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International law
International law
from Wikipedia
Bound volumes of the American Journal of International Law at the University of Münster in Germany

International law, also known as public international law and the law of nations, is the set of rules, norms, legal customs and standards that states and other actors feel an obligation to, and generally do, obey in their mutual relations. In international relations, actors are simply the individuals and collective entities, such as states, international organizations, and non-state groups, which can make behavioral choices, whether lawful or unlawful. Rules are formal, typically written expectations that outline required behavior, while norms are informal, often unwritten guidelines about appropriate behavior that are shaped by custom and social practice.[1] It establishes norms for states across a broad range of domains, including war and diplomacy, economic relations, and human rights.

International law differs from state-based domestic legal systems in that it operates largely through consent, since there is no universally accepted authority to enforce it upon sovereign states. States and non-state actors may choose to not abide by international law, and even to breach a treaty, but such violations, particularly of peremptory norms, can be met with disapproval by others and in some cases coercive action including diplomacy, economic sanctions, and war. The lack of a final authority in international law can also cause far reaching differences. This is partly the effect of states being able to interpret international law in a manner which they see fit. This can lead to problematic stances which can have large local effects.[2]

The sources of international law include international custom (general state practice accepted as law), treaties, and general principles of law recognised by most national legal systems. Although international law may also be reflected in international comity—the practices adopted by states to maintain good relations and mutual recognition—such traditions are not legally binding. Since good relations are more important to maintain with more powerful states they can influence others more in the matter of what is legal and what is not. This is because they can impose heavier consequences on other states which gives them a final say.[3] The relationship and interaction between a national legal system and international law is complex and variable. National law may become international law when treaties permit national jurisdiction to supranational tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights or the International Criminal Court. Treaties such as the Geneva Conventions require national law to conform to treaty provisions. National laws or constitutions may also provide for the implementation or integration of international legal obligations into domestic law.

Terminology

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The modern term "international law" was originally coined by Jeremy Bentham in his 1789 book Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation to replace the older law of nations, a direct translation of the late medieval concepts of ius gentium, used by Hugo Grotius, and droits des gens, used by Emer de Vattel.[4][5] The definition of international law has been debated; Bentham referred specifically to relationships between states which has been criticised for its narrow scope.[6] Lassa Oppenheim defined it in his treatise as "a law between sovereign and equal states based on the common consent of these states" and this definition has been largely adopted by international legal scholars.[7]

There is a distinction between public and private international law; the latter is concerned with whether national courts can claim jurisdiction over cases with a foreign element and the application of foreign judgments in domestic law, whereas public international law covers rules with an international origin.[8] The difference between the two areas of law has been debated as scholars disagree about the nature of their relationship. Joseph Story, who originated the term "private international law", emphasised that it must be governed by the principles of public international law but other academics view them as separate bodies of law.[9][10] Another term, transnational law, is sometimes used to refer to a body of both national and international rules that transcend the nation state, although some academics emphasise that it is distinct from either type of law. It was defined by Philip Jessup as "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers".[11]

A more recent concept is supranational law, which was described in a 1969 paper as "[a] relatively new word in the vocabulary of politics".[12] Systems of supranational law arise when nations explicitly cede their right to make decisions to this system's judiciary and legislature, which then have the right to make laws that are directly effective in each member state.[12][13] This has been described as "a level of international integration beyond mere intergovernmentalism yet still short of a federal system".[12] The most common example of a supranational system is the European Union.[13]

History

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The Hittite version of the Treaty of Kadesh, among the earliest extant examples of an international agreement[14]

Antiquity

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With origins tracing back to antiquity,[15] states have a long history of negotiating interstate agreements. An initial framework was conceptualised by the Ancient Romans and this idea of ius gentium has been used by various academics to establish the modern concept of international law. Among the earliest recorded examples are peace treaties between the Mesopotamian city-states of Lagash and Umma (approximately 3100 BCE), and an agreement between the Egyptian pharaoh, Ramesses II, and the Hittite king, Ḫattušili III, concluded in 1279 BCE.[14] Interstate pacts and agreements were negotiated and agreed upon by polities across the world, from the eastern Mediterranean to East Asia.[16] In Ancient Greece, many early peace treaties were negotiated between its city-states and, occasionally, with neighbouring states.[17] The Roman Empire established an early conceptual framework for international law, jus gentium, which governed the status of foreigners living in Rome and relations between foreigners and Roman citizens.[18][19] Adopting the Greek concept of natural law, the Romans conceived of jus gentium as being universal.[20] However, in contrast to modern international law, the Roman law of nations applied to relations with and between foreign individuals rather than among political units such as states.[21]

Beginning with the Spring and Autumn period of the eighth century BCE, China was divided into numerous states that were often at war with each other. Rules for diplomacy and treaty-making emerged, including notions regarding just grounds for war, the rights of neutral parties, and the consolidation and partition of states; these concepts were sometimes applied to relations with barbarians along China's western periphery beyond the Central Plains.[22][23] The subsequent Warring States period saw the development of two major schools of thought, Confucianism and Legalism, both of which held that the domestic and international legal spheres were closely interlinked, and sought to establish competing normative principles to guide foreign relations.[23][24] Similarly, the Indian subcontinent was divided into various states, which over time developed rules of neutrality, treaty law, and international conduct, and established both temporary and permanent embassies.[25][26]

Middle Ages

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Following the collapse of the western Roman Empire in the fifth century CE, Europe fragmented into numerous often-warring states for much of the next five centuries. Political power was dispersed across a range of entities, including the Church, mercantile city-states, and kingdoms, most of which had overlapping and ever-changing jurisdictions. As in China and India, these divisions prompted the development of rules aimed at providing stable and predictable relations. Early examples include canon law, which governed ecclesiastical institutions and clergy throughout Europe; the lex mercatoria ("merchant law"), which concerned trade and commerce; and various codes of maritime law, such as the Rolls of Oléron— aimed at regulating shipping in North-western Europe — and the later Laws of Wisby, enacted among the commercial Hanseatic League of northern Europe and the Baltic region.[27]

In the Islamic world, Muhammad al-Shaybani published Al-Siyar Al-Kabīr in the eighth century, which served as a fundamental reference work for siyar, a subset of Sharia law, which governed foreign relations.[28][29] This was based on the division of the world into three categories: the dar al-Islam, where Islamic law prevailed; the dar al-sulh, non-Islamic realms that concluded an armistice with a Muslim government; and the dar al-harb, non-Islamic lands which were contested through jihad.[30][31] Islamic legal principles concerning military conduct served as precursors to modern international humanitarian law and institutionalised limitations on military conduct, including guidelines for commencing war, distinguishing between civilians and combatants and caring for the sick and wounded.[32][33]

During the European Middle Ages, international law was concerned primarily with the purpose and legitimacy of war, seeking to determine what constituted "just war".[34] The Greco-Roman concept of natural law was combined with religious principles by Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1135–1204) and Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) to create the new discipline of the "law of nations", which unlike its eponymous Roman predecessor, applied natural law to relations between states.[35][36] In Islam, a similar framework was developed wherein the law of nations was derived, in part, from the principles and rules set forth in treaties with non-Muslims.[37]

Renaissance and emergence of modern international law

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The 15th century witnessed a confluence of factors that contributed to an accelerated development of international law. Italian jurist Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313–1357) was considered the founder of private international law. Another Italian jurist, Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400), provided commentaries and compilations of Roman, ecclesiastical, and feudal law, creating an organised source of law that could be referenced by different nations.[citation needed] Francisco de Vitoria (1486–1546), who was concerned with the treatment of indigenous peoples by Spain, invoked the law of nations as a basis for their innate dignity and rights, articulating an early version of sovereign equality between peoples.[38] For his extensive and seminal work on the topic, he has been called the originator of modern international law.[39] Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), from the School of Salamanca founded by Vitoria, emphasised that international law was founded upon natural law and human positive law.[40] Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) took a secular view to international law, authoring various books on issues in international law, notably Law of War, which provided comprehensive commentary on the laws of war and treaties.[41][42]

A portrait of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius

Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is widely regarded as the father of international law,[43] being one of the first scholars to articulate an international order that consists of a "society of states" governed not by force or warfare but by actual laws, mutual agreements, and customs.[44] Grotius secularised international law;[45] his 1625 work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, laid down a system of principles of natural law that bind all nations regardless of local custom or law.[43] He inspired two nascent schools of international law, the naturalists and the positivists.[46] In the former camp was German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), who stressed the supremacy of the law of nature over states.[47][48] His 1672 work, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, expanded on the theories of Grotius and grounded natural law to reason and the secular world, asserting that it regulated only external acts of states.[47] Pufendorf challenged the Hobbesian notion that the state of nature was one of war and conflict, arguing that the natural state of the world is actually peaceful but weak and uncertain without adherence to the law of nations.[49] The actions of a state consist of nothing more than the sum of the individuals within that state, thereby requiring the state to apply a fundamental law of reason, which is the basis of natural law. He was among the earliest scholars to expand international law beyond European Christian nations, advocating for its application and recognition among all peoples on the basis of shared humanity.[50]

In contrast, positivist writers, such as Richard Zouche (1590–1661) in England and Cornelis van Bynkershoek (1673–1743) in the Netherlands, argued that international law should derive from the actual practice of states rather than Christian or Greco-Roman sources. The study of international law shifted away from its core concern on the law of war and towards the domains such as the law of the sea and commercial treaties.[51] The positivist school grew more popular as it reflected accepted views of state sovereignty and was consistent with the empiricist approach to philosophy that was then gaining acceptance in Europe.[52]

Establishment of Westphalian system

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The developments of the 17th century culminated at the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which is considered the seminal event in international law.[53] The resulting Westphalian sovereignty is said to have established the current international legal order characterised by independent nation states, which have equal sovereignty regardless of their size and power, defined primarily by non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, although historians have challenged this narrative.[54] The idea of nationalism further solidified the concept and formation of nation-states.[55] Elements of the naturalist and positivist schools were synthesised, notably by German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel (1714–1767), both of whom sought a middle-ground approach.[56][57] During the 18th century, the positivist tradition gained broader acceptance, although the concept of natural rights remained influential in international politics, particularly through the republican revolutions of the United States and France.[citation needed]

Until the mid-19th century, relations between states were dictated mostly by treaties, agreements between states to behave in a certain way, unenforceable except by force, and nonbinding except as matters of honour and faithfulness.[citation needed] One of the first instruments of modern armed conflict law was the Lieber Code of 1863, which governed the conduct of warfare during the American Civil War, and is noted for codifying rules and articles of war adhered to by nations across the world, including the United Kingdom, Prussia, Serbia and Argentina.[58] In the years that followed, numerous other treaties and bodies were created to regulate the conduct of states towards one another, including the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899, and the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the first of which was passed in 1864.[59][60]

20th and 21st century developments

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Justices of the International Court of Justice in 1979

Colonial expansion by European powers reached its peak in the late 19th century and its influence began to wane following the unprecedented bloodshed of World War I, which spurred the creation of international organisations. Right of conquest was generally recognized as international law before World War II.[61] The League of Nations was founded to safeguard peace and security.[62][63] International law began to incorporate notions such as self-determination and human rights.[64] The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 to replace the League, with an aim of maintaining collective security.[65] A more robust international legal order followed, buttressed by institutions such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN Security Council (UNSC).[66] The International Law Commission (ILC) was established in 1947 to develop and codify international law.[65]

In the 1940s through the 1970s, the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and decolonisation across the world resulted in the establishment of scores of newly independent states.[67] As these former colonies became their own states, they adopted European views of international law.[68] A flurry of institutions, ranging from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) to the World Health Organization furthered the development of a multilateralist approach as states chose to compromise on sovereignty to benefit from international cooperation.[69] Since the 1980s, there has been an increasing focus on the phenomenon of globalisation and on protecting human rights on the global scale, particularly when minorities or indigenous communities are involved, as concerns are raised that globalisation may be increasing inequality in the international legal system.[70]

Sources of international law

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The sources of international law applied by the community of nations are listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is considered authoritative in this regard. These categories are, in order, international treaties, customary international law, general legal principles and judicial decisions and the teachings of prominent legal scholars as "a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law".[71] It was originally considered that the arrangement of the sources sequentially would suggest an implicit hierarchy of sources; however, the statute does not provide for a hierarchy and other academics have argued that therefore the sources must be equivalent.[72][73]

General principles of law have been defined in the Statute as "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" but there is no academic consensus about what is included within this scope.[74][75] They are considered to be derived from both national and international legal systems, although including the latter category has led to debate about potential cross-over with international customary law.[76][77] The relationship of general principles to treaties or custom has generally been considered to be "fill[ing] the gaps" although there is still no conclusion about their exact relationship in the absence of a hierarchy.[78]

Treaties

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Parties and signatories to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

A treaty is defined in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation".[79] The definition specifies that the parties must be states, however international organisations are also considered to have the capacity to enter treaties.[79][80] Treaties are binding through the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which allows states to create legal obligations on themselves through consent.[81][82] The treaty must be governed by international law; however it will likely be interpreted by national courts.[83] The VCLT, which codifies several bedrock principles of treaty interpretation, holds that a treaty "shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose".[84] This represents a compromise between three theories of interpretation: the textual approach which looks to the ordinary meaning of the text, the subjective approach which considers factors such as the drafters' intention, and the teleological approach which interprets a treaty according to its objective and purpose.[84][85]

A state must express its consent to be bound by a treaty through signature, exchange of instruments, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Accession refers to a state choosing to become party to a treaty that it is unable to sign, such as when establishing a regional body. Where a treaty states that it will be enacted through ratification, acceptance or approval, the parties must sign to indicate acceptance of the wording but there is no requirement on a state to later ratify the treaty, although they may still be subject to certain obligations.[86] When signing or ratifying a treaty, a state can make a unilateral statement to negate or amend certain legal provisions which can have one of three effects: the reserving state is bound by the treaty but the effects of the relevant provisions are precluded or changes, the reserving state is bound by the treaty but not the relevant provisions, or the reserving state is not bound by the treaty.[87][88] An interpretive declaration is a separate process, where a state issues a unilateral statement to specify or clarify a treaty provision. This can affect the interpretation of the treaty but it is generally not legally binding.[89][90] A state is also able to issue a conditional declaration stating that it will consent to a given treaty only on the condition of a particular provision or interpretation.[91]

Article 54 of the VCLT provides that either party may terminate or withdraw from a treaty in accordance with its terms or at any time with the consent of the other party, with 'termination' applying to a bilateral treaty and 'withdrawal' applying to a multilateral treaty.[92] Where a treaty does not have provisions allowing for termination or withdrawal, such as the Genocide Convention, it is prohibited unless the right was implied into the treaty or the parties had intended to allow for it.[93] A treaty can also be held invalid, including where parties act ultra vires or negligently, where execution has been obtained through fraudulent, corrupt or forceful means, or where the treaty contradicts peremptory norms.[94]

International custom

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Customary international law requires two elements: a consistent practice of states and the conviction of those states that the consistent practice is required by a legal obligation, referred to as opinio juris.[95][96] Custom distinguishes itself from treaty law as it is binding on all states, regardless of whether they have participated in the practice, with the exception of states who have been persistent objectors during the process of the custom being formed and special or local forms of customary law.[97] The requirement for state practice relates to the practice, either through action or failure to act, of states in relation to other states or international organisations.[98] There is no legal requirement for state practice to be uniform or for the practice to be long-running, although the ICJ has set a high bar for enforcement in the cases of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries and North Sea Continental Shelf.[99] There has been legal debate on this topic with the only prominent view on the length of time necessary to establish custom explained by Humphrey Waldock as varying "according to the nature of the case".[100] The practice is not required to be followed universally by states, but there must be a "general recognition" by states "whose interests are specially affected".[101]

The second element of the test, opinio juris, the belief of a party that a particular action is required by the law is referred to as the subjective element.[102] The ICJ has stated in dictum in North Sea Continental Shelf that, "Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it".[103] A committee of the International Law Association has argued that there is a general presumption of an opinio juris where state practice is proven but it may be necessary if the practice suggests that the states did not believe it was creating a precedent.[103] The test in these circumstances is whether opinio juris can be proven by the states' failure to protest.[104] Other academics believe that intention to create customary law can be shown by states including the principle in multiple bilateral and multilateral treaties, so that treaty law is necessary to form customs.[105]

The adoption of the VCLT in 1969 established the concept of jus cogens, or peremptory norms, which are "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character".[106] Where customary or treaty law conflicts with a peremptory norm, it will be considered invalid, but there is no agreed definition of jus cogens.[107] Academics have debated what principles are considered peremptory norms but the mostly widely agreed is the principle of non-use of force.[108] The next year, the ICJ defined erga omnes obligations as those owed to "the international community as a whole", which included the illegality of genocide and human rights.[106]

Relationship to national laws

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There are generally two approaches to the relationship between international and national law, namely monism and dualism.[109] Monism assumes that international and national law are part of the same legal order.[110] Therefore, a treaty can directly become part of national law without the need for enacting legislation, although they will generally need to be approved by the legislature. Once approved, the content of the treaty is considered as a law that has a higher status than national laws. Examples of countries with a monism approach are France and the Netherlands.[111] The dualism approach considers that national and international law are two separate legal orders, so treaties are not granted a special status.[109][112] The rules in a treaty can only be considered national law if the contents of the treaty have been enacted first.[112] An example is the United Kingdom; after the country ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, the convention was only considered to have the force of law in national law after Parliament passed the Human Rights Act 1998.[113]

In practice, the division of countries between monism and dualism is often more complicated; countries following both approaches may accept peremptory norms as being automatically binding and they may approach treaties, particularly later amendments or clarifications, differently than they would approach customary law.[114] Many countries with older or unwritten constitutions do not have explicit provision for international law in their domestic system and there has been an upswing in support for monism principles in relation to human rights and humanitarian law, as most principles governing these concepts can be found in international law.[115]

International actors

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Among the international actors, only certain ones are considered subjects of international law. Before the 20th century, states were considered the only subjects of international law, with rare exceptions. Since then, international organizations have become accepted as subjects, as affirmed by the International Court of Justice in its opinion Reparations for injuries case [nl]. Non-state actors such as dependent territories, belligerent groups, and even individuals, companies, and non-governmental organizations can be considered entities with international rights and duties under international law, though not full subjects.[116][117][118][119]

States

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A state is defined under Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States as a legal person with a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter relations with other states. There is no requirement on population size, allowing micro-states such as San Marino and Monaco to be admitted to the UN, and no requirement of fully defined boundaries, allowing Israel to be admitted despite border disputes. There was originally an intention that a state must have self-determination, but now the requirement is for a stable political environment. The final requirement of being able to enter relations is commonly evidenced by independence and sovereignty.[120]

  UN member states that at least one other member state does not recognise
  Non-UN member states recognised by at least one UN member state
  Non-UN member states recognised only by other non-UN member states

Under the principle of par in parem non habet imperium, all states are sovereign and equal,[121] but state recognition often plays a significant role in political conceptions. A country may recognise another nation as a state and, separately, it may recognise that nation's government as being legitimate and capable of representing the state on the international stage.[122][123] There are two theories on recognition; the declaratory theory sees recognition as commenting on a current state of law which has been separately satisfied whereas the constitutive theory states that recognition by other states determines whether a state can be considered to have legal personality.[124] States can be recognised explicitly through a released statement or tacitly through conducting official relations, although some countries have formally interacted without conferring recognition.[125]

Throughout the 19th century and the majority of the 20th century, states were protected by absolute immunity, so they could not face criminal prosecution for any actions. However a number of countries began to distinguish between acta jure gestionis, commercial actions, and acta jure imperii, government actions; the restrictive theory of immunity said states were immune where they were acting in a governmental capacity but not a commercial one. The European Convention on State Immunity in 1972 and the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property attempt to restrict immunity in accordance with customary law.[126]

Individuals

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Historically individuals have not been seen as entities in international law, as the focus was on the relationship between states.[127][128] As human rights have become more important on the global stage, being codified by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, individuals have been given the power to defend their rights to judicial bodies.[129] International law is largely silent on the issue of nationality law with the exception of cases of dual nationality or where someone is claiming rights under refugee law but as, argued by the political theorist Hannah Arendt, human rights are often tied to someone's nationality.[130] The European Court of Human Rights allows individuals to petition the court where their rights have been violated and national courts have not intervened and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights have similar powers.[129]

International organisations

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Traditionally, sovereign states and the Holy See were the sole subjects of international law. With the proliferation of international organisations over the last century, they have also been recognised as relevant parties.[131] One definition of international organisations comes from the ILC's 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations which in Article 2(a) states that it is "an organization established by treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality".[132] This definition functions as a starting point but does not recognise that organisations can have no separate personality but nevertheless function as an international organisation.[132] The UN Economic and Social Council has emphasised a split between inter-government organisations (IGOs), which are created by inter-governmental agreements, and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).[133] All international organisations have members; generally this is restricted to states, although it can include other international organisations.[134] Sometimes non-members will be allowed to participate in meetings as observers.[135]

The Yearbook of International Organizations sets out a list of international organisations, which include the UN, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF.[136][137] Generally organisations consist of a plenary organ, where member states can be represented and heard; an executive organ, to decide matters within the competence of the organisation; and an administrative organ, to execute the decisions of the other organs and handle secretarial duties.[138] International organisations will typically provide for their privileges and immunity in relation to its member states in their constitutional documents or in multilateral agreements, such as the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.[139] These organisations also have the power to enter treaties, using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations as a basis although it is not yet in force.[80] They may also have the right to bring legal claims against states depending, as set out in Reparation for Injuries, where they have legal personality and the right to do so in their constitution.[140]

United Nations

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The UNSC has the power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take decisive and binding actions against states committing "a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression" for collective security although prior to 1990, it has only intervened once, in the case of Korea in 1950.[141][142] This power can only be exercised, however, where a majority of member states vote for it, as well as receiving the support of the permanent five members of the UNSC.[143] This can be followed up with economic sanctions, military action, and similar uses of force.[144] The UNSC also has a wide discretion under Article 24, which grants "primary responsibility" for issues of international peace and security.[141] The UNGA, concerned during the Cold War with the requirement that the USSR would have to authorise any UNSC action, adopted the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 3 November 1950, which allowed the organ to pass recommendations to authorize the use of force. This resolution also led to the practice of UN peacekeeping, which has been notably been used in East Timor and Kosovo.[145]

International courts

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The Peace Palace in the Hague, which houses the International Court of Justice

There are more than one hundred international courts in the global community, although states have generally been reluctant to allow their sovereignty to be limited in this way.[146] The first known international court was the Central American Court of Justice, prior to World War I, when the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was established. The PCIJ was replaced by the ICJ, which is the best known international court due to its universal scope in relation to geographical jurisdiction and subject matter.[147] There are additionally a number of regional courts, including the Court of Justice of the European Union, the EFTA Court and the Court of Justice of the Andean Community.[148] Interstate arbitration can also be used to resolve disputes between states, leading in 1899 to the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration which facilitates the process by maintaining a list of arbitrators. This process was used in the Island of Palmas Case and to resolve disputes during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war.[149]

The ICJ operates as one of the six organs of the UN, based out of the Hague with a panel of fifteen permanent judges.[150] It has jurisdiction to hear cases involving states but cannot get involved in disputes involving individuals or international organizations. The states that can bring cases must be party to the Statute of the ICJ, although in practice most states are UN members and would therefore be eligible. The court has jurisdiction over all cases that are referred to it and all matters specifically referred to in the UN Charter or international treaties, although in practice there are no relevant matters in the UN Charter.[151] The ICJ may also be asked by an international organisation to provide an advisory opinion on a legal question, which are generally considered non-binding but authoritative.[152]

Social and economic policy

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Conflict of laws

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Conflict of laws, also known as private international law, was originally concerned with choice of law, determining which nation's laws should govern a particular legal circumstance.[153][154] Historically the comity theory has been used although the definition is unclear, sometimes referring to reciprocity and sometimes being used as a synonym for private international law.[155][156] Story distinguished it from "any absolute paramount obligation, superseding all discretion on the subject".[156] There are three aspects to conflict of laws – determining which domestic court has jurisdiction over a dispute, determining if a domestic court has jurisdiction and determining whether foreign judgments can be enforced. The first question relates to whether the domestic court or a foreign court is best placed to decide the case.[157] When determining the national law that should apply, the lex causae is the law that has been chosen to govern the case, which is generally foreign, and the lexi fori is the national law of the court making the determination. Some examples are lex domicilii, the law of the domicile, and les patriae, the law of the nationality.[158]

The rules which are applied to conflict of laws will vary depending on the national system determining the question. There have been attempts to codify an international standard to unify the rules so differences in national law cannot lead to inconsistencies, such as through the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and the Brussels Regulations.[159][160][161] These treaties codified practice on the enforcement of international judgments, stating that a foreign judgment would be automatically recognised and enforceable where required in the jurisdiction where the party resides, unless the judgement was contrary to public order or conflicted with a local judgment between the same parties. On a global level, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards was introduced in 1958 to internationalise the enforcement of arbitral awards, although it does not have jurisdiction over court judgments.[162]

A state must prove that it has jurisdiction before it can exercise its legal authority.[163] This concept can be divided between prescriptive jurisdiction, which is the authority of a legislature to enact legislation on a particular issue, and adjudicative jurisdiction, which is the authority of a court to hear a particular case.[164] This aspect of private international law should first be resolved by reference to domestic law, which may incorporate international treaties or other supranational legal concepts, although there are consistent international norms.[165] There are five forms of jurisdiction which are consistently recognised in international law; an individual or act can be subject to multiple forms of jurisdiction.[166][167] The first is the territorial principle, which states that a nation has jurisdiction over actions which occur within its territorial boundaries.[168] The second is the nationality principle, also known as the active personality principle, whereby a nation has jurisdiction over actions committed by its nationals regardless of where they occur. The third is the passive personality principle, which gives a country jurisdiction over any actions which harm its nationals.[169] The fourth is the protective principle, where a nation has jurisdiction in relation to threats to its "fundamental national interests". The final form is universal jurisdiction, where a country has jurisdiction over certain acts based on the nature of the crime itself.[169][170]

Human rights

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photograph of Eleanor Roosevelt holding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
US ambassador to the UN, Eleanor Roosevelt, holding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949

Following World War II, the modern system for international human rights was developed to make states responsible for their human rights violations.[171] The UN Economic and Security Council established the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1946, which developed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which established non-binding international human rights standards, for work, standards of living, housing and education, non-discrimination, a fair trial and prohibition of torture. Two further human rights treaties were adopted by the UN in 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These two documents along with the UDHR are considered the International Bill of Human Rights.[172]

Non-domestic human rights enforcement operates at both the international and regional levels. Established in 1993, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights supervises Charter-based and treaty-based procedures.[172] The former are based on the UN Charter and operate under the UN Human Rights Council, where each global region is represented by elected member states. The Council is responsible for Universal Periodic Review, which requires each UN member state to review its human rights compliance every four years, and for special procedures, including the appointment of special rapporteurs, independent experts and working groups.[173] The treaty-based procedure allows individuals to rely on the nine primary human rights treaties:

The regional human rights enforcement systems operate in Europe, Africa and the Americas through the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.[175] International human rights has faced criticism for its Western focus, as many countries were subject to colonial rule at the time that the UDHR was drafted, although many countries in the Global South have led the development of human rights on the global stage in the intervening decades.[176][177]

Labour law

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International labour law is generally defined as "the substantive rules of law established at the international level and the procedural rules relating to their adoption and implementation". It operates primarily through the International Labor Organization (ILO), a UN agency with the mission of protecting employment rights which was established in 1919.[178][179] The ILO has a constitution setting out a number of aims, including regulating work hours and labour supply, protecting workers and children and recognising equal pay and the right to free association, as well as the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, which re-defined the purpose of the ILO.[179][180] The 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work further binds ILO member states to recognise fundamental labour rights including free association, collective bargaining and eliminating forced labour, child labour and employment discrimination.[180]

The ILO have also created labour standards which are set out in their conventions and recommendations. Member states then have the choice as to whether or not to ratify and implement these standards.[180] The secretariat of the ILO is the International Labour Office, which can be consulted by states to determine the meaning of a convention, which forms the ILO's case law. Although the Right to Organise Convention does not provide an explicit right to strike, this has been interpreted into the treaty through case law.[181][182] The UN does not specifically focus on international labour law, although some of its treaties cover the same topics. Many of the primary human rights conventions also form part of international labour law, providing protection in employment and against discrimination on the grounds of gender and race.[183]

Environmental law

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It has been claimed that there is no concept of discrete international environmental law, with the general principles of international law instead being applied to these issues.[184] Since the 1960s, a number of treaties focused on environmental protection were ratified, including the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment of 1972, the World Charter for Nature of 1982, and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985. States generally agreed to co-operate with each other in relation to environmental law, as codified by principle 24 of the Rio Declaration of 1972.[185] Despite these, and other, multilateral environmental agreements covering specific issues, there is no overarching policy on international environmental protection or one specific international organisation, with the exception of the UN Environmental Programme. Instead, a general treaty setting out the framework for tackling an issue has then been supplemented by more specific protocols.[186]

Scenarios of global greenhouse gas emissions as of April 2022

Climate change has been one of the most important and heavily debated topics in recent environmental law. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, intended to set out a framework for the mitigation of greenhouse gases and responses to resulting environmental changes, was introduced in 1992 and came into force two years later. As of 2023, 198 states were a party.[187][188] Separate protocols have been introduced through conferences of the parties, including the Kyoto Protocol which was introduced in 1997 to set specific targets for greenhouse gas reduction and the 2015 Paris Agreement which set the goal of keeping global warming at least below 2 °C (3.6 °F) above pre-industrial levels.[189]

Individuals and organisations have some rights under international environmental law as the Aarhus Convention in 1998 set obligations on states to provide information and allow public input on these issues.[190] However few disputes under the regimes set out in environmental agreements are referred to the ICJ, as the agreements tend to specify their compliance procedures. These procedures generally focus on encouraging the state to once again become compliant through recommendations but there is still uncertainty on how these procedures should operate and efforts have been made to regulate these processes although some worry that this will undercut the efficiency of the procedures themselves.[191]

Territory and the sea

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Legal territory can be divided into four categories. There is territorial sovereignty which covers land and territorial sea, including the airspace above it and the subsoil below it, territory outside the sovereignty of any state, res nullius which is not yet within territorial sovereignty but is territory that is legally capable of being acquired by a state and res communis which is territory that cannot be acquired by a state.[192] There have historically been five methods of acquiring territorial sovereignty, reflecting Roman property law: occupation, accretion, cession, conquest and prescription.[193]

The law of the sea is the area of international law concerning the principles and rules by which states and other entities interact in maritime matters. It encompasses areas and issues such as navigational rights, sea mineral rights, and coastal waters jurisdiction.[194] The law of the sea was primarily composed of customary law until the 20th century, beginning with the League of Nations Codification Conference in 1930, the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and the adoption of the UNCLOS in 1982.[195] The UNCLOS was particularly notable for making international courts and tribunals responsible for the law of the sea.[196]

Maritime Zones under International Law

The boundaries of a nation's territorial sea were initially proposed to be three miles in the late 18th century.[197] The UNCLOS instead defined it as being at most 12 nautical miles from the baseline (usually the coastal low-water mark) of a state; both military and civilian foreign ships are allowed innocent passage through these waters despite the sea being within the state's sovereignty.[198][199] A state can have jurisdiction beyond its territorial waters where it claims a contiguous zone of up to 24 nautical miles from its baseline for the purpose of preventing the infringement of its "customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations".[200] States are also able to claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) following passage of the UNCLOS, which can stretch up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline and gives the sovereign state rights over natural resources. Some states have instead chosen to retain their exclusive fishery zones, which cover the same territory.[201] There are specific rules in relation to the continental shelf, as this can extend further than 200 nautical miles. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has specified that a state has sovereign rights over the resources of the entire continental shelf, regardless of its distance from the baseline, but different rights apply to the continental shelf and the water column above it where it is further than 200 nautical miles from the coast.[202]

The UNCLOS defines the high seas as all parts of the sea that are not within a state's EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters.[203] There are six freedoms of the high seas—navigation, overflight, laying submarine cables and pipelines, constructing artificial islands, fishing and scientific research—some of which are subject to legal restrictions.[204] Ships in the high seas are deemed to have the nationality of the flag that they have the right to fly and no other state can exercise jurisdiction over them; the exception is ships used for piracy, which are subject to universal jurisdiction.[205]

Finance and trade law

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In 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank) and the IMF. At the conference, the International Trade Organization was proposed but failed to be instituted due to the refusal of the United States to ratify its charter. Three years later, Part IV of the statute was adopted to create the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which operated between 1948 and 1994, when the WTO was established. The OPEC, which banded together to control global oil supply and prices, caused the previous reliance on fixed currency exchange rates to be dropped in favour of floating exchange rates in 1971. During this recession, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan pushed for free trade and deregulation under a neo-liberal agenda known as the Washington Consensus.[206]

Conflict and force

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War and armed conflict

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The law relating to the initiation of armed conflict is jus ad bellum.[207] This was codified in 1928 in the Kellogg–Briand Pact, which stated that conflicts should be settled through peaceful negotiations with the exception, through reservations drafted by some state parties, of self-defence.[208] These fundamental principles were re-affirmed in the UN Charter, which provided for "an almost absolute prohibition on the use of force", with the only three exceptions.[209][210] The first involves force authorised by the UNSC, as the entity is responsible in the first instance for responding to breaches or threats to the peace and acts of aggression, including the use of force or peacekeeping missions.[211] The second exception is where a state is acting in individual or collective self-defence, as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.[212] A state can invoke Article 51 in the case of an "armed attack" but the intention behind this exception has been challenged, particularly as nuclear weapons have become more common, with many states relying instead on the customary right of self-defence as set out in the Caroline test.[213][214] The ICJ considered collective self-defence in Nicaragua v. United States, where the U.S. unsuccessfully argued that it had mined harbours in Nicaragua in pre-emption of an attack by the Sandinista government against another member of the Organization of American States.[215] The final exception is where the UNSC delegates its responsibility for collective security to a regional organisation, such as NATO.[216] The Fourth Geneva Convention also further developed a body of law that is called "Occupation Law". This details the temporary rights of the occupying power and entrusts it with the need to protect the local population and the integrity of the area.[217]

Humanitarian law

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The First Geneva Convention (1864) is one of the earliest formulations of international law.

International humanitarian law (IHL) is an effort to "mitigate the human suffering caused by war" and it is often complementary to the law of armed conflict and international human rights law.[218] The concept of jus in bello (law in war) covers IHL, which is distinct from jus ad bellum.[207] Its scope lasts from the initiation of conflict until a peaceful settlement is reached.[219] There are two main principles in IHL; the principle of distinction dictates that combatants and non-combatants must be treated differently and the principle of not causing disproportionate suffering to combatants. In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ described these concepts as "intransgressible principles of international customary law".[220]

The two Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 considered restrictions on the conduct of war and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross, considered the protection of innocent parties in conflict zones.[221] The First Geneva Convention covers wounded and ill combatants, the Second Geneva Convention covers combatants at sea who are wounded, ill or shipwrecked, the Third Geneva Convention covers prisoners of war and the Fourth Geneva Convention covers civilians.[220] These conventions were supplemented the additional Protocol I and Protocol II, which were codified in 1977.[221] Initially IHL conventions were only considered to apply to a conflict if all parties had ratified the relevant convention under the si omnes clause, but this posed concerns and the Martens clause began to be implemented, providing that the law would generally be deemed to apply.[222]

There have been various agreements to outlaw particular types of weapons, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. The use of nuclear weapons was determined to be in conflict with principles of IHL by the ICJ in 1995, although the court also held that it "cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence."[223] Multiple treaties have attempted to regulate the use of these weapons, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but key states have failed to sign or have withdrawn. There have been similar debates on the use of drones and cyberwarefare on the international stage.[224]

International criminal law

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International criminal law sets out the definition of international crimes and compels states to prosecute these crimes.[225] While war crimes were prosecuted throughout history, this has historically been done by national courts.[226] The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo were established at the end of World War II to prosecute key actors in Germany and Japan.[227] The jurisdiction of the tribunals was limited to crimes against peace (based on the Kellogg–Briand Pact), war crimes (based on the Hague Conventions) and crimes against humanity, establishing new categories of international crime.[228][229] Throughout the twentieth century, the separate crimes of genocide, torture and terrorism were also recognised.[229]

Initially these crimes were intended to be prosecuted by national courts and subject to their domestic procedures.[230] The Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977 and the 1984 UN Convention against Torture mandated that the national courts of the contracting countries must prosecute these offenses where the perpetrator is on their territory or extradite them to any other interested state.[231] It was in the 1990s that two ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), were established by the UNSC to address specific atrocities.[232][233] The ICTY had authority to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide occurring in Yugoslavia after 1991 and the ICTR had authority to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[234][235]

The building housing the International Criminal Court in 2018

The International Criminal Court (ICC), established by the 1998 Rome Statute, is the first and only permanent international court to prosecute genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression.[236] There are 123 state parties to the ICC although a number of states have declared their opposition to the court; it has been criticised by African countries including The Gambia and Kenya for "imperialist" prosecutions.[237][238] One particular aspect of the court that has received scrutiny is the principle of complementarity, whereby the ICC only has jurisdiction if the national courts of a state with jurisdiction are "unwilling or unable to prosecute" or where a state has investigated but chosen not to prosecute a case.[239][240] The United States has a particularly complicated relationship with the ICC; originally signing the treaty in 2000, the US stated in 2002 that it did not intend to become a party as it believed the ICC threatened its national sovereignty and the country does not recognise the court's jurisdiction.[241][242]

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International legal theory comprises a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches used to explain and analyse the content, formation and effectiveness of international law and institutions and to suggest improvements. Some approaches center on the question of compliance: why states follow international norms in the absence of a coercive power that ensures compliance.[243][244] Some scholars view compliance failure as a problem of enforcement whereby states can be incentivized to follow international law due to international inducements, reciprocity, concerns about reputation, or domestic political factors.[245] Other scholars see compliance failure as rooted in a lack of state capacity where a willing state is incapable of fully following international legal commitments.[245] Rationalist choice theorists have referred to the "Three Rs" that lead states to comply with international law: Reciprocity, Reputation, and Retaliation.[246] Constructivist scholars emphasize how states are socialized into complying with international law by internalizing norms and seeking status and reputation.[245][247][248]

Other perspectives are policy oriented: they elaborate theoretical frameworks and instruments to criticize the existing norms and to make suggestions on how to improve them. Some of these approaches are based on domestic legal theory, some are interdisciplinary, and others have been developed expressly to analyse international law. Classical approaches to International legal theory are the natural law, the Eclectic and the legal positivism schools of thought.[249][page needed]

The natural law approach argues that international norms should be based on axiomatic truths. The 16th-century natural law writer de Vitoria examined the questions of the just war, the Spanish authority in the Americas, and the rights of the Native American peoples. In 1625, Grotius argued that nations as well as persons ought to be governed by universal principle based on morality and divine justice while the relations among polities ought to be governed by the law of peoples, the jus gentium, established by the consent of the community of nations on the basis of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that is, on the basis of the observance of commitments. On his part, de Vattel argued instead for the equality of states as articulated by 18th-century natural law and suggested that the law of nations was composed of custom and law on the one hand, and natural law on the other. During the 17th century, the basic tenets of the Grotian or eclectic school, especially the doctrines of legal equality, territorial sovereignty, and independence of states, became the fundamental principles of the European political and legal system and were enshrined in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.[citation needed]

The early positivist school emphasized the importance of custom and treaties as sources of international law. In the 16th-century, Gentili used historical examples to posit that positive law (jus voluntarium) was determined by general consent. van Bynkershoek asserted that the bases of international law were customs and treaties commonly consented to by various states, while John Jacob Moser emphasized the importance of state practice in international law. The positivism school narrowed the range of international practice that might qualify as law, favouring rationality over morality and ethics. The 1815 Congress of Vienna marked the formal recognition of the political and international legal system based on the conditions of Europe.[citation needed] Modern legal positivists consider international law as a unified system of rules that emanates from the states' will. International law, as it is, is an "objective" reality that needs to be distinguished from law "as it should be". Classic positivism demands rigorous tests for legal validity and it deems irrelevant all extralegal arguments.[250]

Alternative views

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John Austin asserted that due to the principle of par in parem non habet imperium, "so-called" international law, lacking a sovereign power and so unenforceable, was not really law at all, but "positive morality", consisting of "opinions and sentiments...more ethical than legal in nature."[251] Since states are few in number, diverse and atypical in character, unindictable, lack a centralised sovereign power, and their agreements unpoliced and decentralised, Martin Wight argued that international society is better described as anarchy.[252]

Hans Morgenthau believed international law to be the weakest and most primitive system of law enforcement; he likened its decentralised nature to the law that prevails in preliterate tribal societies. Monopoly on violence is what makes domestic law enforceable; but between nations, there are multiple competing sources of force. The confusion created by treaty laws, which resemble private contracts between persons, is mitigated only by the relatively small number of states.[253] He asserted that no state may be compelled to submit a dispute to an international tribunal, making laws unenforceable and voluntary. International law is also unpoliced, lacking agencies for enforcement. He cites a 1947 US opinion poll in which 75% of respondents wanted "an international police to maintain world peace", but only 13% wanted that force to exceed the US armed forces. Later surveys have produced similar contradictory results.[254]

Noura Erakat in her work on law in relation to the question of Palestine, argues that by adopting a more constructivist perspective, international law emerges not simply as a product of politics or state actions but rather as a factor in a relationship of reciprocal constitution.[255] Thereby state actions are influenced, however not directed, by law and law is influenced, however not rewritten by state actions. Additionally, Erakat also underlines a clear difference in the goals and the outcomes of international law. For instance, in striving for state-hood, one may not gain freedom and vice versa.[255] Another caveat added to this perspective is the differentiation between state-hood, independence, and autonomy. Erakat delivers an example of the Oslo Peace Process and the Madrid Conference of 1991 in which U.S. policy sought to establish Palestinian autonomy to govern their territory without formal state recognition.[256] Also plays with the argument that the instrumental use of international law, may in fact not simply produce justice but a clear trade-off in advantages and disadvantages between actors.

Challenges and controversies

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International law is currently navigating a complex array of challenges and controversies that have underscored the dynamic nature of international relations in the 21st century. Some of these challenges include enforcement difficulties, the impact of technological advancements, climate change, and worldwide pandemics.[257] The possible re-emergence of right of conquest as international law is contentious.[258]

Among the most pressing issues are enforcement difficulties, where the lack of a centralized global authority often leads to non-compliance with international norms, particularly evident in violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Sovereignty disputes further complicate the international legal landscape, as conflicts over territorial claims and jurisdictional boundaries arise, challenging the principles of non-interference and peaceful resolution. Furthermore, the emergence of new global powers introduces additional layers of complexity, as these nations assert their interests and challenge established norms, necessitating a reevaluation of the global legal order to accommodate shifting power dynamics.[259]

Cybersecurity has also emerged as a critical concern, with international law striving to address the threats posed by cyber-attacks to national security, infrastructure, and individual privacy. Climate change demands unprecedented international cooperation, as evidenced by agreements like the Paris Agreement, though disparities in responsibilities among nations pose significant challenges to collective action.[260]

The COVID-19 pandemic has further highlighted the interconnectedness of the global community, emphasizing the need for coordinated efforts to manage health crises, vaccine distribution, and economic recovery.[261]

Democratic legitimacy

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International law has been criticized due to limited democratic legitimacy.[262] International courts have been criticised for a lack of legitimacy, as they can seem disconnected from the crimes that have occurred, but hybrid courts aim to combine both national and international components, operating in the jurisdiction where the crimes in question occurred.[263][264] There has been debate about what courts can be included within this definition, but generally the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have been listed.[265][236][264] Backlash to international laws can contribute to judicial populism.[266]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

International law, or public international law, consists of rules, norms, and standards binding sovereign states and international actors in their relations, regulating conduct among sovereign states, international organizations, and occasionally individuals in their international capacities. Its primary sources are treaties (binding agreements), customary practices accepted as obligatory, and general principles of law, as enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute of the , supplemented by judicial decisions and scholarly writings. It covers domains such as human rights, trade, environment, and conflict. Originating from ancient interstate agreements such as the Treaty of Kadesh circa 1259 BCE but systematically theorized in the early modern era by in works like (1625), which laid foundations for applications to interstate relations, international law evolved through events like the (1648) establishing sovereign equality.
Notable achievements encompass the codification of humanitarian protections via the of 1949, ratified by 196 states and forming the core of by safeguarding non-combatants and prisoners during armed conflicts, and the establishment of the in 1945, which has facilitated over 560 multilateral treaties addressing peace, , and economic cooperation. However, it lacks a central legislature or enforcement, rendering compliance dependent on state consent, reciprocity, and institutions like the UN and ICJ rather than compulsory sanctions, which has led to controversies over selective adherence—particularly by major powers—and persistent violations in conflicts, trade disputes, and territorial claims, underscoring its limitations as a binding system amid sovereign primacy.

Definition and Characteristics

Terminology and Fundamental Concepts

International law, also known as public international law to distinguish it from private international law which governs cross-border private disputes, refers to the body of rules governing relations between sovereign states. The term "international law" was coined by the English philosopher in his 1789 work An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, replacing earlier phrases like "law of nations" or to emphasize rules derived from state interactions rather than putative applicable to all humanity. Unlike domestic law, international law primarily binds states as its principal subjects, though international organizations and, in limited contexts such as and , individuals may also bear direct obligations. A foundational concept is state sovereignty, which posits that states exercise supreme authority within their territories and enjoy formal equality in international relations, free from external hierarchy absent consent. Statehood, the prerequisite for full participation in international law, requires four criteria under the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Recognition by other states declaratorily affirms but does not create statehood, as existence depends on factual fulfillment of these elements rather than political approval. Central to treaty-based obligations is the principle of , Latin for "agreements must be kept," which mandates good-faith performance of treaties as binding instruments of consent. This principle, codified in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, underpins the stability of international commitments, though derogation is possible except for jus cogens—peremptory norms of general international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can only be modified by subsequent norms of the same character. Examples of jus cogens include prohibitions on , , and , accepted by the as overriding even consensual arrangements. These concepts reflect international law's consensual foundation, where binding force derives from state practice and opinio juris rather than centralized legislative or coercive authority.

Distinction from Domestic Law

International law operates in a decentralized framework among states, lacking a central legislative or executive authority comparable to that in domestic legal systems, where a single holds monopoly over law-making, interpretation, and coercion within its territory. This absence stems from the principle of state sovereignty, codified in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter (1945), which affirms the equal sovereign status of states without subordination to a higher power, in contrast to domestic law's hierarchical structure where citizens and entities are subject to binding national institutions. Domestic law derives authority from internal constitutional processes, enabling direct applicability and uniform enforcement, whereas international law's norms apply horizontally between states as co-equals. A core distinction lies in the basis of obligation: international law relies on state consent as the foundational source of binding force, with treaties requiring explicit and emerging from widespread state practice accompanied by opinio juris (a sense of legal obligation), as outlined in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the (1945). Domestic law, by contrast, imposes duties unilaterally through legislative acts, binding individuals irrespective of personal agreement, reflecting the sovereign's inherent authority over its subjects. This consent-based nature limits international law's scope, as states retain the right to opt out via reservations (per Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, , 1969) or persistent objection to custom, mechanisms unavailable in domestic contexts where non-consent does not negate validity. Enforcement mechanisms further highlight the divide: domestic law employs institutionalized coercion via police, courts, and penalties, ensuring high compliance through immediate sanctions, whereas international law lacks a global enforcer, depending instead on remedies, reciprocity, diplomatic negotiations, or collective actions like UN Security Council sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Empirical data underscores this gap; for instance, only about 20% of contentious cases (from 1946–2023) result in full compliance without external pressure, often relying on reputational costs or power asymmetries rather than compulsory execution. While bodies like the (established 2002) extend limited direct enforcement to individuals for grave crimes, state-level violations predominantly invoke voluntary adherence or countermeasures, as no international police force exists to mirror domestic writs of execution. The subjects of regulation also differ: international law traditionally governs states as primary actors, with individuals historically lacking standing until post-World War II developments like the (1945–1946), which established personal criminal responsibility under international norms, and subsequent frameworks. Domestic law, however, directly regulates individuals, corporations, and subnational entities as its core subjects, with states acting as intermediaries rather than direct bearers of rights and duties. This evolution has blurred lines in areas like transnational crimes, yet the foundational state-centricity of international law persists, prohibiting unilateral domestic enforcement against foreign states due to principles.

Enforcement Limitations and Compliance Dynamics

International law lacks a centralized enforcement authority analogous to domestic police or executive branches, relying instead on decentralized mechanisms such as state consent, reciprocity, and collective action through institutions like the (UNSC). The UNSC, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, can authorize sanctions or military force to address threats to peace, but its effectiveness is curtailed by the veto power of its five permanent members—, , , the , and the —which has blocked enforcement in numerous cases, including resolutions on Syria's chemical weapons use in 2017 and Russia's annexation of in 2014. Similarly, the (ICJ) issues binding judgments for consenting states, yet possesses no direct enforcement powers; compliance depends on voluntary adherence or secondary pressures like diplomatic isolation. Prominent examples illustrate these limitations: in the 1986 Nicaragua v. United States case, the ICJ ruled that U.S. support for Contra rebels and mining of Nicaraguan harbors violated international law, but the U.S. rejected the jurisdiction and did not pay reparations, withdrawing from compulsory ICJ jurisdiction shortly thereafter. similarly ignored a 2013-2015 ICJ provisional order and 2014 arbitration award in the Arctic Sunrise case brought by the over activists' detention, resuming operations without compliance. The (ICC), established in 2002, faces jurisdictional gaps, as non-party states like the U.S., , and do not recognize its authority, leading to non-cooperation in investigations such as those into alleged U.S. torture in or Russian actions in . These instances highlight how powerful states, particularly nuclear-armed P5 members, can often pursue aggressive actions or reject inconvenient rulings with short-term impunity due to their veto privileges and the absence of centralized enforcement, thereby reinforcing the largely consensual nature of compliance while prioritizing and national interests over legal obligations, undermining uniform enforcement. Despite these constraints, empirical studies indicate high levels of state compliance with international law, estimated at over 90% for treaty obligations in areas like and , driven not primarily by but by instrumental, normative, and managerial factors. Rationalist theories posit compliance stems from cost-benefit calculations, where states weigh reputational costs of breach—such as boycotts or strains—against short-term gains, as seen in repeated WTO dispute settlements where even disputants like the U.S. and adjust policies post-ruling to preserve . Normative internalization occurs when legal rules align with domestic values or habits, fostering "" or "" without overt pressure, per Louis Henkin's observation that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time." Compliance dynamics also involve managerial approaches emphasizing capacity-building, dispute clarification, and iterative cooperation over punitive sanctions, which Chayes and Chayes argue better addresses root causes like ambiguity or implementation challenges in environmental treaties like the 1987 , where transparency mechanisms boosted ozone-depleting substance phase-outs to 98% compliance by 2010. Reciprocity sustains adherence, as mutual compliance in bilateral agreements like extradition treaties deters defection through tit-for-tat responses. However, non-compliance can propagate via contagion, where observed impunity—such as Russia's 2022 invasion of despite UN prohibitions—emboldens others, eroding systemic deterrence and highlighting the fragility of reliance on soft mechanisms absent robust countervailing power.

Historical Development

Ancient and Medieval Foundations

The foundations of international law trace back to ancient Near Eastern civilizations, where written treaties regulated relations between polities. One of the earliest recorded agreements is the treaty between the rulers of and in , dating to approximately 2100 BC, which established a defined and rights to prevent conflict. The most prominent surviving example is the of 1259 BC between Pharaoh and King Hattusili III, following the ; inscribed on clay tablets and silver plates, it stipulated non-aggression, mutual defense against third parties, of fugitives, and perpetual peace, marking the first known comprehensive bilateral accord with reciprocal obligations. These agreements relied on pragmatic reciprocity rather than universal principles, often invoking divine oaths for enforcement, and demonstrate early recognition of to manage territorial disputes and alliances among sovereign entities. In , Greek city-states formalized interstate relations through alliances, truces, and , as seen in amphictyonic councils like that of , which enforced shared religious norms and mediated conflicts from the onward. contributed the concept of jus gentium, developed from the by praetors to govern interactions between Romans and non-citizens, encompassing rules on contracts, property, and war declarations via the fetiales priests, who ensured formalities like renuntiatio belli for just cause. This body of customary practices, distinct from jus civile, influenced later notions of universal norms applicable to all peoples, including sanctity of ambassadors and rights over war spoils, though primarily serving Roman expansionist interests. Medieval developments built on these precedents amid fragmented European and Islamic polities. In Christian Europe, the just war doctrine, articulated by St. Augustine (354–430 AD) as requiring legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention, evolved through (1225–1274) to include proportionality and between combatants and non-combatants, informing papal decrees and chivalric codes that regulated truces and safe conducts. Late medieval jurists like Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400) expanded ius gentium to justify relations among princes, emphasizing consent-based treaties and principles derived from reason. In the Islamic world, siyar—the law governing Muslim-non-Muslim interactions—emerged in the 8th century with and was systematized by (d. 805 AD), permitting treaties (mu'ahadat) with non-Muslims under conditions of mutual benefit, safe passage (aman), and limits on warfare, such as prohibiting attacks on non-combatants, though subordinated to imperatives. These traditions, while regionally distinct, shared emphases on oaths, retaliation deterrence, and diplomatic envoys, laying groundwork for consensual interstate order amid feudal and caliphal fragmentation.

Early Modern Emergence

The early modern emergence of international law coincided with the , the Age of Discovery, and the Protestant Reformation, which disrupted medieval universalist structures like the and papal authority, prompting jurists to articulate rules for relations among emerging sovereign states. Spanish theologian (c. 1483–1546), in his 1532 relectiones at the , extended just war doctrine to European interactions with in the , arguing that conquest required valid title and prohibiting enslavement absent resistance to natural law principles like and . Vitoria's works, including De Indis and De Iure Belli, laid groundwork for ius gentium as a secular body of norms derived from reason and custom, applicable beyond . Italian jurist Alberico Gentili (1552–1608), exiled to England and appointed Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford in 1581, advanced these ideas through treatises like De Legationibus (1585), which codified diplomatic immunity and ambassadorial functions, and De Iure Belli (1598), which systematized laws of war, prohibiting perfidy and mandating moderation in victory. Gentili distinguished ius gentium from Roman private law, framing it as binding interstate custom enforced by reprisal or alliance, influencing English prize law and early diplomatic practice amid religious conflicts. His secular approach, drawing on Cicero and Tacitus over theology, reflected causal pressures from Italian city-state rivalries and Ottoman threats, prioritizing reciprocity over divine sanction. Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), writing amid the Eighty Years' War and his exile after 1619, published De Iure Belli ac Pacis in 1625, synthesizing prior thought into a comprehensive treatise on the law of nations, asserting its validity even absent a sovereign enforcer—"etiamsi daremus (quod sine summo nefas) non esse Deum." Grotius grounded rules on war, treaties, and maritime commerce in natural law, voluntary agreements, and historical practice, advocating proportionality in reprisals and neutrality for neutrals, with over 1,500 citations from classical, biblical, and contemporary sources. This work, printed in Paris with dedications to European monarchs, facilitated Dutch trade ambitions and influenced subsequent codifications, marking the transition to a state-centric system by decoupling law from religious unity.

Westphalian Sovereignty and 19th Century Codification

The , comprising the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück signed on October 24, , concluded the (1618–1648) and the (1568–1648), marking a pivotal shift toward state sovereignty in European international relations. These treaties granted German princes independence from the , affirming their right to form alliances and conduct , while establishing principles of territorial sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and legal equality among states regardless of size. Religious toleration was mandated within states, but external interference on religious grounds was curtailed, prioritizing secular state authority over universalist claims like those of the Papacy or Empire. This Westphalian framework laid the groundwork for modern international law by conceptualizing states as the primary actors with exclusive jurisdiction over internal matters and mutual recognition of , influencing subsequent diplomatic practices and legal doctrines. Although predated 1648 in embryonic forms, the treaties operationalized it amid the devastation of religious conflicts, fostering a balance-of-power system that reduced large-scale wars for over a century. The system's emphasis on contractual relations among equals echoed traditions but grounded them in positive agreements, setting a for treaty-based order. In the 19th century, building on Westphalian foundations, European powers pursued codification to formalize customary rules into binding treaties, driven by expanding trade, colonial rivalries, and humanitarian concerns following the (1803–1815). The (1814–1815) exemplified early efforts, with its Final Act regulating diplomatic ranks, river navigation (e.g., opening the and to international ), and establishing the for collective security, though prioritizing great-power equilibrium over universal codification. These arrangements codified select norms on neutrality and access, reflecting positivist shifts toward explicit consent-based law. Mid-century treaties advanced humanitarian and maritime codification: the Declaration of Paris (April 16, 1856) standardized naval warfare rules post-Crimean War (1853–1856), abolishing privateering, defining blockades, and protecting neutral flags, ratified by major powers including Britain, France, and Russia. The (August 22, 1864), initiated by Henri Dunant and adopted by 12 states, protected wounded soldiers and medical personnel, founding through multilateral agreement. Later, the St. Petersburg Declaration (November 29, 1868) prohibited explosive projectiles under 400 grams, signaling growing consensus on limiting war's barbarity. Private initiatives, such as Johann Bluntschli's 1868 codification project and the 1873 founding of the Institut de Droit International, complemented state efforts but lacked binding force, highlighting tensions between scholarly aspiration and diplomatic pragmatism. These developments transitioned international law from fragmented customs to systematic treaties, reinforcing Westphalian amid industrialization and .

20th Century Institutionalization

The institutionalization of international law in the 20th century accelerated following the devastation of World War I, with the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 under the Treaty of Versailles. The League's Covenant outlined mechanisms for collective security, dispute settlement, and the promotion of international cooperation, marking the first attempt at a permanent global organization to maintain peace and apply legal norms among states. Integral to this framework was the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1920, which commenced operations in 1922 as the League's judicial organ, providing a forum for advisory opinions and contentious cases between states on matters of international law. The PCIJ handled 29 contentious cases and issued 27 advisory opinions before ceasing operations in 1940 amid escalating global conflict, demonstrating both the potential and limitations of centralized judicial mechanisms without robust enforcement powers. The League's inability to prevent aggression, exemplified by failures in addressing in 1931 and Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, underscored enforcement deficits inherent in voluntary compliance structures, contributing to its dissolution and the onset of . Postwar reconstruction emphasized stronger institutional foundations, culminating in the Charter signed on June 26, 1945, by 50 states, which established the UN as a successor organization with explicit commitments to international law. The Charter designated the (ICJ), founded in June 1945 and operational from April 1946, as the UN's principal judicial organ, seated at the in and tasked with settling disputes and providing advisory opinions based on international law. Unlike the PCIJ, the ICJ's statute forms an integral part of the UN Charter, with all UN members automatically parties, though remains consensual via special agreements or compulsory clauses accepted by states. The UN framework facilitated extensive codification of international norms through treaties and General Assembly resolutions, institutionalizing areas such as humanitarian law and treaty interpretation. The four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, ratified by over 190 states, updated and expanded protections for wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians in armed conflict, forming the core of with universal adherence driven by the horrors of . Complementary developments included the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified rules for treaty formation, interpretation, and termination, entering into force in 1980 and reflecting customary practices to enhance predictability in state interactions. Specialized agencies like the (founded 1919, integrated into UN) and later bodies such as the (established by the 1998 ) further embedded international law into governance structures, though persistent challenges in compliance and sovereignty assertions limited coercive efficacy.

Post-Cold War and Contemporary Evolutions

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked the end of the bipolar order, ushering in a period of perceived unipolar dominance by the and renewed emphasis on institutions. This era saw accelerated institutionalization of international law, with a focus on enforcement and , though enforcement remained constrained by state sovereignty and Security Council vetoes. Optimism for a "new world order" under U.S. leadership facilitated interventions justified on humanitarian grounds, challenging traditional prohibitions on the absent UN authorization. A pivotal evolution occurred with the establishment of the (ICC) through the , adopted on July 17, 1998, by 120 states and entering into force on July 1, 2002, after ratification by 60 countries. The ICC represented a shift toward individual accountability for , , war crimes, and , complementing ad hoc tribunals like those for (1993) and (1994). Its significance lies in codifying permanent jurisdiction over atrocities, though limited by non-universal ratification—major powers such as the , , and remain non-parties—and reliance on state cooperation for arrests and evidence. The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo exemplified tensions between sovereignty and humanitarian imperatives, conducted without explicit UN Security Council approval due to anticipated Russian and Chinese vetoes. Lasting 78 days from March to June 1999, the bombing campaign aimed to halt by Yugoslav forces, averting a predicted and mass killings akin to . Legally contested under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting force against , it drew on emerging customary norms of , later influencing the (R2P) doctrine. Developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 and endorsed at the 2005 UN World Summit, R2P reframes sovereignty as a responsibility to protect populations from atrocities, authorizing collective action—including force as a last resort—when states fail. Critics note R2P's selective application, as seen in (2011) where UN Resolution 1973 morphed into regime change, eroding consensus, while inaction prevailed in due to vetoes. Economic dimensions advanced through the (WTO), established on January 1, 1995, via the concluding the (1986–1994). Succeeding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO institutionalized binding dispute settlement via its , overseeing trade rules for 164 members as of 2023 and facilitating that reduced global tariffs from 40% in 1947 to under 5% by the 2000s. Its role in international law includes enforcing non-discrimination principles (most-favored-nation and national treatment) and integrating trade with intellectual property (TRIPS) and services (GATS), though crises like the 's paralysis since 2019 highlight vulnerabilities to disputes. Environmental law evolved with the , adopted December 12, 2015, at COP21 and entering force November 4, 2016, ratified by 196 parties. Unlike the binding emission targets of the 1997 , Paris employs nationally determined contributions (NDCs) with transparency mechanisms but lacks enforceable penalties, relying on "name-and-shame" compliance. It aims to limit warming to well below 2°C, preferably 1.5°C, above pre-industrial levels, imposing duties on states to pursue good-faith efforts and report progress biennially. Implications include soft law hybridization, where voluntary pledges interact with customary obligations to prevent transboundary harm, though U.S. withdrawal (2017–2021) and re-entry underscore geopolitical fragility. NATO's post-Cold War enlargements—from 16 members in to 32 by , including waves in 1999, , and (Finland, )—reinforced collective defense under Article 5 but sparked debates over assurances given to Soviet leaders in 1990 against eastward expansion, which declassified documents show were informal and non-binding. These shifts contributed to tensions, exemplified by Russia's 2022 invasion of , which violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum's security assurances and Helsinki Final Act principles, prompting ICC arrest warrants for Russian leadership and debates over aggression's criminalization. Contemporary evolutions face strains from resurgent great power competition among the U.S., , and , eroding multilateral consensus. 's rejection of the 2016 Award and 's actions in and Georgia challenge dispute settlement efficacy, while cyber operations and test norms. Proliferation of treaties on issues like (e.g., extension to 2026) coexists with withdrawals, such as from the Open Skies Treaty (2020), signaling fragmentation. Despite this, international law persists through adaptive mechanisms, including UN resolutions invoking R2P and prosecutions, though compliance hinges on power balances rather than centralized enforcement.

Sources of International Law

Customary International Law

comprises rules arising from consistent state practice undertaken with the belief that such conduct is legally required. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the (ICJ) identifies it as "international custom, as evidence of a accepted as law," serving as a alongside treaties and general principles. This unwritten body of law binds all states without requiring explicit consent, filling gaps where treaties are absent or ambiguous, and evolving through empirical patterns of behavior rather than abstract theorizing. Formation requires two interdependent elements: an objective component of widespread, representative state practice and a subjective component of opinio juris sive necessitatis, whereby states follow the practice because they perceive it as obligatory under law rather than mere courtesy or expediency. State practice must be general, virtually uniform, and enduring, evidenced by diplomatic correspondence, legislative acts, judicial decisions, treaties reflecting practice, and operational conduct such as military actions or resource exploitation. Opinio juris is inferred from statements acknowledging legal duty, reactions to breaches, or invocations of the rule in international forums, distinguishing binding norms from habitual policies. The International Law Commission (ILC) in its 2018 conclusions emphasizes that these elements must be assessed concurrently, with no isolated proof sufficient. No fixed duration is mandated for formation, though practice typically spans considerable time to demonstrate consistency; short periods suffice if is dense, representative, and accompanied by clear opinio juris, as in rapidly evolving domains like activities post-1967 Outer Space Treaty reflections. The ILC rejects rigid temporal thresholds, noting that "the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily... a bar" when evidence is compelling. Historical persistence aids assessment but yields to qualitative factors like the rule's clarity and state reactions. Exceptions apply to persistent objectors: a state that consistently and publicly objects to an emerging norm from its inception, without acquiescence, remains unbound, preserving sovereign choice against majority practice. This doctrine, affirmed in ICJ jurisprudence like the North Sea Continental Shelf case (1969), does not extend to jus cogens norms or late objectors, requiring objections during norm crystallization rather than retroactively. Customary rules may crystallize into peremptory norms (jus cogens), such as prohibitions on aggression or , overriding treaties and binding erga omnes. Prominent examples include the principle of , barring return of refugees to persecution; diplomatic immunities under the 1961 Vienna Convention framework; and core humanitarian restraints like distinction between combatants and civilians in armed conflict, codified in International Committee of the Red Cross studies identifying 161 rules applicable across conflicts. These norms underpin adjudication, with ICJ and arbitral tribunals relying on them in disputes over maritime delimitation or territorial sovereignty, though identification remains contested due to varying state interpretations and evidentiary gaps.

Treaties and Conventions

Treaties serve as a of international law, as specified in Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the , which mandates the application of "international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states." These instruments create binding obligations among states or international organizations through mutual consent, reflecting the principle of sovereign equality. The has registered over 50,000 treaties since 1946, underscoring their prevalence in regulating state interactions across domains such as , , and armed conflict. Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a treaty is defined as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." Adopted on May 23, 1969, and entering into force on January 27, 1980, the VCLT codifies customary rules applicable to treaties between states, covering formation, validity, interpretation, and termination. It has been ratified by 116 states, though non-parties like the United States adhere to its provisions as reflective of customary international law. The convention's rules apply only to written treaties between states, excluding those involving international organizations unless specified otherwise. Central to treaty law is the principle of , which requires that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith," as articulated in Article 26 of the VCLT. This maxim, rooted in and recognized as fundamental across legal systems, ensures stability in by prohibiting unilateral repudiation absent valid grounds such as material breach or fundamental change of circumstances. Interpretation follows objective criteria under Articles 31 and 32, prioritizing the ordinary meaning of terms in their context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose, supplemented by subsequent practice or preparatory work where ambiguities arise. Conventions, often multilateral treaties aimed at codifying general rules, lack a formal distinction from treaties in legal effect; the terminology reflects usage rather than substance, with conventions typically addressing broad normative frameworks like the of 1949. Bilateral treaties bind two parties, while multilateral ones involve multiple states, sometimes open for universal adherence. Article 102 of the UN Charter obliges parties to register treaties with the Secretariat to invoke them before UN organs, though non-registration does not invalidate obligations. Termination or suspension may occur through consent, material breach (Article 60 VCLT), or supervening impossibility (Article 61), but jus cogens norms—peremptory rules like prohibitions on —render conflicting treaties void ab initio (Article 53). These mechanisms balance contractual freedom with systemic integrity in an anarchic .

General Principles and Subsidiary Means


The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, as stipulated in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the (ICJ), form a of international law alongside treaties and custom, intended to address lacunae in other sources by drawing on fundamental norms common to domestic legal systems worldwide. These principles are not derived solely from international practice but are transposed from municipal laws, provided they achieve broad recognition across major legal traditions, such as civil and systems. Examples include (treaties must be observed), the principle of in legal relations, (finality of judgments), (preclusion from inconsistent conduct), and the obligation to make reparation for wrongful acts. The ICJ has invoked such principles in cases like the Corfu Channel ( v. , 1949), where elementary considerations of humanity and notification duties were applied as general principles akin to . Scholarly debate persists on their scope, with some viewing them primarily as procedural tools for interpretation and others as substantive rules capable of independent application, though their use remains infrequent compared to treaties and custom due to the preference for state consent-based sources.
Subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law, outlined in Article 38(1)(d), encompass judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations, serving not as independent sources but as interpretive aids to ascertain and clarify primary rules from conventions, custom, and general principles. Subject to Article 59, which confines ICJ judgments' binding effect to the parties in the specific dispute, prior decisions exert persuasive influence, contributing to the evolution of customary law through consistent application and stare decisis-like reasoning in practice, despite formal non-precedential status. For instance, the ICJ frequently references its own jurisprudence, such as in the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France, 1974), to interpret obligations under unilateral declarations. The teachings of publicists—authoritative writings by scholars like Hugo Grotius or Emer de Vattel—provide doctrinal analysis, though their weight diminishes with the growth of institutionalized jurisprudence, as noted in recent International Law Commission (ILC) deliberations emphasizing their role in identifying emerging norms. National court decisions may also serve subsidiarily in exceptional circumstances, such as evidencing state practice, but only insofar as they reflect international rather than domestic law. The ILC's ongoing work since 2021 underscores that these means enhance systemic coherence without creating binding obligations absent state consent.

Subjects and Actors

States as Primary Subjects

States possess full international legal personality, enabling them to create, interpret, and enforce international norms through treaties, custom, and other means, while bearing corresponding duties such as non-intervention in other states' internal affairs. This primacy stems from the foundational principle of , which grants states supreme authority over their territory and population, subject only to voluntary limitations via consent-based obligations. The conventional criteria for statehood, as codified in Article 1 of the 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States, require a permanent , a defined , an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. These elements reflect empirical prerequisites for stable governance and external engagement, independent of formal recognition by others, aligning with the declaratory theory that views recognition as mere acknowledgment of pre-existing factual statehood rather than its constitutive act. The constitutive theory, positing that recognition by existing states confers legal personality, holds less sway in practice, as evidenced by entities like maintaining state functions despite limited recognition. Sovereignty encompasses both internal dimensions—exclusive jurisdiction over domestic matters—and external aspects, including equality among states and freedom from coercion in international dealings. This is operationalized through mechanisms like treaty-making, where states bind themselves under principles such as pacta sunt servanda, as affirmed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ratified by 116 states as of 2023 and reflecting customary law applicable more broadly. States' primary role persists despite the emergence of secondary subjects like international organizations, as these derive authority from state consent and cannot override core sovereign prerogatives without explicit agreement. Empirical state practice, including over 190 entities functioning as sovereign actors in global forums like the United Nations, underscores this enduring centrality.

International Organizations and Their Roles

International organizations act as subjects of international law, endowed with legal personality that allows them to conclude treaties, incur international obligations, and engage in mechanisms distinct from their member states. They contribute to the development of international norms through standard-setting, operational activities, and institutional practices that influence state behavior and formation. The , founded on October 24, 1945, with 193 member states, serves as the primary forum for multilateral cooperation and the progressive development of international law. Its constitutes a outlining principles of sovereign equality, peaceful dispute settlement, and prohibitions on force, while the General Assembly fosters codification via conventions and resolutions that evidence opinio juris. The Security Council, under Chapter VII, imposes binding measures to address threats to peace, including sanctions and authorizations for force, though veto powers held by its five permanent members often limit enforcement. The , established by the UN Charter as its principal judicial organ and operational since 1946, adjudicates contentious cases between consenting states and delivers advisory opinions to authorized UN bodies on legal questions. Based in , its judgments are binding on parties, deriving jurisdiction from special agreements, treaty compromissory clauses, or optional clause declarations accepting compulsory , with 74 states having made such declarations as of recent records. The Court has addressed disputes spanning territorial claims, maritime delimitations, and treaty interpretations, promoting stability through reasoned application of international law sources. The , created by the 1998 and entering into force on July 1, 2002, holds jurisdiction over individuals for the most serious international crimes—, , war crimes, and —exercisable only when states are unwilling or genuinely unable to prosecute. With 125 states parties as of January 2025, following Ukraine's accession, the ICC operates complementarily to national courts, investigating situations referred by states parties, the UN Security Council, or the . Its proceedings emphasize individual accountability over , though critics highlight selective prosecutions and dependency on state cooperation for arrests. The World Trade Organization, established January 1, 1995, with 166 members accounting for over 98% of global trade, oversees the multilateral trading system by administering agreements, conducting trade policy reviews, and adjudicating disputes via panels and appellate review. Its Dispute Settlement Understanding provides a quasi-judicial mechanism for enforcing trade commitments, issuing rulings that clarify WTO law and influence domestic regulations, though recent appellate body crises have impaired functionality. Specialized agencies within the UN family, such as the (founded 1919) and (1948), generate technical standards and conventions that evolve into binding international law upon , addressing and respectively. Regional organizations like the further integrate international legal principles into supranational frameworks, granting the EU distinct legal personality for treaty-making and litigation. Collectively, these entities enhance compliance through monitoring, capacity-building, and instruments, yet their efficacy remains constrained by state consent, resource limitations, and geopolitical divisions.

Individuals, Corporations, and Non-State Entities

Individuals possess limited subject status under international law, deriving primarily from duties in criminal accountability regimes and rights in frameworks, though enforcement often depends on state cooperation. The 1945 Nuremberg Charter and subsequent trials marked a pivotal shift by affirming individual responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes, and , overriding claims of official immunity and establishing that such acts are punishable regardless of domestic law. This principle was codified in the 1998 of the (ICC), which entered into force in 2002 and grants the ICC jurisdiction over natural persons accused of , , war crimes, or when committed by nationals of or on territory of states parties, or via UN Security Council referral. As of 2023, the ICC had issued arrest warrants for 52 individuals, though convictions remain few due to challenges in custody and evidence, underscoring the regime's reliance on state execution of mandates. Human rights treaties further position individuals as direct beneficiaries, with instruments like the 1948 and the 1966 International Covenants imposing obligations on states while granting individuals standing to petition bodies such as the Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by 116 states as of 2023. Yet, individuals cannot independently conclude treaties or access inter-state forums like the , which explicitly bars private claims. Scholarly consensus holds that this partial subjectivity reflects international law's state-centric core, where individuals' protections serve state interests in stability rather than conferring full legal personality. Corporations lack general international legal personality and are not direct subjects, with obligations imposed indirectly through state regulatory duties under customary and treaty law. In investment law, however, corporations as investors may invoke protections under bilateral investment treaties or multilateral conventions like the 1965 ICSID Convention, enabling them to arbitrate disputes against host states before panels that recognize their standing to claim expropriation or fair treatment violations; over 1,200 such cases were known by 2023. Efforts to extend direct corporate criminal liability, such as under the in U.S. courts or proposed extensions of , have faltered, with tribunals like the ICC limited to natural persons and no binding global regime for corporate accountability emerging despite advocacy. This indirect approach aligns with causal realities of corporate action through dispersed decision-making, prioritizing state enforcement over illusory direct subjection. Non-state entities, encompassing armed groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and terrorists, exhibit fragmented and context-specific roles, without universal subjectivity akin to states. Under international humanitarian law, organized non-state armed groups in non-international conflicts bear direct duties via Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, prohibiting violence to life and requiring humane treatment, as affirmed in over 100 state ratifications and customary status per International Committee of the Red Cross studies. Additional Protocol I (1977), ratified by 174 states, extended combatant status and prisoner protections to fighters in wars of national liberation against colonial or racist regimes, though its application remains contested and limited to specific struggles like those in Algeria or Palestine pre-1990. NGOs influence norm development through advisory roles in UN bodies but hold no enforceable rights or duties beyond domestic law, while terrorist entities face sanctions regimes like UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), mandating states to suppress financing without granting groups legal personality. Empirical data from conflicts, such as in Syria or Yemen, reveal non-state actors' de facto impact on law application yet persistent doctrinal exclusion from primary subjecthood, preserving state monopoly on legitimate violence.

Monism, Dualism, and Incorporation

Monism and dualism represent two foundational theories addressing the relationship between international law and domestic legal systems. posits that international and national law constitute a unified legal order, with international law directly applicable within domestic jurisdictions upon ratification or establishment, often holding primacy over conflicting national norms. This view, advanced by legal theorist in the early 20th century, treats all law as part of a single normative hierarchy, where international law serves as the foundational "grundnorm" superior to state law. In practice, monist systems enable courts to invoke international treaties or directly without legislative transformation, facilitating smoother compliance but risking judicial overreach if international norms override entrenched domestic statutes. Dualism, in contrast, conceives international as a distinct system governing relations between , separate from the domestic legal order rooted in national . Originating in early 20th-century scholarship by Heinrich Triepel and Dionisio Anzilotti, dualism requires explicit incorporation of international obligations into domestic through legislative acts for enforceability in national courts. This approach preserves and prevents automatic erosion of domestic rules, though it can delay or hinder implementation, as seen in cases where treaties remain unenforceable absent . Pure dualism subordinates international to domestic law in conflicts, emphasizing state and transformation over direct supranational authority. Incorporation refers to the mechanisms by which dualist states integrate international law into their domestic frameworks, typically via statutes, constitutional amendments, or judicial recognition of self-executing provisions. In the United States, for instance, non-self-executing treaties require congressional legislation for domestic effect, as affirmed in the 2008 decision Medellín v. , which held that the lacked direct applicability without statutory implementation. The exemplifies dualism through its tradition, where treaties like the necessitated the 1998 Human Rights Act for incorporation, allowing courts to review domestic laws against international standards post-legislation. In monist states such as and , incorporation occurs automatically upon ratification, with constitutional provisions like Article 55 of the French Constitution granting treaties supremacy over subsequent statutes, though judges may still reference national law for interpretation. Hybrid approaches exist, blending elements—e.g., the treats customary international law as directly applicable but requires statutes for treaties—reflecting pragmatic adaptations rather than rigid adherence to theory. These doctrines influence enforcement and compliance: monist systems, prevalent in civil law jurisdictions like Belgium and Italy, promote rapid alignment with global norms but may subordinate democratic processes to international bodies. Dualist systems, common in common law states including India and Canada, safeguard national autonomy by mandating legislative scrutiny, potentially leading to selective incorporation that aligns with domestic priorities. Empirical studies indicate no clear correlation between monism/dualism and state compliance rates, as effectiveness depends more on political will and institutional capacity than doctrinal purity. Conflicts arise when international rulings challenge core domestic interests, underscoring that both theories serve as interpretive frameworks rather than absolute determinants of legal hierarchy.

Supremacy and Conflicts

Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) codifies the principle that a state party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty, thereby asserting international law's supremacy in interstate relations. This rule, rooted in the customary principle of , holds states accountable for compliance regardless of domestic legal obstacles, with violations engaging state responsibility under frameworks like the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility (2001). Internationally, such supremacy ensures treaty obligations prevail, but it lacks direct mechanisms to override national sovereignty, relying instead on diplomatic pressure, countermeasures, or adjudication by tribunals like the (ICJ). The resolution of conflicts between international and domestic law hinges on whether a state adopts a monist or dualist approach to incorporation. In monist systems, such as those in or , international law integrates directly into the national order and typically supersedes inconsistent domestic norms, enabling courts to apply treaties or customary rules ex proprio motu. Dualist systems, prevalent in the and , view international and domestic law as distinct realms, necessitating legislative transformation of treaties into national law; here, conflicts often favor the domestic rule unless constitutional provisions mandate precedence, as in the UK's , which requires courts to interpret statutes compatibly with the where possible but permits declarations of incompatibility rather than invalidation. Domestic judicial practices reveal varied deference to international supremacy. In the United States, Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution designates treaties as "supreme Law of the Land" over state laws but subordinate to the Constitution itself and potentially to subsequent federal statutes under the last-in-time rule, as established in Whitney v. Robertson (124 U.S. 190, 1888), where a treaty provision yielded to a conflicting tariff act. European constitutional courts have asserted counterclaims of solange primacy for core national principles; Germany's , in its 1974 ruling, scrutinized Community law for compatibility with until assured otherwise, though later decisions like Solange II (1986) relaxed this to presumptive acceptance. In contrast, the enforces uniform supremacy of EU law over national constitutions in member states, as in (Case 6/64, 1964), invalidating conflicting domestic measures. When domestic authorities prioritize national , international tribunals disregard such rationales. The ICJ's LaGrand judgment (Germany v. United States, 2001) held that U.S. to comply with Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Article 36—due to state procedural defaults—constituted a breach, rejecting internal excuses and ordering remedial measures like review and reconsideration of convictions. Similarly, in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States, 2004), the Court reaffirmed that Article 27 VCLT precludes domestic barriers to provisional measures. These cases illustrate that while domestic supremacy claims persist—often justified by or constitutional identity—international attributes responsibility to the state, potentially escalating to sanctions or reparations, though enforcement depends on state consent and reciprocity rather than hierarchical compulsion.

Core Substantive Domains

Law of Treaties and State Responsibility

The law of treaties establishes the framework for international agreements between states, primarily codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), adopted by the Conference on the Law of Treaties on 22 May 1969 and entering into force on 27 January 1980 after ratification by 35 states. Article 2(1)(a) defines a as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." The VCLT applies to treaties concluded by states after its entry into force, with many provisions reflecting applicable even to non-parties, as recognized by states like the . Central to the VCLT is the principle of pacta sunt servanda under Article 26, which mandates that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Interpretation follows Article 31, requiring treaties to be construed in good faith according to the ordinary meaning of terms in their context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose, supplemented by subsequent agreements, practice, or relevant rules of international law if ambiguity arises (Article 32). Invalidity may result from coercion of a state or its representative (Article 52), error (Article 48), fraud (Article 49), corruption (Article 50), or conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens, Article 53). Termination or suspension can occur by consent, material breach (Article 60, defined as repudiation or violation of essential provisions), supervening impossibility of performance (Article 61), or fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus, Article 62, applicable only if the change radically transforms obligations and was unforeseen). State responsibility addresses the attribution of wrongful conduct and its consequences, as articulated in the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), adopted on 9 August 2001 and commended by UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83 without a convention due to insufficient consensus for further action. Article 1 establishes that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State," comprising two elements under Article 2: conduct attributable to the state and a breach of an international obligation. Attribution extends to acts of state organs (Article 4), persons or entities exercising governmental authority even ultra vires (Article 5), private actors under state direction or control (Article 8), or entities usurping governmental functions in the absence of officials (Article 9). Breaches include violations of treaty obligations, customary law, or general principles, assessed at the time of conduct unless the obligation specifies otherwise (Article 13). ARSIWA delineates circumstances precluding wrongfulness, such as state consent (Article 20), under the UN Charter (Article 21), countermeasures proportionate to prior wrongs (Article 22, excluding core rights like non-use of force), (Article 23), distress (Article 24), or necessity (Article 25, requiring no alternative and non-prejudicial effect on essential interests). Consequences mandate cessation and non-repetition (Articles 30-31), with reparation via restitution (Article 35), compensation for financially assessable damage (Article 36), or satisfaction such as acknowledgment or apology (Article 37). Invocation of responsibility follows under Part Three, allowing injured states to seek remedies or countermeasures, with serious breaches of jus cogens norms (Article 40) obliging all states to cooperate in response (Article 41). The law of treaties and intersect such that non-performance of treaty obligations constitutes an internationally wrongful act under ARSIWA unless the treaty provides specific remedies or suspension rules, as VCLT Article 73 explicitly reserves questions of responsibility without prejudice. For instance, a material breach under VCLT Article 60 triggers responsibility under ARSIWA, enabling countermeasures or termination, but ARSIWA's invocation rules apply to enforceability, reflecting a functional distinction: treaties define primary obligations, while responsibility governs secondary consequences like reparation. This regime underscores consent-based liability, with customary elements ensuring broad applicability beyond parties, though remains decentralized absent centralized .

Use of Force and Self-Defense

The foundational norm prohibiting the in is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter, which states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or against the or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the ." This provision, adopted on June 26, 1945, reflects a post-World War II consensus to curtail aggressive wars, building on earlier efforts like the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy but lacked enforcement mechanisms. The prohibition applies to both direct military actions and indirect coercion, such as arming insurgents to destabilize a , as affirmed by the (ICJ) in its 1986 Nicaragua v. United States judgment, where the Court held that U.S. support for Contra rebels constituted an unlawful under , even absent direct combat involvement. Exceptions to this prohibition are narrowly circumscribed. The primary allowance is for actions authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the , enabling collective measures to address threats to peace, but such authorizations require a determination of threat, breach, or aggression under Article 39 and are subject to the veto power of permanent members. The inherent , codified in Article 51, permits individual or collective responses "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the , until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security," with any measures reported immediately to the Council. This right draws from pre- , emphasizing that self-defense must satisfy criteria of necessity (no alternative means to repel the attack), proportionality (response not exceeding the injury suffered), and immediacy (action without undue delay). Customary international law on self-defense, as articulated in the 1837 Caroline incident—where British forces destroyed a U.S. vessel aiding Canadian rebels—requires that necessity be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The ICJ in Nicaragua confirmed that an "armed attack" under Article 51 entails significant scale and effects, distinguishing it from minor border incidents or mere provision of arms, thereby rejecting claims of collective self-defense on behalf of non-state groups without a full-scale assault. Proportionality assessments consider the totality of circumstances, including ongoing threats, as seen in subsequent ICJ rulings like Oil Platforms (2003), where Iran's attacks on neutral shipping were deemed disproportionate responses to alleged U.S. actions. Debates persist over anticipatory self-defense, where states act before an attack fully materializes. While some scholars invoke the Caroline formula to permit responses to imminent threats—defined as specific, credible dangers with no time for Security Council action—the ICJ's restrictive reading in Nicaragua and the 2004 Wall advisory opinion limits Article 51 to post-attack scenarios, viewing preemption as incompatible with Charter text unless authorized collectively. Customary acceptance of broader anticipatory action remains contested, with post-Cold War instances like Israel's 1981 Osirak reactor strike or the U.S. 2003 Iraq invasion invoking preventive rationales often criticized as exceeding legal bounds. The emergence of non-state actors has challenged traditional paradigms, particularly after the September 11, 2001, attacks by , which the U.S. cited as an "armed attack" justifying invasion of under Article 51, despite the host state's disputed complicity. UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) implicitly endorsed this by recognizing the attacks as threats to peace without requiring state attribution, suggesting evolving customary tolerance for self-defense against unattributable non-state violence if it reaches armed attack thresholds. However, the ICJ's Nicaragua emphasis on scale implies that sporadic terrorist acts may not suffice absent state involvement or cumulative gravity, complicating responses to groups like , where over 80 states invoked Article 51 by 2018 for operations in and . Enforcement remains decentralized, reliant on state reciprocity and Council action, underscoring the norm's fragility amid power asymmetries.

International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict or jus in bello, comprises rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict for humanitarian reasons by protecting persons who do not or no longer take part in hostilities, such as civilians, wounded soldiers, and prisoners of war, and by restricting the means and methods of warfare. It applies to both international armed conflicts between states and non-international armed conflicts involving non-state armed groups, though protections differ in scope between these categories. IHL is distinct from , which governs the legality of resorting to force, focusing instead on conduct during hostilities. The foundational treaties of IHL include the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which established regulations on the laws and customs of war on land, prohibiting unnecessary suffering and regulating weapons like expanding bullets. These were supplemented by the four of 1949, adopted in response to atrocities during , addressing the wounded and sick in armed forces (Convention I), wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea (II), prisoners of war (III), and civilians (IV). All 196 recognized states are parties to the , making them universally ratified, with Additional Protocols in 1977 extending protections to victims of non-international conflicts and enhancing safeguards in international ones. , binding on all states regardless of treaty ratification, further supplements these instruments, incorporating practices like the prohibition of chemical weapons. Core principles of IHL include distinction, requiring parties to differentiate between combatants and or civilian objects, targeting only the former; proportionality, mandating that anticipated civilian harm not be excessive relative to the concrete military advantage; , permitting only actions indispensable for military purposes; and humanity, forbidding superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. These principles derive from provisions and customary norms, aiming to balance military imperatives with humanitarian imperatives, though their application demands contextual assessment by commanders. IHL protections extend to specific categories: medical personnel and facilities must not be attacked, is safeguarded, and weapons causing indiscriminate harm, such as biological agents, are banned under complementary conventions. In non-international conflicts, Common Article 3 of the mandates humane treatment without adverse distinction, prohibiting violence to life, , and hostage-taking, applicable to all parties including non-state actors. Enforcement relies on state responsibility to investigate and prosecute grave breaches, defined as war crimes like willful killing or , with universal jurisdiction permitting prosecution by any state. The (ICC) addresses individual accountability for such acts in member states or Security Council referrals, yet challenges persist, including non-ratification by major powers like the , , and , proliferation of non-state armed groups evading state-like obligations, and selective compliance influenced by geopolitical interests, leading to frequent violations despite IHL's normative universality. Empirical data from ongoing conflicts, such as those in and , indicate high non-compliance rates, underscoring enforcement gaps due to lack of centralized authority and reliance on voluntary state action.

International Criminal Accountability

International criminal accountability establishes individual criminal responsibility for the most serious violations of international law, departing from traditional state-centric focus by prosecuting persons for acts like , , war crimes, and aggression. This framework originated with the post-World War II tribunals, particularly the International Military Tribunal at , convened in 1945 under the London Charter, which affirmed that individuals, including heads of state, bear responsibility for international crimes regardless of official capacity or if manifestly unlawful. The , codified by the UN in 1950, rejected head-of-state immunity and established that acts constituting crimes under international law incur personal liability. Subsequent developments included the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in (1946–1948), applying similar principles to Japanese leaders, and ad hoc tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, established 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 827) and the (ICTR, 1994 by Resolution 955), which prosecuted atrocities from the and 1994 Rwandan genocide, respectively. These tribunals developed doctrines such as , holding superiors liable for subordinates' crimes if they knew or should have known and failed to prevent or punish them. The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), created in 2012, continues residual functions of the ICTY and ICTR. The permanent (ICC), established by the adopted on July 17, 1998, and entering into force on July 1, 2002, exercises jurisdiction over the core crimes defined therein: per the 1948 , (widespread or systematic attacks on civilians, including murder, extermination, enslavement, and rape), war crimes (grave breaches of the and other serious violations in armed conflict), and the (added via Kampala Amendments effective 2018). Jurisdiction requires the crime to occur on territory of a state party, involve nationals of state parties, or be referred by the UN Security Council; the ICC acts only complementarily, intervening if national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute genuinely. Enforcement relies on state cooperation for arrests and evidence, as the ICC lacks police powers, leading to challenges like non-surrender of indictees (e.g., Omar al-Bashir of , indicted 2009 for Darfur genocide, remains at large). Selectivity in case selection—early ICC prosecutions focused disproportionately on African situations (e.g., , Congo, , )—has drawn criticism for perceived bias, with resolutions in 2009 and 2017 accusing the court of targeting Africa while ignoring Western-involved conflicts. Academic analyses highlight that , constrained by resources and politics, undermines perceived legitimacy, as powerful states (non-parties like the , , ) evade scrutiny despite referrals (e.g., UNSC on , ). Despite convictions (e.g., ICTY's 90, ICTR's 61, ICC's 10 as of 2023), effectiveness is limited by enforcement gaps and sovereignty tensions, with withdrawal threats (e.g., 2019, 2017) illustrating resistance to perceived overreach.

Human Rights Regimes

The international human rights regime originates with the framework, centered on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the on December 10, 1948, in . Although not a binding treaty, the UDHR has attained status through widespread state practice and has served as the foundation for subsequent binding instruments, articulating civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. This global system expanded with the "International Bill of Rights," comprising the UDHR alongside the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both adopted by the on December 16, 1966. The ICCPR, addressing rights such as freedom of expression and fair trials, entered into force on March 23, 1976, and binds 174 states parties as of June 2024, monitored by the Human Rights Committee through state reports and individual complaints under its Optional Protocol. The ICESCR, focusing on rights to work, health, and education, entered into force on January 3, 1976, with 173 states parties as of August 2025, overseen by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Additional UN treaties, such as the Convention Against Torture (1984) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), form a core of nine instruments, each with expert committees for compliance review, though enforcement depends on state consent and lacks universal judicial compulsion. The UN Human Rights Council, established in 2006 to replace the Commission on Human Rights, conducts universal periodic reviews but faces criticism for selective scrutiny, including disproportionate resolutions against Israel—nearly half of its condemnatory actions—and admitting states with poor records, undermining impartiality. Regional human rights regimes supplement the UN system, varying in robustness and jurisdiction. The (ECHR), adopted in 1950 under the , established the (ECtHR) in 1959, which by 2023 had overseen execution of judgments in thousands of cases but left 3,819 pending, including 1,071 leading cases, highlighting persistent non-compliance by states like prior to its 2022 expulsion. In the Americas, the (1969) created the (IACtHR), operational since 1979, with jurisdiction accepted by 20 states; it has issued binding rulings on violations like forced disappearances, though enforcement relies on mechanisms amid political resistance. Africa's regime, via the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981, entered 1986), features the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (inaugurated 1987) and the African Court (2006), but the latter's direct individual access is limited to eight states' declarations, reflecting weaker institutionalization and compliance. These regimes promote universal standards but encounter enforcement gaps due to state sovereignty, with no centralized coercive authority; compliance often correlates with domestic political will rather than treaty obligations alone. Selectivity persists, as powerful states evade scrutiny while weaker ones face disproportionate pressure, and debates over challenge Western-centric norms embedded in instruments like the UDHR. Empirical data shows ratification widespread—over 170 parties for core covenants—but violations continue, as evidenced by ongoing ECtHR backlogs and UN Council resolutions favoring geopolitical allies.

Economic, Trade, and Financial Law

International economic law governs cross-border trade, investment, and financial flows through multilateral agreements and institutions aimed at reducing barriers and promoting stability, though enforcement often hinges on state compliance and economic leverage rather than centralized authority. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed on October 30, 1947, by 23 countries, established core principles including most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, national treatment, and tariff-binding to minimize discriminatory barriers and foster reciprocal liberalization. These principles were incorporated into the World Trade Organization (WTO), created on January 1, 1995, under the Marrakesh Agreement by 123 founding members, which expanded coverage to services (GATS), intellectual property (TRIPS), and agriculture while providing a formal dispute settlement mechanism. As of 2023, the WTO comprises 164 members, overseeing about 98% of global trade, but its single-undertaking approach—requiring consensus on all issues—has led to gridlock. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), operational since 1995, mandates compulsory consultations, panel rulings, and an for appeals, with automatic adoption of reports unless consensus rejects them, marking a shift from GATT's weaker consensus-based blocking. Over 600 disputes have been filed, with compliance rates around 90% in monitored cases, though effectiveness varies: powerful states like the and often secure favorable outcomes due to retaliatory capacity, while smaller economies face capacity gaps and prolonged procedures averaging 12-15 months. Criticisms include judicial overreach by the , which the has blocked since 2017 by refusing judge appointments, paralyzing appeals and prompting alternative mechanisms like the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement used by 25 members as of 2023. Financial law centers on institutions from the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, where 44 Allied nations established the (IMF) to oversee fixed exchange rates pegged to the US dollar and , providing short-term balance-of-payments loans to prevent competitive devaluations. The IMF, with 190 members and $1 trillion in quotas as of 2023, now focuses on surveillance, crisis lending (e.g., $650 billion in allocated in 2021), and conditionality tied to fiscal reforms, though programs have drawn criticism for exacerbating in recipient states without guaranteed growth. Complementing it, the finances long-term development projects, disbursing $128.6 billion in commitments in fiscal 2023, but both institutions reflect postwar US dominance, with voting power weighted by economic size (US holds 16.5% in IMF). Investment law primarily operates via over 2,500 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and multilateral pacts, which protect foreign investors through fair and equitable treatment, expropriation safeguards, and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The first modern BIT was signed between and in 1959; by 2023, networks cover most states, often incorporating under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), established in 1966 by the World Bank's Convention ratified by 158 states. ICSID has registered over 900 cases since inception, awarding investors billions (e.g., $50 billion in known claims by 2020), but faces critiques for bias toward capital-exporting states and chilling domestic regulation, prompting reforms like the EU's 2019 Investment Court System proposal. Economic sanctions, as non-forcible countermeasures, derive legality from UN Charter Article 41 under Chapter VII, authorizing Security Council measures to address threats to peace after Article 39 determinations, as in 15 active regimes since 1966 targeting proliferation and . Unilateral sanctions by states like the (e.g., against since 1979, intensified 2018) lack explicit Charter prohibition but risk violating non-intervention principles under Article 2(4) if extraterritorial, though permits countermeasures for breaches; effectiveness is mixed, with studies showing GDP reductions of 2-3% in targeted economies but frequent evasion via third parties. Multilateral efforts like the stalled Doha Round (launched November 2001 for development-focused liberalization) underscore challenges, collapsing by 2015 due to disputes and North-South divides, shifting trade liberalization to plurilateral deals like CPTPP (2018, 11 members). Overall, these regimes prioritize and reciprocity but reveal asymmetries favoring stronger economies.

Environmental Regulation and Resource Management

International environmental law governs transboundary pollution, , conservation, and shared resource management, primarily through multilateral treaties that impose obligations on states to cooperate despite constraints. These frameworks emerged prominently after the 1972 Stockholm Conference, addressing issues like atmospheric degradation and overexploitation of commons. Key instruments include the 1987 , which phased out ozone-depleting substances and achieved near-universal ratification, leading to recovery of the Antarctic by mid-century projections. In contrast, climate regimes under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have struggled with compliance, as global rose 54% from 1990 to 2022 despite commitments. The Kyoto Protocol (1997, entered into force 2005) mandated binding emission reductions for developed countries, resulting in a 22% average annual cut among participants during its second period (2013-2020), though overall global emissions increased due to growth in developing economies exempt from targets. The 2015 Paris Agreement shifted to nationally determined contributions (NDCs), requiring parties to pursue emission peaks before 2025 and 43% reductions by 2030 relative to 2019 levels to meet 1.5°C goals, but lacks enforcement teeth, relying on transparency reports and peer pressure; current policies project 2.5-2.9°C warming by 2100. Biodiversity efforts via the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity aim to halt species loss, yet one million species face extinction risks, with implementation hampered by weak national enforcement. Resource management focuses on global commons like oceans and , where the 1982 United Nations Convention on the (UNCLOS) delineates maritime zones and mandates conservation of living resources, including exclusive economic zones extending 200 nautical miles. The 2023 Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement addresses high-seas genetic resources and marine protected areas, complementing UNCLOS but facing ratification delays. In , the 1959 Antarctic Treaty suspends territorial claims and bans mineral exploitation via the 1991 Protocol, promoting scientific cooperation and ecosystem protection, though enforcement relies on consultative parties. These regimes highlight causal challenges: free-rider incentives in non-excludable resources lead to , as states prioritize domestic economic gains over . Enforcement gaps persist due to absent centralized authority, with treaties often non-binding or dependent on national implementation, allowing violations without sanctions beyond naming and shaming. National sovereignty enables opt-outs, as seen in U.S. non-ratification of , and economic pressures override commitments, exemplified by rising use in offsetting Western reductions. Empirical assessments indicate modest successes in targeted pollutants like CFCs but failures in diffuse problems like , where causal links to policy are obscured by confounding factors such as technological shifts and .

Territorial Disputes, Law of the Sea, and Space Law

International law on territorial disputes primarily derives from customary principles and state consent to adjudication, with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) applying criteria such as treaty stipulations, historical title through discovery and occupation, and effectivités—demonstrated administrative control—to determine sovereignty. In the Burkina Faso v. Mali case of 1986, the ICJ upheld the principle of uti possidetis juris, preserving colonial administrative boundaries at independence to prevent chaos in decolonization, awarding territory based on 1930s maps and effective control evidence. However, enforcement remains voluntary; states like Russia in the Aerial Incident off the Coast of the USSR (1983) have ignored ICJ rulings, highlighting reliance on political will rather than compulsory mechanisms. Ongoing disputes, such as those over the Falkland Islands or Kuril Islands, persist due to competing effectivités claims and rejection of third-party jurisdiction, underscoring international law's limits against power asymmetries. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982 and entering force in 1994, codifies maritime zones including a territorial sea extending up to 12 nautical miles from baselines, where coastal states exercise full sovereignty akin to land territory, and an up to 200 nautical miles granting sovereign rights over resources. The contiguous zone reaches 24 nautical miles for customs and immigration enforcement, while the continental shelf allows resource exploitation beyond the EEZ if geological criteria are met, subject to Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf delineation. Disputes are addressed via compulsory procedures under Annex VII arbitration or the , as in the 2016 where a ruled 's "" incompatible with UNCLOS, invalidating historic rights beyond generated entitlements and declaring features like incapable of sustaining human habitation for EEZ claims. rejected the award, continuing island-building and patrols, illustrating non-compliance despite 168 parties to UNCLOS (excluding the U.S., which adheres as ); enforcement gaps favor powerful actors, with no direct coercive mechanisms beyond diplomatic pressure. Space law, anchored in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) ratified by over 110 states, prohibits national appropriation of outer space, the , or celestial bodies by claim of , use, or occupation, mandating exploration for peaceful purposes and international cooperation. Article VI imposes state responsibility for all national activities, including those by non-governmental entities, requiring authorization and supervision of private actors like or to ensure compliance. The treaty bans nuclear weapons and WMD in orbit or celestial bodies but permits conventional military uses, contributing to challenges like anti-satellite (ASAT) tests—China's 2007 test generated over 3,000 debris pieces, risking cascades. Emerging issues include resource extraction ambiguities, with the U.S. 2020 asserting safety zones around mining operations without violating non-appropriation, contrasting the 1979 Moon Agreement's common heritage regime ratified by few states; private commercialization outpaces regulation, as states bear liability for damages under the 1972 Liability Convention without robust attribution mechanisms for hybrid actors. Militarization escalates with dual-use satellites, yet no comprehensive treaty prevents , relying on voluntary norms amid great power competition.

Theoretical Frameworks

Positivist approaches to international law assert that legal obligations arise solely from the explicit or implicit of states, rather than from abstract moral principles or independent of state will. This methodology emphasizes observable sources such as treaties and customary practices, where validity stems from state agreement, aligning with post-Westphalian notions of where states are the primary subjects and no supranational authority enforces compliance coercively. Positivism thus prioritizes empirical evidence of consent over normative derivations, viewing international law as a horizontal system of reciprocal undertakings among equals. Consent manifests primarily through treaties, which codify explicit state agreements, and custom, inferred from consistent state practice accompanied by opinio juris—the belief that such practice constitutes legal obligation. The principle of pacta sunt servanda, obligating states to honor treaties in good faith, derives its force from the consenting parties' mutual commitment, as reflected in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), adopted on May 22, 1969, and entering into force on January 27, 1980. This convention, ratified by 116 states as of 2023, exemplifies positivist codification by regulating treaty formation, interpretation, and termination based on state volition, without invoking external moral imperatives. Key early 20th-century theorists like Heinrich Triepel and Dionisio Anzilotti advanced consent-based frameworks by conceptualizing international law as the product of a "common will" (Völkerwille) among states, distinct from domestic law's unilateral commands. Triepel, in his 1899 work Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, argued that international norms emerge from coordinated state intentions, while Anzilotti's dualist theory in Corso di diritto internazionale (1912 onward) separated international and municipal legal orders, insisting that international rules bind only through collective state consent, rejecting monist integrations that might impose law without agreement. These views influenced Article 38 of the of the International Court of Justice (1945), which lists treaties and custom as primary sources, subordinating general principles to evidentiary roles rather than foundational ones. In practice, positivism's consent requirement limits international law's scope to areas where states perceive mutual benefit, explaining the absence of universal enforcement mechanisms and reliance on reciprocity or self-help for compliance. Reservations to treaties, permitted under VCLT Article 19 if compatible with the treaty's object and purpose, further underscore voluntarism, allowing states to tailor obligations while preserving overall consent. This approach, while critiqued for potential fragmentation in addressing global challenges like climate change, maintains analytical rigor by grounding law in verifiable state behavior rather than aspirational universals.

Natural Law and Universalist Perspectives

Natural law theory posits that certain principles of justice and morality are inherent in and discernible through reason, forming a universal foundation for legal obligations among states independent of explicit consent or positive enactments. This perspective traces to ancient Stoic and Roman influences but gained systematic articulation in early modern thought, particularly through 's (1625), where he defined as "the dictate of right reason" indicating moral necessity or turpitude in actions, applicable to all rational beings including sovereign states. Grotius secularized by arguing its validity would hold even if God did not exist, emphasizing its rational basis over divine command, thereby providing a non-theological groundwork for interstate rules on war, property, and treaties. Preceding Grotius, Spanish Scholastics like integrated Thomistic into discourse on the Spanish conquests, asserting universal rights and duties that bound European powers toward , such as prohibitions on unjust absent cause like or punishment for grave wrongs. These universalist elements framed international law as deriving from shared human rationality rather than or power dynamics, influencing concepts like () as a bridge between natural and voluntary law. In practice, this supported obligations—duties owed to the as a whole—evident in modern recognitions of jus cogens norms like the prohibition of , which persist despite lacking universal due to their rootedness in fundamental moral imperatives. Universalist perspectives extend by advocating that international norms must reflect objective human goods, such as life, knowledge, and sociability, transcending state sovereignty and enabling critique of positivistic consent models that tolerate atrocities if unprohibited by . Critics within academia, often aligned with positivist traditions, contend this approach risks imposing subjective moralities, yet proponents counter that empirical failures of consent-based systems—such as pre-20th century tolerance of or —demonstrate natural law's necessity for binding constraints on state behavior. Empirical support includes the post-World War II codification of in the Nuremberg Charter (1945), justified not solely by victor imposition but by appeals to universal principles predating the conflict. This framework persists in debates over , where natural law rationalizes actions against sovereign violations of basic rights, as seen in invocations during the 1999 Kosovo intervention.

Realist Critiques and Power-Based Realism

Classical realists, such as , contend that international law derives its limited efficacy from the underlying distribution of power among states rather than from inherent normative force or institutional mechanisms. In an anarchic international system devoid of a sovereign enforcer, Morgenthau argued in (1948) that legal rules function as instruments of national policy only when backed by the material capabilities of dominant actors, critiquing positivist views that overemphasize consent and custom without accounting for coercive realities. This perspective holds that attempts to universalize international law ignore the primacy of state self-interest defined in terms of power, as evidenced by Morgenthau's post-World War II shift from legal scholarship to realism, where he observed law's impotence against aggressive expansionism absent balancing coalitions. Neorealists extend this critique by emphasizing structural constraints of , asserting that international institutions and treaties fail to mitigate great-power competition or compel compliance beyond what self-interested calculations already dictate. , in his 1994 article "The False Promise of International Institutions," argues that institutions like the serve redistributive functions favoring weaker states but possess no independent causal power to alter state behavior, as powerful states routinely bypass them when vital interests are at stake—such as the ' 2003 invasion of despite Security Council reservations. Empirical analyses supporting realist skepticism show compliance rates varying inversely with power asymmetries; for instance, great powers exhibit lower adherence to rulings against them, with only 30-40% of such decisions leading to full implementation between 1946 and 2000, attributable to interest convergence rather than legal obligation. Power-based realism further posits that international law emerges as an epiphenomenon of hegemonic stabilization, where dominant states impose rules reflecting their preferences, as seen in the post-1945 liberal order crafted under U.S. preponderance, which prioritized open markets and alliances like NATO over strict territorial sovereignty norms. This view critiques idealistic enforcement narratives by highlighting instances where law yields to raw power, such as China's rejection of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on South China Sea claims, underscoring that legal outcomes depend on military and economic leverage rather than judicial authority. Realists maintain that such patterns persist because states calculate adherence based on relative gains, with data from treaty compliance studies indicating that violations spike during power transitions, as in the 60% non-compliance rate among major powers in arms control agreements during the Cold War's endgame (1989-1991). Critics within realism also warn against overreliance on law as ideology, which saw as masking power disparities and fostering illusions of order, potentially disarming prudent statecraft. While acknowledging sporadic successes—like the 1815 Congress of Vienna's balance-of-power settlements stabilizing for decades—realists attribute these to geopolitical equilibria, not legal innovation, cautioning that systemic biases in academic assessments of law's role often stem from institutional incentives favoring normative optimism over power-centric explanations.

Critical Theories and Compliance Rationales

Critical theories of international law, emerging prominently in the late 20th century, contest the discipline's purported neutrality and universality by emphasizing its historical embeddedness in power structures, colonial legacies, and ideological biases. Scholars associated with Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) argue that international law perpetuates global inequalities originating from European imperialism, such as through doctrines like uti possidetis that entrenched colonial borders post-independence, thereby constraining sovereignty in the Global South. This perspective critiques institutions like the International Monetary Fund for imposing conditionalities that favor creditor states, evidenced by structural adjustment programs in the 1980s-1990s that correlated with increased poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, where GDP per capita stagnated or declined in affected countries between 1980 and 2000. However, TWAIL's emphasis on systemic oppression often prioritizes narrative over falsifiable causal mechanisms, potentially overlooking instances where international law facilitated decolonization, as in the 1960 UN Declaration on Granting Independence, which contributed to over 80 former colonies gaining sovereignty by 1975. Feminist critiques further highlight international law's gender insensitivity, contending that its state-centric framework marginalizes women's experiences and reinforces patriarchal norms, such as in human rights treaties that historically subsumed gender violence under public order rather than private sphere abuses until the 1993 Vienna Declaration. Proponents like assert that doctrines like obscure gendered hierarchies in conflict zones, where data from the UN shows women comprising 70-90% of refugees in recent armed conflicts. extensions similarly decry international law's racial underpinnings, linking it to hierarchies that sustain disparities, though empirical analyses reveal limited direct causation, with compliance variations better attributable to economic incentives than embedded . These approaches, while illuminating oversights, frequently derive from postmodern that renders law indeterminate, undermining predictive utility; for instance, critiques rarely quantify how alternative frameworks would yield superior outcomes, contrasting with positivist models that align more closely with observed state behaviors. Compliance rationales explain state adherence to international law not as moral imperative but through instrumental and normative logics. Rationalist theories posit that states comply when legal commitments align with self-interests, such as reputational costs or mechanisms; empirical studies across and regimes indicate baseline compliance rates of 70-80% even absent strong sanctions, rising with verifiable monitoring like WTO dispute panels, which resolved over 600 cases since 1995 with adherence in 90% of instances. Constructivist accounts emphasize norm internalization and identity formation, where repeated interactions foster a "compliance culture," as in the on , where participation grew from 24 parties in 1987 to 197 by 2000, driven partly by shared rather than . Yet, evidence tempers constructivism: cross-national data on environmental treaties show compliance correlating more strongly with domestic capacity and economic alignment (r=0.6-0.8) than normative persuasion alone, suggesting rational calculations predominate. Realist-inflected views underscore power asymmetries, where great powers like the selectively comply—evident in non-ratification of the in 1998—while weaker states face pressure, though aggregate data from 1946-2010 reveals no consistent violation pattern tied to power status alone. Overall, hybrid models integrating rational incentives with limited normative effects best account for observed patterns, as pure falters against defection in high-stakes domains like , where the 2015 Iran deal saw partial compliance until withdrawal in 2018 amid perceived imbalances.

Challenges, Controversies, and Effectiveness

Enforcement Gaps and Selective Application

International law suffers from inherent enforcement gaps due to the absence of a centralized with coercive power, unlike domestic legal systems. Compliance relies primarily on voluntary state adherence, reputational costs, reciprocity, and decentralized measures such as countermeasures or sanctions imposed by affected states, but these prove insufficient against non-compliant actors unwilling to yield. Scholarly analyses highlight that international law's horizontal structure, predicated on sovereign equality, lacks robust self-enforcing mechanisms, leading to frequent noncompliance, particularly in areas like or environmental treaties where monitoring and verification are challenging. The United Nations Security Council exemplifies these gaps through its veto power, wielded by the five permanent members (P5: , , , , ), which has blocked enforcement actions over 300 times since 1945, often shielding allies or national interests. For instance, vetoed 16 resolutions on between 2011 and 2023, preventing collective measures against regime atrocities, while the has vetoed numerous drafts critical of , such as 45 since 1972 related to conflicts. This structural feature, designed to ensure great power buy-in, results in paralysis on high-stakes issues, undermining the UN Charter's mandate for maintaining international peace and security under Chapter VII. Selective application further erodes efficacy, as enforcement disproportionately targets weaker states while great powers evade accountability, reflecting power asymmetries rather than impartial rule application. The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002, illustrates this bias: of 52 arrest warrants issued by 2023, over 80% targeted African situations, prompting accusations of neocolonial selectivity despite the court's global jurisdiction over , war crimes, and . Non-party states like the , , and face no direct obligations, and investigations into actions in stalled without indictments, while ICC probes into Palestinian territories advanced amid great power resistance. Realist critiques attribute this selectivity to causal dynamics where military and economic might dictate compliance: powerful states like the ignored ICJ rulings, such as the 1986 Nicaragua case on unlawful intervention, without reprisal, whereas smaller states like faced 1990-2003 sanctions for invasion violations. Empirical studies confirm that noncompliance rates exceed 50% in domains without strong monitoring, with great powers exploiting institutional vetoes or non-ratification—e.g., non-adherence to the —to sidestep constraints, perpetuating a system where law serves as a tool for the powerful rather than a universal restraint. Such patterns foster legitimacy deficits, as evidenced by rising challenges to UNSC reform demands from Global South states since the .

Sovereignty Erosion and Great Power Resistance

International institutions and doctrines have progressively eroded traditional state by imposing obligations that intrude on domestic authority, particularly through mechanisms like the and the . The ICC, established by the effective July 1, 2002, asserts jurisdiction over , war crimes, and , potentially overriding national prosecutorial discretion and immunities for heads of state or military leaders. Similarly, R2P, endorsed unanimously at the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, reframes as a responsibility to protect populations from atrocities, justifying international intervention—including military action—when states fail, as seen in NATO's 2011 operation authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011. These frameworks, while rooted in preventing atrocities, enable selective application that diminishes the Westphalian norm of non-interference, with empirical analyses indicating that economic integration via investor-state dispute settlement further constrains policy autonomy in over 3,000 bilateral investment treaties as of 2023. Great powers, possessing military and economic leverage, have systematically resisted these erosive tendencies to safeguard their core interests. The signed the on December 31, 2000, but unsigned it on May 6, 2002, under President , citing threats to national sovereignty and military operations; it has since enacted the of 2002 to prohibit cooperation with the ICC regarding U.S. personnel. China refused to participate in the 2013-2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration proceedings initiated by the over claims, rejecting the July 12, 2016, award as "null and void" for exceeding jurisdictional limits under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and has continued militarization of disputed features. , likewise, dismissed the International Court of Justice's March 16, 2022, provisional measures ordering suspension of military operations in under the , maintaining its invasion launched February 24, 2022, as a defensive response. This resistance manifests structurally through veto power in the UN Security Council, where permanent members block enforcement actions adverse to their positions; and together cast 18 vetoes on Syria-related resolutions from to , preventing sanctions or interventions despite documented atrocities. Such patterns align with realist observations that great powers treat international law as a tool for weaker states while prioritizing power balances, as U.S.-- divergences over scopes and underscore in contemporary conflicts. Empirical data from compliance studies reveal lower adherence rates among great powers to unfavorable rulings—e.g., non-compliance in 70% of ICJ cases involving major powers since —highlighting how institutional designs accommodate rather than constrain hegemonic interests.

Institutional Biases and Legitimacy Deficits

![International Criminal Court 2018][float-right] International institutions administering international law, such as the (UNHRC), the (ICJ), and the (ICC), exhibit institutional biases stemming from their compositional structures, selection processes, and operational dependencies, which undermine their perceived neutrality and legitimacy. The UNHRC, for instance, maintains a permanent agenda item focused solely on , resulting in disproportionate condemnations: between 2015 and 2023, the UN adopted 154 resolutions against compared to 71 against all other countries combined. This selectivity arises from voting patterns dominated by blocs like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which prioritize resolutions against Western-aligned states while minimizing scrutiny of authoritarian regimes such as or , despite their documented abuses. The ICC faces accusations of selectivity bias, with the majority of its investigations and convictions targeting African states and individuals. As of recent assessments, 15 of 22 active cases involve African situations, and all but one convicted has been a Black African male, fueling perceptions of racial and regional rather than impartial . This pattern, critiqued in scholarly analyses, reflects prosecutorial discretion influenced by referral sources—often UN Security Council referrals or dynamics—and a to pursue cases against nationals of non-party states like the or , eroding the Court's universality claim. Legitimacy deficits are compounded by non-ratification by major powers (e.g., the , , and have not joined), limiting and enforcement, as evidenced by withdrawals like Burundi's in 2017 amid perceived targeting. At the ICJ, judicial selection and voting behavior reveal national interest alignments over abstract legalism. Empirical studies indicate that judges often vote in patterns mirroring their appointing states' foreign policy positions, particularly in contentious cases involving geopolitical rivals. The election process, involving UN and Security Council votes, favors candidates from influential states or blocs, introducing politicization: for example, regional representation quotas ensure overrepresentation of certain ideologies, as seen in advisory opinions on issues like the Israeli separation barrier, where outcomes align with majority non-Western views. Funding dependencies further strain legitimacy; the UN system, encompassing these bodies, relies heavily on contributions from a few donors—the provides about 22% of the regular budget—creating leverage points for accusations of donor influence or, conversely, resentment when policies diverge from donor interests. These biases contribute to broader legitimacy deficits, as powerful states resist compulsory and mechanisms, viewing institutions as arenas for projection rather than impartial arbiters. Under rivalry, compliance rates drop, with non-enforcement in cases like Russia's actions in highlighting structural weaknesses. Scholarly critiques, often from sources acknowledging Western academic tendencies toward deference to , nonetheless substantiate that without reforms to selection, funding transparency, and universal participation, these institutions risk deepening perceptions of illegitimacy, as measured by declining state cooperation and metrics in global surveys.

Empirical Failures and Successes in Specific Domains

The World Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanism represents one of the more empirically successful domains of international law, having adjudicated 631 disputes as of December 31, 2024, with many resolved through consultations or panel rulings leading to compliance by respondents. Complainants have prevailed in approximately 90% of cases reaching a ruling, contributing to trade liberalization and reduced tariffs globally since 1995, though the system's effectiveness has waned since 2019 due to the paralysis of the amid U.S. objections to judicial overreach. This quasi-automatic enforcement contrasts with prior GATT processes, fostering predictability in commerce, yet recent delays—averaging 862 days for complaint processing in 2023—underscore vulnerabilities to great-power vetoes. In , the of 1949, ratified by all 196 states, exhibit mixed empirical outcomes, with compliance varying by conflict type but often failing in asymmetric or . Geospatial analyses of bombings in recent conflicts reveal frequent breaches of distinction principles, as in Syrian operations from 2011–2018 where civilian areas were disproportionately targeted, eroding protections for non-combatants. Successes include partial restraint in state-on-state engagements, such as limited use post-1993 conventions, but non-state actors like those in and routinely disregard common Article 3, with violations documented in over 80% of internal conflicts per ICRC reports. The International Criminal Court's prosecution of war crimes has yielded limited deterrence, with only 31 cases concluded since 2002, predominantly from African situations despite global mandates under the . Selectivity critiques highlight a focus on weaker states—10 of 12 situations investigated involve or non-permanent UN Security Council members—while major powers like and remain unprobed for alleged atrocities in and , respectively, raising legitimacy concerns rooted in resource constraints and political deference rather than legal neutrality. Empirical data on recidivism shows no clear reduction in atrocities post-indictments, as in where evaded arrest until 2019 without curbing violence. Environmental regimes under the of 2015 have failed to curb absolute global CO2 emissions, which rose from 36 gigatons in 2015 to projected 37.4 gigatons in 2023 despite nationally determined contributions from 196 parties. While carbon intensity declined by an estimated 4.1% globally post-agreement, driven by efficiency gains in , aggregate emissions trajectories remain incompatible with the 1.5–2°C warming limit, with non-compliance evident in major emitters like and exceeding pledges. Studies attribute modest relative successes to signaling effects but causal inefficacy to voluntary targets and weak enforcement, contrasting with binding ozone protocols like 1987 that achieved near-total phase-out. Under the Convention on the (UNCLOS), ratified by 169 parties since 1982, has succeeded in over 20 delimitations via , stabilizing fisheries and resource claims in areas like the . However, enforcement falters against non-compliant great powers, as in the where China's rejection of the 2016 arbitral award favoring the —invalidating nine-dash claims—has escalated without recourse, with vessel incursions rising 50% from 2016–2023 per data. This selective adherence by underscores power asymmetries, rendering UNCLOS ineffective for high-stakes zones despite its codification of exclusive economic zones.

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