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Battle of Kyongju
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Battle of Kyongju
The Battle of Kyongju was an engagement between United Nations Command (UN) and North Korean forces early in the Korean War from August 31 to September 15, 1950, in the vicinity of Kyongju in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. The battle ended in a victory for the UN after large numbers of United States Army (US) and Republic of Korea Army (ROK) troops repelled a strong North Korean Korean People's Army (KPA) attack.
Holding a line north of P'ohang-dong, An'gang-ni, and Kyongju, the so-called "Kyongju corridor," the ROK I Corps was unexpectedly hit with an attack by the KPA's II Corps, part of the wider Great Naktong Offensive. The ROK troops, already demoralized and struggling to maintain a strong defensive line, were easily pushed back from their positions. US units were called in to assist the ROK to repel the attack.
Fighting was heavy and the two sides fought to capture and recapture P'ohang-dong and An'gang-ni, with the KPA seeking to break through the Kyongju corridor as a way to attack the UN base at Pusan. However, with large amounts of UN air and naval support, the US and ROK forces were able to rout and force back the KPA troops after two weeks of fighting.
From the outbreak of the Korean War and the invasion of South Korea by the North, the KPA had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and equipment over both the ROK and the UN forces dispatched to South Korea to prevent it from collapsing. The KPA strategy was to aggressively pursue UN and ROK forces on all avenues of approach south and to engage them aggressively, attacking from the front and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the unit, which allowed the KPA to surround and cut off the opposing force, which would then be forced to retreat in disarray, often leaving behind much of its equipment. From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the KPA used this strategy to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south. However, when the UN forces, under the Eighth United States Army, established the Pusan Perimeter in August, the UN troops held a continuous line along the peninsula which KPA troops could not outflank, and their advantages in numbers decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the UN forces.
When the KPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on August 5, they attempted the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter. Throughout August, the KPA 6th Division, and later the 7th Division engaged the US 25th Infantry Division at the Battle of Masan, initially repelling a UN counteroffensive before countering with battles at Komam-ni and Battle Mountain. These attacks stalled as UN forces, well equipped and with plenty of reserves, repeatedly repelled KPA attacks. North of Masan, the KPA 4th Division and the US 24th Infantry Division sparred in the Naktong Bulge area. In the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the KPA division was unable to hold its bridgehead across the river as large numbers of US reserve forces were brought in to repel it, and on August 19, the KPA 4th Division was forced back across the river with 50 percent casualties. In the Taegu region, five KPA divisions were repulsed by three UN divisions in several attempts to attack the city during the Battle of Taegu. Particularly heavy fighting took place at the Battle of the Bowling Alley where the KPA 13th Division was almost completely destroyed in the attack. On the east coast, three more KPA divisions were repulsed by the ROK at P'ohang-dong during the Battle of P'ohang-dong. All along the front, the KPA troops were reeling from these defeats, the first time in the war their strategies were not working.
In planning its new offensive, the KPA command decided any attempt to flank the UN force was impossible thanks to the support of the UN naval forces. Instead, they opted to use frontal attack to breach the perimeter and collapse it as the only hope of achieving success in the battle. Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union the North Koreans were aware the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle. A secondary objective was to surround Taegu and destroy the UN units in that city. As part of this mission, the KPA would first cut the supply lines to Taegu.
On August 20, the KPA commands distributed operations orders to their subordinate units. The plan called for a simultaneous five-prong attack against the UN lines. These attacks would overwhelm the UN defenders and allow the KPA to break through the lines in at least one place to force the UN forces back. Five battle groupings were ordered. The easternmost of these was for the KPA 12th and 5th Divisions break through the ROK Capital and 3rd Infantry Divisions to P'ohang-dong and Kyongju.
The KPA attack struck first on the UN's right flank on Korea's east coast. Although the KPA II Corps general attack in the north and east was planned for September 2, the KPA 12th Division, now with a strength of 5,000 men, started to move forward from the mountains earlier than planned, from where it had reorganized after its defeat in the Kigye and P'ohang-dong area. The division was low in food supply, weapons, and ammunition, and its men suffered from low morale. On August 26, US and ROK officers in the P'ohang-dong and Kigye area were optimistic; they congratulated each other on having repulsed what they thought was the last serious threat to the Pusan Perimeter.
