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Scope (formal semantics)
Scope (formal semantics)
Scope (formal semantics)
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In formal semantics, the scope of a semantic operator is the semantic object to which it applies. For instance, in the sentence "Paulina doesn't drink beer but she does drink wine," the proposition that Paulina drinks beer occurs within the scope of negation, but the proposition that Paulina drinks wine does not. Scope can be thought of as the semantic order of operations.

One of the major concerns of research in formal semantics is the relationship between operators' syntactic positions and their semantic scope. This relationship is not transparent, since the scope of an operator need not directly correspond to its surface position and a single surface form can be semantically ambiguous between different scope construals. Some theories of scope posit a level of syntactic structure called logical form, in which an item's syntactic position corresponds to its semantic scope. Others theories compute scope relations in the semantics itself, using formal tools such as type shifters, monads, and continuations.

Phenomena

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Scope ambiguity

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The scope of an operator need not correspond directly to the word order of the sentence it occurs in. For instance, some sentences display a scope ambiguity in that the relative scopes of two operators can be construed in multiple ways.[1][2]

  1. Every hedgehog is friends with a giraffe.

This sentence can be understood in two ways. On the inverse scope reading, there is a single giraffe who is very popular in the hedgehog community. On the surface scope reading, the sentence can be true even if the hedgehogs are friends with different giraffes.

Split scope

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Split scope is the phenomenon where different components of an expressions item's meaning take scope in different places. Negative quantifiers are one category of expression which have been argued to take split scope.

  1. The company need fire no employees.

On the de re (non-split) reading, this sentence means that there is no employee such that the company needs to fire that employee. This is a non-split scope reading since "no" simply takes scope above the modal "need". On the split scope reading of this sentence, it means that it is not the case that the company needs to fire any employees. On this reading, "no" decomposes into a negation scoping above "need" and an existential quantifier scoping below it.[3]

Indefinites have been argued to have split scope, having separate existential scope and distributive scope. This fact can be seen in the following example:[4][5][6]

  1. If three relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house.

Among this sentence's reading is one which means "There exists a set of three relatives such that, if those three relatives die, I will inherit a house." On this reading, the indefinite "three relatives of mine" takes existential scope outside the conditional–– it asserts unconditionally that those three relatives do in fact exist. However, if the indefinite takes distributive scope inside the conditional–– the speaker will inherit a house if three relatives die, not if x dies where x can be any of those three relatives.

Definite descriptions have also been argued to have split scope. Definites are classically considered to presuppose that their referents are unique. For instance, the definite description "the cat" is infelicitous in a context where there are multiple cats which the speaker could have in mind. However, this generalization seems to be contradicted by Haddock descriptions such as the following:

  1. Context: In front of the speaker are numerous hats, one of which contains a rabbit.
    Haddock description: The rabbit in the hat

This noun phrase is felicitous to use in this context, even though there is no unique hat. What seems to license this surprising use of the definite description is the fact that the context contains a unique rabbit-containing hat. To cash out this idea, it has been proposed that the uniqueness presupposition of "the hat" takes scope separately from the rest of the definite's meaning. In other words, a witness set is established low in the structure, but is checked for singletonness higher up.[7][8]

Scope islands

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While operators can often take scope above their surface position, there are not entirely free to take scope wherever they want. For instance, as illustrated by Sentence 1 below, quantifiers that originate inside an if-clause usually cannot take scope outside of that "if"-clause. This sentence cannot mean that Beth will inherit one house for each dead relative.[9][10]

  1. If every relative of mine dies, I will inherit a house.

This fact parallels the fact that a wh-phrase cannot be extracted from an "if"-clause, as shown in Sentence 2.

  1. Which relativei will you inherit a fortune if ti dies?

Examples of this sort have been used to argue that scope relations are determined by syntactic movement operations.

Aside from their theoretical significance, scope islands are also practically useful since they can be used to construct unambiguous paraphrases of sentences with scope ambiguities.[10]

Exceptional scope

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While most operators are unable to scope out of an island, others can.[11] For instance, the indefinite "a" in the sentence below can take scope outside of its surface position inside an "if"-clause. This sentence can mean that there is a particular relative who must die for the speaker to get a house.

  1. If a relative of mine dies, I will inherit a house.

Examples of this sort have been used to argue that indefinites do not have standard generalized quantifier denotations. On the choice function approach proposed by Tanya Reinhart, indefinites contribute a variable over choice functions which can be existentially closed at any point higher in the structure.[12] Angelika Kratzer proposed another choice function-based theory, which is similar to Reinhart's except that the choice function variable is left free.[13] Recent work such as Charlow (2020) treats indefinites as denoting sets of individuals which can be type shifted so that they take scope in a manner similar to Karttunen's (1977) alternative-based mechanism for wh-questions.[14][15]


Formal approaches to scope

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Tanya Reinhart pioneered the structural approach to scope.

The structural view of scope is one influential view which posits a close relationship between syntax and semantics. This approach is characterized by the following hypothesis, first formulated by Tanya Reinhart:[16][17]

Hypothesis about scope and domain: The semantic scope of an operator corresponds to the position of the item which expresses it at some level of syntactic representation.

This view is widely adopted in generative approaches such as that of Heim and Kratzer (1998). In these approaches, the relevant syntactic level is logical form and the syntactic notion which corresponds to semantic scope is typically identified as c-command.[16]

In structural approaches, discrepancies between an expression's surface position and its semantic scope are explained by syntactic movement operations such as quantifier raising.[18][19][20] The movement approach is motivated in large part by the fact that quantifier scope seems to obey many of the same restrictions that movement does, e.g. islands.

One prominent alternative to the structural view is the type shifting view first proposed by Barbara Partee and Mats Rooth.[21][22] This approach uses type shifters to govern scopal relations. Since type shifters are applied during the process of semantic interpretation, this approach allows scopal relations to be partly independent of syntactic structure. The type shifting approach serves as the basis of many recent proposals for exceptional scope, split scope, and other troublesome scope-related phenomena.[20]


See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Scope (formal semantics)

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In formal semantics, scope refers to the domain within a linguistic expression over which a semantic operator, such as a quantifier or , applies its effect, determining the interpretation of the elements it governs. This concept is central to understanding how operators interact in logical forms, where the relative ordering of scopes can yield distinct truth conditions for the same syntactic structure. For instance, in a sentence like "Some boys saw every teacher," the quantifier "some" may take wide scope over "every," implying there exists a group of boys who collectively saw all teachers, or narrow scope, meaning for each teacher, there were some boys who saw them. Scope phenomena often give rise to ambiguities in natural language, as the semantic scope of an operator may not strictly align with its syntactic position, requiring mechanisms like quantifier raising to account for inverse scope readings. Key challenges include scope islands, where certain block operator movement or reinterpretation, and exceptional scope behaviors in constructions involving indefinites or focus-sensitive particles. Formal theories, building on generalized quantifier approaches, model scope through or alternative semantics like choice functions, enabling precise representations of linear, branching, or cumulative quantification. These scope interactions underpin broader issues in semantics, such as binding dependencies between quantifiers and pronouns, and extend to cross-linguistic variations in scope rigidity or flexibility. Research continues to explore how prosody, context, and grammatical constraints resolve scope ambiguities, informing computational models and theories of compositionality.

Core Concepts

Definition and Basic Principles

In formal semantics, the scope of a semantic operator refers to the semantic object—such as a , , or other constituent—to which the operator applies, determining the domain over which its meaning is interpreted. Operators like , quantifiers, and modals interact with this scope to yield specific truth conditions; for example, typically takes scope over a to deny the associated . Basic principles of scope include the distinction between surface scope, which aligns with the syntactic position of elements in a sentence, and interpreted scope, which may differ due to ambiguities resolved through semantic composition. In many frameworks, syntactic conditions like —where one constituent commands another if the first branching node dominating the commander also dominates the commandeé—constrain possible scope relations, ensuring that operators can only affect elements within their c-command domain. For instance, in the sentence "Paulina doesn't drink ," the negation operator takes surface scope over the "drink ," yielding the interpretation that it is not the case that Paulina drinks . Quantifiers illustrate scope principles through their interaction with other elements; in "Every student reads a book," the surface scope reading has the universal quantifier "every" taking wide scope over the indefinite "a," interpreted as each student reads some (possibly different) book. These concepts originated in Richard Montague's 1970s work, which treated scope via abstractions to compositionally assign meanings to quantified expressions in .

Syntactic-Semantic Mapping

In formal semantics, the syntactic-semantic mapping establishes how the hierarchical structure of a sentence determines the scope relations among operators, predicates, and arguments, ensuring that semantic interpretation aligns with syntactic configuration. This mapping operates through an intermediate level known as (LF), which represents the syntactic structure after covert movements and adjustments, serving as the direct input to semantic composition. Phrase structure plays a crucial role in delimiting scope domains by providing dominance and precedence relations within tree diagrams, where a node's position relative to others defines the boundaries over which operators apply. A fundamental distinction in this mapping is between surface structure, which captures the overt and visible syntax, and deeper representational levels like LF, which resolve type mismatches and scope interactions through structural adjustments. Adjacency effects arise when operators are positioned close to their operands in the phrase structure, allowing direct composition via functional application, while in subordinate clauses can restrict scope by creating barriers that limit operator interaction. For instance, in embedded constructions, may scope narrowly over a numeral within a , preventing wider application to matrix elements. Consider the sentence "John does not have three children," where the syntactic position of "not" immediately preceding the verb phrase influences its scope over the numeral "three." In this configuration, negation typically takes wide scope, yielding the interpretation that it is not the case that John has exactly three children (i.e., he has fewer or more). This differs from cases involving quantifiers, where scope can interact more flexibly with the numeral due to their distinct semantic types, but the core mapping relies on the adjacency of "not" to the embedded phrase to compose semantically first with the predicate. Such positional effects highlight how linear and hierarchical syntax guide interpretation rules like functional application, which combines denotations based on phrase structure without regard to linear order. In the framework of Heim and Kratzer (1998), serves as a key syntactic relation linking structure to scope precedence: a node α s β if the first branching node dominating α also dominates β, ensuring that higher-ing elements take scope over those they dominate. This is illustrated in phrase structure trees, such as the binary branching diagram for a simple sentence like "Ann smokes," where the (VP) is dominated by the sentence node (S), delimiting the scope of the predicate to its argument. For more complex cases, like quantifier integration, trees show adjunction sites (e.g., a adjoining to IP), with traces bound by ing operators to enforce scope order—e.g., in a tree for "John offended every linguist," the moved quantifier s its trace in the VP, prioritizing its scope. These mapping mechanisms can lead to scope ambiguity as a consequence of multiple possible LF representations compatible with a single surface structure.

Scope Phenomena

Quantifier Scope Ambiguity

Quantifier scope ambiguity is a central in formal semantics, occurring when sentences contain multiple quantifiers whose relative scopes can yield distinct interpretations. In such cases, the surface scope reading aligns with the linear order of the quantifiers in the sentence, typically favoring the leftmost quantifier taking wider scope, while inverse scope reverses this hierarchy, allowing a rightward quantifier to outscope the one to its left. This ambiguity arises because quantifiers are semantically interpreted as operators that variables over domains, and their interaction determines how predicates are applied across entities. For instance, universal quantifiers like "every" often interact with existentials like "a" or "some," leading to readings where the universal distributes over the existential or vice versa. Similar patterns appear in simpler cases like "Every boy kissed a girl," where the surface scope (∀>∃\forall > \exists) means each boy kissed some girl (possibly different girls), while inverse scope (∃>∀\exists > \forall) means there was one girl kissed by every boy. Interpretive options for these ambiguities typically include pairwise scope relations, such as ∀>∃\forall > \exists (universal over existential) and ∃>∀\exists > \forall (existential over universal), each yielding logically distinct truth conditions. Functional readings, where the inner quantifier's domain depends on the outer one (e.g., each farmer beats his own donkey), are also attested but often emerge from contextual or pragmatic strengthening rather than strict scope alternation. In English, experimental evidence reveals a strong surface scope bias, with speakers preferring ∀>∃\forall > \exists interpretations in processing tasks, as shown in studies from the 1980s examining lexical and structural cues. For example, Micham et al. (1980) demonstrated that subjects reliably favored surface readings in doubly quantified sentences, influenced by syntactic position and quantifier type. In contrast, languages like Japanese show a greater preference for inverse scope, allowing ∃>∀\exists > \forall more readily due to differences in quantifier raising or interpretive strategies. Recent studies on large models (as of 2024) indicate that these models often exhibit a similar surface scope bias to humans but struggle with generating or resolving inverse scope readings accurately, highlighting ongoing challenges in computational modeling of scope phenomena.

Split and Exceptional Scope

Split scope refers to the phenomenon in which a single quantificational expression, such as a negative indefinite like "no," appears to decompose semantically, with its components taking scope at different levels relative to other operators. This results in readings where the scopes higher than an intervening operator, while the existential component scopes lower. A classic example is the sentence "The company need fire no employees" (using "need" as a negative polarity item), which can be interpreted not as the company being obligated to fire zero employees (a narrow-scope reading), but rather as the company not being obligated to fire any employees (a split-scope reading: over "need," existential under "need"). This split is particularly available in downward-entailing contexts, such as under modals like "need," where the intervening operator allows the existential force to remain low while the escapes high. Exceptional scope, by contrast, involves indefinites taking wide scope over embedding operators in contexts that typically block such scoping, known as scope islands. For instance, in the conditional "If a relative of mine dies, I inherit a house," the indefinite "a relative" can receive a wide-scope interpretation, meaning there exists a specific relative such that if that one dies, the inheritance follows (existential over the conditional). This wide-scope reading for indefinites contrasts with the behavior of other quantifiers, which are generally confined to narrow scope within such islands, and it occurs without overt syntactic movement. One influential approach to accounting for exceptional scope treats indefinites not as standard existential quantifiers but as variables over functions that select individuals from the of the . In this framework, an indefinite like "a cat" denotes a function ff such that f(C)f(C) picks an individual from the set of cats CC, allowing the indefinite to behave as if it has wide scope without actual displacement. For example, in the conditional above, the function applied to "relative of mine" selects a particular individual independently of the conditional operator, yielding the wide-scope effect. This mechanism, originally proposed to handle indefinites in islands, also facilitates split-scope readings for negative indefinites by decomposing "no" into a and a choice-function-bound existential. Such exceptions highlight how scope islands, which constrain standard quantifier movement, can be circumvented by the non-quantificational semantics of indefinites.

Scope Islands and Constraints

In formal semantics, scope islands refer to syntactic structures that restrict the ability of quantificational operators to take wide scope over larger portions of the sentence, mirroring the island constraints originally proposed for syntactic movement by Ross (1967). These barriers arise in domains such as subjects, adjuncts, and coordinate structures, where inverse scope readings—such as a lower quantifier scoping over a higher one—are systematically blocked. For instance, in subject islands, a universal quantifier embedded in the subject position cannot easily scope outside its clause, as in "A picture of every professor was hanging on the wall," which resists the reading where every professor has their own picture. Similarly, adjunct islands, including conditional clauses, prevent wide scope for embedded operators; the sentence "You will inherit a fortune if every man dies" only allows the reading where the inheritance depends on the death of all men collectively, not each man individually triggering the fortune. Coordinate structures exhibit comparable restrictions, as in "Some professor despises every student and admires the dean," which lacks an inverse scope interpretation where every student is despised by their own professor. Wh-islands and relative clauses further exemplify these constraints, limiting the scope of quantifiers within embedded interrogative or restrictive domains. In wh-islands, such as "I wonder who every student saw," the universal "every" cannot take wide scope over the matrix clause, yielding only a functional or pair-list reading rather than a full inverse one. Relative clauses impose similar limitations, as in "The man who saw every dog ran," where "every dog" is confined to scoping within the relative clause, blocking a reading in which the man ran after seeing each dog individually. Ross's original island constraints—such as the Complex NP Constraint and the Adjunct Island Condition—have been adapted to semantic scope phenomena, suggesting that these syntactic domains create opacity for quantifier raising or binding operations. Additionally, superiority effects in questions reinforce these barriers, where a lower wh-phrase or quantifier cannot outscope a higher one without violating locality, as seen in the degraded acceptability of "*What did every student buy?" compared to "What did someone buy?" Empirical asymmetries highlight variations in how different quantifiers interact with islands: indefinites exhibit greater mobility than universals, often escaping boundaries to achieve wide-scope referential readings. According to Fodor and Sag (1982), indefinites like "a friend" can take scope outside adjunct islands, as in "If a friend of mine from had died, I would have inherited a fortune," interpreted as a specific friend triggering the inheritance, whereas universals like "every friend" remain trapped, yielding only narrow-scope readings. This difference stems from the semantic ambiguity of indefinites, allowing referential interpretations akin to definite descriptions that bypass scoping restrictions. Cross-linguistic variations further modulate these effects; for example, Chinese permits broader quantifier scope across certain island-like domains due to its lack of overt movement (Huang 1982), while Japanese shows sensitivity to types influenced by focus particles (Hoji 1985). Such differences underscore that while core constraints are universal, their semantic impact varies by language-specific syntax-semantics mappings.

Formal Theories

Movement-Based Approaches

Movement-based approaches to scope resolution in formal semantics rely on syntactic transformations to establish quantifier interactions, positing that scope ambiguities arise from alternative positions that quantifiers can occupy after movement operations. Central to these theories is Quantifier Raising (QR), a covert movement rule that allows quantifiers to adjoin to higher structural positions at the level of (LF), thereby enabling inverse scope readings without altering overt syntax. Developed by Robert May, QR operates within the principles-and-parameters framework, where quantifiers, treated as determiners heading noun phrases (DPs), undergo adjunction to clausal nodes such as VP or IP to achieve wide scope. This movement is optional and applies selectively to quantificational elements, preserving the c-command relations essential for binding and scope assignment post-derivation. The Scope Principle governs interpretation, stipulating that a quantifier's scope domain is the set of elements it c-commands at LF, thus ensuring hierarchical dominance without permitting crossing dependencies that would disrupt structural integrity. These mechanisms integrate seamlessly with the Government and Binding (GB) theory outlined by Noam Chomsky, in which LF represents the syntactic level fed to semantic interpretation, distinguishing it from surface structure and deep structure as an interface level. In GB, QR adheres to general constraints on movement, such as the Empty Category Principle, which requires traces left by QR to be properly governed, thereby linking syntactic well-formedness to scopal possibilities. For structures involving multiple quantifiers, successive QR applications are regulated to avoid violations of binding conditions, ensuring that each trace is bound by its antecedent without unintended interactions. A representative example illustrates QR's role in deriving inverse scope: the sentence "Every giraffe loves some zebra" has a surface structure where the subject quantifier every (universal, ∀) c-commands the object some (existential, ∃), yielding the direct reading ∀ > ∃, meaning for every giraffe, there exists (possibly different) zebras it loves. To obtain the inverse reading ∃ > ∀—there exists some zebra loved by every giraffe—the object DP undergoes QR, adjoining to the VP or IP node and leaving a trace t in object position, resulting in the LF representation: [IPsome zebrai [VPevery giraffe loves ti]][_{IP} \text{some zebra}_i \ [_{VP} \text{every giraffe} \ \text{loves } t_i ]] This structure interprets with some zebra taking scope over every giraffe, as the raised quantifier c-commands the embedded one. Constraints on multiple QR, such as those from the Proper Binding Condition, prevent overgeneration by requiring each trace to be bound within its minimal scope domain. In general, the interpretive effect of QR on nested quantifiers follows from the hierarchical structure at LF; for a configuration where Q1 adjoins above Q2, the semantics yields Q1 > Q2 scope, formalized as: ⟦[IPQ1 [IPQ2 VP]]⟧=Q1(λx1. Q2(λx2. ⟦VP⟧(x1,x2)))\llbracket [_{IP} Q_1 \ [_{IP} Q_2 \ VP ]] \rrbracket = Q_1 (\lambda x_1 . \, Q_2 (\lambda x_2 . \, \llbracket VP \rrbracket (x_1, x_2) )) Here, Q1 binds its variable externally to Q2's scope, establishing wide scope dominance. Scope islands, such as relative clauses or coordinate structures, block QR out of their domains, limiting wide scope possibilities as per May's analysis.

Non-Movement Semantic Theories

Non-movement semantic theories address scope phenomena by employing operations within the semantic composition process, allowing expressions to interact scopally without relying on syntactic displacement mechanisms such as Quantifier Raising (QR). These approaches emphasize type flexibility and functional interpretations to resolve ambiguities, particularly for indefinites and quantifiers that exhibit wide or exceptional scope. A key mechanism in these theories is type-shifting, which permits noun phrases (NPs) to adjust their semantic types to fit compositional requirements, thereby enabling scope interactions independently of syntax. Introduced by Partee (1986), type-shifting principles resolve conflicts between referential, predicative, and quantificational interpretations of NPs by applying operators that raise or lower types as needed. For instance, Partee and Rooth's operators, such as IDENT and LIFT, facilitate this by converting a predicate-type expression of type ⟨e,t⟩\langle e, t \rangle (where ee denotes entities and tt truth values) into a quantifier-type expression of type ⟨⟨e,t⟩,t⟩\langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle, allowing it to take scope over other operators. The IDENT operator identifies a variable with the semantic value of its argument, while LIFT elevates an expression to a , preserving alternatives in focus-sensitive contexts. This type flexibility ensures that NPs like proper names or indefinites can function quantifierially without structural reconfiguration. Choice functions provide another semantic tool for handling the scopal behavior of indefinites, particularly in cases of exceptional wide scope. Reinhart (1997) proposes that indefinites can denote choice functions f:P(D)→Df: \mathcal{P}(D) \to D, where P(D)\mathcal{P}(D) is the power set of the domain DD of individuals, selecting a single entity from any non-empty property set to satisfy existential commitments. This interpretation allows indefinites to bind variables or take scope over universal quantifiers without movement, dividing labor with QR by restricting the latter to non-indefinites. For example, in the sentence "A pizza is on every table," the indefinite "a pizza" receives wide scope via a choice function ff, yielding the reading ∃x (pizza(x)∧∀y (table(y)→on(x,y)))\exists x \, (\text{pizza}(x) \land \forall y \, (\text{table}(y) \to \text{on}(x, y))), where ff picks a single pizza that lies on all tables, contrasting with the narrow-scope reading under a universal. These semantic operations also offer advantages in analyzing split scope phenomena, where a single quantifier appears to distribute its components across multiple scopes. Szabolcsi (2006) demonstrates how decompositional approaches treat "no" as a composite of negation (¬) and existential quantification (∃), enabling split readings like ¬∃x∀y\neg \exists x \forall y in sentences such as "No student read every book," where the existential escapes the universal while the negation binds broadly, without invoking syntactic relocation. This method captures the intermediate scope possibilities of indefinites and negatives in a purely semantic framework, highlighting the theory's flexibility for complex interactions.

Underspecification and Dynamic Frameworks

Underspecification approaches in formal semantics address quantifier scope ambiguities by constructing representations that defer resolution until after the initial semantic synthesis, often through . A seminal method is Cooper storage, introduced by Robin Cooper, where quantified noun phrases are represented as pairs consisting of a restrictor and a stored quantifier, allowing multiple scope permutations to be generated by unpacking the storage mechanism post-compositionally. This avoids committing to a single scope during parsing, enabling efficient handling of ambiguities without exhaustive enumeration. Similarly, Hole semantics employs a graph-based formalism with "holes" (underspecified positions) and "plugs" (quantifiers that fill them), where scope relations are specified via dominance constraints that are solved afterward to yield complete interpretations. Dynamic semantics frameworks, such as Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), treat scope resolution as an incremental process of updating a discourse context rather than a static assignment. Developed by Hans Kamp, DRT models sentences as instructions that modify a Discourse Representation Structure (DRS), a box containing discourse referents and conditions, with quantifiers introducing new referents dynamically to interact with prior context. This approach particularly excels in handling anaphora interactions with scope, as pronouns can bind to referents introduced by quantifiers across sentences, resolved through context updates that embed subordinate DRSs within superordinate ones. For instance, in processing "Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it," the universal quantifier updates the DRS by creating a new structure where the restrictor ("farmer who owns a donkey") forms the nuclear scope, and the nuclear condition ("beats it") embeds the ongoing discourse in the consequent scope, allowing the anaphor "it" to refer back dynamically. The formal update for a quantifier like "every" in DRT can be expressed as follows: Given a current DRS KK, the sentence every x:P(x).Q(x)\text{every } x : P(x). Q(x) constructs a superordinate DRS y0∣γ0N(y0,γ0)C(y0,γ0)\begin{smallmatrix} y_0 & | & \gamma_0 \\ \hline & N(y_0, \gamma_0) & C(y_0, \gamma_0) \end{smallmatrix}, where y0y_0 is a new discourse referent for the bound variable, γ0\gamma_0 embeds KK, NN includes P(y0)P(y_0) and merges relevant prior conditions, and CC includes Q(y0)Q(y_0); the overall update succeeds if there exists an of NN into CC that resolves the quantifier's scope relative to the context. This mechanism ensures monotonic context growth while accommodating scope flexibly through . Recent developments in the extend these frameworks to capture in scope, where interpretations allow partial or probabilistic scoping rather than binary ambiguities, as seen in studies on quantifiers over questions that exhibit gradient acceptability based on contextual . Additionally, as of 2024, research on large models (LLMs) demonstrates their use of probabilistic models to resolve scope ambiguities, often preferring surface readings but approximating human-like gradience through token-level uncertainty in autoregressive generation.

References

  1. https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TlmYzE3M/.szabolcsi_scope_and_binding.pdf
  2. https://www.phil.uu.nl/~yoad/papers/RuysWinterScope.pdf
  3. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montague-semantics/
  4. http://people.umass.edu/partee/MGU_2005/MGU052.pdf
  5. http://www.its.caltech.edu/~matilde/HeimKratzerSemanticsGenerativeGrammar.pdf
  6. https://www.ling.uni-stuttgart.de/institut/ilg/team/Dateien/KissPafel-2017-Quantifier-scope-ambiguities.pdf
  7. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01067449.pdf
  8. https://direct.mit.edu/tacl/article/doi/10.1162/tacl_a_00670/121540/Scope-Ambiguities-in-Large-Language-Models
  9. https://web.stanford.edu/~cgpotts/papers/potts00-hankamer-webfest.pdf
  10. https://ling.sprachwiss.uni-konstanz.de/pages/home/penka/Pubs/Penka_LingCompass2012.pdf
  11. https://semantics.uchicago.edu/kennedy/classes/s08/semantics2/reinhart97.pdf
  12. https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DFjNjM5M/Scope.or.Pseudoscope.pdf
  13. https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TlmYjc1M/AbelsMart%25202010.pdf
  14. https://cb125.github.io/Papers/barker-rethinking-scope-islands.pdf
  15. https://janetdeanfodor.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/fodor-and-sag-1982-referential-and-quantificational-indefinites.pdf
  16. https://www.ling.uni-potsdam.de/~zimmermann/teaching/Syntax-Semantic_Interface/Handouts/May-QuantifierRaising.pdf
  17. https://archive.org/details/lecturesongovern0000chom
  18. https://people.umass.edu/partee/docs/partee86_type_shifting.pdf
  19. https://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/ThiYWY5Y/partee-rooth83.pdf
  20. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-015-6932-3
  21. https://www.ps.uni-saarland.de/Publications/documents/holes-dom.pdf
  22. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/discourse-representation-theory/
  23. https://ojs.ub.uni-konstanz.de/sub/index.php/sub/article/view/1025
  24. https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.04332
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