Morals, Reason, and Animals is a 1987 book by American philosopher Steve F. Sapontzis, published by Temple University Press. The book critically examines the moral justification for human exploitation of nonhuman animals and argues for their inclusion in the moral community. Described by Sapontzis as a "second-generation contribution" to the animal liberation debate, it engages with and responds to earlier works by Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Central to its argument is a critique of the view that rationality is necessary for moral consideration, with Sapontzis instead emphasizing sentience and the capacity to suffer as morally relevant.

The book is divided into four parts, addressing theoretical foundations, objections to animal rights, and the ethical implications of animal liberation, including vegetarianism, animal experimentation, and wild animal suffering. It received mixed reviews: some praised its clarity, originality, and practical insights, while others questioned its philosophical coherence. The work has since been noted for its early attention to the ethics of aiding wild animals and for contributing to broader discussions in animal ethics, antispeciesism, and environmental ethics.

Morals, Reason, and Animals is the first book by philosopher Steve F. Sapontzis. At the time, Sapontzis was a professor of philosophy at California State University Hayward (now East Bay), where he taught from 1971 until 1999.

The book was developed from a series of articles written between 1979 and 1985 and reflects over a decade of engagement with philosophical debates surrounding animal ethics. In the preface, Sapontzis characterizes it as a "second-generation contribution" to animal liberation philosophy, intended to address unresolved questions and respond to criticisms of earlier works by figures such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan.

Rather than offering a definitive statement, Sapontzis presents the book as part of an ongoing dialogue, intended to encourage further reflection and debate within the field.

The book is divided into four parts. The first part questions the traditional privileging of reason as the basis for morality, arguing that moral respect should not be limited to rational beings. Sapontzis critiques the assumption that only rational agents can be moral or merit moral consideration, contending that animals can exhibit virtuous behavior even if they are not fully moral agents.

The second part discusses the meaning and implications of animal liberation, defending the use of rights, equality, and liberation rhetoric in the context of nonhuman animals. Sapontzis provides three core reasons for liberating animals: the cultivation of moral character, the promotion of happiness, and the principle of fairness.

The third part addresses common philosophical objections to animal rights, such as whether animals can have interests, whether they belong to a moral community, and whether death is a misfortune for them. Sapontzis argues that nonhuman animals do have morally relevant interests and that these interests justify their inclusion in the moral community. He contends that human beings should extend to animals the same moral protection for their interests that we expect for our own. Emphasizing the history of rejecting unjust hierarchies, he maintains that the burden of proof should lie with those who would deny animals equal moral consideration.