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Tideman alternative method
The Tideman Alternative method, also called[by whom?] Alternative-Smith voting, is a voting rule developed by Nicolaus Tideman which selects a single winner using ranked ballots. This method is Smith-efficient, making it a Condorcet method, and uses the alternative vote (RCV) to resolve any cyclic ties.
The procedure for Tideman's rule is as follows:
The procedure can also be applied using tournament sets other than the Smith set, e.g. the Landau set, Copeland set, or bipartisan set.
Tideman's Alternative strongly resists both strategic nomination and strategic voting by political parties or coalitions (although like every system, it can still be manipulated in some situations). The Smith and runoff components of the system each cover the other's weaknesses:
The combination of these two methods creates a highly strategy-resistant system.
Tideman's Alternative fails independence of irrelevant alternatives, meaning it can sometimes be affected by spoiler candidates. However, the method adheres to a weaker property that eliminates most spoilers, sometimes called independence of Smith-dominated alternatives (ISDA). This method states that if one candidate (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will still win the election as long as Y is not in the highest-ranked cycle.
The following table compares Tideman's Alternative with other single-winner election methods:
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Tideman alternative method
The Tideman Alternative method, also called[by whom?] Alternative-Smith voting, is a voting rule developed by Nicolaus Tideman which selects a single winner using ranked ballots. This method is Smith-efficient, making it a Condorcet method, and uses the alternative vote (RCV) to resolve any cyclic ties.
The procedure for Tideman's rule is as follows:
The procedure can also be applied using tournament sets other than the Smith set, e.g. the Landau set, Copeland set, or bipartisan set.
Tideman's Alternative strongly resists both strategic nomination and strategic voting by political parties or coalitions (although like every system, it can still be manipulated in some situations). The Smith and runoff components of the system each cover the other's weaknesses:
The combination of these two methods creates a highly strategy-resistant system.
Tideman's Alternative fails independence of irrelevant alternatives, meaning it can sometimes be affected by spoiler candidates. However, the method adheres to a weaker property that eliminates most spoilers, sometimes called independence of Smith-dominated alternatives (ISDA). This method states that if one candidate (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will still win the election as long as Y is not in the highest-ranked cycle.
The following table compares Tideman's Alternative with other single-winner election methods: