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Bank tax
Bank tax
Bank tax
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A bank tax, or a bank levy, is a tax on banks which was discussed in the context of the 2008 financial crisis. The bank tax is levied on the capital at risk of financial institutions, excluding federally insured deposits, with the aim of discouraging banks from taking unnecessary risks. The bank tax is levied on a limited number of sophisticated taxpayers and is not especially difficult to understand. It can be used as a counterbalance to the various ways in which banks are currently subsidized by the tax system, such as the ability to subtract bad loan reserves, delay tax on interest received abroad, and buy other banks and use their losses to offset future income. In other words, the bank tax is a small reimbursement of taxpayer funds used to bailout major banks after the 2008 financial crisis, and it is carefully structured to target only certain institutions that are considered "too big to fail."[1]

On 16 April 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put forward three possible options to deal with the crisis, which were presented in response to an earlier request of the G20 leaders, at the September 2009 G20 Pittsburgh summit, for an investigative report on options to deal with the crisis.[2] The IMF opted in favour of the "financial stability contribution" (FSC) option, which many media have referred to as a "bank tax". Both before and after that IMF report, there was considerable debate among national leaders as to whether such a "bank tax" should be global or semi-global, or whether it should be applied only in certain nations.

History

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In the context of the 2008 financial crisis, in August 2009, British Financial Services Authority chairman Lord Adair Turner said in Prospect magazine that he would be happy to consider a "tax on banks" to prevent excessive bonus payments.[3]

IMF responds to G20 request

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When the IMF presented its interim report[4][5] for the G20 on April 16, 2010, it set out three options, each of which is distinct from another:

Financial stability contribution (FSC)

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Financial stability contribution (FSC) – a tax on a financial institution's balance sheet (most probably on its liabilities or possibly on assets) whose proceeds would most likely be used to create an insurance fund to bail out the industry in any future crisis rather than making taxpayers pay for bailouts.

Much of the IMF's report is devoted to the first option of a levy on all major financial institutions balance sheets. Initially it could be imposed at a flat rate and later it could be refined so that the institutions with the most risky portfolios would pay more than those who took on fewer risks.

The levy could be modeled on US President Obama's proposed Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee to raise US$90 billion over 10 years from US banks with assets of more than US$50 billion. If Obama's proposal had passed, the proceeds would have gone into general government revenues. They would have been used to pay the costs of the 2008 crisis rather than gone into an insurance fund in anticipation of the next one.[6]

Financial activities tax (FAT)

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A financial activities tax (FAT) – a tax on the sum of bank profits and bankers’ remuneration packages with the proceeds going into general government revenues.[7][8]

Financial transaction tax (FTT)

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Main article: Financial transaction tax

A financial transactions tax (FTT) – a tax on a broad range of financial instruments including stocks, bonds, currencies and derivatives.

In November 2009, two months after the G20 Pittsburgh summit, G20 national Finance Ministers met in Scotland to address the 2008 financial crisis, but were unwilling to endorse the German proposal for a financial transactions tax:

"European Union leaders urged the International Monetary Fund on Friday to consider a global tax on financial transactions in spite of opposition from the US and doubts at the IMF itself. In a communiqué issued after a two-day summit, the EU’s 27 national leaders stopped short of making a formal appeal for the introduction of a so-called "Tobin tax" but made clear they regarded it as a potentially useful revenue-raising instrument."[9]

While the IMF does not endorse an FTT, it concedes that "The FTT should not be dismissed on grounds of administrative practicality."[4]

Difference between a bank tax and a financial transactions tax

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A "bank tax" ("bank levy") differs from a financial transaction tax in the following way:

A financial transaction tax is a tax on a specific type (or types) of financial transaction for a specific purpose (or purposes). This term has been most commonly associated with the financial sector, as opposed to consumption taxes paid by consumers. However, it is not a tax on the financial institution itself. Instead, it is charged only on the specific transactions that are designated as taxable. If an institution never carries out the taxable transaction, then it will never be taxed on that transaction.[10] Furthermore, if it carries out only one such transaction, then it will only be taxed for that one transaction. As such, this tax is neither a financial activities tax (FAT), nor a financial stability contribution (FSC) (or "bank tax"),[11] for example. This clarification is important in discussions about using a financial transaction tax as a tool to selectively discourage excessive speculation without discouraging any other activity (as Keynes originally envisioned it in 1936.[12])

Aftermath to IMF report

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On June 27, 2010 at the 2010 G20 Toronto summit, the G20 leaders declared that a "global tax" was no longer "on the table," but that individual countries will be able to decide whether to implement a levy against financial institutions to recoup billions of dollars in taxpayer-funded bailouts.[13]

Nevertheless, Britain, France and Germany had already agreed before the summit to impose a "bank tax."[13] On May 20, 2010, German officials were understood to favour a financial transaction tax over a financial activities tax.[14]

Two simultaneous taxes considered in the European Union

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On June 28, 2010, the European Union's executive said it will study whether the European Union should go alone in imposing a tax on financial transactions after G20 leaders failed to agree on the issue.

The financial transactions tax would be separate from a bank levy, or a resolution levy, which some governments are also proposing to impose on banks to insure them against the costs of any future bailouts. EU leaders instructed their finance ministers in May 2010 to work out by the end of October 2010, details for the banking levy, but any financial transaction tax remains much more controversial.[2][15]

Country-by-Country report on European OECD countries which implemented bank tax

[edit]

The global debate about whether and how taxation should be used to stabilize the financial sector and raise revenue to partly cover the costs associated with future crises was sparked by the 2008 financial crisis.

To European OECD countries which implemented bank taxes belong Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Of all these countries, which implemented the levy after the 2008 financial crisis, Greece is the only exception, in that Greece implemented the bank levy in 1975. The majority of countries base their bank tax on a measurement of liabilities or assets. Some countries, however, have chosen a different tax base.[16]

Financial stability contributions as of 2021

[edit]

In 2011 the bank tax was implemented in Austria and based on a measure of total liabilities net of equity and insured deposits. Tax is rated between 0.024% - 0.029%.

In case of Belgium, the bank tax is measured on various tax bases depending on the size of institution, risk, and destination of tax payments. It was implemented in 2012 and the tax rates are varying.

France implemented the bank tax in 2011 and taxes the minimal amount of capital required to meet the regulatory requirements. Tax rate is 0.0642%.

Greece presents an exception, in that the bank levy was implemented before the 2008 financial crisis, in 1975. The value of the credit portfolio is taxed with the tax rate 0.12%-0.60%.

In 2010 the bank tax was implemented in Hungary, levied on a measure of assets net of interbank loans, with tax rate 0.15%-0.20%.

Iceland implemented the bank tax in 2011 and tax is levied on total debt with tax rate of 0.145%.

The tax rate in the Netherlands ranges from 0.033% to 0.066% and taxes the total amount of liabilities net of equity and insured deposits. The tax went into effect in 2012.

Poland represents another of the exception, in that the bank tax was implemented in 2016. Tax rate is 0.44% and is levied on a total value of assets.

Portugal levies the bank tax on various bases with tax rates ranging from 0.01% to 0.11%. The tax went into effect in 2011.

Slovenia levies the bank tax on a measure of total assets and has a tax rate equal to 0.10%. The tax was implemented in 2011.

The bank tax in Sweden was implemented in 2015 and taxes the total amount of liabilities net of equity and insured deposits with tax rate of 0.05%.

In case of the United Kingdom the tax rate ranges from 0.05% to 0.10% and taxes the total amount of liabilities net of insured deposits. The tax went into effect in 2011.[16]

Special cases

[edit]

Latvia

[edit]

The bank tax was implemented in Latvia in 2011 and was levied on a measure of assets with tax rate equal to 0.1%. However, Latvia's bank levy was abolished in 2020.

Slovakia

[edit]

In 2012, the Slovak financial stability contribution, also known as the bank levy, was enacted in order to provide a protection against possible financial crises. By the end of 2020, the tax on bank liabilities after deducting basic capital was due to expire. Despite this, Slovak lawmakers voted in November 2019 to prolong the tax indefinitely and increase the rate from 0.2 percent to 0.4 percent. Both the National Slovak Bank and the European Central Bank criticized that plan. The central bank, in its financial stability report published in November 2019, forecasted that the higher tax would reduce bank income by 33%.[17] Slovakia's bank levy was abolished in January 2021.  

However, while still in effect the Covid-19 pandemic stroke and policymakers in Slovakia were attempting to reduce bank taxes in order to provide more financial support to enterprises and public-sector investment programs. In return for lenders' assistance in funding the country's economic recovery from the pandemic, the Slovak government approved the removal of a special tax on bank deposits. Banks agreed to provide annual credit funding increases of 500 million euros for state investment projects and 1 billion euros for corporate and individual loans.[17]

Controversies

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Should the bank tax be global?

[edit]

On August 30, 2009, British Financial Services Authority chairman Lord Adair Turner had said it was "ridiculous" to think he would propose a new tax on London and not the rest of the world.[18] However, in May, and June 2010, the government of Canada expressed opposition to the bank tax becoming "global" in nature.[11]

Controversy over the IMF's refusal to promote a financial transactions tax

[edit]

In a detailed analysis of the IMF's proposals, Stephan Schulmeister of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research finds that, "the assertion of the IMF paper, that [a financial-transactions tax] ‘is not focused on the core sources of financial instability,’ does not seem to have a solid foundation in the empirical evidence."[19] Yet at least one independent commentator has endorsed the IMF's view.[2]

In an alternative critique of the IMF's stance, Aldo Caliari of U.S. NGO the Center of Concern said, "the naiveté with which the IMF approaches its preferred mechanism — a bank tax tied to systemic risks — is astonishing for such a knowledgeable institution, unless it is in fact designed to let the financial sector off the hook."[19] He argues that the FAT and FSC do not reduce the overall risk in the system, and may increase it if banks are encouraged to feel that the taxes provide a government guarantee of future bailouts. Nonetheless, a 2010 Tulane Law Review article lent lukewarm support to President Obama's Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee, which is a "bank tax" similar to the FSC.[2] The Tulane article concluded that taxing financial transactions would be "foolish", and that a bank tax "could constitute shrewd regulatory reform if done properly."[2]

Who pays the bank tax?

[edit]

The issue of tax incidence is discussed since it is unclear who bears the burden of bank taxation. However, an increase in taxes will increase borrowing rates for businesses and creditors without reducing bank income if banks are able to pass their taxes on to their customers. This would be counter to policymakers' goals of taxing banks to recoup bailout costs linked to the crisis, as well as taxing banks' economic rents due to potential implicit bailout guarantees.[20]

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Bank tax

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
A bank tax, also known as a bank levy, is a tax imposed on financial institutions, primarily banks, to fund potential government interventions during crises, discourage excessive risk-taking, and address the fiscal costs of systemic instability exposed by events like the 2008 financial crisis. The concept was advanced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to G20 requests, favoring a Financial Stability Contribution levied on balance sheets over alternatives like taxes on activities or transactions, though a uniform global levy was not adopted. Several European countries subsequently implemented national versions targeting liabilities excluding insured deposits, including Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, and the United Kingdom, aiming to enhance financial stability without harmonized international rates or bases. These levies typically apply to short- and long-term liabilities, with variations reflecting domestic priorities for recouping bailout expenses and curbing moral hazard from perceived government backstops.

Background and Rationale

Definition

A bank tax, also known as a bank levy, is a tax imposed specifically on financial institutions, targeting particular elements of their balance sheets such as liabilities. This levy focuses on the banking sector to address inherent risks like leverage and systemic vulnerabilities, rather than applying broadly across industries. The tax base typically excludes insured customer deposits, concentrating on unsecured or riskier liabilities net of own funds to avoid burdening stable funding sources protected by deposit insurance schemes. Unlike general corporate income taxes, which are levied on profits, bank taxes use balance sheet measures to influence institutions' risk profiles directly.

Purposes

Bank taxes serve to discourage excessive risk-taking by financial institutions through levies on liabilities or balance sheets that penalize high leverage and risky activities, thereby promoting more stable funding structures and reducing systemic vulnerabilities. A key objective is to counterbalance the implicit subsidies banks enjoy from perceived government guarantees, such as "too-big-to-fail" protections, which lower their funding costs compared to non-guaranteed entities; these taxes aim to claw back such advantages by imposing equivalent fiscal burdens. These measures also seek to recover the substantial taxpayer costs associated with government bailouts during crises like the one in 2008, ensuring that the financial sector contributes to offsetting the fiscal burdens of potential future interventions.

