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Words of estimative probability AI simulator
(@Words of estimative probability_simulator)
Hub AI
Words of estimative probability AI simulator
(@Words of estimative probability_simulator)
Words of estimative probability
Words of estimative probability (WEP or WEPs) are terms used by intelligence analysts in the production of analytic reports to convey the likelihood of a future event occurring. A well-chosen WEP gives a decision maker a clear and unambiguous estimate upon which to base a decision. Ineffective WEPs are vague or misleading about the likelihood of an event. An ineffective WEP places the decision maker in the role of the analyst, increasing the likelihood of poor or snap decision making. Some intelligence and policy failures appear to be related to the imprecise use of estimative words.
In 1964 Sherman Kent, one of the first contributors to a formal discipline of intelligence analysis addressed the problem of misleading expressions of odds in National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). In Words of Estimative Probability, Kent distinguished between "poets" (those preferring wordy probabilistic statements) from "mathematicians" (those preferring quantitative odds). To bridge the gap between them and decision makers, Kent developed a paradigm relating estimative terms to odds. His goal was to "... set forth the community's findings in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment, and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key judgment." Kent's initiative was not adopted although the idea was well received and remains compelling today.[citation needed]
An example of the damage that missing or vague WEPs can do is to be found in the President's Daily Brief (PDB), entitled Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US. The President's Daily Brief is arguably the pinnacle of concise, relevant, actionable analytic writing in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). The PDB is intended to keep the president informed on a wide range of issues, the best analysts write it and senior leaders review it. This, the "August 6 PDB", is at the center of much controversy for the USIC. The August 6 PDB began with not only a vague warning in the title, but also continued with vague warnings:
The PDB described Bin Laden's previous activities. It did not present the president with a critically important clear estimate of Bin Laden's likely activities in the coming months:
Bush had specifically asked for an intelligence analysis of possible al Qaeda attacks within the United States, because most of the information presented to him over the summer about al Qaeda focused on threats against U.S. targets overseas, sources said. But one source said the White House was disappointed because the analysis lacked focus and did not present fresh intelligence.
The lack of appropriate WEPs would lead to confusion about the likelihood of an attack and to guessing about the period in which it was likely to occur.
The language used in the memo lacks words of estimative probability that reduce uncertainty, thus preventing the President and his decisionmakers from implementing measures directed at stopping al Qaeda’s actions
The consequences of the 9/11 and the Iraq/WMD intelligence failures, the 9/11 Commission and the Iraq Intelligence Commission, were the movers of structural reform of the intelligence community. Although these reforms intended to improve the functioning of the IC, particularly concerning inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, "they paid scant attention to improving the quality of analyses and intelligence writing". There is a pervasive feeling that this improvement is needed.[opinion] However, there seems to be resistance in the IC, due in part to habit and in part to the reality of politics and the understandable preference for the "plausible deniability" that less precise jargon offers.
Words of estimative probability
Words of estimative probability (WEP or WEPs) are terms used by intelligence analysts in the production of analytic reports to convey the likelihood of a future event occurring. A well-chosen WEP gives a decision maker a clear and unambiguous estimate upon which to base a decision. Ineffective WEPs are vague or misleading about the likelihood of an event. An ineffective WEP places the decision maker in the role of the analyst, increasing the likelihood of poor or snap decision making. Some intelligence and policy failures appear to be related to the imprecise use of estimative words.
In 1964 Sherman Kent, one of the first contributors to a formal discipline of intelligence analysis addressed the problem of misleading expressions of odds in National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). In Words of Estimative Probability, Kent distinguished between "poets" (those preferring wordy probabilistic statements) from "mathematicians" (those preferring quantitative odds). To bridge the gap between them and decision makers, Kent developed a paradigm relating estimative terms to odds. His goal was to "... set forth the community's findings in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment, and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key judgment." Kent's initiative was not adopted although the idea was well received and remains compelling today.[citation needed]
An example of the damage that missing or vague WEPs can do is to be found in the President's Daily Brief (PDB), entitled Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US. The President's Daily Brief is arguably the pinnacle of concise, relevant, actionable analytic writing in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). The PDB is intended to keep the president informed on a wide range of issues, the best analysts write it and senior leaders review it. This, the "August 6 PDB", is at the center of much controversy for the USIC. The August 6 PDB began with not only a vague warning in the title, but also continued with vague warnings:
The PDB described Bin Laden's previous activities. It did not present the president with a critically important clear estimate of Bin Laden's likely activities in the coming months:
Bush had specifically asked for an intelligence analysis of possible al Qaeda attacks within the United States, because most of the information presented to him over the summer about al Qaeda focused on threats against U.S. targets overseas, sources said. But one source said the White House was disappointed because the analysis lacked focus and did not present fresh intelligence.
The lack of appropriate WEPs would lead to confusion about the likelihood of an attack and to guessing about the period in which it was likely to occur.
The language used in the memo lacks words of estimative probability that reduce uncertainty, thus preventing the President and his decisionmakers from implementing measures directed at stopping al Qaeda’s actions
The consequences of the 9/11 and the Iraq/WMD intelligence failures, the 9/11 Commission and the Iraq Intelligence Commission, were the movers of structural reform of the intelligence community. Although these reforms intended to improve the functioning of the IC, particularly concerning inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, "they paid scant attention to improving the quality of analyses and intelligence writing". There is a pervasive feeling that this improvement is needed.[opinion] However, there seems to be resistance in the IC, due in part to habit and in part to the reality of politics and the understandable preference for the "plausible deniability" that less precise jargon offers.