Battle of Plaman Mapu

The Battle of Plaman Mapu (27 April 1965) was one of the largest battles of the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation, a protracted undeclared war between Indonesia and a British-led Commonwealth of Nations over the creation of a new Malaysian state. The battle occurred as a result of an Indonesian effort to storm a British hilltop base at Plaman Mapu, on the border between the Malaysian state of Sarawak and Indonesia.

In the early hours of 27 April 1965, a crack battalion of Indonesian soldiers launched a surprise attack on 'B' Company, 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment in their base at Plaman Mapu. The British garrison was outnumbered by at least five to one, but it managed to repel the Indonesian assault after an intense two hour firefight. Acting commanding officer Sergeant-Major John Williams received a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his role in the action. Relief units soon arrived by helicopter, but the battle had concluded by this point.

The battle was the last attempt by Indonesian forces to launch a major raid into Malaysian territory, and was a propaganda disaster for the Indonesian government. Dissent grew in military and political circles, particularly over the perceived foolishness of incumbent President Sukarno in continuing the conflict, and on 30 September elements of the army revolted against him. Despite the speedy defeat of the rebels, Sukarno's rivals, particularly in the army, blamed the uprising on him and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The conflict subsequently began to wind down, and a peace treaty ending the Confrontation was signed in August 1966. The increasingly unpopular Sukarno was forced to step down from office the next year.

In 1957, Malaya received its independence from Britain as part of their decolonisation process in that region. The British government, in their reorganisation of the region following their departure, sought to combine Malaya with Singapore and the states of Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei to form a new 'Malaysian Federation.' This would serve British interests in these regions, particularly military basing rights, which they hoped the Malaysians would protect. Indonesia, however, and in particular President Sukarno, was fiercely opposed to such a project. Sukarno, who was leaning ever closer towards the Communist bloc of China and Russia, despised the 'imperialist' British, and had planned to incorporate the latter three regions, all of which are located on the northern tip of Borneo, with the Indonesian-controlled territory of Kalimantan, which makes up the vast majority of that island. Sukarno determined to begin a military Confrontation with Malaysia, which through a series of raids and supported revolts might improve Indonesia's position in negotiating for the island.

The context of the Confrontation in the murky chapters of Indonesian politics is extremely layered. Sukarno's choice of pursuing this strategy would come at the expense of an important program aiming at the rehabilitation of the damaged economy, as it relied upon funding from Britain and America, who would not support the strengthening of another Communist power forming in Asia. However, the Indonesian populace and much of the government, who had recently fought their way from the hands of Dutch rule, would likely not support the economic program as it would seem as if Indonesia was sliding back into the embrace of the 'imperialist' powers of the West. The proposal was also beginning to lose support from the army, as they learned that demobilisation and lessening of funding that the program entailed would affect them adversely. Confrontation, on the other hand, might serve as a far more stabilising force, as it garnered support from both the Communists and the military, whose internecine political conflict weakened Sukarno's government. A campaign could keep the army busy while the Communists became accepted into mainstream Indonesian politics, which the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) found favourable. The nationalist-leaning army was content to fight the Malaysians to both remove British influence from the region as well as to establish Indonesian dominance in Southeast Asia. Some of the military high command thought that conflict could solidify a central role for the army in Indonesian politics, as well as increase their budget and return the country to martial law, which would greatly empower the military. Short of all-out war, the military was largely supportive of Confrontation.

The first blood was shed deep in Malaysian territory, with the Indonesian-staged Brunei Revolt on 8 December 1962. This operation, with the goal of seizing the oilfields as well as European hostages, was swiftly crushed by British forces that flew in from Singapore. The conflict proper, however, began in April of the following year, as 'volunteer' Indonesian forces made occasional raids across the Sarawak border. These raids were small, generally composed of groups smaller than platoon size, and their damage was minimised with relative ease by local security forces. The turning point came on 16 September, when the Malaysian Federation was formally created. In Indonesia, the response to the frustration of their plans to prevent the Federation's birth was serious and violent. A mob converged upon the British embassy in Jakarta, smashing windows and doors in protest. Sukarno authorised stronger raids by Indonesian regular forces, and even launched seaborne attacks into peninsular Malaysia. The raiding would continue for the duration of the conflict.

The British had numerous issues in dealing with the expanding crisis. A defensive battle had been proven unsound by the immense amount of time and resources expended pursuing a similar course during the twelve year Malayan Emergency that had ended only a few years before, as well as Dutch efforts to quell the Indonesian rebels during the Indonesian War of Independence, but launching an offensive into Indonesian territory to take the initiative would bring the conflict into an all-out war, and this was unacceptable to Cabinet policy-makers. At the same time, an effective solution had to be found that did not cede Malaysia to the Communists, a move that many feared would be the beginning of the 'domino effect' in Asia. The proposal selected as the most effective was presented to the Cabinet in January 1964 by Richard Austen Butler, who recommended that Britain continue fighting without declaring war, with the conflict contained in Borneo, a strategy designed to weary the Indonesians of battle until the necessity of economic reform overcame them and peace was made.

The actual implementation of this strategy was left to the commander on site, Major General Walter Walker, a veteran of the Burma Campaign of the Second World War who had learned the hard lessons of the Malayan Emergency. Walker realised that a defensive strategy would leave all British forces tied down defending their bases, and instead determined to take the initiative from the aggressive Indonesians. Walker ordered that one-third of a unit should be left defending its base, which would be one of many along the border, while the remainder patrolled the jungle, foraying into Indonesian territory and attempting to keep them tied down at their headquarters instead. Thus, the British would attempt to control the jungle through guerrilla warfare. In implementing this idea, Walker was presented with a considerable dilemma. His instructions, similar to most colonial commanders, ordered him to use 'minimum force' so as not to provoke Sukarno into escalating the conflict. However, Walker had to apply a certain level of destructive power to cow the aggressive and assertive Indonesians.