Historical Development

Post-2008 Financial Crisis Origins

The 2008 global financial crisis exposed significant taxpayer-funded bailouts for financial institutions, totaling trillions of dollars worldwide, which underscored systemic risks posed by excessive leverage and risk-taking in the banking sector, prompting widespread calls for mechanisms to ensure banks contribute to future crisis resolution costs. These bailouts highlighted moral hazard issues, where implicit government guarantees encouraged risky behavior, leading policymakers to advocate for as a tool to internalize such externalities and deter future vulnerabilities. In response, G20 leaders at their September 2009 Pittsburgh Summit explicitly requested the IMF to develop proposals for how the financial sector could make a "fair and substantial contribution" toward recovering crisis-related costs and reducing moral hazard. This directive marked a pivotal shift toward targeted fiscal measures on banks, aiming to offset the burdens borne by public finances during the downturn. However, momentum for a coordinated global bank tax stalled at the 2010 G20 Toronto Summit, where leaders rejected a uniform international levy in favor of national implementations, citing concerns over competitiveness and uneven adoption. This outcome reflected divisions among member countries, particularly opposition from hosts Canada and others wary of imposing additional burdens on recovering economies.

IMF and G20 Proposals

In response to a request from G20 leaders at their September 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, the IMF prepared a report outlining ways for the financial sector to make a "fair and substantial contribution" toward recovering costs from the global financial crisis and promoting stability, including proposals for a levy on bank balance sheets known as the Financial Stability Contribution. The report also discussed a Financial Activities Tax targeting high-income earners' profits and remuneration in the sector, as well as considerations of a Financial Transaction Tax, though the IMF did not endorse the latter as a primary mechanism for addressing systemic risks. At the G20 Toronto Summit in June 2010, leaders failed to reach consensus on a uniform global bank levy, effectively rejecting coordinated international implementation in favor of allowing countries to pursue national approaches tailored to their circumstances. This shift paved the way for diverse domestic bank taxes, primarily in Europe, as an alternative to a worldwide framework.

International Frameworks

Financial Stability Contribution

The Financial Stability Contribution (FSC), proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to the 2009 G20 request, is a levy applied to the balance sheets of financial institutions aimed at funding resolution mechanisms for potential future crises. This contribution targets the liabilities of banks and other financial entities, excluding insured deposits, to ensure that the tax base reflects capital at risk rather than protected retail funding. The design of the FSC emphasizes a broad application across financial institutions to internalize the costs of systemic risk, with rates calibrated to promote safer leverage levels and discourage excessive risk-taking. By linking the levy to balance sheet size, particularly short-term wholesale funding, it incentivizes institutions to reduce vulnerability to liquidity shocks and moral hazard from perceived government backstops. In promoting financial stability, the FSC serves as a pre-funded resource for orderly resolutions, mitigating the need for taxpayer bailouts by building industry contributions ahead of failures. The IMF envisioned it as adaptable, potentially with graduated rates for riskier profiles, to align incentives with macroprudential goals without distorting core banking functions.

Financial Activities Tax and Transaction Tax

The Financial Activities Tax (FAT) is a proposed levy on the aggregate profits and remuneration paid by financial institutions, designed to capture income generated from financial intermediation activities. The IMF presented the FAT as one of several options for a "fair and substantial contribution" by the financial sector in its 2010 report to the G-20, aiming to address under-taxation of the sector relative to non-financial activities by broadening the base to include wages and bonuses alongside earnings. Unlike balance sheet-based levies, which focus on institutional size and leverage, the FAT targets the economic rents from high-risk activities, potentially varying rates to discourage excessive risk-taking. The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT), another IMF-considered instrument, imposes a small levy on the value of financial trades, such as securities, derivatives, or foreign exchange transactions, to curb speculative trading volumes and generate revenue. While the IMF analyzed FTTs for their potential to reduce systemic risk and market volatility, it did not endorse them as a primary tool for financial sector taxation, citing challenges like reduced liquidity and migration of activity to untaxed venues. In scope, FTTs differ from balance sheet levies by emphasizing transaction frequency and volume over static positions, though implementation has been limited and often debated for distorting price discovery.

