Problem of evil

The problem of evil, also known as the problem of suffering, is the philosophical question of how to reconcile the existence of evil and suffering with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God. There are currently differing definitions of these concepts. The best known presentation of the problem is attributed to the Greek philosopher Epicurus.

Besides the philosophy of religion, the problem of evil is also important to the fields of theology and ethics. There are also many discussions of evil and associated problems in other philosophical fields, such as secular ethics and evolutionary ethics. But as usually understood, the problem of evil is posed in a theological context.

Responses to the problem of evil have traditionally been in three types: refutations, defenses, and theodicies.

The problem of evil is generally formulated in two forms: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. The logical form of the argument tries to show a logical impossibility in the coexistence of a God and evil, while the evidential form tries to show that, given the evil in the world, it is improbable that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and a wholly good God. Concerning the evidential problem, many theodicies have been proposed. One accepted theodicy is to appeal to the strong account of the compensation theodicy. This view holds that the primary benefit of evils, in addition to their compensation in the afterlife, can reject the evidential problem of evil. The problem of evil has been extended to non-human life forms, to include suffering of non-human animal species from natural evils and human cruelty against them.

While most philosophers see the logical problem of evil as having been rebutted, the inductive or evidential arguments remain unresolved. Among contemporary philosophers, most discussion on the problem of evil currently revolves around the evidential problem of evil, namely that the existence of God is unlikely, rather than logically impossible.

Typically in the context of the problem of evil, a broad concept of evil is considered that encompasses "any bad state of affairs, wrongful action, or character flaw". These may be either natural evils or moral evils including minor harm or injustice, in contrast to the modern colloquial use of "evil" commonly associated with particularly horrendous moral acts. More restrictive concepts of evil may be relevant to particular formulations and responses to the problem of evil. Marcus Singer says that a usable definition of evil must be based on the knowledge that: "If something is really evil, it can't be necessary, and if it is really necessary, it can't be evil". According to philosopher John Kemp, evil cannot be correctly understood on "a simple hedonic scale on which pleasure appears as a plus, and pain as a minus".

Evil takes on different meanings when seen from the perspective of different belief systems, and while evil can be viewed in religious terms, it can also be understood in natural or secular terms, such as social vice, egoism, criminality, and sociopathology. John Kekes writes that an action is evil if "(1) it causes grievous harm to (2) innocent victims, and it is (3) deliberate, (4) malevolently motivated, and (5) morally unjustifiable".

Omniscience is "maximal knowledge". According to Edward Wierenga, a classics scholar and doctor of philosophy and religion at the University of Massachusetts, maximal is not unlimited but limited to "God knowing what is knowable". This is the most widely accepted view of omniscience among scholars of the twenty-first century, and is what William Hasker calls freewill-theism. Within this view, future events that depend upon choices made by individuals with free will are unknowable until they occur.