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Albin Kurti
Albin Kurti
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Albin Kurti (Albanian: ['albin 'kuɾti]; born 24 March 1975) is a Kosovo Albanian politician who has been serving as Prime Minister of Kosovo since 2021, having previously held the office from February to June 2020. He came to prominence in 1997 as the vice-president of the University of Pristina student union, and a main organizer of non-violent student demonstrations of 1997 and 1998. Kurti then worked in Adem Demaçi's office when the latter became the political representative of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Kurti has been a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo since 2010 in three consecutive legislatures.

Key Information

Life and career

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Early life

[edit]

Albin Kurti was born on 24 March 1975 in Pristina, Kosovo of SFR Yugoslavia. Kurti's father, Zaim Kurti originates from an Albanian family from the village of Sukobin in Ulcinj Municipality, Montenegro; an engineer, he moved to Pristina in search for employment. Kurti's mother, Arife Kurti is a retired elementary school teacher, born and educated in Pristina.[1] Kurti also has two brothers, Arianit and Taulant. Kurti finished his elementary and middle education in Pristina. He graduated university in 2003 in Telecommunications and Computer Engineering at the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Pristina.[2]

Kosovo War

[edit]

Kurti first came to prominence in October 1997, as one of the leaders of the student protests in Kosovo. Albanian students protested against the occupation of the University of Pristina campus by the Yugoslav police. The occupation had started in 1991 and had led to ethnic Albanian academic staff and students having to use alternative locations for their classes due to them being barred from using university premises by Serbian law.[3] The protests were crushed violently, but the students and Kurti did not stop the resistance and they organized other protests in the following months. In July 1998, Kurti was the assistant of the political representative of the UÇK, Adem Demaçi. These actions made him a target of the Yugoslav police.[2][4]

In April 1999, during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Kurti was arrested and severely beaten by Yugoslav forces.[5] He was first sent to the Dubrava Prison, but as the Serbian army withdrew from Kosovo, they transferred him to a prison in Požarevac on 10 June 1999.[2] Later that year, he was charged with "jeopardizing Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and conspiring to commit an enemy activity linked to terrorism" and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.[6]

Kurti was released in December 2001 by Yugoslavia's post-Milošević government after being pardoned by President Vojislav Koštunica[7] amid international pressure. Since his release, he worked outside party politics in Kosovo but was a severe critic of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and of corruption. He organised non-violent protests in support of the families of those whose relatives disappeared in the war, and in favor of Kosovo's self-determination. On 23 April 2003 Kurti graduated with a degree in Computer and Telecommunications Sciences from the University of Prishtina. He was an activist for the Action for Kosovo Network (AKN), which was formed in 1997, and was a movement whose mission focused on human rights and social justice, education, culture and art.[citation needed]

Albin Kurti in a Vetëvendosje demonstration, 2013

Vetëvendosje

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On 12 June 2005 AKN activists wrote the slogan "No negotiations, Self-Determination" on the walls of UNMIK buildings. The police, with the help of UN Police, arrested, jailed, and convicted hundreds of activists, including Kurti. AKN then changed its name to the Self-Determination Movement (Vetëvendosje). Vetëvendosje demanded a referendum on the status of Kosovo, stating "only with a referendum as a use of international right for self-determination, can we realise a democratic solution for Kosovo, instead of negotiations which compromise freedom".[8]

In February 2007 Vetëvendosje organized a protest against the Ahtisaari Plan, which according to them divided Kosovo along ethnic lines and did not give the people of Kosovo what they were striving for. The protest turned violent and the Romanian UN Police killed two unarmed protesters and injured 80 others with plastic and rubber bullets. Kurti was arrested. He was detained until July 2007 and then kept under house arrest. Amnesty International criticised the irregularities in his prosecution. He was eventually sentenced to nine months. Kurti was an advocate of "active nonviolent resistance".[9]

Vetëvendosje joined the political spectrum of Kosovo by running in the elections of 2010 for the first time. Albin Kurti was the candidate for prime minister, though Vetëvendosje only scored 12.69% and won 14 out of 120 seats in the assembly, becoming the third political force in the country. Vetëvendosje criticized the Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. The Vetëvendosje MPs, including Kurti, were escorted out of the parliament by police for disrupting the session of the assembly.[10]

Kurti ran for prime minister again in the following elections in 2014, but Vetëvendosje was third again, only gaining 16 seats. Vetëvendosje and Kurti personally were involved in the protests within the parliament that earned international attention by setting off tear gas in the parliament on multiple cases.[11][12]

In the 2017 election Vetëvendosje doubled in size, becoming the biggest political party in Kosovo and winning 32 seats (the most as an individual party compared to other parties in that election); his party took 200.135 votes (27,49%).[13] They were still defeated by the big PANA coalition that took 245.627 (33,74%). Albin Kurti became the most-voted politician in Kosovo. During this term, Kurti was the leader of the opposition and Vetëvendosje managed to put strong pressure on the government in coordination with the other opposition party, LDK. On 3 January 2018, Kurti was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months in prison on probation for his role in setting off the tear-gas in 2015.[14]

Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj resigned in July 2019, taking Kosovo to early elections in October 2019. In the elections that followed, Kurti's Vetëvendosje won the largest share of the electorate with 221.001 (26,27% or 29 seats) and remained the primary political force in Kosovo, with Kurti's share of votes increasing further in comparison to 2017. He became Prime Minister of Kosovo in early February 2020.

Following the 2019 Albania earthquake, Kurti visited Durrës to survey the damage and stressed the importance for institutional cooperation between both Kosovo and Albania.[15][16]

On 18 March 2020, Kurti sacked Interior Minister Agim Veliu (LDK) due to his support for declaring a state of emergency to handle the coronavirus pandemic, which would have given power to the Kosovo Security Council chaired by Hashim Thaçi (PDK). The Democratic League of Kosovo, the junior partner leader of the coalition, filed a no-confidence vote motion in retaliation for the sacking, and on 25 March, 82 members of the Kosovo Assembly voted in favour of the motion, and Kurti's cabinet becoming the first government to be voted out of power due to disagreements regarding the coronavirus pandemic.[17][18][19]

The Kurti cabinet continued as a caretaker government,[20][21] until 3 June 2020, when Avdullah Hoti was elected as the next Prime Minister.[22]

On 26 January 2021, Kurti was barred from running in the 2021 Kosovan parliamentary election by Kosovo's election complaints panel, as he had been convicted of a crime less than three years prior to the election.[23] In spite of this, the party went on to win by a landslide with 50.28% of the vote.

In the elections of February 9, 2025, the political party led by Kurti won the elections with 41% of the vote. Albin Kurti in these elections managed to become the most voted politician in the history of Kosovo, reaching 337.000 votes.[24][25][26]

Prime Minister of Kosovo (2020-2025)

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First Albin Kurti cabinet

On 3 February 2020, Albin Kurti was elected Prime Minister of Kosovo with 66 votes[27] in favor and 10 abstains,[28] 34 opposition MPs boycotted the vote and left the Kosovo assembly building.

One of the first decisions by Kurti and his cabinet was to repeal the unpopular pay raise awarded to ministers by the preceding Haradinaj government and return salaries to their previous amount.[29] As a result, the Prime Minister's monthly wage set at €2,950 will return to €1,500 for Kurti.[29]

As part of his government's policy platform, Kurti seeks to introduce a three-month period of military conscription service in Kosovo, viewing it important to the country's defence.[30][27]

Second Albin Kurti cabinet

Kurti was elected Prime Minister of Kosovo for a second time on 22 March 2021 with 67 members of the assembly voting in favour and 30 members against.[31]

Policies

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Economy

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According to the 2024 report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kosovo’s economy remained “resilient” during Kurti’s term, recording real GDP growth of 3.3% in 2023 and a projected 3.8% in 2024.[32] The Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs' economic report noted that, although the GDP growth had slowed down from 4.3% in 2022 largely due to weaker net exports, increased public investment and a further rise in remittances (14% of GDP) provided “positive momentum”. After peaking at 11.6% in 2022, inflation averaged 4.9% in 2023. To mitigate the impact of high costs, Kurti's government introduced a fiscal support package worth 4.3% of GDP, including energy subsidies and price controls on petroleum products. Revenues grew by 9% to €2.86 billion (29.6% of GDP), while capital expenditures expanded by 40.8%. As a result, Kosovo recorded the strongest pace of fiscal consolidation among the emerging European economies, reducing the deficit to 0.2% of GDP and public debt to 17.5% of GDP, the lowest level in the Western Balkans. Under Kurti's administration, ICT services exports grew by nearly 36%, travel services grew by 17.7% and the agriculture sector grew by 3.3% in 2023.[33]

Inflation decelerated further to 2% year-on-year in early 2024, while Kurti's fiscal policy was described as “prudent”. The IMF noted that all program targets and structural reforms under Kosovo’s Stand-By Arrangement were met, including improvements in tax compliance, public investment management and financial sector governance. Kosovo also received its first sovereign credit rating in 2023.[32]

According to the IMF's 2025 report and the World Bank's 2025 report, Kosovo’s economy actually grew by 4.4% in 2024,[34] which was higher than the projected growth given a year earlier.[35] Growth in 2025 was projected at 4% by the IMF[35] and 3.8% by the World Bank,[34] while inflation fell to 1.6% in 2024 before stabilising at around 2%. The fiscal deficit and public debt remained low due to the government’s economic policies, supported by higher tax revenues and improved fiscal management.[35]

In March 2025, Kosovo became an official donor to the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) with a $1.4 million contribution, joining the community of 78 countries that both borrow from and contribute to the fund. This contribution was made possible by Kosovo's steady economic progress since its independence.[36]

Energy

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In 2021, Kurti's government faced Kosovo's biggest energy crisis since 2010, leading to the declaration of a 60-day state of emergency for electricity supply on 24 December.[37] In July 2022, the United States granted Kosovo 236 million dollars for an energy project that would reinforce Kosovo's energy reserves through high capacity batteries of 170 megawatts (MWh), which would provide about 340 MWh of reserves.[38][39][40]

In 2023, the government signed a €56 million agreement to modernise turbines at TC Kosova B, extending its lifetime and adding 30 MWh of production capacity without raising emissions and reducing the need for constant repairs.[41][42][43] That same year, Kurti announced a 950 MWh renewable investment package, including plans for a 150 MWh wind farm and a 100 MWh solar farm. Climate-related damages in 2023 cost the state €28.9 million and affected 21,500 people, prompting commitments from Kurti's government to cut greenhouse-gas emissions by 36% by 2030.[44]

However, one of the most controversial aspects of the Kurti's administrations on the energy sector was the opposition of the Kosova e Re power plant project, a major coal-fired power station, whose plan was first presented in 2009 in order to address Kosovo's energy needs in the long term.[45] The Kosova e Re project had been negotiated by the previous government under former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj with the British company, ContourGlobal, and would have been the largest foreign direct investment in Kosovo's history. It also announced by ContourGlobal that the power plant would create around 10,000 jobs during the construction phase and greatly improve the air quality by reducing the harmful emissions coming from the old coal-fired power plants into the atmosphere.[46] On March 2020, one month after the formation of the government under Kurti’s leadership, ContourGlobal announced the abandonment of the Kosova e Re project, citing a lack of political support.[47] While this was praised by environmental groups and civil society groups fearing a raise of energy bills by up to 50 percent,[48] energy analysts criticized the cancellation, arguing that it eliminated an important future source of electrical energy capacity and increased Kosovo's dependence on electrical energy imports. In addition, the government of Kosovo also lost the arbitration case to ContourGlobal over the cancelled project and was ordered to pay compensation for the cancellation of over 20 million euros.[49][50][51]

Despite the cancellation of the Kosova e Re project, electricity prices still rose during Kurti’s administration. On April 2025, Kosovo experienced a 16.1% increase in electricity tariffs as it is forced to import more power to meet domestic demand.[52][53] Prior to this general rise, households consuming over 800 kWh per month, had already faced a sharp increase, with tariffs above this threshold being raised by approximately 103 percent.[54]

In 2024, at the Summit on the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, Kurti announced that his government's comprehensive energy strategy was aimed towards making Kosovo carbon neutral by 2050, and that this strategy was supported by the government's recent laws on climate change and renewable energy sources. However, substantial investments would be required for energy transition, waste management and transport decarbonisation.[44] In that same year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that Kosovo’s Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) has supported the government’s green agenda, including the first competitive auctions for solar and wind generation, as well as preparations for carbon pricing and measures to enhance energy efficiency, air quality and energy security.[32] Additionally, in January 2025, Kurti announced the launch of battery-based energy storage systems - 125 MWh under the Kosovo Energy Corporation and 45 MWh under KOSTT. These facilities, to be built in Ferizaj and Istog, would stabilise the power grid, reduce import costs, improve supply reliability and enable greater integration of renewable sources.[55]

Justice reforms and corruption

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During the 2021 election campaign, Kurti had promised vetting and the reform of the justice system. After his victory in the elections, the Kurti government brought the file on vetting and justice reform to the Assembly of Kosovo on 4 September 2022.[56] In 2023, the Assembly of Kosovo approved Kurti's Law on the State Bureau for the Verification and Confiscation of Unjustified Assets, following a positive opinion from the Venice Commission in 2022. The law foresaw that public officials, their family members and related third parties may have their assets reviewed, and in cases where a discrepancy of more than €25,000 is found between legal income and property, the Bureau can refer cases to the courts for confiscation. The Bureau was to be led by a director elected by the assembly for a five-year term, with confiscated assets to be managed by the Agency for the Administration of Seized or Confiscated Property. While the law was supported by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) announced it would challenge it and send it to the Constitutional Court.[57]

As Prime Minister, Kurti reformed Kosovo's Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APK), which has now provided the Ministry of Justice with the means to investigate corruption and prosecute criminals.[58][59] Since Kurti first became Prime Minister, Kosovo's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score has progressively increased from 36 in 2020 to 44 in 2024, meaning that corruption has declined during his term, and Kosovo currently ranks as the 73rd least corrupt country in the world.[60] According to a survey carried out by the GAP Institute in 2023, 62% of Kosovo's citizens believe that corruption has decreased since Kurti came to power.[59]

According to a 2024 analysis by the Group for Legal and Political Studies (GLPS), Kurti’s second government demonstrated stronger political will to tackle corruption than previous administrations, and introduced numerous reforms to this end. It also promoted greater transparency through digitalisation of procurement and administrative processes. However, GLPS noted that progress has been slow, with implementation hampered by institutional resistance, weak enforcement capacities and political obstacles, particularly in the judiciary. According to the GLPS, while Kurti has set an ambitious anti-corruption agenda, its impact has been limited, reflecting both the constraints of Kosovo’s institutions and the lack of broad parliamentary consensus necessary to push through deeper reforms.[61]

In June 2024, the OSCE published a trial-monitoring report on organised crime and corruption cases in Kosovo, based on 52 cases and 670 hearings held between July 2021 and March 2024. The report acknowledged several positive developments under Kurti’s government, including the adoption of the 2021–2026 Strategy on Rule of Law, the 2022–2024 Strategic Plan for the Effective Solution of Cases of Corruption and Organized Crime, and the March 2023 signing of a Joint Statement of Commitment by key stakeholders. At the same time, it highlighted persistent problems, such as high acquittal rates, delays, poor case management and inconsistent judicial practices. Minister of Justice Albulena Haxhiu stated at the report’s launch that the government had completed the anti-corruption legal package, approved the Law on the State Bureau for the Verification and Confiscation of Assets and established new regulations on whistleblower protection, while also preparing an anti-corruption task force and joint investigation team. The OSCE report concluded that while the government has advanced the legal framework, the judiciary still faces serious challenges in effectively adjudicating high-level corruption cases.[62]

In early 2025, Kurti repeatedly ignored summons from the Special Prosecution in Prishtina to testify as a witness in a case concerning the alleged misuse of €600,000 worth of state reserves by other politicians, of which Kurti was not personally involved in. While prosecutors insisted he appear in person, Kurti stated that he was willing to testify only from his office, accusing the prosecution of politicization and stated that, if his testimony was that important, the prosecution would have approached him at his office. Kurti believed that the Special Prosecution was, in his words, more interested in filling the front pages of news articles rather than actually bringing about justice.[63]

Social reforms

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Kurti has doubled Kosovo's minimum wage since he first took office. After remaining unchanged for 13 years, Kosovo’s minimum wage was raised to €350 gross per month, effective from 1 October 2024 onwards. Until then, Kosovo had the lowest minimum wage in the Balkans, set at €130 for workers under 35 and €170 for those over 35. The increase was enabled by a new law adopted in July 2023 and upheld by the Constitutional Court in June 2024, which allowed the government to set the minimum wage without mandatory consultation with social partners. The government initially proposed an increase to €264 in 2022, but that proposal was blocked for more than one year by the opposition and was then sent to the Constitutional Court, where it was delayed for another 11 months. Kurti's government considered that amount to be inadequate considering the time lapsed, and subsequently decided on €350. The Ministry of Finance estimated that the rise would benefit around 150,000 workers, particularly in the private sector and low-wage sectors such as gastronomy and construction, while the GAP Institute calculated that employers would collectively pay an additional €12 million monthly.[64][65] Tax rates were also changed alongside the increase in minimum wage; previously, monthly incomes from €80 onwards were taxed, but Kurti's new law legislated that no tax would be imposed on monthly salaries of up to €250. The tax rate for salaries ranging from €251 to €450 is now 8 per cent, whilst for salaries over €450, it is 10 percent.[65]

In September 2021, around six months after taking office, Kurti’s government introduced Kosovo’s first universal child benefit and extended maternity support to unemployed women. Under the scheme, all children aged 0–2 became entitled to €20 per month, while a phased plan gradually expanded a €10 benefit to children aged 2–16, reaching those aged 2–7 as early as November 2021. By that point, 68% of eligible infants and 58% of children aged 2–7 were already receiving payments. Unemployed mothers became eligible for six months of maternity benefits at €170 per month, equivalent to the minimum wage, though the requirement of at least one year of prior unemployment drew some criticism. Although critics raised concerns about potential “productivist” goals and risks of incentivising long-term unemployment, the measures were widely regarded as a significant improvement in Kosovo’s social protection system, particularly for lower-income households.[66] In 2024, the government increased the universal child benefit. Each child would now benefit from €20 per month until the age of 16, whereas if a family has 3 children or more, they will benefit from €30 a month for each child.[67][68]

In May 2024, Kurti's government launched a pilot of a reformed social assistance scheme, developed with support from the World Bank. The new program replaces the old model, which had excluded families once their children turned five or if any member earned even minimal income. Under the reform, eligibility is based on a poverty test, ensuring support for households with less than €100 per member per month, while also introducing incentives for beneficiaries to seek formal employment. Alongside this, the government reported that since the beginning of their term in 2021, over 400,000 children and 55,000 mothers had benefited from child and maternity allowances, around 100,000 women opened bank accounts for the first time, and over €100 million had been allocated to support pensioners and vulnerable families, including subsidies for electricity bills for more than 60,000 households.[69]

In October 2024, Kurti's government raised all pensions by 20%, covering more than 300,000 beneficiaries. This included raising the basic social pension from €100 to €120, contributory pensions ranging from €182–€265 to €218–€318 depending on category, and targeted increases for blind and paraplegic/tetraplegic beneficiaries. A further 20% rise for war-related categories was scheduled for January 2025.[70][71]

In late 2024, Kurti's government adopted the 2025–2030 Health Sector Strategy, which was formally approved in February 2025, which pledged universal and equal access to healthcare for Kosovo’s citizens. This was also packaged with a new health security action plan, developed with WHO and co-financed by the EU, which sets out long-term measures for public health emergency preparedness and response.[72][73]

Organised crime

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Kurti has stated that they have made progress in the fight against organised crime during his first two years in power, from 2021 to 2023. According to the figures published by the government, Kosovo Police have arrested over 3800 people for serious criminal offences, including over 300 public officials. 16 drug laboratories have been broken up, nine of them in North Mitrovica. In cooperation with Montenegro and North Macedonia, illegal roads have been closed along the respective borders. 24 illegal roads have also been closed in North Mitrovica which were used for smuggling, trafficking and illegal border crossing by organised crime structures.[74][75][76]

Kosovo Security Force

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The Kurti government has increased the budget for the Ministry of Defense. In 2017, the budget for the Kosovo Security Force was 51 million euros.

In 2022, the budget increased to 102 million euros and in 2023, it increased to 123 million. 153 million euros have been allocated for 2024. The Security Force has purchased six drones from Turkey, known as Bayraktar, and has concluded several other agreements for the purchase of armaments. New recruits have also been added to the Kosovo Security Force, increasing the number of soldiers.

The U.S. government approved a potential sale of hundreds of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Kosovo for an estimated cost of $75 million. Kosovo has requested to buy 246 Javelin missiles and 24 lightweight command launch units, among other items. Meanwhile Serbia says it is disappointed with possible US sale of anti-tank missiles to Kosovo. President Aleksandar Vučić, said that Kosovo should not have an army because this violates international law. Serbia continues to consider that Kosovo is part of its territory.

On 27 November 2024, Prime Minister Kurti signed the decision to initiate procedures for the establishment of the defense industry of the Republic of Kosovo. Later, on 16 December 2024, Kurti announced that he had signed an agreement with the state-owned Turkish defense industry producer MKEK for the operation of a factory in Kosovo for the production of ammunition and unmanned aerial vehicles.[77][78]

Foreign policy

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Relations with Albania

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Kurti had opposed the "Open Balkan" project which consisted of the three countries Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia. Kurti had estimated that Serbia was the largest regional producer and opening borders for their goods would harm the economy of Albania and Kosovo.[79]

During a visit to Tirana in 2020, Kurti held a press conference with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama where he argued that the economic project should be based on the interest of the Albanians and that it was necessary to increase commercial cooperation between Albania and Kosovo. Rama opposed Kurti, saying that opening the borders was in the interest of the region.[80][81]

The European Union has held a neutral stance regarding the initiative. They have stated that the initiative would be successful if other countries such as Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina were also integrated.[82]

In June 2023, Rama announced that his country had withdrawn from this initiative because "Open Balkan" had fulfilled its mission and that it was time to focus on the processes for integration into the European Union.[83]

The Serbian government were surprised by the decision, with Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić stating that she would talk with the Albanian Prime Minister, adding that she did not think that the "Open Balkans" project was dead because, according to her, this initiative was in the best interests of their nations.[84]

Unification of Kosovo and Albania
[edit]

Albin Kurti is a strong supporter of direct-democracy and he has often criticized the Constitution of Kosovo for not allowing direct referendums. One topic that he has stated should be decided on through a referendum is the potential unification of Kosovo and Albania.[85] Kurti has continuously criticized the third article of the constitution for not allowing the referendum to happen. In a rally with Vetëvendosje supporters in 2018, Kurti stated that "We want to have the right of Kosovo to join Albania, but we would not start the third Balkan war for this goal."[86] Following the 2019 election and LVV's electoral success, Kurti stated that Kosovo Albanians were not after territorial and political unification with Albania but instead seek "integration with Albania and the EU, through the success of Kosovo as a state."[87] Kurti has however stated that if a referendum would be held on possible unification, he would vote in favour of it.[88]

Relations with Serbia

[edit]

Kurti has claimed that Serbia is threatening Kosovo's security because it has allegedly built 48 military bases along the border with Kosovo.[89][90] The government of Kosovo has requested that the United States turn Camp Bondsteel, where KFOR troops are stationed, into a permanent American base.[91]

In June 2023, the Government of Kosovo declared the "Civil Defense" and "North Brigade" organizations as terrorist organizations as they allege that they have been responsible for attacks against Kosovo Police and KFOR members in North Mitrovica and have support from the state of Serbia.[92][93] Kosovo's allies have stated that the Government did not consult with them before taking this decision.[94]

On 24 September 2023, a group of armed Serbs attacked the Kosovo Police in the village of Banjska, Zvečan, killing a Kosovo policeman. The Kosovo police killed three of the attackers, while the rest of the group managed to escape and enter Serbia.[95][96][97] The European Union described the attack on the Kosovo Police as a terrorist attack and asked that Serbia bring the perpetrators who were in Serbia to justice.[98][99] The United States has also requested that Serbia extradite the alleged mastermind of the incident, Milan Radoičić, to Kosovo.[100][101] Serbian Aleksandar Vučić, stated the justice system in Serbia will deal with Milan Radoičić and that he would not be extradited to Kosovo as Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state.[102]

Kurti has accused Russia of encouraging attacks by Serbs against institutions in Kosovo with the aim of destabilizing the region.[103]

While he was a member of the political opposition, Kurti was known for his strong opinions on the dialogue between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia. He has criticized Kosovo's stance in its negotiations with Serbia, saying that dialogue should be based on conditions and reciprocity. He had further criticized the government for not conditioning the dialogue with Serbia on a return of the bodies of missing persons from the Kosovo War buried in mass graves in Serbia, Serbia paying war reparations to Kosovo, along with the return of allegedly stolen pension funds and artifacts.[104]

Following the 2019 election, Kurti said that "solid dialogue" and "reciprocity" were needed in the process of normalizing relations with Serbia. Kurti stated that Kosovo needed first to negotiate with its Serb minority and the European Union before negotiating with Serbia. He considers future dialogue with Kosovo's minorities and the EU "a top priority".[87]

During his second term as prime minister in 2023, Kurti participated in a series of talks mediated by the European Union with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, leading to the Ohrid Agreement. Based on Kurti's policy of reciprocity in dialogue with Serbia, the agreement obliges both parties to recognise the national symbols and official documents of the other party (among other clauses). However, it stops short of mandating the formal recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state. The implementation framework for this accord is still pending.

Relations with the United States

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Kurti (right) with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani in 2022

During his first term as prime minister, Kurti had a poor relationship with Donald Trump and his administration. Kurti accused the special envoy sent by Trump, Richard Grenell, of discussing the Kosovo–Serbia land swap.[105]

Kurti's opponent Hashim Thaçi had been supported by Grenell who demanded that Kosovo must unconditionally lift punitive tariffs imposed on imports from Serbia so that a "deal" he has championed, namely the establishment of direct rail and air connections between Kosovo and Serbia, could have been enforced as soon as possible. Kurti countered by saying that Kosovo could only lift the tariffs if Serbia, for its part, also abolished trade restrictions.[106]

In October 2020, Kurti endorsed the Democratic nominee Joe Biden for U.S. president.[107]

The government of Kosovo had accepted the request of the US to shelter the refugees from Afghanistan in Kosovo. Kosovo has sheltered only Afghan citizens who were at risk due to their collaboration with the United States and NATO. An agreement between the United States and Kosovo allowed the U.S. to temporarily shelter a limited number of Afghan citizens whose applications (for visas in the US) required additional processing. About 700 refugees were sheltered in Camp Bondsteel, located in Ferizaj.[108][109]

Relations with Greece

[edit]

The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has visited the state of Greece several times, where he has also participated in various forums. Kurti participated in the "Delphi" economic forum in 2022.[110][111][112] Also, the Foreign Minister of Greece, Nikos Dendias, visited Pristina where he met with Prime Minister Kurti where they also expressed their views regarding the cooperation between these countries.[113][114]

The report assigned by the Council of Europe, Dora Bakoyannis, who is a Greek politician, prepared the report for Kosovo, where she underlined that Kosovo meets the conditions to be a member of the Council of Europe[115][116][117] Her report was voted by the majority of votes in the Council of Europe, which provoked the reaction of Serbia.[118][119] According to the Government of Serbia, Dora Bakoyannis had damaged the "fraternal" relations between Serbia and Greece with her recommendation that Kosovo become part of the Council of Europe.[120]

The good relations with Kosovo has influenced Greece to increase the trade volume by exporting their goods to this country. According to the GAP institute, Greece has exported goods worth 330 million euros to Kosovo. Greece recognizes the documents of the state of Kosovo and has its office in Pristina[121]

Relations with Albanian political parties in North Macedonia

[edit]
The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti during the meeting with the leader of VLEN, Arben Taravari in Pristina

Albanian parties in Kosovo cooperate with Albanian political parties in Macedonia. The political class in Kosovo has continuously supported the Albanian party in Macedonia, the Democratic Union for Integration (BDI) led by Ali Ahmeti. Ahmeti was in the Government as a coalition partner with the Macedonian parties.[122][123][124]

However, the new Government led by Albin Kurti informed the public that relations with Ali Ahmeti had deteriorated. Kurti was against the "Open Balkan" initiative, which included Serbia, North Macedonia and Albania. He had stated that the economic initiative was in favor of Serbia and harmed the economies of neighboring countries.[125] For this reason, he had disagreements with the chairman of DUI, Ali Ahmeti, who was part of the Government of North Macedonia.[126][127]

He had accused Ali Ahmet of flirting with the idea of the president of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, about the possibility of exchanging territories between Serbia and Kosovo.[128][129] Kurti was against the exchange of territories.[130] In the 2024 elections in North Macedonia, an Albanian party known as "VLEN" was created within the Albanian population. Kurti met with the representatives of this political entity, giving them support in these elections. The leader of the Albanian political entity VLEN is Arben Taravari, who was also the mayor of the municipality of Gostivar.[131][132][133]

The highest official of the Democratic Union for Integration, Bujar Osmani, accused Kurti of interfering in the elections with his actions, but according to him, these interventions will not have an impact on Albanian voters. Osmani had declared that they would win the mandates and would be part of the Government again.[134][135]

Relations with the United Kingdom

[edit]

In October 2025, Kurti announced that Kosovo would be willing to take in asylum seekers who had their applications rejected by the United Kingdom, in return for security guarantees from the UK government. This made Kosovo the first west-Balkan country to agree to such an arrangement with the United Kingdom, after similar plans had been rejected by Albanian and Bosnian governments.[136]

EFTA Agreement

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Kosovo signed an agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) on January 22, 2025, after negotiations that lasted more than two and a half years.

The removal of tariffs is one of the facilities that will be enjoyed by Kosovo companies that export or want to export to EFTA member countries, with which Kosovo has trade agreements.

EFTA members, in addition to Switzerland, also include Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Bilateral trade between Kosovo and EFTA began in 2008, after the country's independence. Since then, it has been growing steadily, reaching its highest level in 2023: 176 million euros, according to data on the organization's website.

Kosovo exports to EFTA countries mainly goods such as furniture, plastics, iron and steel, as well as wood products, while importing from them mainly vehicles, pharmaceutical products, tobacco and machinery.[137][138][139]

Personal life

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Kurti is married to Norwegian researcher Rita Augestad Knudsen and they have a daughter together. He speaks Albanian, Serbian and English. Besides his Kosovo citizenship, Kurti also holds Albanian citizenship and has voted in Albanian elections.[140]

Notes and references

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from Grokipedia
Albin Kurti (born 24 March 1975) is a Kosovar Albanian politician and activist who has served as from February to June 2020 and since March 2021, currently in an acting capacity amid post-election coalition negotiations following the February 2025 parliamentary elections. Kurti founded the Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! (Self-Determination Movement) in 2005, initially as a civil society organization evolving from the Kosovo Action Network to advocate for Kosovo's self-determination and resistance against international administration perceived as undermining local sovereignty. The movement transitioned into a political party in 2010, with Kurti as its leader, emphasizing anti-corruption measures, economic sovereignty, and opposition to negotiated partition with Serbia. His political ascent began in the late 1990s as a student leader in the Students' Independent Union of the University of Pristina, organizing protests against Serbian rule under Slobodan Milošević; during the 1999 Kosovo War, he was arrested by Serbian authorities and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for activities deemed a threat to Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, but released in 2001 following international advocacy. Later, in 2009, Kurti faced detention by UNMIK authorities for his role in Vetëvendosje protests against foreign oversight, serving over two years before acquittal. As , Kurti has prioritized domestic reforms including job creation, , and energy sector investments, such as a $202 million U.S. compact signed in 2022 to modernize Kosovo's power infrastructure. His administration has pursued assertive policies toward , including bans on parallel institutions in Serb-majority areas, which have drawn criticism from international bodies for escalating ethnic tensions despite his stated focus on normalization under Kosovo's constitutional framework. In the 2025 elections, secured the largest share of seats but fell short of a majority, leading to ongoing delays as of October 2025.

Early life and education

Childhood in Pristina

Albin Kurti was born on 24 March 1975 in , the capital of the within the . His parents were ethnic ; his father, Zaim Kurti, worked as an engineer and hailed from an Albanian family in the village of Sukobin near , . Kurti completed his in from 1981 to 1989, achieving excellent results, before attending high school there from 1989 to 1993. During this period, he grew up in an environment of escalating ethnic tensions between the Albanian majority and Serb minority in , exacerbated by the revocation of the province's autonomy in 1989 under Serbian President , which imposed restrictions on Albanian political, cultural, and educational institutions. Albanian-language schooling remained available in through the late 1980s, though it faced growing pressures that foreshadowed the establishment of a parallel education system in the 1990s amid systematic discrimination against .

University studies and initial activism

Kurti enrolled at the in 1993, studying telecommunications and informatics at the Faculty of Electrical and , amid the Serbian authorities' restrictions on Albanian-language higher education. Following the revocation of Kosovo's in and the 1991 dismissal of Albanian faculty and students from state institutions, Albanian education operated through a parallel system organized informally in private homes and makeshift facilities to circumvent Serb control over public universities. This underground framework, sustained by boycotts of Serb-dominated institutions, shaped Kurti's academic experience, exposing him to resilient networks of Albanian intellectuals and students committed to preserving cultural and educational despite surveillance and repression. During his studies, Kurti connected with nascent dissent circles through the Student Independent Union of the (SIUUP), joining its presidency in the mid-1990s to advocate for student rights and oppose discriminatory policies under the Milošević regime. These early affiliations introduced him to ideas of collective resistance and self-determination, drawing from Albanian nationalist thought and critiques of Yugoslav centralization, while emphasizing intellectual preparation over immediate confrontation. Professors later described him as among the top students, noting his diligence in technical subjects like , which laid groundwork for his analytical approach to . Kurti's university tenure was protracted by system's disruptions and the escalating conflict, culminating in his graduation with a degree in and computer engineering on April 23, 2003. This completion, post-NATO intervention and amid Kosovo's transitional administration, signified his shift from student networks to broader political engagement, building on foundational exposure to non-conformist ideas forged in constrained academic environments.

Anti-Yugoslav activism and imprisonment

Student protests in the 1990s

In 1997, amid Slobodan Milošević's policies that had revoked Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and imposed Serbian control over educational institutions, Albanian students at the University of Pristina organized resistance through the Independent Union of Students. Albin Kurti, then a student activist, emerged as a key figure in this union, serving in leadership roles and advocating for the reclamation of university facilities seized by Serbian authorities earlier that year. These efforts built on a parallel Albanian education system established in response to discriminatory laws, but focused specifically on nonviolent demands for restored access to physical university premises. The pivotal demonstration took place on October 1, 1997, in , where students gathered peacefully to protest the occupation of their university buildings and to demand the resumption of Albanian-language education under autonomous administration. Kurti helped coordinate the event, emphasizing tactics such as sustained marches and occupations to challenge Serbian dominance without resorting to armed conflict. This action marked the first major public protests since 1992, breaking a period of enforced silence amid fears of reprisal. Serbian police responded with immediate and forceful crackdowns, deploying , batons, and arrests to disperse the unarmed demonstrators, resulting in dozens of detentions and reports of beatings that injured participants. The underscored the regime's intolerance for , halting the initial but galvanizing further underground organizing among students, though it yielded no immediate concessions on educational . Kurti's involvement highlighted a strategy of persistent, low-risk mobilization, which faced systemic suppression rather than negotiation from authorities.

Arrest and detention during NATO intervention

Kurti was arrested by Serbian police on April 27, 1999, in amid the bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of , which had begun on March 24 to halt Serbian operations in . Initially held in prison until May 2, he was then transferred to prison, where he remained until June 10. Following the June 10 armistice, which ended the 78-day NATO intervention and compelled Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo under the Kumanovo agreement, Kurti—along with hundreds of other ethnic Albanian detainees—was relocated to facilities inside Serbia to evade advancing NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops and the incoming United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). He spent time in Požarevac prison from June 10 to December 13, 1999, before being moved to Niš prison, where conditions for political prisoners included overcrowding, limited medical access, and reports of physical mistreatment. Kurti later recounted enduring beatings shortly after his arrest and fearing for his life during solitary periods, amid broader documentation of ill-treatment in Serbian detention centers holding Kosovo Albanians. On March 9, 2000, Kurti's trial commenced in on charges of and endangering Yugoslavia's ; he was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on March 13, rejecting the proceedings as politically motivated. International groups, including the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom, advocated for his release alongside over 1,900 other Albanian prisoners held in , citing violations of and the need for under post-war agreements. Kurti was freed on December 7, 2001, after a from Yugoslavia's post-Milošević administration, enabled by the October 2000 —a indirectly facilitated by the 1999 NATO campaign's weakening of Serbian control and subsequent international isolation. He returned to under UNMIK oversight, where the NATO intervention had laid the groundwork for provisional and eventual independence aspirations by shielding the territory from Serbian reassertion.

Formation of Vetëvendosje movement

Origins and ideological foundations

The Vetëvendosje movement was established in 2005 by Albin Kurti and a group of activists as a civic initiative, emerging from earlier networks like the Kosovo Action Network to challenge the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It positioned itself against the prolonged international oversight following the 1999 intervention, arguing that UNMIK's provisional institutions fostered dependency, inefficiency, and unchecked corruption rather than fostering genuine . Kurti, drawing from his experiences in and , framed the movement as a call for vetëvendosje—prioritizing 's sovereign agency over external impositions that delayed and economic . Ideologically, Vetëvendosje blended elements of left-wing nationalism with a strong emphasis on anti-corruption and popular sovereignty, critiquing the post-war neoliberal economic transitions that it viewed as benefiting a narrow elite tied to international actors at the expense of broader welfare provisions. The movement advocated for direct democratic mechanisms, such as referendums and citizen assemblies, to empower the populace against bureaucratic inertia and privatizations marred by graft, while rejecting the obedience to foreign missions that it saw as perpetuating colonial-like structures. This synthesis rejected both ethnic divisiveness and uncritical market liberalization, instead promoting state-led interventions for social equity alongside uncompromised national independence. By 2010, following Kosovo's in , Vetëvendosje transitioned from a purely civic pressure group to a registered political entity, enabling formal participation in elections while retaining its core commitment to over traditional party . This reflected a pragmatic to the post-independence , where the movement sought to institutionalize its demands for accountability without diluting its opposition to and external influence.

Early protests against UNMIK administration

The Vetëvendosje movement, led by Albin Kurti, initiated protests against the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) shortly after its formal establishment in 2005, targeting perceived failures in advancing Kosovo's and criticizing international oversight as obstructive. These actions challenged UNMIK's handling of post-war governance, including delays in status resolution and economic policies viewed as favoring external interests over local sovereignty. In February 2007, organized a major demonstration in on February 10 against the , which proposed supervised independence but included provisions for and minority protections that protesters deemed compromises undermining full sovereignty. Attended by thousands, the rally escalated into clashes with Kosovo Police Service and international forces, who deployed and , resulting in two protester deaths, dozens injured, and over 100 arrests. Kurti, as a key organizer, faced subsequent charges related to inciting unrest, leading to his detention. Further rallies followed, including on March 3 and 31, 2007, protesting the status negotiations, UNMIK, and the Kosovo negotiating team, with crowds numbering in the hundreds to thousands decrying elite complicity with international administrators. These events highlighted frustrations with stalled independence amid ongoing Serbian opposition and UN Security Council deadlock, positioning as a vocal force. UNMIK reports noted the movement's success in mobilizing public discontent, though clashes often involved from both sides. By 2007–2008, repeated protests, including smaller gatherings in June and September against the status process, built Vetëvendosje's base by tapping into widespread disillusionment with UNMIK's protracted administration and perceived corruption in efforts under international supervision. Kurti's arrests and the movement's non-violent rhetoric, contrasted with forceful responses, amplified its narrative of resistance against external , attracting youth and disillusioned seeking assertive self-rule.

Parliamentary career and opposition leadership

Entry into politics and electoral gains

Kurti entered parliamentary politics as the leader of in the snap elections of December 12, 2010, securing the party's first seats in the Assembly of with 14 seats out of 120. This debut marked a transition for the movement from street protests to formal opposition, reflecting voter disillusionment with established parties amid ongoing governance challenges post-independence. In the June 8, 2014, parliamentary elections, maintained its momentum, winning 16 seats despite a competitive field dominated by coalitions of former figures. Kurti was re-elected, positioning the party as a consistent third force in the legislature. The 2017 snap elections on June 11 saw further gains, with capturing 30 seats and Kurti receiving the highest individual preference votes among prime ministerial candidates at 143,642. Throughout these cycles, Kurti emphasized Vetëvendosje's refusal to join governing coalitions with major parties like the or , citing irreconcilable differences over corruption and foreign policy compromises. This stance reinforced the party's outsider image, appealing to voters seeking alternatives to entrenched elites while limiting short-term power but sustaining ideological purity.

Key opposition tactics and criticisms of governments

As leader of , Albin Kurti employed disruptive tactics in Kosovo's parliament to challenge coalitions led by the (PDK) and (LDK), particularly those under Hashim Thaçi's influence. These included releasing canisters to halt sessions, as occurred on October 8, 2015, when opposition MPs, including Kurti, deployed smoke bombs and to protest a proposed agreement granting greater autonomy to Serb-majority areas through the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities. Similar actions persisted, obstructing parliamentary work for nearly two years against a border demarcation deal with , leading to suspended jail terms of 15 to 18 months for four MPs in January 2018. Kurti's criticisms centered on systemic corruption and in PDK-LDK governments, accusing them of and ties that perpetuated and youth . He positioned as an force, highlighting how entrenched elites under Thaçi maintained power through networks, which eroded public trust amid high rates exceeding 30% in the mid-2010s. These tactics and resonated with younger voters disillusioned by the failure of post-war governments to deliver reforms, boosting 's parliamentary seats from 13 in 2014 to 30 in elections. The Hague Specialist Chambers' 2020 indictment of Thaçi for war crimes and related abuses validated some of Kurti's prior allegations of elite impunity, though Vetëvendosje's methods drew condemnation for undermining democratic institutions, with critics arguing they prioritized confrontation over legislative engagement. Kurti defended such blockades as necessary to prevent "treacherous" deals, framing them as civic resistance against corrupt governance rather than criminal acts. This approach solidified his image as a principled opponent but contributed to political instability, including repeated assembly suspensions.

Terms as Prime Minister

First term (February–October 2020)

Following the October 2019 parliamentary elections in which emerged as the largest party, Albin Kurti formed a with the (LDK) and minority parties. The cabinet was approved by the Assembly on February 3, 2020, with 66 votes in favor and 10 abstentions, marking Kurti's inauguration as . The government's program emphasized anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms, and reciprocity in trade with , including maintaining tariffs imposed in 2018 to counter perceived discriminatory barriers. Kurti appointed a new justice minister, Rexhep Selimi, who initiated reviews of high-profile cases and pushed for processes in the , though substantive changes were constrained by the brief tenure. Early efforts also addressed the emerging , with measures like border closures and testing protocols implemented in and March, but internal disagreements over mandatory quarantines for returning citizens escalated tensions. Coalition frictions intensified over Serbia policy, as LDK advocated lifting tariffs to facilitate U.S.-brokered normalization talks, while Kurti prioritized economic reciprocity and opposed concessions without mutual recognition. These divides culminated in a no-confidence motion tabled by LDK on March 23, 2020, citing inadequate COVID-19 responses, which passed on March 25 with 82 votes in favor, toppling the government after less than two months. Kurti continued as caretaker until June 2020, when of LDK assumed the role, but the initial term's collapse highlighted underlying incompatibilities in foreign policy approaches toward . During the caretaker phase extending into October 2020 amid ongoing constitutional disputes over the Hoti government's legitimacy—later invalidated by the in December—the administration maintained basic functions but achieved few policy advances beyond provisional pandemic management. Limited legislative output included preliminary steps toward justice sector transparency, such as asset declarations for officials, yet the period underscored the fragility of post-election coalitions in Kosovo's polarized politics.

Second term (2021–present) and snap elections

Following the collapse of Avdullah Hoti's minority government in December 2020, Kosovo held snap parliamentary elections on February 14, 2021, in which Vetëvendosje secured 50.3 percent of the vote, translating to 58 seats in the 120-seat assembly—the first time a single party achieved an absolute majority in the country's history. This landslide enabled Albin Kurti to be re-elected as prime minister on March 22, 2021, forming a single-party cabinet without coalition partners, marking a continuation of his leadership after the brief interruption of his initial term. Kurti's second administration maintained power through various challenges, including natural disasters and economic pressures such as the 2022 floods that affected multiple municipalities and that peaked at 14.1 percent in mid-2022 amid global supply disruptions. The government implemented temporary relief measures to preserve liquidity and employment during these periods, though fiscal execution for capital projects lagged, with only 21 percent of planned spending realized in 2022. Parliamentary elections on February 9, 2025—triggered by the expiration of the prior term and ongoing institutional deadlines—saw again finish first, but with a reduced share insufficient for a , necessitating negotiations to form a new government. Post-election delays led to caretaker status for Kurti's administration starting around March 2025, sparking disputes over executive authority, including U.S. suspension of strategic dialogue on September 12, 2025, citing actions that heightened instability, such as handling of Serb minority representation and judicial summonses ignored by Kurti. Amid these tensions, Kosovo's passport advanced to 65th in the 2025 , granting visa-free access to 81 destinations, reflecting incremental diplomatic gains. As of October 2025, government formation remained unresolved, with Kurti's team operating in limited capacity while parliamentary sessions proceeded.

Domestic policies

Anti-corruption and justice reforms

Upon assuming office in 2021, the Kurti government prioritized anti-corruption measures, including strengthening the Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo (SPRK), which investigates high-level corruption cases involving public officials. The SPRK has pursued indictments against former officials from opposition parties, such as members of the (PDK), for alleged graft in public procurement and misuse of funds during prior administrations. These efforts targeted , with arrests including figures linked to PDK-led governments accused of and abuse of position. The government advanced judicial vetting, modeled after Albania's process to assess judges and prosecutors for integrity, assets, and performance, with the approving the framework in 2023 despite implementation delays. The European Commission's 2024 report noted some progress in adjudicating cases, including more final convictions, but highlighted persistent shortcomings in enforcement and . proceeded with full vetting in 2024 over EU reservations that it risked politicization without adequate safeguards. Critics, including opposition parties and civil society, have alleged selective enforcement, arguing that prosecutions disproportionately target political rivals from PDK and LDK while scrutiny of allies lags, as seen in ongoing probes into government-linked scandals like state reserve misuse without swift resolutions. Kurti's refusal to testify before the SPRK in a 2025 investigation into alleged reserve fund irregularities drew accusations of undermining prosecutorial , echoing tactics he previously condemned in opponents. assessments describe the anti-corruption drive as constrained and politicized, with limited advancement against entrenched elite networks. Despite these issues, a 2023 survey indicated 62% of respondents perceived reduced since Kurti's rise, though empirical conviction rates remain low relative to reported cases. Kurti's government implemented several fiscal measures aimed at bolstering domestic consumption and social support, including multiple increases to the , culminating in a doubling to €350 gross per month for full-time work announced on August 28, 2024. The administration also introduced free higher education to expand access and introduced subsidies targeted at vulnerable groups, such as allowances for children and expectant mothers equivalent to the minimum wage for initial postpartum periods. These policies sought to mitigate inequality but drew criticism for potentially inflating labor costs without commensurate productivity gains, as evidenced by stagnant private sector wage growth relative to public sector hikes. Economic performance under Kurti showed moderate GDP expansion, with annual growth averaging approximately 4-6% from 2021 onward following the 2020 contraction of 5% amid the global pandemic. Specific figures include 2.8% growth in 2022 due to energy and food import pressures, rising to around 4.25% in 2024 driven by private consumption and public investment. However, these rates lagged behind pre-Kurti averages in some analyses and failed to generate sufficient formal , with hovering near 25% overall and over 40% for as of 2023. Emigration accelerated during Kurti's tenure, with official statistics recording 37,451 departures in alone, representing about 2.4% of the , and similar outflows of around 41,553 in 2022. Cumulative net migration losses exceeded 200,000 from 2020 to , predominantly young and skilled individuals citing chronic job scarcity and limited prospects despite policy interventions. This exodus persisted amid visa liberalization with the in , which facilitated outflows rather than reversing them, underscoring structural failures in job creation over redistributive measures. Kosovo's economy remained heavily reliant on remittances, which constituted 14.6% of GDP in 2024, totaling over €1.35 billion, offsetting weak (FDI) inflows that, while rising to €850 million net in 2024, concentrated in rather than productive sectors. Critics, including analyses from think tanks, attribute FDI shortfalls to policy unpredictability and insufficient incentives, arguing that wage hikes and subsidies deterred manufacturing investment while remittances masked underlying stagnation in domestic production. Kurti's government claimed FDI averaged €705.6 million annually—2.4 times prior levels—but independent assessments highlight that political tensions and regulatory opacity limited diversification beyond funds.

Social welfare and security measures

Under Kurti's second administration, the Kosovo government expanded child allowances, introducing a redesigned scheme in July 2024 that doubled monthly payments for most families to 20 euros per child for the first and second offspring, and 30 euros each for families with three or more children. This policy, building on the September 2021 universal child benefit initiative, has benefited over 410,000 children under 16 and 60,000 mothers in three years, with an additional one-time 100-euro payment allocated to child allowance recipients aged 0-16 in December 2024. Reforms to the social assistance scheme also aimed to remove discriminatory eligibility criteria, prioritizing citizenship and social equality. Healthcare access saw targeted post-COVID enhancements, including EU-supported measures to aid vulnerable groups, though systemic digitalization efforts like the health information system remained stalled as of 2024, limiting overall integration and efficiency gains. On security, the government launched campaigns against and , with Kurti emphasizing concrete protection projects during the 2022 EU Anti-Trafficking Day and supporting police operations targeting northern networks involved in drugs, arms, and . U.S. State Department reports noted intensified anti-trafficking efforts, including training for officials, though fell short of fully meeting elimination standards due to inadequate victim support and prosecutions. Over two years, authorities conducted over 1,000 operations leading to nearly 4,000 arrests, contributing to a reported decline in petty crime, but —particularly mafia-linked activities in the north—persisted, with limited high-level convictions despite stated commitments. 's intentional rate rose to 2.21 per 100,000 in 2020 before stabilizing around moderate levels (crime index 41.1 in mid-2025), reflecting partial successes in enforcement amid criticisms of uneven application and overreach in Serb-majority areas.

Kosovo Security Force expansion

During Albin Kurti's second term as prime minister, the (KSF) underwent significant expansion in personnel, budget, and capabilities as part of efforts to enhance national defense post-independence. Legislation passed in 2018, prior to Kurti's tenure, authorized growth to 5,000 active personnel and 3,000 reservists by around 2030, expanding from an earlier limit of approximately 2,500–3,000 members focused on and civilian protection. Under Kurti's government since 2021, recruitment and training accelerated toward these targets, with international partnerships including U.S. and Turkish assistance to build operational readiness. Budget allocations for the KSF rose substantially, reflecting Kurti's emphasis on ; in 2024, funding reached 202.8 million euros, with plans announced in 2025 for over 1 billion euros across the next four years to support procurement and domestic production. This included a 60% defense spending increase in 2025, acquisitions of Turkish Bayraktar drones, 50 U.S.-supplied M1117 Guardian armored security vehicles delivered in August 2025, and initiatives for an ammunition factory and "Made in Kosovo" military drones. Kurti described these as preparations to equip the force with "modern armament and advanced equipment" to address potential threats. The expansions aimed to fulfill Kosovo's post-1999 defense requirements amid perceived vulnerabilities, but faced criticism from , which views the KSF's evolution toward full status as provocative and destabilizing. Kurti targeted operational capabilities by 2028, yet full transformation requires constitutional amendments to overcome existing limits on the force's lightly armed mandate and integrate a dedicated defense ministry. While U.S. training partnerships proceeded, earlier reservations about persisted, though recent developments emphasized without replacing KFOR's role.

Foreign policy

Kosovo–Serbia relations and normalization talks

Kurti has conditioned progress in EU-mediated normalization talks on Serbia's de facto or mutual recognition of Kosovo's independence, viewing it as a prerequisite for resolving underlying sovereignty disputes. This stance contrasts with Serbia's demands for implementation of the 2013 Brussels Agreement provisions, particularly the establishment of an Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) to grant autonomy to ethnic Serb communities in northern Kosovo. Kurti has rejected ASM formation without reciprocal recognition, arguing it would undermine Kosovo's unitary state structure, while Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has countered that enhanced Serb autonomy must precede any normalization steps. Flashpoints have included Kosovo's 2023 reciprocity measures on vehicle license plates, mandating the replacement or temporary covering of Serbian-issued plates with Kosovo-issued ones (RKS), which prompted ethnic Serb boycotts of local elections and in northern municipalities, disrupting cross-border movement and trade. responded by permitting RKS plates in its territory from January 2024, but enforcement led to heightened border delays and an estimated 20-30% drop in northern Kosovo's parallel trade flows reliant on Serbian goods. Similarly, Kosovo's February 2024 directive phasing out the for euro-only transactions severed direct funding channels for Serb pensions and public salaries, affecting over 10,000 ethnic Serbs and prompting protests; this measure, defended by Kurti as aligning with Kosovo's monetary sovereignty, reduced informal remittances by up to 15% in Serb enclaves per economic reports. EU-facilitated dialogues, including the February 2023 Ohrid Agreement on implementing normalization principles, faltered amid these disputes, with no annex agreed upon by October 2023 despite verbal endorsements from both leaders. A planned June 2024 Brussels summit collapsed when Kurti refused participation without Serbia dropping preconditions on ASM, as stated by EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. Vučić has maintained that factual recognition of Kosovo remains off the table, prioritizing Serb institutional presence. These stalemates have correlated with escalated incidents, notably the September 23-24, 2023, clash in northern , where approximately 70-100 Serb militants, armed with heavy weaponry including machine guns and RPGs, ambushed investigating unlicensed trucks, resulting in one officer's death and three gunmen's fatalities during the ensuing firefight and siege. authorities linked the attackers to Serbian vice-president , who was present and fled to , while denied state involvement and portrayed the deceased as victims; the event prompted UN Security Council debates on rising violence and stalled talks. Overall, trade disruptions from these measures have cost 's northern economy an estimated €50-100 million annually in lost cross-border commerce, per EU assessments, underscoring the causal link between unresolved preconditions and economic isolation for Serb communities.

Ties with Albania and greater Albania rhetoric

Albin Kurti has pursued enhanced economic cooperation with , emphasizing joint projects to foster cross-border integration. Investments from into Kosovo rose by 136.5 percent between 2019 and 2022, reaching higher values amid Kurti's administration. Trade exchanges between the two countries have also expanded, supported by implemented agreements on and . In October 2025, officials inaugurated the Gorozhup-Pogaj cross-border road, symbolizing improved connectivity for local communities and economic flows. Kurti has described these ties as historically strong yet with room for deeper , citing undeniable despite expectations for greater Albanian support. Kurti's rhetoric has occasionally invoked potential unification, highlighting cultural and national affinities. In February 2021, shortly after his electoral victory, he stated he would vote in favor of a on joining if held peacefully and democratically. He has referenced Albanian national revival ideals in envisioning Kosovo's future, framing closer ties as aligned with historical unity aspirations. Such statements underscore pros of cultural cohesion, potentially bolstering shared identity without immediate institutional merger. However, no formal unification initiatives have advanced under his tenure from 2021 to 2025, constrained by domestic political divisions and differing visions between and . Critics have interpreted Kurti's positions as promoting greater Albanian irredentism, particularly through engagements beyond Kosovo's borders. During a 2023 visit to North Macedonia, his appeals to Albanian communities there drew accusations of fueling ethnic tensions and regional instability, with observers warning of broader Balkan risks. Alignments with Albanian parties in North Macedonia and references to pan-Albanian solidarity have alienated some international partners, who view such rhetoric as destabilizing despite empirical gains in bilateral trade. These elements contrast with strained personal relations between Kurti and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, marked by public tensions since 2021, which limit deeper political convergence. Overall, while economic interdependence has grown, unification discourse remains aspirational, checked by internal frictions and external apprehensions over escalation.

Relations with the United States and EU

Following his first election victory in February 2020, Prime Minister Albin Kurti positioned Kosovo as a staunch U.S. ally, emphasizing shared values in democracy and anti-corruption efforts. The Biden administration initially commended Kurti's government for advancing rule-of-law reforms and combating entrenched corruption, viewing these as steps toward institutional stability. Early engagements, such as the July 2022 meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Kurti, and President Vjosa Osmani, underscored mutual commitments to regional stability and economic prosperity. By 2023, relations began to fray amid U.S. and criticisms of Kurti's handling of northern , where unilateral actions like the May 2023 installation of ethnic Albanian mayors amid Serb boycotts escalated ethnic tensions and prompted sanctions from both entities. The U.S. and rebuked for undermining the -facilitated Belgrade-Pristina , with Kurti accused of sabotaging normalization efforts by rejecting Association of Serb Municipalities implementation and prioritizing confrontational policies. In response, the imposed restrictive measures, including funding cuts and suspended high-level visits, citing 's failure to de-escalate and adhere to prior agreements. Tensions peaked in 2025 with the U.S. indefinite suspension of the planned Strategic on , directly attributing the decision to Kurti's "recent actions and statements" that stoked instability and reversed progress in Kosovo-Serbia ties. This move highlighted a "" dynamic, where underlying alliance persisted but was overshadowed by policy divergences, including Kurti's resistance to Western pressure on resumption. EU visa liberalization, achieved in January 2024 despite prior delays linked to rule-of-law deficiencies, faced ongoing scrutiny under Kurti, as persistent governance gaps in and enforcement eroded confidence in Pristina's commitments. Despite these frictions, Kurti maintained that relations remained "very good," framing differences as normal in partnerships requiring mutual concessions.

Engagement with regional neighbors

Kurti's government has sought to deepen ties with despite ' non-recognition of Kosovo's independence, a stance rooted in solidarity with and concerns over precedents for . In September 2023, Kurti stated that was the closest among the five non-recognizers to extending formal acknowledgment, though Greek officials promptly denied any such shift. Kurti has visited multiple times, including meetings with Prime Minister where he urged recognition, yet bilateral relations remain informal, focused on cultural and economic exchanges without diplomatic normalization. Engagement with North Macedonia, which recognized Kosovo in 2008, emphasizes practical cooperation on shared and aspirations. Kurti met Prime Minister in on August 5, 2024, affirming no bilateral disagreements and highlighting extensive partnership as neighbors. Agreements signed during joint government sessions address border management and trade, but Kurti's alignment with Skopje's leadership has drawn criticism from ethnic Albanian parties in North Macedonia, such as DUI leader , who in October 2025 accused him of prioritizing Mickoski over Albanian interests amid coalition instability. Relations with are constrained by 's non-recognition and internal divisions, with Kurti conducting unofficial visits to pro-Kosovo figures. On December 6, 2024, he met Presidency members and in , where discussions included visa liberalization gratitude but avoided formal recognition talks, sparking backlash from Serb member as a breach of consensus requirements. Kurti has rejected parallels between and Bosnia's territorial models, warning against "Bosnianization" that could legitimize partition claims. These selective engagements underscore broader Balkan challenges, where Kurti's insistence on reciprocity and independence amplifies isolation risks among non-recognizing neighbors like and , limiting multilateral initiatives beyond economic forums.

Trade agreements and international economic integration

EFTA and CEFTA developments

Negotiations for a between and the (EFTA)—comprising , , , and —began in June 2022 under Albin Kurti's government, following earlier exploratory discussions dating back to 2016. After four rounds of talks, the agreement was signed on January 22, 2025, in , , with Kurti in attendance. The pact liberalizes trade in goods and services, aiming to enhance while including provisions on , , and , though its scope remains narrower than a potential agreement. Within the (CEFTA), has experienced modest intra-regional trade growth, with exports to CEFTA partners rising from analysis of 2014–2023 data showing incremental openness, though overall impacts vary between 0.02% and 7.4% for members. Under Kurti's administration, persistent customs disputes with —stemming from a 100% imposed in 2018 and partially addressed in 2020—have disrupted flows, including a 2023 import blockade citing security concerns. The on Serbian finished goods was lifted in October 2024, enabling 's fuller participation, and during its 2024–2025 CEFTA presidency, the bloc appointed a new director after two years of Serbian-led blockages, restoring some functionality. These developments occur against the backdrop of stalled implementation of Kosovo's Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the , which entered force in 2016 but saw suspensions until May 2025 due to governance issues, with Kosovo meeting only five of 22 EU priorities. Critics note that EFTA and CEFTA pacts have yielded minimal (FDI) gains, with FDI inflows remaining limited amid political barriers like unresolved Serbia tensions and EU sanctions costing over €600 million in stalled funds by mid-2025. Such agreements provide incremental but are overshadowed by broader integration hurdles, constraining Kosovo's export diversification and potential.

Implications for Kosovo's economy and recognition

Trade agreements such as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the recently signed European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Free Trade Agreement in January 2025 have facilitated preferential market access for Kosovo, enabling duty-free exports in select sectors like agriculture and manufacturing to partner states. However, these benefits remain constrained by Kosovo's partial international recognition, as non-recognizing CEFTA members—including Serbia—impose bilateral trade disputes and technical barriers, limiting the depth of integration and exposing Kosovo to asymmetric import dependencies. Empirical assessments indicate modest export contributions to GDP, with real GDP growth moderating to 3.3% in 2023 amid subdued external demand, projected to rise to 3.8% in 2024 driven primarily by domestic factors rather than trade surges. Non-membership in the (WTO), stalled by recognition hurdles and opposition from states like , further curtails Kosovo's ability to secure multilateral disciplines and , perpetuating vulnerabilities such as arbitrary border controls and exclusion from global supply chains. While CEFTA has yielded positive net effects on intra-regional volumes, evidenced by historical econometric models showing incremental economic expansion, Kosovo's exports declined by approximately €57.3 million in 2023, reflecting persistent imbalances with imports exceeding exports by €5.1 billion. remains structurally elevated above 25%, underscoring that liberalization alone fails to address underlying causal factors like skills mismatches and informal labor markets, yielding only marginal job creation in export-oriented industries. From a causal realist perspective, leveraging pacts to demonstrate economic viability could incrementally enhance Kosovo's claims to and international legitimacy, positioning integration as evidence of state functionality. Yet, strategies emphasizing as diplomatic leverage—amid unresolved normalization talks—risk retaliatory measures from non-recognizing neighbors, potentially eroding gains and alienating EU mediators essential for broader accession paths. This dynamic highlights a : short-term bolsters GDP resilience from a low base, but without reciprocal recognition, it reinforces Kosovo's exclusion from high-stakes forums like the WTO, constraining long-term legitimacy and sustainable growth.

Controversies and criticisms

Northern Kosovo escalations and ethnic tensions

In April 2023, ethnic Serbs in 's four northern municipalities—, , , and —boycotted local elections organized by authorities, resulting in turnout below 5% and the election of ethnic Albanian mayors supported by Albin Kurti's party. Kurti defended the elections as legitimate exercises of 's sovereignty, arguing that Serb abstention reflected Belgrade's influence rather than genuine local opposition. The low participation enabled Albanian candidates to secure victories by narrow margins, such as in where one mayor won by just over 100 votes amid the . The imposition of these mayors prompted widespread Serb protests starting in late May 2023, escalating into violence when demonstrators attempted to block access to municipal buildings; clashes with injured dozens, including over 20 KFOR peacekeepers who intervened to protect the officials. Kurti attributed the unrest to orchestration by Serbian-backed groups, labeling certain Serb units as terrorist threats to Kosovo's constitutional order and justifying police enforcement of mayoral authority. Serb representatives, however, portrayed the mayoral installations as provocative overreach, exacerbating ethnic divisions and contributing to an exodus, with Kosovo's overall Serb population declining by approximately 22% from 2002 to 2024 due to , low birth rates, and perceived insecurity. Despite northern municipalities retaining Serb majorities (around 90-95% in some areas), Kurti's government targeted parallel Serb institutions—such as education and health systems funded by —as undermining Pristina's monopoly on force and enabling criminal networks. Tensions persisted into 2025, with Kurti's administration advancing infrastructure projects including two new bridges over the Ibar River in Mitrovica to symbolize integration, though U.S. and EU officials warned these moves risked inflaming divisions in the ethnically split city. Concurrently, deployments of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) to northern areas proceeded under monitored agreements, which KFOR endorsed as compliant but which Serbian officials decried as escalatory violations threatening Serb communities. Kurti framed such actions as essential countermeasures to Serbian hybrid threats, including parallel governance that sustains divided loyalties and hampers Kosovo's state-building, while critics contend they accelerate Serb departures and erode minority protections without addressing root autonomy demands. Empirical data underscores the north's demographic fragility, with Serb numbers in Kosovo dropping to about 2.3% of the total population by 2024, amplifying claims from Pristina of needing firmer control to prevent de facto partition.

Strains with Western allies over governance

In September 2025, the indefinitely suspended its planned Strategic Dialogue with , citing concerns over actions by Albin Kurti's that had "increased tensions and instability" and undermined bilateral cooperation. The U.S. Embassy in specifically attributed the decision to Kurti's recent unilateral moves, which it stated limited opportunities for advancing 's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and risked broader regional destabilization. This suspension marked a significant escalation in strains, as the dialogue was intended to deepen ties on , economic, and issues, reflecting Washington's frustration with Pristina's perceived prioritization of domestic political maneuvers over coordinated international engagement. European Union assessments have similarly highlighted governance challenges under Kurti, including limited progress in judicial independence and rule-of-law reforms essential for EU accession. Reports from bodies like the International Crisis Group have pointed to Kurti's centralization of power as exacerbating a rift with Western partners, with actions interpreted as manufacturing crises through unilateralism rather than fostering institutional stability. EU officials have urged restraint following Kurti's public criticisms of Kosovo's Constitutional Court, emphasizing that judicial independence forms the bedrock of democratic governance and warning against executive interference that could signal backsliding. Kurti has rebutted these critiques by framing them as misguided pressure to compromise Kosovo's for toward , insisting that true rule-of-law requires rejecting concessions that undermine national institutions. He has argued that Western demands overlook empirical failures of past conditionality, which failed to yield sustainable without reciprocal against Serbian non-compliance, and positioned his government's actions as essential for long-term stability over short-term diplomatic optics. Despite these defenses, the fallout has evidenced growing isolation, with analysts warning that sustained could erode Kosovo's leverage with key allies like the U.S., potentially stalling visa liberalization and efforts tied to benchmarks. Following the short-lived 2020 coalition between and the (LDK), which collapsed after a no-confidence vote on March 25, 2020, amid disputes over measures and internal power struggles, Kurti's subsequent governments faced repeated instability. By 2025, post-election coalition negotiations again faltered, with LDK rejecting 's May 6 offer for partnership after the February parliamentary vote, where obtained 40.1% of votes but lacked a for solo . This led to over 50 failed attempts to elect an Assembly speaker, extending institutional paralysis for six months. In response to these breakdowns, LDK initiated 17 lawsuits on May 8, 2025, against Kurti and his ministers for unlawfully retaining offices after formal resignations tied to the election results certification. The suits invoked the 2022 Law on the , which requires immediate resignation upon certification, a provision Kurti's administration allegedly breached by continuing to act in an outgoing capacity. Political analysts, including those from the Kosovo Democratic Institute, described this as a direct violation of Kurti's had enacted, underscoring accusations of selective adherence to institutional norms. Kurti's tenure also involved escalating tensions with the , which twice intervened in 2025 to enforce procedural compliance, including a ruling declaring unconstituted and halting until full assembly seating. Kurti denounced the Court as a "shadow opposition" undermining on September 7, 2025, prompting EU officials to urge restraint against judicial interference. These clashes, coupled with prior coalition fractures, fueled critiques of power consolidation tactics that mirror opposition strategies once employed against rivals, such as legal blockades and institutional delays. Supporters of Kurti point to Vetëvendosje's electoral successes, including the 2021 majority and 2025 plurality, as mandates for continuity despite legal hurdles. Detractors counter that persistent high —exacerbated by under successive governments—serves as a public rebuke, with over 10,000 Kosovo citizens leaving annually in recent years amid unaddressed failures. This duality highlights risks of eroded institutional trust, as maneuvers prioritizing mandate assertion over consensus prolong domestic gridlock.

Personal life and ideology

Family and personal background

Albin Kurti was born on March 24, 1975, in , then part of , to Zaim Kurti, whose family originates from the Albanian village of Sukobinë in , ; he has two brothers, Arianit, an , and Taulant. Kurti spent part of his childhood in Sukobinë, where relatives have shared accounts of his early years. He married Rita Augestad Knudsen, a Norwegian senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), in 2014, with their civil ceremony held in Pristina's municipal hall; the couple has one daughter, Lea, born around 2015. Kurti is multilingual, fluent in Albanian (his native language), English (used in communication with his ), and Serbian (spoken without an Albanian accent).

Political philosophy and public persona

Albin Kurti's centers on a synthesis of left-nationalism, prioritizing national and over supranational oversight, as embodied in the movement's foundational emphasis on Kosovo's from perceived imperial influences like prolonged UN and administration. He advocates anti-imperialist stances rooted in critiques of post-1999 international intervention as a form of "disaster colonialism," arguing it undermined local agency in favor of external control, while favoring welfare-oriented economics that maintain primacy of state . This approach integrates social democratic principles, such as reforms for , without endorsing pure ; Kurti has rejected neoliberal dominance in , viewing the EU's origins as potentially more egalitarian before market liberalization, and supports redistribution like enhanced social assistance as pragmatic responses to inequality rather than Marxist orthodoxy. Labels of or applied to Kurti often stem from his leftist and anti-colonial inspirations, but evidence shows no advocacy for or state of production; instead, his framework accommodates market mechanisms within a nationalist , debunking propagandistic exaggerations. Kurti's public persona projects as a charismatic orator and leader, frequently positioning himself at the of demonstrations against and foreign interference, evoking emotional appeals through exposure and arrests to symbolize resistance. Critics portray him as a divisive agitator, accusing him of fostering polarization through uncompromising that alienates minorities and international partners. Recent actions, such as Kosovo's 2025 offer to host UK's rejected asylum seekers as a reciprocal gesture for past support against Milosevic, illustrate pragmatic shifts away from rigid anti-Westernism, framing it as mutual obligation rather than ideological purity. Despite ideological commitments to , Kurti faces criticisms of authoritarian tendencies in , including efforts to marginalize media and consolidate power within by sidelining internal competitors, which observers link to a self-image akin to historical figures but risking democratic . These practices contrast with his public advocacy for a hierarchy-free , highlighting tensions between stated and style, where reveals power consolidation as a response to perceived rather than inherent .

References

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