National Implementations

European Examples

Several European countries, primarily in response to the 2008 financial crisis and without a coordinated global framework, implemented national bank levies post-2010, focusing on liabilities to promote stability and recover costs. These levies vary in design, with at least twelve nations adopting forms targeting balance sheet elements like liabilities excluding insured deposits. In the United Kingdom, the bank levy charges 0.10% on short-term liabilities and 0.05% on long-term liabilities as of 2021, applied to UK balance sheet equity and liabilities of banks and building societies, excluding certain protected deposits. Austria levies 0.029% on bank liabilities net of equity and insured deposits. Belgium increased its levy on certain bank liabilities—primarily customer deposits—to 0.17% from a prior 0.13%, reflecting adjustments to broaden the base amid ongoing fiscal needs. Hungary imposes a special tax on financial institutions, including banks, at rates such as 0.19% on adjusted tax bases exceeding thresholds, targeting larger entities' balance sheets. France applies bank taxes on elements like minimal regulatory capital requirements, contributing to the diverse European landscape of liability-focused measures.

Other Countries

Australia implemented the Major Bank Levy in 2017, targeting with liabilities exceeding A$100 billion at a rate of 0.015% on those liabilities. This levy complements prudential regulations to bolster financial system resilience post-2008 crisis, focusing on the largest banks to fund potential resolution costs and mitigate systemic risks. Compared to European models, Australia's approach applies more narrowly to major institutions rather than broadly across the sector, yet aligns in targeting uninsured liabilities to discourage excessive leverage while offsetting implicit guarantees. Adoptions remain sparse elsewhere outside Europe, with examples in countries like Canada—such as the one-time Canada Recovery Dividend implemented in 2022 taxing bank profits at 15%—not evolving into ongoing levies akin to stability contributions. These limited implementations often prioritize targeted fiscal recovery over comprehensive risk mitigation, diverging in scope from Europe's wider application while sharing core aims of recouping bailout-like exposures.

Design Features

Tax Bases and Targets

Bank taxes primarily target the liabilities of financial institutions, focusing on elements that expose the financial system to risk, such as short-term funding or wholesale borrowing. This approach aims to capture the capital at risk beyond stable sources, often encompassing total liabilities net of equity or own funds. A key design feature across most implementations is the exclusion of insured or guaranteed customer deposits from the tax base, ensuring that protected retail funding—typically covered by deposit insurance schemes—is not penalized. This exclusion helps maintain incentives for banks to rely on stable deposit funding while directing the levy toward riskier, uninsured liabilities. Variations in tax bases reflect differing priorities in proposals and national designs; for instance, the IMF's Financial Stability Contribution envisions a broad levy on balance sheets or liabilities to promote stability, while some systems narrow the focus to unsecured or non-deposit liabilities. These differences allow tailoring to local financial structures but commonly prioritize funding sources prone to runs or instability.

Rates and Variations

Bank tax rates typically range from 0.02% to 0.6% on targeted liabilities or assets, with the majority clustering between 0.03% and 0.1% to balance revenue generation and minimal distortion of banking operations. Progressive structures in countries like Germany and Austria apply lower rates to smaller liabilities (e.g., 0.02% up to certain thresholds) and higher ones to larger volumes, aiming to disproportionately burden systemically important institutions. Certain implementations differentiate by liability maturity, such as the UK's and Netherlands' halved rates for long-term funding exceeding one year, encouraging stability over short-term borrowing, unlike flat applications elsewhere. While most levies operate as ongoing annual charges since their post-2008 introductions, variations include occasional repeals, as with Slovakia's in 2021, reflecting evolving fiscal priorities. These rate differences stem from national economic conditions as of 2021, including bank sector scale, crisis recovery needs, and incentives for risk reduction, with adjustments tailored to local leverage levels and funding preferences.

