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Khartoum Resolution
،لا صلح مع إسرائيل
،لا تفاوض مع إسرائيل
.لا اعتراف بإسرائيل
No peace with Israel,
No negotiation with Israel,
No recognition of Israel.
The Khartoum Resolution (Arabic: قرار الخرطوم) of 1 September 1967 was issued at the conclusion of the 1967 Arab League summit (aka 'the Khartoum Conference'), which was convened in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, in late August 1967. It was convened in the aftermath of the Six-Day War and was attended by leaders of eight Arab states. The declaration issued at its conclusion (aka 'the Khartoum Resolution') is famous for containing (in the third paragraph) what became known as the "Three Noes" (Arabic: اللاءات الثلاث) or "The Three Noes of Khartoum" (لاءات الخرطوم الثلاث). The resolution guided Arab policy toward Israel until the Yom Kippur War.
In Israel, the Khartoum Resolution was generally seen as a confirmation and further proof that the Arab states intended to continue the conflict and were not ready to engage in peace negotiations. The Israeli government issued a decision committing itself to the pursuit of peace agreements with the Arab states, but stating that in the face of Arab refusal to negotiate, Israel would stand by “positions essential to its security and to its unhindered development.” Golda Meir described the resolution as a call for Israel’s destruction and proof that the Arab position had not changed. While visiting the Suez Canal, Israel’s prime minister, Levi Eshkol, responded to the resolution saying “When there is no dialogue, there is no choice but to seek and find natural boundaries and there is no more natural boundary than this canal, the Suez Canal.” Abba Eban rejected interpretations that the Arab states had shown moderation at the conference. Similarly, Henry Kissinger saw the Khartoum resolution as evidence of the radicalization that had taken hold in the Arab world after the Six-Day War.
Ahmad Shukeiri described the resolution as a second Arab defeat following the Six-Day War. In his view, the conference marked the beginning of major political concessions and a retreat from the struggle to liberate Palestine.
Commentators have frequently presented the resolution as an example of Arab rejectionism. Abd al Azim Ramadan stated that the Khartoum decisions left only one option—war. Efraim Halevy, Guy Ben-Porat, Steven R. David, Julius Stone, and Ian Bremmer all agree the Khartoum Resolution amounted to a rejection of Israel's right to exist. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) itself enlisted the Khartoum Resolution to advocate against acceptance of Israel's right to exist as articulated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Benny Morris wrote that the Arab leaders "hammered out a defiant, rejectionist platform that was to bedevil all peace moves in the region for a decade" despite an Israeli offer on 19 June 1967 "to give up Sinai and the Golan in exchange for peace." Odd Bull of the UNTSO opined in much the same manner in 1976. Similarly, Professor William Quandt argued that the Arab position hardened at the conference.
Avi Shlaim argued that Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean "no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no de jure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state" (emphasis in original). Shlaim states that the conference marked a turning point in Arab–Israeli relations by noting that Gamal Abdel Nasser urged Hussein of Jordan to seek a "comprehensive settlement" with Israel. Shlaim acknowledges that none of that was known in Israel at the time, whose leaders took the "Three Nos" at face value. Similarly, Fred Khouri argued that "the Khartoum conference cleared the way for the Arab moderates to seek a political solution and to offer, in exchange for their conquered lands, important concessions short of actually recognizing Israel and negotiating formal peace treaties with her."
Several media outlets in the United States noted what it saw as a shift in the Arab position and regarded it as a positive development. A similar assessment appeared in a report submitted to Lyndon B. Johnson and was echoed by various Western officials.
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Khartoum Resolution
،لا صلح مع إسرائيل
،لا تفاوض مع إسرائيل
.لا اعتراف بإسرائيل
No peace with Israel,
No negotiation with Israel,
No recognition of Israel.
The Khartoum Resolution (Arabic: قرار الخرطوم) of 1 September 1967 was issued at the conclusion of the 1967 Arab League summit (aka 'the Khartoum Conference'), which was convened in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, in late August 1967. It was convened in the aftermath of the Six-Day War and was attended by leaders of eight Arab states. The declaration issued at its conclusion (aka 'the Khartoum Resolution') is famous for containing (in the third paragraph) what became known as the "Three Noes" (Arabic: اللاءات الثلاث) or "The Three Noes of Khartoum" (لاءات الخرطوم الثلاث). The resolution guided Arab policy toward Israel until the Yom Kippur War.
In Israel, the Khartoum Resolution was generally seen as a confirmation and further proof that the Arab states intended to continue the conflict and were not ready to engage in peace negotiations. The Israeli government issued a decision committing itself to the pursuit of peace agreements with the Arab states, but stating that in the face of Arab refusal to negotiate, Israel would stand by “positions essential to its security and to its unhindered development.” Golda Meir described the resolution as a call for Israel’s destruction and proof that the Arab position had not changed. While visiting the Suez Canal, Israel’s prime minister, Levi Eshkol, responded to the resolution saying “When there is no dialogue, there is no choice but to seek and find natural boundaries and there is no more natural boundary than this canal, the Suez Canal.” Abba Eban rejected interpretations that the Arab states had shown moderation at the conference. Similarly, Henry Kissinger saw the Khartoum resolution as evidence of the radicalization that had taken hold in the Arab world after the Six-Day War.
Ahmad Shukeiri described the resolution as a second Arab defeat following the Six-Day War. In his view, the conference marked the beginning of major political concessions and a retreat from the struggle to liberate Palestine.
Commentators have frequently presented the resolution as an example of Arab rejectionism. Abd al Azim Ramadan stated that the Khartoum decisions left only one option—war. Efraim Halevy, Guy Ben-Porat, Steven R. David, Julius Stone, and Ian Bremmer all agree the Khartoum Resolution amounted to a rejection of Israel's right to exist. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) itself enlisted the Khartoum Resolution to advocate against acceptance of Israel's right to exist as articulated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Benny Morris wrote that the Arab leaders "hammered out a defiant, rejectionist platform that was to bedevil all peace moves in the region for a decade" despite an Israeli offer on 19 June 1967 "to give up Sinai and the Golan in exchange for peace." Odd Bull of the UNTSO opined in much the same manner in 1976. Similarly, Professor William Quandt argued that the Arab position hardened at the conference.
Avi Shlaim argued that Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean "no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no de jure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state" (emphasis in original). Shlaim states that the conference marked a turning point in Arab–Israeli relations by noting that Gamal Abdel Nasser urged Hussein of Jordan to seek a "comprehensive settlement" with Israel. Shlaim acknowledges that none of that was known in Israel at the time, whose leaders took the "Three Nos" at face value. Similarly, Fred Khouri argued that "the Khartoum conference cleared the way for the Arab moderates to seek a political solution and to offer, in exchange for their conquered lands, important concessions short of actually recognizing Israel and negotiating formal peace treaties with her."
Several media outlets in the United States noted what it saw as a shift in the Arab position and regarded it as a positive development. A similar assessment appeared in a report submitted to Lyndon B. Johnson and was echoed by various Western officials.