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1923 Bellbird Mining Disaster
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1923 Bellbird Mining Disaster
The 1923 Bellbird Mining Disaster took place on 1 September 1923 when there was a fire at Hetton-Bellbird coal mine, known locally as the Bellbird Colliery or mine. The coal mine was located near the village of Bellbird, which is itself three miles southwest of Cessnock in the Northern coalfields of New South Wales, Australia. The accident occurred in the No. 1 Workings of the mine and resulted in the deaths of 21 miners and their horses. At the time of the disaster the mine employed 538 people including 369 who worked underground.
The disaster prompted a thorough investigation into the causes of the accident, which resulted in legislative changes that were implemented in an effort to improve worker safety in Australian coal mines. These efforts culminated with the Mines Rescue Act 1925 which established standards for mine rescue operations in New South Wales.
The Bellbird Colliery was owned by the Hetton Coal Company. Two initial tunnels were constructed in 1908 and were referred to as No. 1 Mine. Two additional tunnels were completed in 1918 were worked as No. 2 Mine. Locally, it was known as the Bellbird mine. Coal from Bellbird mine was first sent to market in 1912 and at the time of the disaster, more than 600 people were employed there, more than 400 underground. By 1922 it was producing around 1,700 tons of bituminous coal daily, making Bellbird a medium output mine compared to other mines in NSW.
Despite having a reputation as a relatively safe mine, there had been seven fatalities between 1917 and 1923. The mine was worked with naked lights, except for when inspections were carried out with safety lamps.
Prior to the disaster, the mine was not worked during May, June or July due to strike action known as the "Major Crane Strike".
At 1:00 pm on 1 September 1923 twenty men entered the colliery for their shift. Deputies Eke, Sneddon and Wilson from the day shift were in the mine conducting inspections as a part of the shift handover. At 1:30 pm the inspection was finished and they went to No.4 West Flat. The fire occurred shortly after 1:30 pm. The deputies went to No.3 where they found smoke and flames in the air return tunnel. At 2:00 pm an explosion occurred. At 4:00 pm they decided to recover bodies and seal the mine without knowing the source of the fire. Sealing of the mine commenced at 9:30 pm and completed by 1:00 pm the next day. This caused six men to be entombed inside the pit. Four tunnels were sealed with sand, soil and timber followed by upcast shaft. There were seven separate underground explosions. At 1:45 pm on 2 September 1923 an explosion burst through the seal in the tunnel near killing two volunteers. The manager called the colliery office four times without a response and failed to inform worker of the fire or smoke.
A coronial inquest and a Royal Commission were conducted. The inquest was held over 9 days from 4 September to 4 October by coroner George Brown at the Cessnock Court House which included a jury of six people and forty-two witnesses. The first jury verdict was inconclusive, finding that the deceased met their deaths from carbon monoxide poisoning which was caused by either a fire or explosion yet “there was no evidence to show how such fire of explosion was caused”. They found that the evidence did not provide definitely how the disaster originated. They also stressed that the great weight of evidence shows that the mine was a safe one but that such an accident could occur in any mine in the local coalfields justifying the need for a central rescue station. Jury further argued the need for more strict regulations governing safety in the coal mines of NSW.
A second inquest was held by George Brown on 20 May 1925. This new inquest yielded very little new information to add to the findings of the original inquest but emphasised the possibility that the fire was caused by employee negligence. Regardless of the causes of the disaster, the recommendations to avoid a repeat of its aftermath were the same. Further safety standards were needed and trained professionals in centrally located rescue stations. Both were recognised as vital for future coal mining safety. A report into the incident found unsafe work practices including smoking in the mines, unreliable emergency phone lines and lack of hazard reduction and reporting. The inquest revealed that some workers did not have safety lamps.
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1923 Bellbird Mining Disaster
The 1923 Bellbird Mining Disaster took place on 1 September 1923 when there was a fire at Hetton-Bellbird coal mine, known locally as the Bellbird Colliery or mine. The coal mine was located near the village of Bellbird, which is itself three miles southwest of Cessnock in the Northern coalfields of New South Wales, Australia. The accident occurred in the No. 1 Workings of the mine and resulted in the deaths of 21 miners and their horses. At the time of the disaster the mine employed 538 people including 369 who worked underground.
The disaster prompted a thorough investigation into the causes of the accident, which resulted in legislative changes that were implemented in an effort to improve worker safety in Australian coal mines. These efforts culminated with the Mines Rescue Act 1925 which established standards for mine rescue operations in New South Wales.
The Bellbird Colliery was owned by the Hetton Coal Company. Two initial tunnels were constructed in 1908 and were referred to as No. 1 Mine. Two additional tunnels were completed in 1918 were worked as No. 2 Mine. Locally, it was known as the Bellbird mine. Coal from Bellbird mine was first sent to market in 1912 and at the time of the disaster, more than 600 people were employed there, more than 400 underground. By 1922 it was producing around 1,700 tons of bituminous coal daily, making Bellbird a medium output mine compared to other mines in NSW.
Despite having a reputation as a relatively safe mine, there had been seven fatalities between 1917 and 1923. The mine was worked with naked lights, except for when inspections were carried out with safety lamps.
Prior to the disaster, the mine was not worked during May, June or July due to strike action known as the "Major Crane Strike".
At 1:00 pm on 1 September 1923 twenty men entered the colliery for their shift. Deputies Eke, Sneddon and Wilson from the day shift were in the mine conducting inspections as a part of the shift handover. At 1:30 pm the inspection was finished and they went to No.4 West Flat. The fire occurred shortly after 1:30 pm. The deputies went to No.3 where they found smoke and flames in the air return tunnel. At 2:00 pm an explosion occurred. At 4:00 pm they decided to recover bodies and seal the mine without knowing the source of the fire. Sealing of the mine commenced at 9:30 pm and completed by 1:00 pm the next day. This caused six men to be entombed inside the pit. Four tunnels were sealed with sand, soil and timber followed by upcast shaft. There were seven separate underground explosions. At 1:45 pm on 2 September 1923 an explosion burst through the seal in the tunnel near killing two volunteers. The manager called the colliery office four times without a response and failed to inform worker of the fire or smoke.
A coronial inquest and a Royal Commission were conducted. The inquest was held over 9 days from 4 September to 4 October by coroner George Brown at the Cessnock Court House which included a jury of six people and forty-two witnesses. The first jury verdict was inconclusive, finding that the deceased met their deaths from carbon monoxide poisoning which was caused by either a fire or explosion yet “there was no evidence to show how such fire of explosion was caused”. They found that the evidence did not provide definitely how the disaster originated. They also stressed that the great weight of evidence shows that the mine was a safe one but that such an accident could occur in any mine in the local coalfields justifying the need for a central rescue station. Jury further argued the need for more strict regulations governing safety in the coal mines of NSW.
A second inquest was held by George Brown on 20 May 1925. This new inquest yielded very little new information to add to the findings of the original inquest but emphasised the possibility that the fire was caused by employee negligence. Regardless of the causes of the disaster, the recommendations to avoid a repeat of its aftermath were the same. Further safety standards were needed and trained professionals in centrally located rescue stations. Both were recognised as vital for future coal mining safety. A report into the incident found unsafe work practices including smoking in the mines, unreliable emergency phone lines and lack of hazard reduction and reporting. The inquest revealed that some workers did not have safety lamps.