Impacts and Debates

Economic Effects

are designed to mitigate systemic risk by incentivizing banks to internalize the externalities of high leverage and , thereby promoting prudent balance sheet management and reducing the likelihood of taxpayer-funded bailouts. They also serve to build dedicated resolution funds, enhancing the capacity to handle bank failures without broader economic disruption. Empirical evidence from European implementations shows that bank levies prompt shifts in funding composition, with banks increasing equity reliance and curtailing short-term wholesale debt to minimize levy exposure, which partially lowers leverage ratios. These behavioral adjustments align with goals of curbing procyclicality, though interactions with corporate tax shields can temper the deleveraging effect. On lending, studies indicate that levies can elevate loan pricing and constrain credit volumes, as banks pass on costs or reallocate resources toward less taxable activities, potentially slowing economic transmission of monetary policy. For financial stability, while short-term reductions in risk-taking behaviors are observed, particularly under liability-based designs, long-term outcomes remain under-researched, with some evidence of strained profitability hindering capital accumulation during downturns.

Criticisms

Critics argue that bank levies impose competitive disadvantages on domestic financial institutions relative to foreign competitors not subject to similar taxes, potentially encouraging relocation of operations to lower-tax jurisdictions. For instance, UK bank executives have highlighted how the levy erodes their global edge, prompting considerations of shifting headquarters abroad. Such taxes may also unintentionally stifle credit provision by raising banks' operational costs, leading to reduced lending and tighter credit conditions that hinder economic growth. Empirical studies on implementations like Poland's bank levy show institutions curtailing loan extensions, which could heighten sector vulnerability to shocks rather than bolstering stability. Debates persist over the levies' effectiveness in curbing excessive risk-taking and preventing crises, as banks often pass costs to customers or investors without meaningfully altering behavior, while administrative complexities add burdens without commensurate benefits. The absence of robust global coordination exacerbates these issues, allowing and undermining national efforts to achieve financial stability goals.

References

  1. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8364302/
  2. https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/paris/pdf/090110.pdf
  3. https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/eu/bank-taxes-in-europe-2021/
  4. https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf
  5. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20430795.2025.2578632
  6. https://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2015/70.pdf
  7. https://www.minneapolisfed.org/speeches/2010/more-on-taxing-risk
  8. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/canada-to-oppose-global-bank-tax-report-idUSTRE61I2SR/
  9. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/02/canada-rejects-plan-for-global-bank-tax/36258/
  10. https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/g20-leaders-to-bury-bank-tax-and-focus-on-capital-idUSLDE65F1GS/
  11. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1015.pdf
  12. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1154.pdf
  13. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/taxing-financial-transactions-issues-and-evidence-24702
  14. https://www.cadtm.org/Bank-taxes-in-the-EU-exceptional-temporary-and-far-less-than-the-EUR6-trillion
  15. https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/tax-by-tax-spend-by-spend/bank-levy/
  16. https://www.cadtm.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=22197
  17. https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2024/english/wpiea2024143-print-pdf.pdf
  18. https://multilaw.com/Multilaw/Multilaw/Multilaw_News/Jurisdiction_News/Hungary_Special_Taxes_on_Banks_and_Retailers.aspx
  19. https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/print?DocID=NEM%2FEM201728%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00003&PiT=99991231235958
  20. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/MajorBankLevy/Report/c01
  21. https://www.ctf.ca/EN/EN/Newsletters/Perspectives/2023/1/230104.aspx
  22. https://nielsjohannesen.net/wp-content/uploads/DJV2019-banklevies.pdf
  23. https://www.suerf.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/f_ac9409d10ea7b978d52b9e977ef787cc_15905_suerf.pdf
  24. https://oxfordtax.sbs.ox.ac.uk/can-taxes-tame-the-banks-evidence-from-european-bank-levies
  25. https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/wp/esrb.wp103~1365cfba23.en.pdf
  26. https://www.ieseg.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/2020-ACF-08.pdf
  27. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1572308924000470
  28. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-33444127
  29. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/aug/04/standard-chartered-bank-levy-relocation
  30. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346240846_The_Dark_Side_of_the_Bank_Levy
  31. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/assessing-effects-regulatory-bank-levies
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