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2017 Hamas charter
On 1 May 2017, Palestinian political and military organization Hamas unveiled A Document of General Principles and Policies (Arabic: وثيقة المبادئ والسياسات العامة لحركة حماس), also known as the 2017 Hamas charter, "new charter", or "current" charter. It accepted the idea of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, i.e. comprising the West Bank and Gaza Strip only, on the condition that also the Palestinian refugees were allowed to return to their homes, if it is clear this is the consensus of the Palestinians ("a formula of national consensus"); but at the same time this document strove for the "complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea", and did not explicitly recognize Israel. The new charter holds that armed resistance against an occupying power is justified under international law.
While the 1988 Hamas Charter had been widely criticized for its antisemitism, the 2017 document removed the antisemitic language and stated that Hamas' fight was not with Jews as such because of their religion but with the "Zionist project." When asked, Hamas leaders explained that "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past." Khaled Mashal stated that the new document reflected "our position for now." However, Hamas fell short of formally repudiating the original 1988 charter. According to an analyst Hamas did not formally revoke the old charter so as to not alienate some of its base members, who it feared might join rival Islamist factions.
Views on the 2017 document varied. While some welcomed it as a sign of pragmatism and increased political maturity, and a potential step on the way to peace, many others dismissed it as a merely cosmetic effort designed to make Hamas sound more palatable while changing nothing about Hamas' underlying aims and methods.
Hamas leader Khaled Mashal presented the document at a press conference in Doha on 1 May 2017, shortly before being replaced as leader by Ismail Haniyeh. The new document was the result of years of internal discussions; many Hamas members still regarded its text as controversial.
In his presentation, Mashal described the Hamas movement as following a middle way between two poles: extremism (tatarruf or tashaddud) and flexibility (muyu'a, literally: "liquidity"). In comparison to the Hamas Charter of 1988, which was marked by religious rhetoric and utopian ideas, the newer document was characterized by simple and mostly pragmatic political language. It contained a preamble and 42 paragraphs in which Hamas outlined its positions on the fundamental aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The document affirmed the movement's adherence to its founding principles, but also left open gray areas to allow Hamas political room for maneuver in the future. The text was called wathiqa (document) in Arabic which is supposed to be less fixed and binding than mithaq – the term used for the 1988 charter.
In a departure from the tone of the original charter, which presented the fight against Israel as a religious struggle, the new document said that there was a nationalist conflict "with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion". However, the old charter was not explicitly revoked. When asked, Hamas leaders explained: "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past." Mashal stated that the new document reflected "our position for now, which means that we are not a rigid ideological organization ... The old charter was a product of its era, 30 years ago. We live in a different world today." Some analysts opined that Hamas did not revoke the old charter so as to not alienate some of its base members, who it feared might join rival Islamist factions. Jean-François Legrain, writing in the Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, said the question of the 1988 charter's repeal having been avoided could only mean that it was not repealed. Only its antisemitic aspects could be considered repealed, Legrain said, as the new document explicitly expressed an entirely different position. Any other provisions in the 1988 charter upon which the new document remained silent could be considered still valid, along with numerous other communiqués and declarations Hamas had published over the preceding three decades.
Hamas also declared its willingness to support any peace agreement accepted in a popular referendum and distanced itself from all foreign Islamic organisations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which, having lost power in Egypt, had come to be classed as a terrorist organization there. The Brotherhood is not even mentioned by name in the new document, although there are still traceable echoes of their ideology.
The document was published in Arabic and English. There are some slight differences between the two language versions, mainly involving differences in nuance and connotation.
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2017 Hamas charter
On 1 May 2017, Palestinian political and military organization Hamas unveiled A Document of General Principles and Policies (Arabic: وثيقة المبادئ والسياسات العامة لحركة حماس), also known as the 2017 Hamas charter, "new charter", or "current" charter. It accepted the idea of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, i.e. comprising the West Bank and Gaza Strip only, on the condition that also the Palestinian refugees were allowed to return to their homes, if it is clear this is the consensus of the Palestinians ("a formula of national consensus"); but at the same time this document strove for the "complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea", and did not explicitly recognize Israel. The new charter holds that armed resistance against an occupying power is justified under international law.
While the 1988 Hamas Charter had been widely criticized for its antisemitism, the 2017 document removed the antisemitic language and stated that Hamas' fight was not with Jews as such because of their religion but with the "Zionist project." When asked, Hamas leaders explained that "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past." Khaled Mashal stated that the new document reflected "our position for now." However, Hamas fell short of formally repudiating the original 1988 charter. According to an analyst Hamas did not formally revoke the old charter so as to not alienate some of its base members, who it feared might join rival Islamist factions.
Views on the 2017 document varied. While some welcomed it as a sign of pragmatism and increased political maturity, and a potential step on the way to peace, many others dismissed it as a merely cosmetic effort designed to make Hamas sound more palatable while changing nothing about Hamas' underlying aims and methods.
Hamas leader Khaled Mashal presented the document at a press conference in Doha on 1 May 2017, shortly before being replaced as leader by Ismail Haniyeh. The new document was the result of years of internal discussions; many Hamas members still regarded its text as controversial.
In his presentation, Mashal described the Hamas movement as following a middle way between two poles: extremism (tatarruf or tashaddud) and flexibility (muyu'a, literally: "liquidity"). In comparison to the Hamas Charter of 1988, which was marked by religious rhetoric and utopian ideas, the newer document was characterized by simple and mostly pragmatic political language. It contained a preamble and 42 paragraphs in which Hamas outlined its positions on the fundamental aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The document affirmed the movement's adherence to its founding principles, but also left open gray areas to allow Hamas political room for maneuver in the future. The text was called wathiqa (document) in Arabic which is supposed to be less fixed and binding than mithaq – the term used for the 1988 charter.
In a departure from the tone of the original charter, which presented the fight against Israel as a religious struggle, the new document said that there was a nationalist conflict "with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion". However, the old charter was not explicitly revoked. When asked, Hamas leaders explained: "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past." Mashal stated that the new document reflected "our position for now, which means that we are not a rigid ideological organization ... The old charter was a product of its era, 30 years ago. We live in a different world today." Some analysts opined that Hamas did not revoke the old charter so as to not alienate some of its base members, who it feared might join rival Islamist factions. Jean-François Legrain, writing in the Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, said the question of the 1988 charter's repeal having been avoided could only mean that it was not repealed. Only its antisemitic aspects could be considered repealed, Legrain said, as the new document explicitly expressed an entirely different position. Any other provisions in the 1988 charter upon which the new document remained silent could be considered still valid, along with numerous other communiqués and declarations Hamas had published over the preceding three decades.
Hamas also declared its willingness to support any peace agreement accepted in a popular referendum and distanced itself from all foreign Islamic organisations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which, having lost power in Egypt, had come to be classed as a terrorist organization there. The Brotherhood is not even mentioned by name in the new document, although there are still traceable echoes of their ideology.
The document was published in Arabic and English. There are some slight differences between the two language versions, mainly involving differences in nuance and connotation.