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Last resort rule
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Last resort rule
In U.S. constitutional law, the last resort rule is a largely prudential rule which gives a federal court the power to avoid a constitutional issue in some circumstances. It is one the seven rules of the constitutional avoidance doctrine established in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) and requires that the Supreme Court of the United States to "not [rule] upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. ... [I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter."
Brandeis cited two examples in Ashwander of the "most varied application" of the last resort rule. First, as between two potential grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will only decide the latter. To the extent the question involves statutory construction and a plausible interpretation of the statute might obviate the need for constitutional review, this example replicates the seventh rule of the avoidance doctrine.
To illustrate this first application, Brandeis relied primarily on Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. In Siler, a railroad company challenged an order by the Kentucky railroad commission setting maximum rates on commodities transported by rail within the state. The company asserted a takings claim and a Commerce Clause claim under the United States Constitution, as well as state law claims, including a claim that the commission had exceeded its statutory authorization in making such an order. The Supreme Court upheld the lower federal court's order enjoining enforcement of the maximum rate order. The Court indicated, however, that the lower court should have enjoined the rate order on state law grounds, without reaching the federal constitutional grounds.
The Court in Siler confirmed that once the lower court properly determined that it had federal question jurisdiction, the court had the right to decide either all questions or only the state law questions. The Siler Court stated that where a case can be decided without reference to questions arising under the federal Constitution, that course is "usually pursued and is not departed from without important reasons." The Court declared it better to decide the case with regard to the construction of the state statute, and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record.
The Siler Court offered no case precedent or doctrinal ground for this policy decision. The discretionary nature of the Court's decision limits the extent to which Siler serves as a primary basis for an absolute last resort rule. After recognizing the lower court's authority to decide the constitutional questions, the Court decided to follow the "usual course" of avoiding such questions if questions of local law would resolve the dispute. This purely prudential formulation of the rule allows courts to dispense with the rule for "important reasons." 1 Although Brandeis prefaced his avoidance doctrine discussion in Ashwander by casting the seven rules as prudential, his formulation of the last resort rule omits this "important reasons" qualification. Thus, an evaluation of the proper scope of the last resort rule requires a determination of whether the qualifying phrase should be employed, or whether the rule should be viewed as an absolute.
"Pullman abstention" represents the most prominent development of this initial application of the last resort rule after Ashwander.
The second application Brandeis furnished to demonstrate the last resort rule in Ashwander is the adequate and independent state ground doctrine: "Appeals [to the United States Supreme Court] from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground." When reviewing judgments of state courts, the United States Supreme Court only reviews questions of federal law. The Court will decline to hear a case if an adequate and independent state ground supports the judgment of the state court. The Court reasons that, if a state ground independently supports the judgment, a decision by the Court on federal law grounds will have no effect on the outcome of the case and will amount to an advisory opinion.
The Supreme Court has provided six closely related justifications for the general doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions, noting their grounding in "the unique place and character . . . of judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality."
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Last resort rule
In U.S. constitutional law, the last resort rule is a largely prudential rule which gives a federal court the power to avoid a constitutional issue in some circumstances. It is one the seven rules of the constitutional avoidance doctrine established in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) and requires that the Supreme Court of the United States to "not [rule] upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. ... [I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter."
Brandeis cited two examples in Ashwander of the "most varied application" of the last resort rule. First, as between two potential grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will only decide the latter. To the extent the question involves statutory construction and a plausible interpretation of the statute might obviate the need for constitutional review, this example replicates the seventh rule of the avoidance doctrine.
To illustrate this first application, Brandeis relied primarily on Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. In Siler, a railroad company challenged an order by the Kentucky railroad commission setting maximum rates on commodities transported by rail within the state. The company asserted a takings claim and a Commerce Clause claim under the United States Constitution, as well as state law claims, including a claim that the commission had exceeded its statutory authorization in making such an order. The Supreme Court upheld the lower federal court's order enjoining enforcement of the maximum rate order. The Court indicated, however, that the lower court should have enjoined the rate order on state law grounds, without reaching the federal constitutional grounds.
The Court in Siler confirmed that once the lower court properly determined that it had federal question jurisdiction, the court had the right to decide either all questions or only the state law questions. The Siler Court stated that where a case can be decided without reference to questions arising under the federal Constitution, that course is "usually pursued and is not departed from without important reasons." The Court declared it better to decide the case with regard to the construction of the state statute, and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record.
The Siler Court offered no case precedent or doctrinal ground for this policy decision. The discretionary nature of the Court's decision limits the extent to which Siler serves as a primary basis for an absolute last resort rule. After recognizing the lower court's authority to decide the constitutional questions, the Court decided to follow the "usual course" of avoiding such questions if questions of local law would resolve the dispute. This purely prudential formulation of the rule allows courts to dispense with the rule for "important reasons." 1 Although Brandeis prefaced his avoidance doctrine discussion in Ashwander by casting the seven rules as prudential, his formulation of the last resort rule omits this "important reasons" qualification. Thus, an evaluation of the proper scope of the last resort rule requires a determination of whether the qualifying phrase should be employed, or whether the rule should be viewed as an absolute.
"Pullman abstention" represents the most prominent development of this initial application of the last resort rule after Ashwander.
The second application Brandeis furnished to demonstrate the last resort rule in Ashwander is the adequate and independent state ground doctrine: "Appeals [to the United States Supreme Court] from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground." When reviewing judgments of state courts, the United States Supreme Court only reviews questions of federal law. The Court will decline to hear a case if an adequate and independent state ground supports the judgment of the state court. The Court reasons that, if a state ground independently supports the judgment, a decision by the Court on federal law grounds will have no effect on the outcome of the case and will amount to an advisory opinion.
The Supreme Court has provided six closely related justifications for the general doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions, noting their grounding in "the unique place and character . . . of judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality."