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Lion Air Flight 610
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Lion Air Flight 610
Lion Air Flight 610 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Soekarno–Hatta International Airport, Tangerang, to Depati Amir Airport, Pangkal Pinang, in Indonesia. On 29 October 2018, the Boeing 737 MAX 8 operating the route, carrying 181 passengers and 8 crew members, crashed into the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff, killing all 189 occupants on board. It was the first major accident and hull loss of a 737 MAX, a then recently introduced aircraft.
It is the deadliest accident involving the Boeing 737 family, surpassing Air India Express Flight 812 in 2010. It was the deadliest accident in Lion Air's history, surpassing the 2004 Lion Air Flight 538 crash that killed 25, the deadliest aircraft accident in Indonesia since Garuda Indonesia Flight 152 in 1997, and the deadliest aircraft accident in the Java Sea, surpassing Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 in 2014.
The Indonesian government's search and rescue found debris and human remains soon after from a 280-kilometre-wide (150-nautical-mile) area. The first victim was identified two days after the crash. The flight data recorder (FDR) was found on 1 November and recovered for analysis. One diver also died during recovery operations.
The subsequent investigation, led by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), revealed that a new software function in the flight control system caused the aircraft to nose down. That function, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), had been intentionally omitted by Boeing from aircraft documentation for aircrews, so the Lion Air pilots did not know about it nor did they know what it could do. Investigators concluded that an external device on the aircraft, the angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor, was miscalibrated due to improper maintenance which sent erroneous data to MCAS. In turn, MCAS responded by pushing the nose down. The problem had occurred on the same aircraft during its immediately preceding flight, and the pilots had recovered using a standard checklist for such a "runaway stabilizer" condition. During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which pushed the nose of the aircraft down. The pilots did not properly follow the checklist, with the result that MCAS remained active and repeatedly put the aircraft into an unsafe nose-down position until it crashed into the water.
After the accident, the United States Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing issued warnings and training advisories to all operators of the Boeing 737 MAX series, reminding pilots to follow the runaway stabilizer checklist to avoid letting the MCAS cause similar problems. The company also said that a software update would be made available to update the behavior of MCAS. Despite these advisories, similar issues caused the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on 10 March 2019, prompting a worldwide grounding of all 737 MAX aircraft.
The final report by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia criticized Boeing's design and the FAA's certification process for MCAS and said the issues were compounded by maintenance issues and lapses by Lion Air's repair crews and its pilots, as well as Xtra Aerospace, a US-based company that supplied Lion Air with the AoA sensor.
The aircraft involved was a Boeing 737 MAX 8, registration PK-LQP, line number 7058, and powered by two CFM International LEAP-1B engines, and was delivered new to Lion Air on 13 August 2018. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had flown about 800 hours in service. This was the first accident involving a 737 MAX since the type's entry into service on 22 May 2017, and the deadliest accident involving a Boeing 737.
The accident aircraft had recently received a replacement angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor. The used replacement sensor was supplied by a US-based company, Xtra Aerospace. Subsequent investigations found that the sensor was likely miscalibrated when sent out by Xtra Aerospace, and that Lion Air’s maintenance crews did not test the sensor before returning the aircraft to service.
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Lion Air Flight 610
Lion Air Flight 610 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Soekarno–Hatta International Airport, Tangerang, to Depati Amir Airport, Pangkal Pinang, in Indonesia. On 29 October 2018, the Boeing 737 MAX 8 operating the route, carrying 181 passengers and 8 crew members, crashed into the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff, killing all 189 occupants on board. It was the first major accident and hull loss of a 737 MAX, a then recently introduced aircraft.
It is the deadliest accident involving the Boeing 737 family, surpassing Air India Express Flight 812 in 2010. It was the deadliest accident in Lion Air's history, surpassing the 2004 Lion Air Flight 538 crash that killed 25, the deadliest aircraft accident in Indonesia since Garuda Indonesia Flight 152 in 1997, and the deadliest aircraft accident in the Java Sea, surpassing Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 in 2014.
The Indonesian government's search and rescue found debris and human remains soon after from a 280-kilometre-wide (150-nautical-mile) area. The first victim was identified two days after the crash. The flight data recorder (FDR) was found on 1 November and recovered for analysis. One diver also died during recovery operations.
The subsequent investigation, led by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), revealed that a new software function in the flight control system caused the aircraft to nose down. That function, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), had been intentionally omitted by Boeing from aircraft documentation for aircrews, so the Lion Air pilots did not know about it nor did they know what it could do. Investigators concluded that an external device on the aircraft, the angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor, was miscalibrated due to improper maintenance which sent erroneous data to MCAS. In turn, MCAS responded by pushing the nose down. The problem had occurred on the same aircraft during its immediately preceding flight, and the pilots had recovered using a standard checklist for such a "runaway stabilizer" condition. During the accident flight, the AoA sensor again fed erroneous data to the MCAS, which pushed the nose of the aircraft down. The pilots did not properly follow the checklist, with the result that MCAS remained active and repeatedly put the aircraft into an unsafe nose-down position until it crashed into the water.
After the accident, the United States Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing issued warnings and training advisories to all operators of the Boeing 737 MAX series, reminding pilots to follow the runaway stabilizer checklist to avoid letting the MCAS cause similar problems. The company also said that a software update would be made available to update the behavior of MCAS. Despite these advisories, similar issues caused the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on 10 March 2019, prompting a worldwide grounding of all 737 MAX aircraft.
The final report by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia criticized Boeing's design and the FAA's certification process for MCAS and said the issues were compounded by maintenance issues and lapses by Lion Air's repair crews and its pilots, as well as Xtra Aerospace, a US-based company that supplied Lion Air with the AoA sensor.
The aircraft involved was a Boeing 737 MAX 8, registration PK-LQP, line number 7058, and powered by two CFM International LEAP-1B engines, and was delivered new to Lion Air on 13 August 2018. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had flown about 800 hours in service. This was the first accident involving a 737 MAX since the type's entry into service on 22 May 2017, and the deadliest accident involving a Boeing 737.
The accident aircraft had recently received a replacement angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor. The used replacement sensor was supplied by a US-based company, Xtra Aerospace. Subsequent investigations found that the sensor was likely miscalibrated when sent out by Xtra Aerospace, and that Lion Air’s maintenance crews did not test the sensor before returning the aircraft to service.
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