms, recouping principal plus $32 billion in profits by 2014 but criticized for subsidizing risk-taking. Post-crisis analysis showed bailed-out banks increased higher-yield, riskier lending, suggesting bailouts distorted incentives by reducing market discipline on excessive leverage and opaque trading. Ongoing allegations persist that "" status, retained by firms like JPMorgan and with assets over $2 trillion each as of 2023, fosters , as creditors price in rescue expectations, lowering funding costs by 50-100 basis points and enabling sustained high-risk activities without full accountability. Critics argue this perpetuates systemic fragility, evidenced by unresolved interconnections in shadow banking, though proponents of post-Dodd-Frank capital requirements claim risks are mitigated; empirical data from stress tests indicate vulnerabilities remain under severe scenarios. Such dynamics, rooted in causal chains of leverage amplification and network effects, underscore debates on whether bailouts avert or exacerbate future crises by undermining prudent risk management.

Technological Integration and Fintech

Investment banks have increasingly integrated advanced technologies to enhance , , and client services, with (AI) and (ML) playing central roles in core functions like (M&A) advisory. Deloitte estimates that generative AI could boost front-office at the top 14 global investment banks by 27% to 35% through applications such as automated deal screening, predictive valuation modeling, and for document review. For instance, banks like employ analytics to rank deal origination opportunities, analyze client behaviors, and assess risks, leveraging ML algorithms to process from and market reports. These tools enable faster insight generation and higher in handling complex M&A transactions, as evidenced by multi-agent AI systems that simulate negotiation scenarios and optimize deal structures. Fintech innovations have disrupted traditional investment banking models by introducing agile platforms for capital raising, trading, and advisory, prompting banks to form partnerships or develop in-house solutions to maintain competitiveness. In 2025, generative AI's integration is projected to add $200 billion to $340 billion in value across banking sectors, including investment banking, by streamlining research and enabling data-driven decision-making in volatile markets. Fintech firms specializing in AI-driven M&A tools, such as those for automated target identification and risk simulation, have accelerated deal cycles, with 97% of executives in Deloitte's 2025 M&A Trends Survey reporting adoption of generative AI or advanced for these purposes. Major banks respond through acquisitions and collaborations; for example, ' 2025 purchase of a fintech enhanced its cloud-native platform for , integrating AI for real-time portfolio analysis. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) and blockchain are transforming post-trade processes in investment banking, reducing settlement times and enabling tokenization of assets. J.P. Morgan's Kinexys platform, launched to provide bank-led blockchain solutions, supports private, permissioned networks for secure transactions in capital markets, including tokenized deposits and securities lending. In September 2025, Swift announced plans to incorporate a blockchain-based shared ledger into its infrastructure, developed with over 30 financial institutions, to enable 24/7 real-time payments and scalability for digital finance applications. UBS's Tokenize initiative, blockchain-agnostic and integrated with existing systems, facilitates tokenized fund issuance and distribution, with pilots demonstrating reduced operational costs in asset servicing. These advancements address longstanding inefficiencies in clearing and settlement, though regulatory hurdles persist in scaling DLT for broader capital markets use.

