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Domain-validated certificate
Domain-validated certificate
Domain-validated certificate
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A domain validated certificate for opensuse.org, issued by Let's Encrypt

A domain validated certificate (DV) is an X.509 public key certificate typically used for Transport Layer Security (TLS) where the domain name of the applicant is validated by proving some control over a DNS domain.[1] Domain validated certificates were first distributed by GeoTrust in 2002 before becoming a widely accepted method.[2]

Issuing criteria

[edit]

The sole criterion for a domain validated certificate is proof of control over whois records, DNS records file, email or web hosting account of a domain. Typically control over a domain is determined using one of the following:

  • Response to email sent to the email contact in the domain's whois details
  • Response to email sent to a well-known administrative contact in the domain, e.g. (admin@, postmaster@, etc.)
  • Publishing a DNS TXT record
  • Publishing a nonce provided by an automated certificate issuing system

A domain validated certificate is distinct from an Extended Validation Certificate in that this is the only requirement for issuing the certificate.[3] In particular, domain validated certificates do not assure that any particular legal entity is connected to the certificate, even if the domain name may imply a particular legal entity controls the domain.

User interface

[edit]
Main article: Extended Validation Certificate § Creation of special UI indicators in browsers

As of 2020, all major browsers user interfaces display EV, OV, and DV certificates identically, but provide options to query the type of certificate via multiple clicks.

Characteristics

[edit]

As the low assurance requirements allow domain validated certificates to be issued quickly without requiring human intervention, domain validated certificates have a number of unique characteristics:

  • Domain validated certificates are used in automated X.509 certificate issuing systems, such as Let's Encrypt.
  • Domain validated certificates are often cheap or free.
  • Domain validated certificates can be generated and validated without any documentation.
  • Most domain validated certificates can be issued instantly (in less than a minute) via special tools which automate issuing process.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Domain-validated certificate

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
A Domain Validated (DV) certificate is a type of digital certificate issued by a (CA) that verifies an applicant's control over a specific or , enabling secure connections for websites through (PKI) without assessing the organizational or individual identity behind the domain. These certificates are defined under the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS/SSL Certificates, which mandate that CAs confirm domain authorization or control prior to issuance using standardized methods. Validation occurs through techniques such as:
  • Email verification: Sending a confirmation message to addresses associated with the domain's WHOIS record, DNS CAA records, or other domain contacts (methods 3.2.2.4.4, 3.2.2.4.13, 3.2.2.4.14).
  • DNS-based methods: Requiring the addition of a specific TXT record to the domain's DNS configuration (methods 3.2.2.4.7, 3.2.2.4.22).
  • HTTP-based methods: Placing a designated file or meta tag on the web server hosting the domain, often via the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol (methods 3.2.2.4.18, 3.2.2.4.19).
This process ensures the certificate's subject alternative name (SAN) includes only validated fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) or IP addresses, with a reserved certificate policy identifier of 2.23.140.1.2.1 to indicate DV status. In contrast to Organization Validated (OV) and Extended Validation (EV) certificates, which require additional scrutiny of the applicant's legal entity, physical address, and operational details, DV certificates offer the lowest assurance level but the fastest issuance—often automated and within minutes—making them suitable for personal sites, blogs, and non-sensitive applications. They display a basic icon in browsers without green address bars or company names, prioritizing over identity assurance while complying with evolving standards, such as the current maximum certificate validity period of 398 days as of November 2025 (with further reductions to 200 days effective 15 March 2026, 100 days effective 15 March 2027, and 47 days effective 15 March 2029).

