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Zaza nationalism
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Zaza nationalism
Zaza nationalism is an ideology that supports the preservation of Zaza people between Turks and Kurds in Turkey. The movement also supports the idea that Zaza people are a different ethnic group from Kurds.
Western, Ottoman, Persian, and Arab sources from the 18th to early 20th century routinely described Zazas as Kurds, typically without qualification. Vladimir Minorsky, writing on the ethnographic composition of Iranian and Ottoman borderlands, included that “The Kurds of Dersim speak a peculiar dialect, Dimili, which appears to be distinct from Kurmanji, but they are not considered a separate people.” Similarly, Mark Sykes, who traveled through eastern Anatolia in the early 1900s, observed that “the Zaza-speaking Kurds of Dersim and Palu are of Iranian race and take part in the political and tribal life of Kurdish confederations.” Amir Hassanpour noted that “Zaza speakers traditionally saw themselves as part of the Kurdish nation or 'millet', even if they spoke a distinct language.” Before the 20th century, the Zazas did not identify as Zaza but as Dimilî, Kirmanckî, and Kirdkî. While the term Zaza did have older roots, it was regarded as a foreign term and often pejorative. After 1923, usage of the term Zaza increased with encouragement of the Turkish government.
Zazas played a major role in Kurdish nationalist uprisings after 1923. Sheikh Said, the leader of the Sheikh Said revolt in 1925, was a Zaza who identified as a Kurd and united both Kurmanji and Zazaki speakers under a common Kurdish Islamic cause. Seyid Riza, the leader of the Dersim rebellion in 1937, was also a Zaza who led a Kurdish nationalist revolt partially motivated by religion. Robert Olson stated that “In the Koçgiri revolt, the leaders and participants were Dimili speakers, yet their declared objective was Kurdish autonomy. There was no distinction made between Kurds and Zazas by the insurgents themselves.” Many scholars noted that the role of Zazas in the pioneering of Kurdish nationalism in the 20th century was even more intense than that of Kurmanji-speaking Kurds.
According to Martin van Bruinessen, Turkish authorities began encouraging the idea that Zazas were not Kurds but an entirely different ethnic group, often labeling them as the “third nation”. Robert Olson noted that this distinction was not official or academic but nevertheless accepted by Turkish administrative divisions and governance structures. While Zazaki and Kurmanji were both banned from public use under the 1924 Constitution, the Turkish government made attempts to emphasize differences between them. Schoolbooks and internal military reports explicitly listed Zazas separate from Kurds. The 1930s official reports on Eastern Anatolia presented the Zazas as ethnically and historically distinct from Kurds, portraying them as more likely to assimilate into the Turkish national identity.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Zaza nationalist publications were tolerated by the Turkish government, while Kurdish nationalist publications were banned. Some Zaza intellectuals, encouraged by state support, began advocating for a distinct Zaza identity. Klein noted that the Turkish government had sponsored Zaza cultural institutions and intellectuals who rejected Kurdish identity as a way to counter the rapidly increasing amount of Zazas joining Kurdish parties, especially the PKK, in the 1980s and 1990s. Veli Yadirgi noted that “Zaza nationalism emerged in part through state-sponsored programs that encouraged the portrayal of Zazas as a distinct ethnic group, separate from Kurds.”
In 1992, Martin van Bruinessen wrote that "until recently, the distinction between Zaza and Kurd was not considered of ethnic significance. Most Zazas referred to themselves as Kurds, and were seen as such by others” Abbas Vali also added that "The ethnic distinction between Zazas and Kurds was not recognized as significant until after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Previously, the cultural and linguistic diversity of the Kurds included Zaza-speakers without contest.”
Zaza nationalism was very small. Nicole Watts added that while a small number of Zaza intellectuals and some of their followers adopted the nationalist idea that Zazas are a distinct people, the vast majority of Zazas continued to identify as Kurds, participate in Kurdish political movements, and dismissed Zaza nationalism as a Turkish state narrative of ethnic division. Martin van Bruinessen similarly added that “Efforts to develop a distinct Zaza nationalism, often with encouragement from the Turkish state, have met with little success. Most Zaza-speaking Kurds continue to see themselves as part of the wider Kurdish nation."
After the Dersim rebellion, the Turkish government launched a campaign to ethnically reconstruct the region. Survivors were resettled, the area was renamed "Tunceli", local identities were targeted for transformation into loyal Turkish citizens, and references to “Kurd” were replaced with “Zaza” in state documentation, although the use of Zazaki was equally repressed alongside Kurmanji.
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Zaza nationalism
Zaza nationalism is an ideology that supports the preservation of Zaza people between Turks and Kurds in Turkey. The movement also supports the idea that Zaza people are a different ethnic group from Kurds.
Western, Ottoman, Persian, and Arab sources from the 18th to early 20th century routinely described Zazas as Kurds, typically without qualification. Vladimir Minorsky, writing on the ethnographic composition of Iranian and Ottoman borderlands, included that “The Kurds of Dersim speak a peculiar dialect, Dimili, which appears to be distinct from Kurmanji, but they are not considered a separate people.” Similarly, Mark Sykes, who traveled through eastern Anatolia in the early 1900s, observed that “the Zaza-speaking Kurds of Dersim and Palu are of Iranian race and take part in the political and tribal life of Kurdish confederations.” Amir Hassanpour noted that “Zaza speakers traditionally saw themselves as part of the Kurdish nation or 'millet', even if they spoke a distinct language.” Before the 20th century, the Zazas did not identify as Zaza but as Dimilî, Kirmanckî, and Kirdkî. While the term Zaza did have older roots, it was regarded as a foreign term and often pejorative. After 1923, usage of the term Zaza increased with encouragement of the Turkish government.
Zazas played a major role in Kurdish nationalist uprisings after 1923. Sheikh Said, the leader of the Sheikh Said revolt in 1925, was a Zaza who identified as a Kurd and united both Kurmanji and Zazaki speakers under a common Kurdish Islamic cause. Seyid Riza, the leader of the Dersim rebellion in 1937, was also a Zaza who led a Kurdish nationalist revolt partially motivated by religion. Robert Olson stated that “In the Koçgiri revolt, the leaders and participants were Dimili speakers, yet their declared objective was Kurdish autonomy. There was no distinction made between Kurds and Zazas by the insurgents themselves.” Many scholars noted that the role of Zazas in the pioneering of Kurdish nationalism in the 20th century was even more intense than that of Kurmanji-speaking Kurds.
According to Martin van Bruinessen, Turkish authorities began encouraging the idea that Zazas were not Kurds but an entirely different ethnic group, often labeling them as the “third nation”. Robert Olson noted that this distinction was not official or academic but nevertheless accepted by Turkish administrative divisions and governance structures. While Zazaki and Kurmanji were both banned from public use under the 1924 Constitution, the Turkish government made attempts to emphasize differences between them. Schoolbooks and internal military reports explicitly listed Zazas separate from Kurds. The 1930s official reports on Eastern Anatolia presented the Zazas as ethnically and historically distinct from Kurds, portraying them as more likely to assimilate into the Turkish national identity.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Zaza nationalist publications were tolerated by the Turkish government, while Kurdish nationalist publications were banned. Some Zaza intellectuals, encouraged by state support, began advocating for a distinct Zaza identity. Klein noted that the Turkish government had sponsored Zaza cultural institutions and intellectuals who rejected Kurdish identity as a way to counter the rapidly increasing amount of Zazas joining Kurdish parties, especially the PKK, in the 1980s and 1990s. Veli Yadirgi noted that “Zaza nationalism emerged in part through state-sponsored programs that encouraged the portrayal of Zazas as a distinct ethnic group, separate from Kurds.”
In 1992, Martin van Bruinessen wrote that "until recently, the distinction between Zaza and Kurd was not considered of ethnic significance. Most Zazas referred to themselves as Kurds, and were seen as such by others” Abbas Vali also added that "The ethnic distinction between Zazas and Kurds was not recognized as significant until after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Previously, the cultural and linguistic diversity of the Kurds included Zaza-speakers without contest.”
Zaza nationalism was very small. Nicole Watts added that while a small number of Zaza intellectuals and some of their followers adopted the nationalist idea that Zazas are a distinct people, the vast majority of Zazas continued to identify as Kurds, participate in Kurdish political movements, and dismissed Zaza nationalism as a Turkish state narrative of ethnic division. Martin van Bruinessen similarly added that “Efforts to develop a distinct Zaza nationalism, often with encouragement from the Turkish state, have met with little success. Most Zaza-speaking Kurds continue to see themselves as part of the wider Kurdish nation."
After the Dersim rebellion, the Turkish government launched a campaign to ethnically reconstruct the region. Survivors were resettled, the area was renamed "Tunceli", local identities were targeted for transformation into loyal Turkish citizens, and references to “Kurd” were replaced with “Zaza” in state documentation, although the use of Zazaki was equally repressed alongside Kurmanji.