Shifts in Deal-Making and Private Markets

In recent years, investment banks have adapted to a structural shift wherein corporations increasingly favor private markets over public listings for capital raising and growth, driven by abundant private funding availability and regulatory advantages in staying private longer. This trend, accelerating since the mid-2010s, saw U.S. IPO volumes drop to historic lows, with only 31 traditional IPOs in 2023 compared to peaks of over 300 annually pre-2000, as firms accessed billions in and without public scrutiny. Private markets swelled to over $13 trillion globally by 2024, outpacing public equities in growth due to lower disclosure costs and appetite for illiquid, high-yield opportunities. Alternatives to traditional IPOs, such as SPACs and direct listings, briefly surged amid this shift but later moderated. SPAC IPOs raised a record $85 billion in 2021, offering faster paths to public markets via mergers with blank-check companies, often underwritten by investment banks seeking fees outside standard IPO processes. However, post-merger performance disappointed, with many SPACs underperforming benchmarks and facing SEC scrutiny, leading to a 90% decline in SPAC activity by 2023; a "SPAC 4.0" emerged in 2025 with smaller raises around $200 million and tighter timelines, yet volumes remained subdued relative to private deals. Direct listings, eschewing underwriters for secondary share sales, enabled firms like in 2018 but proved rare, as dominance favored buyouts and add-ons over public debuts. Private equity has dominated deal-making, reshaping investment banking advisory roles toward buyouts, recapitalizations, and secondary transactions. Global PE deal value rebounded to $1.7 trillion in 2024, up 22% from 2023, with Q3 2025 hitting a record $310 billion amid narrowing valuation gaps and strategic consolidations. Banks facilitated this through private placements and leveraged financing, though lagged at a 24% year-over-year drop in 2024 for commingled vehicles, reflecting investor caution amid dry powder accumulation exceeding $3 trillion. emerged as a parallel shift, growing to $1.7 trillion in assets by 2025, providing flexible debt alternatives to syndicated loans and capturing bank in mid-market financing. Macroeconomic factors, particularly interest rate cycles, profoundly influenced these shifts. Rising rates from 2022 to mid-2024 suppressed M&A volumes by 20-30% annually, elevating borrowing costs and compressing multiples, yet deal values held as buyers targeted resilient sectors like and healthcare. Rate cuts starting late 2024 spurred a 2025 recovery, with global M&A values up 15% in H1 despite 9% volume decline, enabling leverage and exits from pandemic-era holdings. Investment banks, while facing IPO fee erosion, pivoted to high-margin private advisory, with M&A expected to accelerate in growth-oriented deals per projections for 2025. This evolution underscores a causal link between cheaper private capital and delayed public transitions, sustaining bank relevance through diversified revenue streams despite public market contraction.

Sustainability and Geopolitical Influences

![Risk in Banking.jpg][float-right] Investment banks have increasingly incorporated considerations into their operations, driven by client and regulatory pressures, though political backlash has tempered enthusiasm. In 2025, sustainable fund assets reached a record $3.92 trillion, up 11.5% from the end of 2024, with sustainable funds outperforming traditional ones in the first half of the year. ESG investments are projected to grow to $33.9 trillion by 2026, reflecting sustained interest despite outflows from ESG funds hitting a record in Q1 2025 amid shifting political winds. Major banks like have emphasized trends in financing and climate tech, advising on green bonds whose aligned issuance hit $193.6 billion in Q2 2025, the second-highest quarterly volume on record. However, critics argue that some ESG initiatives prioritize signaling over substantive risk-adjusted returns, with European regulators scrutinizing greenwashing in sustainable markets. Geopolitical tensions have profoundly shaped investment banking activities, prompting heightened risk assessments and shifts in deal-making. The Russia-Ukraine war, ongoing since February 2022, disrupted energy markets, leading banks to curtail financing for Russian entities under Western sanctions and redirecting capital toward alternative energy suppliers, which boosted volatility in oil and gas M&A. U.S.- trade frictions, escalating with new tariffs in 2025, have slowed cross-border deals in tech and , with firms perceiving elevated risks that reduced by an estimated 1-2% in affected sectors. Banks such as have developed geopolitical risk indicators to quantify market attention to these events, showing spikes correlating with equity volatility and reshoring advisory mandates. In response, institutions are embedding resilience frameworks, including scenario analysis for conflicts, to mitigate impacts on and advisory revenues, as geopolitical events have been linked to adverse effects on bank intermediation capacity. These influences intersect in areas like financing, where geopolitical disruptions accelerate demand for sustainable alternatives, yet introduce execution risks; for instance, Europe's post-Ukraine energy diversification has spurred $750 billion in U.S. LNG-related deals since 2022. Overall, while offers growth avenues, geopolitical volatility demands rigorous, data-driven to avoid overexposure.

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