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Battalion tactical group
A battalion tactical group (Russian: Батальонная тактическая группа, batal'onnaya takticheskaya gruppa), abbreviated as BTG, is a combined-arms manoeuvre unit deployed by the Russian Army that is kept at a high level of readiness. A BTG typically comprises a battalion (typically mechanised infantry) of two to four companies reinforced with air-defence, artillery, engineering, and logistical support units, formed from a garrisoned army brigade. A tank company and rocket artillery typically reinforce such groupings. BTGs formed the mainstay of Russia's military intervention in Ukraine from 2013 to 2015, particularly in the war in Donbas.
In August 2021, Russia's defence minister said the country had about 170 BTGs. Each BTG has approximately 600–800 officers and soldiers, of whom roughly 200 are infantrymen, equipped with vehicles typically including roughly 10 tanks and 40 infantry fighting vehicles.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Army structured its tactical formations with the maneuver regiment as the smallest combined arms force and its subordinate battalions as "pure" tank or motorized rifle formations. In practice, the Soviets reinforced their battalions into temporary combined arms groupings during field exercises. Depending on the assigned mission, a battalion could receive additional tanks or motorized rifle infantry, plus supporting elements like artillery, air defense, engineers, or reconnaissance units. For example, a tank battalion might be reinforced with an infantry company, an artillery battalion, and an engineer platoon to transform it into a combined arms force.
Soviet military writers used the term "tactical group" to describe NATO combined arms formations, with "company tactical groups" to describe company teams and "battalion tactical groups" for battalion task forces. By 1987, "battalion tactical group" was used to describe Soviet combined arms battalions. Battalion tactical groups were seen in the Soviet–Afghan War.
The Soviets expanded the combined arms battalion concept as part of the "Army 2000" restructuring plan to make the army more agile and versatile for future war. One element of this plan was "Division 87", which called for the permanent addition of a tank company to every motorized rifle battalion to turn them into a precursor for a larger and more flexible combined arms battalion.
However, the permanent combined arms battalion experiment was abandoned. They were too expensive for the decaying Soviet economy to reorganize and maintain by the end of the 1980s. The switch to a defensive military strategy under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev rendered large-scale army reforms politically unacceptable. Junior battalion commanders also lacked the experience to handle such complicated formations until later in their command assignments. Further tactical reform would have required the Soviets to abandon simple battle drills and introduce more sophisticated combat techniques down to the company and platoon level, which was only possible with a body of professional non-commissioned officers.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Russian Armed Forces to replace the Soviet Armed Forces, ad-hoc battalion tactical groups were formed in the Russian Ground Forces as an expediency due to lack of manpower and equipment to field full-strength brigades and divisions during both the first and second Chechen Wars, and also in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.
Following the Georgian War, in October 2008, the Ministry of Defence announced that it intended to reform the Russian army by creating "permanent readiness" brigades, which led to the 2008 Russian military reform. After Anatoliy Serdyukov was dismissed as defence minister and replaced by Sergei Shoigu in November 2012, this plan was shelved in favour of forming "permanent readiness" BTGs within garrison brigades. These were planned to be 100% staffed by contract soldiers (i.e., non-conscript volunteers). According to sources quoted by the Russian Interfax agency, the reason for this was lack of manpower to form full-strength brigades.
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Battalion tactical group
A battalion tactical group (Russian: Батальонная тактическая группа, batal'onnaya takticheskaya gruppa), abbreviated as BTG, is a combined-arms manoeuvre unit deployed by the Russian Army that is kept at a high level of readiness. A BTG typically comprises a battalion (typically mechanised infantry) of two to four companies reinforced with air-defence, artillery, engineering, and logistical support units, formed from a garrisoned army brigade. A tank company and rocket artillery typically reinforce such groupings. BTGs formed the mainstay of Russia's military intervention in Ukraine from 2013 to 2015, particularly in the war in Donbas.
In August 2021, Russia's defence minister said the country had about 170 BTGs. Each BTG has approximately 600–800 officers and soldiers, of whom roughly 200 are infantrymen, equipped with vehicles typically including roughly 10 tanks and 40 infantry fighting vehicles.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Army structured its tactical formations with the maneuver regiment as the smallest combined arms force and its subordinate battalions as "pure" tank or motorized rifle formations. In practice, the Soviets reinforced their battalions into temporary combined arms groupings during field exercises. Depending on the assigned mission, a battalion could receive additional tanks or motorized rifle infantry, plus supporting elements like artillery, air defense, engineers, or reconnaissance units. For example, a tank battalion might be reinforced with an infantry company, an artillery battalion, and an engineer platoon to transform it into a combined arms force.
Soviet military writers used the term "tactical group" to describe NATO combined arms formations, with "company tactical groups" to describe company teams and "battalion tactical groups" for battalion task forces. By 1987, "battalion tactical group" was used to describe Soviet combined arms battalions. Battalion tactical groups were seen in the Soviet–Afghan War.
The Soviets expanded the combined arms battalion concept as part of the "Army 2000" restructuring plan to make the army more agile and versatile for future war. One element of this plan was "Division 87", which called for the permanent addition of a tank company to every motorized rifle battalion to turn them into a precursor for a larger and more flexible combined arms battalion.
However, the permanent combined arms battalion experiment was abandoned. They were too expensive for the decaying Soviet economy to reorganize and maintain by the end of the 1980s. The switch to a defensive military strategy under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev rendered large-scale army reforms politically unacceptable. Junior battalion commanders also lacked the experience to handle such complicated formations until later in their command assignments. Further tactical reform would have required the Soviets to abandon simple battle drills and introduce more sophisticated combat techniques down to the company and platoon level, which was only possible with a body of professional non-commissioned officers.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Russian Armed Forces to replace the Soviet Armed Forces, ad-hoc battalion tactical groups were formed in the Russian Ground Forces as an expediency due to lack of manpower and equipment to field full-strength brigades and divisions during both the first and second Chechen Wars, and also in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.
Following the Georgian War, in October 2008, the Ministry of Defence announced that it intended to reform the Russian army by creating "permanent readiness" brigades, which led to the 2008 Russian military reform. After Anatoliy Serdyukov was dismissed as defence minister and replaced by Sergei Shoigu in November 2012, this plan was shelved in favour of forming "permanent readiness" BTGs within garrison brigades. These were planned to be 100% staffed by contract soldiers (i.e., non-conscript volunteers). According to sources quoted by the Russian Interfax agency, the reason for this was lack of manpower to form full-strength brigades.