Definition and Background

Definition

A domain-validated certificate (DV certificate) is an v3 employed within the (TLS) protocol to facilitate secure connections over the . It serves as a digital credential that binds a cryptographic public key to one or more domain names, enabling servers to authenticate their identity to clients during TLS handshakes. This binding ensures that encrypted data exchanges occur between the intended parties, thereby protecting against and tampering in web communications. Unlike more rigorous certificate types, the validation for a DV certificate is strictly confined to demonstrating the applicant's control over the specified , without any assessment of the underlying legal entity, organization, or physical address. This limited scope allows for rapid issuance, as it relies solely on domain-level proof rather than broader identity . As a result, DV certificates do not convey assurances about the certificate holder's organizational legitimacy, focusing instead on domain ownership exclusivity. The primary purpose of a DV certificate is to enable for while offering basic identity assurance at the domain level, which is particularly suitable for individual users, small-scale sites, or automated deployment scenarios where speed and simplicity are prioritized over detailed organizational verification. In practice, it supports the padlock icon in browsers to indicate secure connections, though without enhanced visual indicators of trustworthiness. From a technical standpoint, the certificate achieves the public key-to-domain binding via the subject alternative name (SAN) extension in the structure, where the dNSName identifier explicitly lists the under the applicant's control. This extension, as defined in the (PKIX) standards, ensures interoperability in TLS deployments by allowing clients to match the server's presented hostname against the certificate's domain entries during authentication.

History

Domain-validated (DV) certificates emerged as a response to the need for more accessible SSL/TLS security options beyond the resource-intensive organization-validated certificates prevalent in the early . In , pioneered the first commercial issuance of DV certificates, introducing a streamlined validation process focused solely on domain control rather than organizational identity, which significantly reduced costs and issuance times compared to prior methods. This innovation addressed the barriers faced by small websites seeking encryption, positioning DV certificates as a practical alternative for basic security needs. The mid-2000s marked a surge in DV certificate adoption, driven by the explosive growth of and heightened awareness of web risks following incidents like attacks and data breaches. As online transactions proliferated, demand for affordable solutions intensified, with DV certificates enabling small businesses and individuals to secure their sites without the expense of higher-assurance options. By the late , DV certificates had become an important tool in securing websites amid the expansion of digital commerce, though widespread HTTPS deployment accelerated in the as browsers began enforcing stricter indicators around 2014. Standardization efforts in the solidified DV certificates as the foundational standard for public TLS implementations. The , formed in 2005 to harmonize certificate practices, published its inaugural Baseline Requirements in 2011, outlining mandatory issuance and management protocols that emphasized DV methods for domain control verification and established them as the minimum baseline for trusted certificates. These guidelines, adopted by major certificate authorities and browsers, ensured consistency and interoperability, fostering broader trust in DV-secured connections. A pivotal advancement occurred in 2015 with the launch of , a nonprofit that leveraged the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol to automate DV certificate issuance and renewal at no cost. This initiative dramatically scaled access to free DV certificates, issuing the first ones on December 3, 2015, and enabling millions of websites to adopt seamlessly through open-source tools. By prioritizing automation and accessibility, accelerated the global shift toward ubiquitous encryption, reinforcing DV's role in modern web infrastructure.

Validation and Issuance

Domain Control Validation Methods

Domain-validated (DV) certificates require proof of domain control through specific validation methods approved by the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements. These methods ensure that the applicant controls the domain without verifying organizational identity. The primary techniques include DNS-based validation, HTTP-based validation, and email-based validation, each involving unique challenges such as nonces or to prevent unauthorized issuance. In DNS-based validation, the applicant demonstrates control by modifying the domain's DNS records. For the widely used ACME DNS-01 challenge, the certificate authority (CA) generates a unique token and key string derived from the applicant's ACME account key thumbprint. The applicant then adds a TXT record at _acme-challenge.example.com (for domain example.com) containing this authorization string. The CA queries the DNS resolver to verify the record matches the expected value, typically within minutes, confirming control. CAA records can also support validation by specifying allowed CAs and method bindings, such as restricting to DNS-01, via DNS TXT contact emails or phone details, though primary use remains for authorization rather than direct proof. This method supports wildcard certificates and is resilient to web server changes but requires DNS provider API access for automation. HTTP-based validation, often via the ACME HTTP-01 challenge, proves control by serving a specific file over HTTP. The CA provides a token, and the applicant creates a file at http://[example.com](/page/Example.com)/.well-known/acme-challenge/<TOKEN> containing the token concatenated with the account key thumbprint. The CA attempts to fetch this file from port 80 (following limited redirects to ports 80 or 443), verifying the content matches. This approach is straightforward for web-hosted domains, automates easily with tools like Certbot, and validates the server's IP reachability, but it requires an accessible HTTP server and does not support wildcards. Email-based validation historically involved sending a message to addresses obtained from the domain's data, such as registrant, technical, or administrative contacts (e.g., admin@), or generic roles like postmaster@. The CA includes a unique validation or link in the ; the applicant accesses the account, clicks the link, or replies with the to confirm control. This method was simple for manual processes but relied on public data, raising privacy concerns under regulations like GDPR. Effective July 15, 2025, the prohibited reliance on WHOIS-sourced emails for domain validation, deprecating this approach entirely and shifting emphasis to DNS and HTTP methods; prior validations using it remain unusable post-date. Alternative options, like those from DNS CAA or TXT records, persist but are less common. The Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol standardizes these validations for automation, enabling clients like Certbot to handle challenges seamlessly. Certbot, developed by the , integrates with ACME to perform DNS-01 or HTTP-01 validations via command-line options (e.g., --preferred-challenges dns for TXT records), querying DNS APIs or placing files automatically before requesting the certificate. This facilitates rapid, scriptable issuance for DV certificates, reducing manual intervention.

Issuance Criteria and Process

Domain-validated (DV) certificates are issued in accordance with the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates, which mandate proof of domain control without requiring verification of the applicant's or identity. This approach ensures that issuance focuses solely on confirming the applicant's control over the requested , typically through automated methods such as HTTP file placement, DNS TXT records, or challenges. The issuance process begins when the applicant submits a (CSR) to a (CA), including the public key and domain details. The CA then issues a validation challenge, such as providing a random value or token that the applicant must place on the domain via one of the approved methods. Upon receiving the applicant's response, the CA verifies domain control by checking the challenge fulfillment, a step that must occur within a 30-day validation window. If successful, the CA issues the certificate, often within minutes due to full automation of the validation and signing steps. No additional documentation beyond domain proof is required, enabling rapid deployment for websites and services. Prior to issuance, the applicant must enter into a subscriber agreement with the CA, which outlines terms for certificate use, , and liability. The private key must be generated by the subscriber using secure practices, ensuring the CA never handles it directly. Finally, all publicly trusted DV certificates require logging in at least two logs to promote auditability and detect misissuance.

Comparisons and Use Cases

Differences from Other Certificate Types

Domain-validated (DV) certificates differ from organization-validated (OV) certificates primarily in the scope of validation, as DV certifies only control over the through automated methods like , DNS, or HTTP challenges, without verifying the identity of the entity behind the domain. In contrast, OV certificates extend validation to include the organization's legal identity, operational status, and physical address by cross-referencing public records and registries. This additional layer in OV issuance typically involves manual review by certificate authorities (CAs), ensuring the applicant is a legitimate entity, which DV omits entirely. Compared to extended-validation (EV) certificates, DV represents a minimal validation approach that is fully automated and completed in minutes, focusing solely on domain ownership without any legal or operational entity checks. EV certificates, governed by strict guidelines, require comprehensive manual audits of the legal 's existence, including verification of registration documents, operational history, and direct contact with authorized representatives, often taking days or weeks. This rigorous process for EV aims to provide the highest assurance of the site's authenticity, far exceeding DV's basic domain control confirmation. The trade-offs between DV and other types reflect their validation depths: DV certificates are issued rapidly and at low or no cost, making them accessible for broad use, but they convey limited trust since anonymous or unverified entities can obtain them. OV and especially EV certificates, while more expensive and time-consuming due to identity verifications and audits, offer greater user assurance against impersonation, with EV historically justifying its premium through enhanced signals. In terms of trust indicators, all certificate types—DV, OV, and EV—now display similar padlock icons in modern browsers, reducing visual distinctions. However, EV certificates previously featured a prominent green address bar from 2007 until its deprecation in 2019 by major browsers like Chrome and , which studies showed was ineffective and often ignored by users. This change aligned UI treatments across validation levels, though EV still embeds detailed organization information in certificate details for inspection.

Common Applications

Domain-validated (DV) certificates are widely used for securing blogs and personal websites, where the primary need is basic without requiring verification of organizational identity, due to their low cost and straightforward issuance process. These certificates are particularly suitable for sites that do not handle sensitive transactions or collect , allowing individuals and small-scale content creators to implement encryption affordably. In development environments, DV certificates enable quick setup for testing and prototyping, supporting rapid iteration without the overhead of more rigorous validation. DV certificates play an essential role in automated renewals within cloud services, such as AWS Certificate Manager and Google Cloud's managed SSL certificates, where domain ownership is verified efficiently to maintain continuous for hosted applications. This is critical for dynamic cloud infrastructures, ensuring certificates are renewed seamlessly without manual intervention, which supports scalable deployments across virtual servers and load balancers. In (IoT) ecosystems, DV certificates facilitate automated provisioning and renewal for device communications, leveraging domain control to secure connections in large-scale networks of sensors and endpoints. Free services like have significantly expanded the adoption of DV certificates by providing automated, no-cost issuance, which has enabled universal implementation across millions of websites and promoted broader web security. This approach democratizes access to encryption, allowing even resource-constrained projects to maintain valid certificates through simple ACME protocol integrations. Common examples include staging servers for testing, where DV certificates allow secure simulations without production-level scrutiny; internal tools for corporate intranets, benefiting from their ease of management; and high-volume sites requiring rapid setup, such as content delivery networks or event-driven platforms, where the speed of issuance ensures minimal during certificate deployment.

Technical Characteristics

Key Features

Domain-validated (DV) certificates are distinguished by their affordability, with many providers offering them at no cost through automated issuance processes, making them accessible for widespread adoption in securing websites and services. This low-cost structure stems from the elimination of manual verification steps required for higher-assurance certificates, allowing certificate authorities (CAs) to issue DV certificates efficiently without extensive human intervention. A core operational attribute of DV certificates is their rapid issuance, typically completed in seconds to minutes via fully automated domain control validation methods, which enable quick deployment for time-sensitive applications. This automation is facilitated by protocols like ACME (Automated Certificate Management Environment), which streamline the request, validation, and issuance workflow without requiring paperwork or identity vetting. DV certificates support flexible domain coverage options, including single domains (e.g., example.com), wildcard configurations (e.g., *.example.com) to secure all subdomains under a parent domain, and multi-domain setups using Subject Alternative Names (SANs) to protect multiple distinct domains or subdomains in a single certificate. These configurations adhere to standards outlined in the CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements, ensuring compatibility with common server software and browsers while maintaining domain-specific binding. The standard validity period for DV certificates is currently limited to a maximum of 398 days from issuance, as mandated by the CA/B Forum to balance security and usability, though this duration is subject to future adjustments based on industry consensus. This period applies uniformly to all public DV certificates, promoting regular renewal practices to mitigate risks from key compromise. Integration with (CT) logs is a mandatory feature for publicly trusted DV certificates, requiring CAs to submit all issued certificates to append-only, publicly auditable logs for real-time monitoring and detection of misissuance. This transparency mechanism, enforced by browser vendors and the CA/B Forum, allows domain owners, researchers, and users to verify certificate authenticity and identify unauthorized issuances promptly.

Recent Developments

In 2025, the passed Ballot SC081v3, establishing a phased reduction in the maximum validity period for public TLS subscriber certificates, including domain-validated (DV) certificates, from the current 398 days to 47 days by March 15, 2029. The schedule begins with certificates issued on or after March 15, 2026, limited to 200 days; those issued on or after March 15, 2027, restricted to 100 days; and full implementation by March 15, 2029, capping validity at 47 days. This decision aims to enhance security by minimizing the window for exploitation in case of private key compromises, as shorter lifetimes reduce the potential duration and impact of breaches. The policy was influenced by Apple's October 2024 proposal to shorten certificate lifetimes to 45 days by 2027 through a similar phased approach, which sparked industry debate but ultimately led to the CA/Browser Forum's consensus on 47 days as a balanced target. Additionally, the shorter validity periods are expected to drive greater in certificate issuance and renewal processes, thereby reducing human errors associated with manual management. Concurrently, effective July 15, 2025, the CA/Browser Forum's Ballot SC080v3 sunsets the use of WHOIS-based methods for domain contact identification in domain control validation (DCV), specifically prohibiting email, fax, SMS, or postal mail to domain contacts (Method 3.2.2.4.2) and phone contact with domain contacts (Method 3.2.2.4.15) for issuing new subscriber certificates. Prior validations using these methods cannot be reused after this date, mandating a shift to more secure alternatives such as DNS TXT records or HTTP file uploads. This change addresses privacy concerns from public WHOIS data exposure under GDPR and mitigates spoofing risks that enable fraudulent certificate issuance.

User Experience

Browser Display

In major web browsers such as Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Apple Safari, domain-validated (DV) certificates are displayed with the same visual indicators as organization-validated (OV) and extended-validated (EV) certificates, featuring a padlock icon (or equivalent secure connection symbol) in the address bar to signify an encrypted HTTPS connection. This uniform approach has been in place since approximately 2019-2020, following the removal of distinct EV indicators across browsers, ensuring that users see no differentiation based on validation level at a glance. DV certificates lack any unique visual cues in the address bar, relying solely on the standard secure icon shared by all valid TLS certificates. For instance, in Chrome version 77 (released September 2019), the green address bar previously associated with EV certificates was eliminated, aligning EV displays with those of DV and OV types. Similarly, version 70 (October 2019) relocated EV details out of the address bar, and removed EV-specific indicators starting with and (September 2018). Users can access detailed certificate information by clicking the secure icon in the , which opens a dialog displaying the certificate chain; the validation type (such as DV) is indicated in the certificate's details, often via the Certificate Policies extension or subject field attributes. This click-to-view mechanism provides transparency without altering the passive presentation. On mobile devices, browser displays maintain a consistent minimalistic approach: iOS shows a lock icon in the for secure connections using DV certificates, without type-specific distinctions, while Android Chrome uses a similar lock or secure indicator in the omnibox.

Verification and Management

Users and administrators can manually verify domain-validated (DV) certificate details directly in web browsers by inspecting the certificate chain and attributes. In Google Chrome, clicking the padlock icon in the address bar, selecting "Connection is secure," then "Certificate is valid," and navigating to the "Details" tab reveals key information such as the issuer, validity period (notBefore and notAfter dates), subject alternative names, and extensions like the certificate policies OID, which for DV certificates typically includes identifiers confirming domain-only validation without organizational vetting. Similarly, in Mozilla Firefox, clicking the padlock, selecting "Connection secure," then "More information," and choosing "View Certificate" opens a dialog with tabs displaying the issuer, serial number, validity dates, and basic constraints indicating the DV nature through the absence of organization fields and reliance on domain control validation policies as defined by the CA/Browser Forum. These manual checks allow verification of the certificate's DV status by confirming domain control assertions in the subject and extensions, ensuring no extended or organizational validation indicators are present. Effective management of DV certificates relies on automated tools to handle issuance, renewal, and monitoring throughout their lifecycle. The Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol, standardized by the IETF, enables clients like Certbot or acme.sh to automate domain validation and renewal for DV certificates, typically initiating the process 30 days before expiry to maintain uninterrupted service. logs provide public monitoring by appending certificates to append-only logs, allowing administrators to scan for unauthorized issuances or expirations using tools like crt.sh or Cert Spotter, which alert on domain-specific events in real-time. Services such as SSL Labs offer free online assessments, analyzing certificate chains, validation methods, and revocation status for any public domain to identify management issues like misconfigurations or impending expirations. Best practices for DV certificate management emphasize proactive monitoring and security hygiene to mitigate risks from compromise or lapse. Administrators should conduct regular expiry checks, ideally automated via scripts or dashboards, to renew certificates before the 30-day threshold, as lapses can expose sites to man-in-the-middle attacks. Key rotation involves generating new private keys during each renewal to limit exposure windows, a process supported by ACME clients that securely handle and deployment without manual intervention. For handling revocations, (OCSP) responders provide real-time status queries for individual certificates, preferred over Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) due to lower bandwidth and faster validation, enabling browsers and clients to confirm active status during TLS handshakes. Following the CA/Browser Forum's approval in April 2025 of phased reductions in maximum validity periods—from 398 days currently to 200 days in March 2026, 100 days in 2027, and 47 days by 2029—DV certificate management faces increased renewal frequency, heightening the risk of outages without robust automation. This shift necessitates reliance on ACME and monitoring tools to automate validations every few weeks, as manual processes become impractical for large-scale deployments, thereby emphasizing scalable to maintain compliance and .

References

  1. https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/
  2. https://www.ssl.com/article/dv-ov-and-ev-certificates/
  3. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280
  4. https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/documents/TLSBRv2.0.4.pdf
  5. https://cabforum.org/about/information/consumers/
  6. https://letsencrypt.org/docs/glossary/
  7. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6125
  8. https://www.ssldragon.com/blog/history-of-ssl/
  9. https://www.geocerts.com/blog/what-is-geotrust-and-how-is-it-connected-to-geocerts
  10. https://www.digicert.com/blog/digicerts-introduction-to-the-cab-forum
  11. https://cabforum.org/uploads/Baseline_Requirements_V1.pdf
  12. https://letsencrypt.org/
  13. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555
  14. https://letsencrypt.org/docs/challenge-types/
  15. https://letsencrypt.org/2023/09/07/caa23
  16. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555
  17. https://www.sectigo.com/resource-library/domain-control-validation-dcv-methods-how-to-choose
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  19. https://letsencrypt.org/how-it-works/
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  21. https://www.sectigo.com/ssl-certificates-tls/dv-domain-validation
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  23. https://www.globalsign.com/en/ssl-information-center/types-of-ssl-certificate
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  25. https://www.ssltrust.com/blog/green-address-bar
  26. https://www.geotrust.com/what-are-dv-ov-ev-tls-ssl-certificates
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  28. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/acm/latest/userguide/acm-certificate-characteristics.html
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  32. https://letsencrypt.org/docs/staging-environment/
  33. https://www.sectigo.com/resource-library/what-are-the-baseline-requirements
  34. https://www.digicert.com/faq/public-trust-and-certificates/what-is-a-wildcard-certificate
  35. https://certificate.transparency.dev/
  36. https://cabforum.org/2025/04/11/ballot-sc081v3-introduce-schedule-of-reducing-validity-and-data-reuse-periods/
  37. https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/documents/CA-Browser-Forum-TLS-BR-2.1.7-redlined.pdf
  38. https://www.digicert.com/blog/tls-certificate-lifetimes-will-officially-reduce-to-47-days
  39. https://www.sectigo.com/resource-library/apple-now-joins-google-in-push-to-shorten-digital-certificate-lifespans
  40. https://www.cyberark.com/resources/blog/tls-certificate-validity-cut-to-47-days-what-you-need-to-know
  41. https://cabforum.org/2024/11/14/ballot-sc080v3-sunset-the-use-of-whois-to-identify-domain-contacts-and-relying-dcv-methods/
  42. https://cabforum.org/2024/11/14/ballot-sc080v3-sunset-the-use-of-whois-to-identify-domain-contacts-and-relying-dcv-methods/BR-SC80-redlined.pdf
  43. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/software/chrome-and-firefox-changes-spark-the-end-of-ev-certificates/
  44. https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2019/10/15/improved-security-and-privacy-indicators-in-firefox-70/
  45. https://www.troyhunt.com/extended-validation-certificates-are-dead/
  46. https://www.globalsign.com/en/blog/how-to-view-ssl-certificate-details
  47. https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/secure-website-certificate
  48. https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/
  49. https://www.digicert.com/content/dam/digicert/pdfs/guide/tls-best-practices-guide-en.pdf
  50. https://www.keyfactor.com/blog/nist-tls-certificate-management/
  51. https://knowledge.digicert.com/general-information/ocsp-crl-revoked-ssl-certificates
  52. https://www.sectigo.com/47-day-ssl
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