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Argument from nonbelief
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Argument from nonbelief
The argument from nonbelief is a philosophical argument for the nonexistence of God that asserts an inconsistency between God's existence and a world that fails to recognize such an entity. It is similar to the classic argument from evil in arguing that there is an inconsistency between the world that exists and God's existence. The argument is key in philosophical discussions about divine hiddenness.
There are three key varieties of the argument. The argument from reasonable nonbelief (or the argument from divine hiddenness) was first elaborated in J. L. Schellenberg's 1993 book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. According to this argument, if God existed (and was perfectly good and loving) every reasonable person would have been brought to believe in God, but since there are reasonable nonbelievers, it follows that God does not exist.[citation needed]
Theodore Drange subsequently developed the argument from nonbelief, based on the mere existence of nonbelief in God. Drange considers the distinction between reasonable (by which Schellenberg means inculpable) and unreasonable (culpable) nonbelief to be irrelevant and confusing. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of academic discussion is concerned with Schellenberg's formulation.[citation needed]
Schellenberg's formulation, however, has evolved since his 1993 book. Contemporary versions of the argument no longer trade on inculpable nonbelief or deal with God's goodness. Rather, the argument from nonresistant nonbelief (or the contemporary hiddenness argument) argues that if God exists, then no one would ever be in a state of nonresistant nonbelief (that is, a state in which they do not believe in God's existence despite not resisting him in any way), but since some people have been in such a state, God does not exist. The basic engine behind this argument is the idea that God, being unsurpassably loving, would always make it possible for any such capable persons as there may be to begin a relationship with him just by trying. To begin a relationship, according to Schellenberg, both parties must know about the other's existence. Therefore, God would never allow any capable person to be in a state of nonresistant nonbelief at any time.
Discussion of Schellenberg's argument has made explicit a non-theological use of the term 'hiddenness', which is now commonly used simply as a way of talking about the subjective condition of nonbelief in God. In his first presentation of the argument Schellenberg emphasized inculpable or reasonable nonbelief, but he has since shifted to speaking more specifically about nonresistant nonbelief. The first presentation is often given by commentators as follows, based on Schellenberg's own summing up:
Schellenberg has stated that this formulation is misleading, when taken on its own, because it does not make explicit the reason why a perfectly loving God would want to prevent nonbelief. His deepest claim, he says, is "about the connection between love and openness to relationship—a personal and positively meaningful and explicit sort of relationship of the sort that logically presupposes each party's belief in the other's existence." A later presentation of the argument by Schellenberg, which aims at accessibility for students, includes this element:
In an article revisiting the argument ten years after it was originally proposed, Schellenberg observes that criticism has mainly centered around the idea that God would prevent inculpable nonbelief. He asserts that there are relatively few criticisms questioning the existence of inculpable nonbelief, and almost no theistic philosopher objects to the idea that God is perfectly loving.
Schellenberg says he has not seen any serious objections to this premise by theistic philosophers, but there certainly are other conceptions of God.[citation needed] Daniel Howard-Snyder writes about the possibility of believing in an unsurpassably great personal god that is nevertheless dispassionate towards its creatures. Drawing on the Stoic concept of Eudaimonia, he says one can think of a god more akin to a wise sage than the loving parent that Schellenberg envisions.
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Argument from nonbelief
The argument from nonbelief is a philosophical argument for the nonexistence of God that asserts an inconsistency between God's existence and a world that fails to recognize such an entity. It is similar to the classic argument from evil in arguing that there is an inconsistency between the world that exists and God's existence. The argument is key in philosophical discussions about divine hiddenness.
There are three key varieties of the argument. The argument from reasonable nonbelief (or the argument from divine hiddenness) was first elaborated in J. L. Schellenberg's 1993 book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. According to this argument, if God existed (and was perfectly good and loving) every reasonable person would have been brought to believe in God, but since there are reasonable nonbelievers, it follows that God does not exist.[citation needed]
Theodore Drange subsequently developed the argument from nonbelief, based on the mere existence of nonbelief in God. Drange considers the distinction between reasonable (by which Schellenberg means inculpable) and unreasonable (culpable) nonbelief to be irrelevant and confusing. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of academic discussion is concerned with Schellenberg's formulation.[citation needed]
Schellenberg's formulation, however, has evolved since his 1993 book. Contemporary versions of the argument no longer trade on inculpable nonbelief or deal with God's goodness. Rather, the argument from nonresistant nonbelief (or the contemporary hiddenness argument) argues that if God exists, then no one would ever be in a state of nonresistant nonbelief (that is, a state in which they do not believe in God's existence despite not resisting him in any way), but since some people have been in such a state, God does not exist. The basic engine behind this argument is the idea that God, being unsurpassably loving, would always make it possible for any such capable persons as there may be to begin a relationship with him just by trying. To begin a relationship, according to Schellenberg, both parties must know about the other's existence. Therefore, God would never allow any capable person to be in a state of nonresistant nonbelief at any time.
Discussion of Schellenberg's argument has made explicit a non-theological use of the term 'hiddenness', which is now commonly used simply as a way of talking about the subjective condition of nonbelief in God. In his first presentation of the argument Schellenberg emphasized inculpable or reasonable nonbelief, but he has since shifted to speaking more specifically about nonresistant nonbelief. The first presentation is often given by commentators as follows, based on Schellenberg's own summing up:
Schellenberg has stated that this formulation is misleading, when taken on its own, because it does not make explicit the reason why a perfectly loving God would want to prevent nonbelief. His deepest claim, he says, is "about the connection between love and openness to relationship—a personal and positively meaningful and explicit sort of relationship of the sort that logically presupposes each party's belief in the other's existence." A later presentation of the argument by Schellenberg, which aims at accessibility for students, includes this element:
In an article revisiting the argument ten years after it was originally proposed, Schellenberg observes that criticism has mainly centered around the idea that God would prevent inculpable nonbelief. He asserts that there are relatively few criticisms questioning the existence of inculpable nonbelief, and almost no theistic philosopher objects to the idea that God is perfectly loving.
Schellenberg says he has not seen any serious objections to this premise by theistic philosophers, but there certainly are other conceptions of God.[citation needed] Daniel Howard-Snyder writes about the possibility of believing in an unsurpassably great personal god that is nevertheless dispassionate towards its creatures. Drawing on the Stoic concept of Eudaimonia, he says one can think of a god more akin to a wise sage than the loving parent that Schellenberg envisions.