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Leadership Council of Afghanistan
The Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, also translated as the Supreme Council (Pashto: رهبری شُورَىٰ, romanized: Rahbarī Shūrā, also referred to as the Inner Shura), is an advisory council to the supreme leader of Afghanistan and a central Taliban leadership body that has been maintained continuously since the movement formed its first government in 1996. It is empowered to appoint the supreme leader in the event of a vacancy. The supreme leader has ultimate authority and may override or circumvent the council at any time, convening it as often as he desires. It is one of many support organizations that surround the supreme leader in Kandahar, which together with the supreme leader are called the Leadership of the Islamic Emirate. The way it has been used has varied over time with changing circumstances. It played a key role in directing the Taliban insurgency from Quetta, Pakistan, which led to it being informally referred to as the Quetta Shura at the time.
During the Taliban insurgency, a consensus-based decision model was used among members of the Quetta Shura. After the 2021 return to power of the Taliban, Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada centralized power and began to communicate mostly through his three deputies. In March 2023, Oxford Analytica reported that he had not convened the Leadership Council for several months, instead consulting the local Kandahar provincial council of clerics for advice.
The council is the supreme governing body of the Taliban and the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It functions under a consensus decision-making model, and is chaired by the supreme leader. The Leadership Council appoints the supreme leader in the event of a vacancy. Under the first supreme leader, Mullah Omar, the role of the council was purely advisory, but an agreement to rule by consensus was formed upon the contentious appointment of Akhtar Mansour as the second supreme leader. However, the supreme leader may still override or circumvent the council at any time—the consensus model is merely a convention.
There are approximately 30 members. The following bodies make up the Leadership Council:
After the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the end of the Taliban government, ten men who had held positions in the government formed a Council of Leaders (Rahbari Shura) in May 2002. They consisted of eight veteran high ranking (i.e. elite) commanders originally from the southern area of Afghanistan, another hailing from Paktika, and another from Paktia. The Shura was subsequently increased in number, during March 2003, to 33 individuals. During October 2006, the Consultative Council (majlis al-shura) was formed, comprising a number of advisors to 13 core members.
According to retired General of the United States Army Stanley A. McChrystal, the Quetta Shura was directing the Afghani Taliban insurgency. In a report to President Obama in 2009, he stated that it posed the greatest threat to his troops. He said, "Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. The Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Omar announces his guidance and intent for the following year." Americans wanted to extend the drone strikes into Balochistan.
In September 2009 US ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson said, "In the past, we focussed on Al-Qaeda because they were a threat to us. The Quetta Shura mattered less to us because we had no troops in the region, now our troops are there on the other side of the border, and the Quetta Shura is high on Washington's list."
Taliban leaders raised money from wealthy donors from Arab states around the Persian gulf and from direct operations in Southern Afghanistan. According to Lieutenant General David Barno, the retired former commander of American forces in Afghanistan "The Quetta Shura is extremely important, they are the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency."
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Leadership Council of Afghanistan
The Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, also translated as the Supreme Council (Pashto: رهبری شُورَىٰ, romanized: Rahbarī Shūrā, also referred to as the Inner Shura), is an advisory council to the supreme leader of Afghanistan and a central Taliban leadership body that has been maintained continuously since the movement formed its first government in 1996. It is empowered to appoint the supreme leader in the event of a vacancy. The supreme leader has ultimate authority and may override or circumvent the council at any time, convening it as often as he desires. It is one of many support organizations that surround the supreme leader in Kandahar, which together with the supreme leader are called the Leadership of the Islamic Emirate. The way it has been used has varied over time with changing circumstances. It played a key role in directing the Taliban insurgency from Quetta, Pakistan, which led to it being informally referred to as the Quetta Shura at the time.
During the Taliban insurgency, a consensus-based decision model was used among members of the Quetta Shura. After the 2021 return to power of the Taliban, Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada centralized power and began to communicate mostly through his three deputies. In March 2023, Oxford Analytica reported that he had not convened the Leadership Council for several months, instead consulting the local Kandahar provincial council of clerics for advice.
The council is the supreme governing body of the Taliban and the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It functions under a consensus decision-making model, and is chaired by the supreme leader. The Leadership Council appoints the supreme leader in the event of a vacancy. Under the first supreme leader, Mullah Omar, the role of the council was purely advisory, but an agreement to rule by consensus was formed upon the contentious appointment of Akhtar Mansour as the second supreme leader. However, the supreme leader may still override or circumvent the council at any time—the consensus model is merely a convention.
There are approximately 30 members. The following bodies make up the Leadership Council:
After the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the end of the Taliban government, ten men who had held positions in the government formed a Council of Leaders (Rahbari Shura) in May 2002. They consisted of eight veteran high ranking (i.e. elite) commanders originally from the southern area of Afghanistan, another hailing from Paktika, and another from Paktia. The Shura was subsequently increased in number, during March 2003, to 33 individuals. During October 2006, the Consultative Council (majlis al-shura) was formed, comprising a number of advisors to 13 core members.
According to retired General of the United States Army Stanley A. McChrystal, the Quetta Shura was directing the Afghani Taliban insurgency. In a report to President Obama in 2009, he stated that it posed the greatest threat to his troops. He said, "Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. The Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Omar announces his guidance and intent for the following year." Americans wanted to extend the drone strikes into Balochistan.
In September 2009 US ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson said, "In the past, we focussed on Al-Qaeda because they were a threat to us. The Quetta Shura mattered less to us because we had no troops in the region, now our troops are there on the other side of the border, and the Quetta Shura is high on Washington's list."
Taliban leaders raised money from wealthy donors from Arab states around the Persian gulf and from direct operations in Southern Afghanistan. According to Lieutenant General David Barno, the retired former commander of American forces in Afghanistan "The Quetta Shura is extremely important, they are the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban insurgency."