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Battle of Kyongju
The Battle of Kyongju was an engagement between United Nations Command (UN) and North Korean forces early in the Korean War from August 31 to September 15, 1950, in the vicinity of Kyongju in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. The battle ended in a victory for the UN after large numbers of United States Army (US) and Republic of Korea Army (ROK) troops repelled a strong North Korean Korean People's Army (KPA) attack.
Holding a line north of P'ohang-dong, An'gang-ni, and Kyongju, the so-called "Kyongju corridor," the ROK I Corps was unexpectedly hit with an attack by the KPA's II Corps, part of the wider Great Naktong Offensive. The ROK troops, already demoralized and struggling to maintain a strong defensive line, were easily pushed back from their positions. US units were called in to assist the ROK to repel the attack.
Fighting was heavy and the two sides fought to capture and recapture P'ohang-dong and An'gang-ni, with the KPA seeking to break through the Kyongju corridor as a way to attack the UN base at Pusan. However, with large amounts of UN air and naval support, the US and ROK forces were able to rout and force back the KPA troops after two weeks of fighting.
From the outbreak of the Korean War and the invasion of South Korea by the North, the KPA had enjoyed superiority in both manpower and equipment over both the ROK and the UN forces dispatched to South Korea to prevent it from collapsing. The KPA strategy was to aggressively pursue UN and ROK forces on all avenues of approach south and to engage them aggressively, attacking from the front and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the unit, which allowed the KPA to surround and cut off the opposing force, which would then be forced to retreat in disarray, often leaving behind much of its equipment. From their initial June 25 offensive to fights in July and early August, the KPA used this strategy to effectively defeat any UN force and push it south. However, when the UN forces, under the Eighth United States Army, established the Pusan Perimeter in August, the UN troops held a continuous line along the peninsula which KPA troops could not outflank, and their advantages in numbers decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the UN forces.
When the KPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on August 5, they attempted the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter. Throughout August, the KPA 6th Division, and later the 7th Division engaged the US 25th Infantry Division at the Battle of Masan, initially repelling a UN counteroffensive before countering with battles at Komam-ni and Battle Mountain. These attacks stalled as UN forces, well equipped and with plenty of reserves, repeatedly repelled KPA attacks. North of Masan, the KPA 4th Division and the US 24th Infantry Division sparred in the Naktong Bulge area. In the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the KPA division was unable to hold its bridgehead across the river as large numbers of US reserve forces were brought in to repel it, and on August 19, the KPA 4th Division was forced back across the river with 50 percent casualties. In the Taegu region, five KPA divisions were repulsed by three UN divisions in several attempts to attack the city during the Battle of Taegu. Particularly heavy fighting took place at the Battle of the Bowling Alley where the KPA 13th Division was almost completely destroyed in the attack. On the east coast, three more KPA divisions were repulsed by the ROK at P'ohang-dong during the Battle of P'ohang-dong. All along the front, the KPA troops were reeling from these defeats, the first time in the war their strategies were not working.
In planning its new offensive, the KPA command decided any attempt to flank the UN force was impossible thanks to the support of the UN naval forces. Instead, they opted to use frontal attack to breach the perimeter and collapse it as the only hope of achieving success in the battle. Fed by intelligence from the Soviet Union the North Koreans were aware the UN forces were building up along the Pusan Perimeter and that it must conduct an offensive soon or it could not win the battle. A secondary objective was to surround Taegu and destroy the UN units in that city. As part of this mission, the KPA would first cut the supply lines to Taegu.
On August 20, the KPA commands distributed operations orders to their subordinate units. The plan called for a simultaneous five-prong attack against the UN lines. These attacks would overwhelm the UN defenders and allow the KPA to break through the lines in at least one place to force the UN forces back. Five battle groupings were ordered. The easternmost of these was for the KPA 12th and 5th Divisions break through the ROK Capital and 3rd Infantry Divisions to P'ohang-dong and Kyongju.
The KPA attack struck first on the UN's right flank on Korea's east coast. Although the KPA II Corps general attack in the north and east was planned for September 2, the KPA 12th Division, now with a strength of 5,000 men, started to move forward from the mountains earlier than planned, from where it had reorganized after its defeat in the Kigye and P'ohang-dong area. The division was low in food supply, weapons, and ammunition, and its men suffered from low morale. On August 26, US and ROK officers in the P'ohang-dong and Kigye area were optimistic; they congratulated each other on having repulsed what they thought was the last serious threat to the Pusan Perimeter.
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