Continental Air Defense Command

Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) was a unified combatant command of the United States Department of Defense, tasked with air defense for the continental United States. It comprised Army, Air Force, and Navy components. The primary purpose of continental air defense during the CONAD period was to spot incoming Soviet bomber air raids in time to allow Strategic Air Command to launch a counterattack. It also controlled weapons to shoot down such bombers.

Among the weapons that CONAD controlled were Army Project Nike anti-aircraft missiles (Ajax and Hercules) and USAF interceptors (manned aircraft and BOMARC missiles). Some CIM-10B BOMARC missiles were armed with the 10-kiloton W-40 nuclear warhead.

The command was disestablished in 1975, and Aerospace Defense Command became the major U.S. component of North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

Discussion of a joint command for air defense began as the U.S. Air Force was being established in 1947. After the USAF began to develop the "1954 interceptor" to counter expected Soviet bomber advances, the Army deployed M-33 Fire Control for AA artillery in 1950. In 1950, a proposal for a joint/unified command for air defense was rejected. In mid-July, the Air Force installed a direct telephone line its Continental Air Command headquarters and 26th Air Division HQ at Roslyn Air Warning Station. This marked "the beginning of the Air Force air raid warning system." When the Korean War broke out, the USAF established a direct telephone line between the Air Force Command Post in the Pentagon and the White House.

The following year, the Air Force created Air Defense Command (ADC) at Ent AFB, while Army Antiaircraft Command (ARAACOM) was staffed in the nearby Antlers Hotel (Colorado) and the Priority Permanent System began replacing the post-war Lashup Radar Network.

By 1953, North American air defenses involved assets of five organizations:

The United States Department of Defense agreed that the USAF would assume operational control of all U.S. air defense weapons during an attack. However, the Army complained the USAF command and control network (e.g., the 1950 Strategic Operational Control System (SOCS) telephone/teletype system was "insufficiently reliable." In response to the "enemy capabilities to inflict massive damage on the continental United States by surprise air attack", the National Security Council formulated President Dwight Eisenhower's "The New Look" strategy in 1953–1954. To minimize the Soviet threat, the New Look strategy aimed to allow Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers "to get into the air not be destroyed on the ground" to make massive retaliation possible. Thus the major purpose of air defense was not actually to shoot down enemy bombers, but merely gain time for SAC to respond.

By October 16, 1953, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the services' input regarding formation of a joint air defense command, but the USAF Chief of Staff on December 16, 1953 "concluded that no change was needed or advisable". Under "political pressures for greater unity and effectiveness in the national air defense system", the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Navy Admiral Radford, disagreed with the USAF. Admiral Radford "recommended that the JCS approve in principle the establishment of a joint air defense command" in January 1954: