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Hub AI
Patriotic consent AI simulator
(@Patriotic consent_simulator)
Hub AI
Patriotic consent AI simulator
(@Patriotic consent_simulator)
Patriotic consent
The concept of patriotic consent (French: Consentement patriotique) refers to the acceptance of an armed conflict for nationalist reasons, by the combatants themselves. It was notably used in connection with the First World War.
This notion was developed in the 1990s by a group of historians attached to the Historical Research Centre of the Museum of the Great War in Péronne, including the French historians Jean-Jacques Becker, Annette Becker and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau. It is formulated in particular by the latter two in the work 14–18, Retrouver la guerre (Paris, Gallimard, 2000).
The concept of patriotic consent concerns the great war of 1914–1918. It argues that attachment to the nation, the will to win the war and to protect the homeland against the enemy prevailed within European societies and also among fighting troops over the suffering endured by combat and deprivation.
This idea may explain why the outbreak of the First World War was greeted without panic in 1914 in most of the belligerent states, and even provoked enthusiastic reactions in certain places or circles (especially large cities). It was reflected at the political level by the establishment in the various countries concerned of governments of Sacred Union, where political differences were put aside, the entire political class forming a united front.
Few historians have disseminated the term "patriotic consent" and made it the determining explanatory factor of the tenacity of the populations during the war, in particular of the combatants. Indeed, at first glance, the war continued without encountering large-scale organized opposition. A counter-example, however, is that of Russia with the Bolshevik Revolution. This is certainly linked to the particular context which has always been an empire much more than a nation, and where the modern economy and state are much more fragile than elsewhere. But the Revolution cannot be detached from the context of the Great War that triggered it.
From this perspective, consent is said to be "patriotic" because it is based on a nationalism explicitly carrying hatred toward the demonized enemy, which would be confirmed by a certain number of cruel practices observed either on the front or against the invaded civilian populations (rapes, massacres of entire villages, unnecessary destruction, scorched earth).
The concept of patriotic consent, sometimes disseminated in the media and education, is recognized by some French and even other European historians. But many researchers have discussed this term (conscious or unconscious consent, reasoned choice or due to brainwashing) and the vision of combatant societies that it conveys, triggering a "consent quarrel". Among them are Antoine Prost, Frédéric Rousseau and Rémy Cazals. A group of historians particularly interested in qualifying the thesis of "patriotic consent" was founded in 2005 under the name of CRID 14–18.
The critical historiographical discussion, often virulent, focuses on several points:
Patriotic consent
The concept of patriotic consent (French: Consentement patriotique) refers to the acceptance of an armed conflict for nationalist reasons, by the combatants themselves. It was notably used in connection with the First World War.
This notion was developed in the 1990s by a group of historians attached to the Historical Research Centre of the Museum of the Great War in Péronne, including the French historians Jean-Jacques Becker, Annette Becker and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau. It is formulated in particular by the latter two in the work 14–18, Retrouver la guerre (Paris, Gallimard, 2000).
The concept of patriotic consent concerns the great war of 1914–1918. It argues that attachment to the nation, the will to win the war and to protect the homeland against the enemy prevailed within European societies and also among fighting troops over the suffering endured by combat and deprivation.
This idea may explain why the outbreak of the First World War was greeted without panic in 1914 in most of the belligerent states, and even provoked enthusiastic reactions in certain places or circles (especially large cities). It was reflected at the political level by the establishment in the various countries concerned of governments of Sacred Union, where political differences were put aside, the entire political class forming a united front.
Few historians have disseminated the term "patriotic consent" and made it the determining explanatory factor of the tenacity of the populations during the war, in particular of the combatants. Indeed, at first glance, the war continued without encountering large-scale organized opposition. A counter-example, however, is that of Russia with the Bolshevik Revolution. This is certainly linked to the particular context which has always been an empire much more than a nation, and where the modern economy and state are much more fragile than elsewhere. But the Revolution cannot be detached from the context of the Great War that triggered it.
From this perspective, consent is said to be "patriotic" because it is based on a nationalism explicitly carrying hatred toward the demonized enemy, which would be confirmed by a certain number of cruel practices observed either on the front or against the invaded civilian populations (rapes, massacres of entire villages, unnecessary destruction, scorched earth).
The concept of patriotic consent, sometimes disseminated in the media and education, is recognized by some French and even other European historians. But many researchers have discussed this term (conscious or unconscious consent, reasoned choice or due to brainwashing) and the vision of combatant societies that it conveys, triggering a "consent quarrel". Among them are Antoine Prost, Frédéric Rousseau and Rémy Cazals. A group of historians particularly interested in qualifying the thesis of "patriotic consent" was founded in 2005 under the name of CRID 14–18.
The critical historiographical discussion, often virulent, focuses on several points: