Hubbry Logo
Option offenseOption offenseMain
Open search
Option offense
Community hub
Option offense
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Option offense
Option offense
from Wikipedia
The option offense can be run out of various formations. Here, Morris Knolls High School of Denville, New Jersey is running the veer option.

An option offense is an American football offensive system in which a key player (usually the quarterback) has several "options" of how each play will proceed based upon the actions of the defense. Traditionally, option-based offenses rely on running plays, though most mix in forward passes from an option formation as a change of pace. A successful option-based offense can keep possession of the ball for long periods of time, giving the opposing offense fewer possessions and keeping the option team's defense rested. However, because passing is often not a strength of the system, it can be difficult for option-based offenses to come back from a large deficit or to score quickly when needed.

There are several types of option plays, with the common element being that the quarterback must decide which available option has the best chance of succeeding. This decision is usually made soon after the ball is snapped based upon the initial movements of one or two specific defensive players, called "keys" or "reads".

The most common option plays are as follows:

  • In a triple option play, the quarterback can either hand the ball to a fullback running towards the center of the line (dive), fake a handoff and attempt to run the ball himself (quarterback keeper), or pitch the ball to a trailing running back angling towards the sideline (pitch). The quarterback decides which option to utilize by reading the reaction of specific defensive linemen and linebackers which can vary depending on the defensive formation. This triple option is most often run from a wishbone or flexbone formation.
  • In a read option play, the quarterback has only one teammate to whom he can pitch or hand the ball, and he typically "reads" the initial movement of the defensive end when deciding whether to run a keeper or hand it off. This play can be run from a wider variety of offensive formations than the triple option, allowing it to be used as a change-of-pace by teams that do not utilize an option-heavy offensive system.
  • A more recent innovation is the run-pass option play (RPO), in which the quarterback usually has the option of either handing the ball to a running back or throwing a quick pass. The defensive key for RPOs is usually a specific linebacker or safety, but as with all option plays, the read may vary depending on the play design and the pre-snap formation of the defense.[1]

The roots of the option attack go back over a century to the earliest offensive systems of the modern game such as the T formation, Single-wing formation, and the Notre Dame Box, which were developed and widely utilized at all levels of play in the early 20th century. Option-based systems gradually lost favor in the college and pro game until the 1970s, when teams running the wishbone attack or its flexbone variant briefly dominated college football, spawning many imitators. Defenses had grown more accustomed to facing option attacks by the early 1980s, and the systems once again faded in popularity.

While many coaches at all levels include frequent RPOs and occasional read option plays in their offensive scheme, the triple option is a more specialized play that is almost exclusively run by teams employing an option-based system. Such systems have become rare in major college football and have not been used in the National Football League (NFL) for decades, mainly because of the risk of injury to a running quarterback. However, play concepts based on option-based systems are the foundation of the modern spread offense attack.[2][3]

Types

[edit]

An option offense is any football scheme that relies on option running plays as its cornerstone. There are a variety of such schemes. Some of the most popular versions include:

A diagram showing the wishbone formation. Starting from the line of scrimmage working into the backfield, there is: the offensive line, the quarterback, the fullback, and two running backs side by side.
The classic wishbone formation and the backfield set that gives it its name
Wishbone option offense
The wishbone offense, whose introduction to Football Bowl Subdivision (formerly Division I-A) college football is credited to Emory Bellard, is named after its base formation of a quarterback, a fullback aligned four to five yards behind the quarterback, and two halfbacks aligned on each side of the fullback and one yard to two yards deeper. The result is a backfield alignment that resembles the shape of a wishbone. Also called the triple-option, this base formation allows three basic running options: the fullback receiving the handoff, the quarterback pitching to either halfback, or the quarterback running the ball himself. While the wishbone's success reached its zenith in the 1970s, it remains popular at the high school and small college level but is nearly extinct at major college programs.[4]
Wing T offense
The traditional "wing T" offense employs many of the concepts of the wishbone offense. It often employs three running back formations, especially in the Bay City version of the offense. The wing T helped change the game of football in its formative years, and changed the traditional role of the quarterback from a blocker much like a modern fullback in the classic "single wing", to the primary distributor of the ball. As the triple-option became prominent, the wing T quickly incorporated the veer into its arsenal. In conjunction, it tends to employ significantly more misdirection running plays. The traps, crosses, fakes, pulls, sweeps, and counters that characterize the wing T are often supplemented by a heavy dose of option runs—most notably the veer triple option. The veer is well suited to the wing T offense, especially the Delaware version. The Delaware version of the wing T, with its predominant two running back sets, gained significant prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s and was most notably employed by the Notre Dame Fighting Irish during the Parseghian era. It continues to be employed by high schools and small college teams.[5]
Flexbone option offense
The typical flexbone formation. This variation of the wishbone adds spread-like qualities to the standard triple-option configuration and is popular amongst service academies.
The "Flexbone" was invented by Emory Bellard at Mississippi State in 1979. It was called the "Wingbone", a variation of the Wishbone Bellard introduced at Texas.[6] A variant of the wishbone offense, the flexbone came to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. The flexbone offense varies from the wishbone in a few fundamental ways. First, and most notably, the flexbone replaces the halfbacks that are aligned in the backfield of a wishbone with one or two "wingbacks" or "slot backs," that align off-tackle or off-end. These "hybrid" players are typically very quick and must be adept at running, blocking (particularly cut blocking), and receiving. Because of their positioning, they can more easily facilitate the passing game in the flexbone and serve to stretch the defensive alignment laterally prior to the snap. Teams that employ this scheme tend to amass consistently high rushing averages. The name "flexbone" is somewhat controversial and usually reflects the school of thought from which the offense was born. Some practitioners, such as Air Force's famed former head coach, Fisher DeBerry, welcomed the name flexbone because the offense was seen as a modification of the traditional wishbone. Still others, such as Paul Johnson reject the moniker, preferring instead to call their systems, the "spread offense".[7] To these practitioners, the offense is more related to spread schemes such as the run and shoot, and simply uses the triple-option as a foundation instead of a dynamic passing game. The offense was actually born in the latter school of practitioners, with its origins attributed to Paul Johnson while at Georgia Southern in the mid-80s. He brought the system briefly to Hawaiʻi in the late '80s and then returned to Georgia Southern, which won a record six Division I-AA national titles and eight conference titles while using this offense. As traditional wishbone coaches sought to make their offenses more dynamic, they began to mimic the alignments of this "spread offense" and re-dubbed it the flexbone. The name has since stuck, most likely in order to prevent confusion with other spread offenses. By the late '90s, the flexbone was adapted by all three NCAA Division I-A military academies, where it provided strong statistical results. After bringing Navy to its greatest run of success in decades, Johnson brought the offense with him to Georgia Tech, where it has achieved great success.[8]
I-option offense
Also known as the "Nebraska I-offense," this offense derives its name from its extensive use of the I formation with its vertical alignment of quarterback, fullback, and running back. Though balanced attacks from the I formation have been around for decades, the I-option gained extraordinary popularity with its employment by Tom Osborne at the Nebraska Cornhuskers. Using this offense, Osborne had outstanding success from the time of its introduction in 1980 until his retirement in 1997, including three national championships.[9] His successor, Frank Solich, continued to have success with the offense until his departure in 2003. The I-option offense offered a more traditional balanced attack. At its core, the offense relies on a devastating combination of power running, the option, and play-action passing, which are easily run from the I-formation and its variations. The concept of a balanced offensive attack combined with the big play potential of the option enticed vast numbers of top-level college teams to include some components of the Nebraska I.
Spread option offense
Emerging during the late 1990s and 2000s, the spread option is typically run from any variant of the shotgun formation, as in the example above. The "spread" allows teams to use speed[10] and athleticism to exploit gaps created by the wide distribution of players.
The spread option offense is a variant of the more generic "spread offense". It has found success and widespread employment in college and high school football. Essentially a hybrid of the traditionally pass-oriented spread offense, the spread option is based on the concept of defensive isolation. The offense "spreads" the defense by aligning in three-to-five receiver sets, using two or fewer running backs in the backfield and often setting the quarterback in shotgun. This spread forces the defense to defend more of the field and isolates its players in space. To exploit this, the offense employs double or triple option plays which further mitigates the athleticism of the defense and forces it to play their assignments. When used in combination with a consistent passing game, the spread option offense can yield strong results. The means by which option plays are run from the spread option offense vary greatly.[11]

The most popular running play employed in the spread is the read option. This play is also known as the zone read, QB choice, or QB wrap. A type of double option, the read option is a relatively simple play during which the offensive line zone blocks in one direction, ignoring defensive personnel, while the quarterback makes a single read (usually of the backside defensive end or linebacker) and decides whether to keep the ball (if the backside defender crashes down) or to hand off to the back (if the defender indicates that he will cover the quarterback). Some spread offenses employ complicated pre-snap motion schemes that move wide receivers or tight ends into formations in which they can either become ball carriers or run pass routes, allowing for additional possible options.

Urban Meyer's spread offense at Florida with QB Tim Tebow

Since the early 2000s, spread offenses have become very common, as they spread the defense to open running lanes for various option plays while also putting offensive players in favored matchups to allow for a prolific passing attack. The attack was initially developed in the college game, and Rich Rodriguez is generally credited with popularizing the zone read play run out of the shotgun formation while at West Virginia. Over the following seasons, other college coaches such as Urban Meyer (Utah, Florida, Ohio State), Bill Snyder (Kansas State), and Chip Kelly (Oregon, UCLA) developed formidable offenses based on spread option concepts.[12]

Option plays

[edit]
A QB pitches the ball.

At the heart of all option offenses is the option run. This relatively complicated running play may take on many forms. All option runs, however, rely on two common principles: Whereas the traditional running play typically designates the ballcarrier prior to the snap, the ballcarrier in a true option running play is determined by reading the defensive alignment or the actions of defensive players. This may occur at the line of scrimmage or after the ball is snapped. The second principle of the option run is that it must include two or more potential ballcarriers. These individuals each perform a predetermined route, or "track" that poses a unique threat to a defense. By threatening to attack the defense in multiple ways during the play based on the defense's own actions/alignment, the option run forces the opponent to maintain extraordinary discipline. Defenders must focus on their assignments, which stresses the defense and often mitigates its speed, size and aggressiveness. Consequently, option offenses are excellent for undersized teams.

Option runs

[edit]

Option running plays are as numerous as the schemes that employ them. However, nearly all option running plays can be characterized as either a double option or triple option. This is determined by the number of choices available during the play.

  • Triple option: In these highly complex running plays, three potential ballcarriers are available. The triple option typically features three components: a "dive" track, a "keep" track and "pitch" track. In its most generic version, the inside/outside veer, the dive track is typically carried out by a running back. At the snap of the ball, this player attacks the line of scrimmage somewhere between the offensive tackles (or end in the outside veer) as designated by the type of triple option play. This player is often the first choice in the triple option. His goal is to quickly attack the defensive interior in order to either pick up yardage or freeze the defense and prevent their pursuit to the outside. This quick surge into the interior of the defense is traditionally called a "dive". The quarterback determines whether to hand the ball to the fullback by reading a "dive key" - usually a defensive end. If the dive key does not try to tackle the running back the quarterback will hand the ball off to him. Alternatively, if the defender attempts to tackle the running back, the quarterback will keep the ball himself. This decision usually takes place while both the dive back and the quarterback are holding the football in an intricate exchange called the "mesh". On the keep track, the quarterback may run upfield for yardage or pitch the ball to another ballcarrier on the "pitch" track. This player is called the "pitch back" and the quarterback determines whether or not to pitch the ball by reading the "pitch key" - usually a linebacker or defensive back.
  • Double option: The double option is an effective cousin of the triple option. As the name indicates, the double option provides only two potential ballcarriers instead of three. Yet it often relies on speed, or misdirection to compensate for the reduction.
  • Read option: Developed in the 1990s, this play is typically run out of the shotgun formation in a spread offense. The quarterback "reads" the defensive end on the side in which the play is designed to go. If the defensive end is playing outside the tackle after the snap of the ball, the quarterback hands the ball off to the running back, who runs up the middle, away from the end. If the defensive end moves inside at the snap, the quarterback fakes a handoff to the running back and runs the ball to the outside while the offensive tackle occupies the defensive end. Though simple in concept, the play can be very effective if linebackers and defensive backs do not quickly arrive to provide run support. To further pressure the defense, the play can also include an RPO component, which adds a quick pass to the QB's possible options depending on his read of the opponents' reactions.
This read option has been a staple of the college game since the early 2000s and has been successfully utilized by many mobile quarterbacks, most notably national championship winning QBs Vince Young at Texas, Tim Tebow at Florida, and Cam Newton at Auburn, among many other quarterbacks who found team and individual success running a variation of the spread option offense with an emphasis on read option plays.
NFL coaches are generally disinclined to utilize option-based plays very often, as they can result in their valuable quarterback taking hard hits while running the ball. The read option is more often used as an occasional change of pace, particularly against an aggressive defense that is focused on stopping the running back. Only a handful of professional teams with durable and mobile quarterbacks make the play a regular part of their offense, most notably the Baltimore Ravens, which used option concepts to set an NFL team rushing record in 2019 behind league MVP Lamar Jackson, who also set a new season record for rushing yards by a QB (1,206).[13]

Run-pass option (RPO)

[edit]

The RPO has become widely used in both college and professional football. While most previous option plays included several possible options for running the ball, most RPOs give the quarterback the possibility of handing off the ball, running it himself, or passing the ball. The "read" in an RPO is often based on the movement of a single defender, usually a linebacker or safety.[1] If the quarterback reads the targeted defender as defending the run, he will pass. If the read is the defender stays put or appears to be involved in pass defense, the quarterback can hand the ball to a running back or, in some versions, run the ball himself. The idea is to choose the option that gives the offense a numerical advantage.

Because the quarterback makes the decision to run or pass after the snap of the ball, the other offensive players' assignments are a mixture of those usually used during a run or pass play, with receivers going out on pass routes and the offensive line engaging in run blocking. However, because offensive linemen are not allowed to stray much beyond the line of scrimmage before a pass is thrown, the quarterback must quickly make a decision to throw or run before his team incurs a penalty.

Modern use

[edit]

Option-based offenses are most frequently utilized in the high school and collegiate ranks. It is rarely used in the National Football League for several reasons, most importantly because quarterbacks often run with the ball themselves in option plays, resulting in frequent hits. Few professional coaches are willing to assume the increased risk of injury for the player who is usually the highest paid and most important player on the team.

Use in college football

[edit]

Various option-based offenses were by far the most common in the early years of college football, and with several schools winning national championships with the new wishbone attack in the 1970s, the option offense enjoyed a renaissance during that decade and beyond. However, the wishbone's effectiveness waned as defensive schemes were designed to slow it down. By 2000, almost all major college programs had abandoned option attacks for "pro-style" offenses the utilized more passing and attract athletes who had aspirations to play in the NFL, where option offenses had fallen out of favor decades earlier.

While very few teams run pure option attacks, some option concepts and plays have been incorporated into newer offensive schemes in recent years. In the early 2000s, Urban Meyer and other coaches found success with the spread offense, which incorporates elements of an option-based running game while utilizing the shotgun formation and including much more of a passing game than a traditional option scheme. Meyer visited Kansas State University's Bill Snyder and learned the principles of his system. These combine elements of the West Coast offense and the single wing with sorted elements of the flexbone and the wishbone. Meyer used his spread option offense with great success at Bowling Green, Utah, and Florida, where he won two national titles, and at Ohio State, where he won an additional national championship.

Meyer's version is based on the spread attack developed by then-West Virginia coach Rich Rodriguez. Rodriguez earned "pioneer" status for incorporating wishbone principles, such as the zone-read and option pitches, into the primarily passing-oriented spread offense. However, it is unclear whether Rodriguez developed the system, Kansas State coach Bill Snyder developed the zone-read philosophy with QB Michael Bishop in the late 1990s, or whether the two coaches coincidentally developed the system at the same time.[14]

A lateral during an option play.

The option remains popular at mid-major levels as well. The Appalachian State Mountaineers, who won three consecutive titles in Division I FCS from 2005 through 2007, rely on the spread option offense. Additionally, the Cal Poly Mustangs achieved success with its flexbone-style option offense under former head coach Rich Ellerson, who has since installed the offense at Army. Lenoir–Rhyne played for an NCAA DII National Championship in 2013 running the flexbone. Carson–Newman, Eastern New Mexico, and Harding have had a great deal of success running the triple option at the NCAA Division II level.

Option offenses are considered to be "equalizers" on the playing field – allowing less athletic teams to compete with larger and faster defenses, particularly since there are few teams that run the scheme and defensive players and coaches may not be adept at stopping it. Appalachian State proved this theory by defeating the heralded Michigan Wolverines at Michigan Stadium during the 2007 NCAA season. In 2013 Georgia Southern (FCS at the time) defeated Florida and in 2015 Citadel (FCS) defeated South Carolina.

Option offenses remain very popular among the United States service academies, who do not always have the specialized personnel required to successfully run a pro-style offense against top college competition. The Navy Midshipmen, Army Black Knights, and Air Force Falcons each use option offenses. If run properly, an option offense should be able to gain 2-3 yards before the linebackers and defensive backs can identify who has the football and make a tackle. Due in part to this, Navy rarely punts the ball, which has led many Navy fans to jokingly refer to 4th down (normally a punting situation) as "just another down."[citation needed] Coach Paul Johnson was particularly effective using this offensive scheme, leading Navy to 43 victories between 2003 and 2007, and Navy led the nation in rushing yards and rushing touchdowns in 2007.[15] He left Navy for Georgia Tech after the 2007 season, where he continued to successfully run the option until his retirement in 2018.

Former Army coach Bob Sutton joked that the Army–Navy Game could be played in an hour because the game clock rarely stopped due to both teams running option schemes. After Sutton's firing, Army went away from the option in favor of a Pro Style attack under new head coach Todd Berry. After eight years of poor performance on the field (with a record of 17-76 from 2000–2007 including the only 0-13 season in NCAA history), Army returned to a flexbone triple-option scheme in the 2008 season.[16] Many Army alumni pushed for a return to an option-based offense in hopes of regaining the success they saw under head coach Jim Young in the 1980s and early 1990s.[17] Under Young, from 1983–1990, the cadets went 51-39-1, including 3 bowl appearances.[16] With the beginning of spring practice 2008, Army coach Stan Brock closed practices to the fans and media in order to install the new offensive scheme. In mid-April, the Times-Herald Record broke the silence and eased alumni concerns by announcing that Brock and Army would return to the triple-option offense for the 2008 season.[18] Though Army improved statistically, they failed to achieve a winning season, and in December 2008, Army Athletic Director, Kevin Anderson announced Brock's dismissal after only two seasons. Later that month, the team welcomed famed Cal Poly head coach Rich Ellerson as the 36th head coach at West Point. In his first season (2009) on the banks of the Hudson, Ellerson implemented his version of the option and led the Cadets to a 5-7 season. The team showed a marked improvement from the previous 10 years, missing a bowl game by one game.

The United States Air Force Academy also ran the option successfully under coach Fisher DeBerry, often having a run offense near the top of the NCAA. Falcons option quarterback Dee Dowis was a finalist for the Heisman Trophy in 1989, setting an NCAA record for rushing by a quarterback, with 3,612 yards. The option helped the team win the Commander-in-Chief's Trophy 16 times, the most among the three major football-playing service academies.

Current Army head coach Jeff Monken has extensive experience running the option. Before taking over the Army program in December 2013 he served as head coach of Georgia Southern University. His experience working under Paul Johnson at Georgia Southern, Navy and Georgia Tech made him an attractive choice for the position.

Use in professional football

[edit]

Until recently, the option has made rare appearances in the NFL. An article on the option play in the ESPN College Football Encyclopedia discussed why the option was not used as much in the pros. While coaches agreed the option would work, the problem was the impact it would have on the quarterback. The quarterback would need to run more which means taking more hits, causing greater risk of injury.[19] Starting in 2004, Michael Vick, Warrick Dunn and T. J. Duckett ran the option with a degree of success not seen in the NFL before.[20] In a December 2007 game against the New England Patriots, the New York Jets ran the option with quarterback Brad Smith, substituting Smith for starter Chad Pennington.

In the 2008 AFC championship, Ravens QB Joe Flacco ran a QB option tucking the ball for a 5-yard gain and a first down on crucial third down. The Ravens offense was known for mixing up its game plan, and although Flacco is not known for his speed, the deception employed by Baltimore allowed for Flacco to mix up plays successfully despite an AFC championship game loss.

In the 2009 season, the New York Jets ran the option numerous times, with Brad Smith. Each play produced positive yards.[21] The Tennessee Titans also ran the option when Vince Young was re-installed as quarterback.[22] In addition, the option helped Chris Johnson rush for 2,000 yards.[20]

On October 9, 2011, the Carolina Panthers effectively ran the option twice against the New Orleans Saints. The first play was an option pitch from QB Cam Newton to RB DeAngelo Williams for a 67-yard touchdown. The second time, Cam Newton kept the ball and ran for 13 yards.[23]

A month later, the Denver Broncos ran seventeen plays with Tim Tebow as quarterback and Willis McGahee as running back totalling 298 yards on the ground.[24] The option was so effective that the Broncos played it almost exclusively in the fourth quarter of the 38-24 win over the Oakland Raiders, continued using it a week later in a 17-10 win over the Kansas City Chiefs, and again employed it a week later in an overtime win over San Diego. In that win over San Diego, Tim Tebow set an NFL record 22 rushing attempts by a quarterback in one game. The 2011 Denver Broncos, with Tebow at quarterback, have been the most successful team in the NFL to run a read-option offense.[25]

The 2012 season saw more NFL teams adopt the option offense, the most prominent being the Washington Redskins, the Seattle Seahawks and the San Francisco 49ers.[26][27] 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick rushed for 181 yards (an NFL single game record for a QB) on 16 carries using the read option out of the pistol formation vs. the Green Bay Packers in a Divisional Playoff game on January 12, 2013. As a team, the San Francisco 49ers rushed for 323 yards on 43 carries.[28]

The 2013 season saw University of Oregon's head coach Chip Kelly move to the NFL to take the head coaching job for the Philadelphia Eagles. At the start of the season, Michael Vick was named the starting QB and the read option was used with Vick's athletic ability to take advantage of running situations for the quarterback. However, by the 6th week, Vick was injured and Nick Foles took over as starter. Even though Foles had less running ability than Vick, the read option was continued and used successfully. The theory that the read option can work even with pocket passers is that as long as the quarterback can get positive yardage, big gains are not necessary as it keeps the defense honest.

The Run-Pass Option (RPO) has become a more popular play used in the NFL. This adds the passing element to the option offense. After the snap, the quarterback can decide whether to hand off, keep, or pass.

No NFL team truly bases their offense on the option, but the zone read and RPO's have become a staple in almost every team's playbook.

Teams that have or currently run an option offense

[edit]

Particularly dominant teams

[edit]
  • 1971 Oklahoma: Went 11–1 and scored 530 points.
  • 1972 Oklahoma: Went 11–1 and scored 399 points.
  • 1973 Alabama: Went 11–1 and scored 477 points.
  • 1973 Oklahoma: Went 10–0–1 and scored 400 points.
  • 1974 Oklahoma: Went 11–0 and scored 473 points, winning the national championship.
  • 1975 Alabama: Went 11–1 and scored 374 points.
  • 1975 Oklahoma: Went 11–1 and scored 344 points, winning the national championship.
  • 1977 Alabama: Went 11–1 and scored 380 points.
  • 1978 Oklahoma: Went 11–1 and scored 471 points.
  • 1979 Alabama: Went 12–0 and scored 383 points, winning the national championship.
  • 1979 Oklahoma: Went 11–1 and scored 409 points.
  • 1980 Nebraska: Went 10-2 and scored 470 points.
  • 1981 Nebraska: Went 9-3 and scored 364 points.
  • 1982 Nebraska: Went 12–1 and scored 514 points.
  • 1983 Air Force: Went 10–2 and scored 367 points.
  • 1983 Nebraska: Went 12–1 and scored 654 points.
  • 1984 Nebraska: Went 10-2 and scored 387 points.
  • 1985 Air Force: Went 12–1 and scored 470 points.
  • 1985 Georgia Southern: 13–2 and scored 460 points, winning the Division I-AA national championship.
  • 1985 Oklahoma: Went 11–1 and scored 371 points, winning the national championship.
  • 1986 Georgia Southern: 13–2 and scored 619 points, winning the Division I-AA national championship.
  • 1986 Oklahoma: Went 11–1 and scored 508 points.
  • 1987 Oklahoma: Went 11–1 and scored 493 points.
  • 1988 Arkansas: Went 10–2 and scored 349 points.
  • 1988 Georgia Southern: 12–3 and scored 469 points.
  • 1988 Notre Dame: Went 12–0 and scored 339 points.
  • 1989 Arkansas: Went 10–2 and scored 385 points.
  • 1989 Colorado: Went 11–1 and scored 458 points.
  • 1989 Georgia Southern: Went 15–0 and scored 584 points, winning the Division I-AA national championship.
  • 1989 Notre Dame: Went 12–1 and scored 427 points.
  • 1990 Colorado: Went 11–1–1 and scored 399 points, winning a share of the national championship.
  • 1990 Georgia Southern: Went 12-3 and scored 436 points, winning the Division I-AA national championship.
  • 1991 Air Force: Went 10–3 and scored 382 points.
  • 1991 Syracuse: Went 10–2 and scored 321 points.
  • 1992 Hawaii: Went 11–2 and scored 421 points.
  • 1992 Notre Dame: Went 10–1–1 and scored 437 points.
  • 1992 Syracuse: Went 10–2 and scored 340 points.
  • 1993 Notre Dame: Went 11–1 and scored 427 points.
  • 1993 Nebraska: Went 11-1 and scored 407 points
  • 1994 Nebraska: Went 13–0 and scored 459 points, winning the national championship.
  • 1995 Nebraska: Went 12–0 and scored 639 points, winning the national championship.
  • 1996 Army: Went 10–2 and scored 379 points.
  • 1996 Nebraska: Went 11-2 and scored 553 points.
  • 1997 Air Force: Went 10–3 and scored 279 points.
  • 1997 Nebraska: Went 13–0 and scored 607 points, winning a share of the national championship.
  • 1998 Air Force: Went 12–1 and scored 468 points.
  • 1998 Georgia Southern: Went 14–1 and scored 654 points.
  • 1999 Georgia Southern: Went 13–2 and scored 747 points, winning the Division I-AA national championship.
  • 2000 Georgia Southern: Went 13–2 and scored 506 points, winning the Division I-AA national championship.
  • 2001 Georgia Southern: Went 12–2 and scored 525 points.
  • 2002 Georgia Southern: Went 11–3 and scored 493 points.
  • 2005 West Virginia: Went 11-1 7-0 in conference and upset heavily favored Georgia in the Sugar Bowl. Led by freshmen Pat White and Steve Slayton who combined for over 2,000 yards rushing.
  • 2005 Texas: Went 13-0 and scored 662 points, winning the BCS national championship.
  • 2006 West Virginia: Went 11-2.Led by sophomores Pat White and Steve Slayton who combined for over 3,000 yards rushing.
  • 2007 West Virginia: Went 11-2 and upset heavily favored Oklahoma in the Fiesta Bowl.
  • 2009 Georgia Tech: Went 11–3 and scored 473 points.
  • 2010 Auburn: Went 14–0 and scored 577 points, winning the BCS national championship.
  • 2011 Georgia Southern: Went 11–3 and scored 492 points.
  • 2013 Auburn: Went 12–2 and scored 553 points, BCS runner-up.
  • 2014 Air Force: Went 10–3 and scored 409 points.
  • 2014 Georgia Tech: Went 11–3 and scored 530 points.
  • 2015 Navy: Went 11–2 and scored 478 points.
  • 2017 Army: Went 10–3 and scored 399 points with 20 pass completions and 785 carries.
  • 2018 Army: Went 11–2 and finished ranked 19th in AP Poll.
  • 2019 Navy: Went 11-2 and scored 483 points, winning the Liberty Bowl.

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The option offense is a running-based in that emphasizes the quarterback's ability to read defensive alignments in real time and execute multiple choices—typically handing off to a , keeping the ball for a run, or pitching it to a trailing back—thereby forcing a defender to choose between tackling the or a teammate, creating numerical advantages at the point of attack. Originating from early misdirection tactics in the late , the option offense evolved significantly in the mid-20th century, with key innovations like Don Faurot's Split-T formation at the in 1941, which introduced foundational read-option concepts, and Emory Bellard's Wishbone offense unveiled at the University of Texas in 1968, which popularized the and led to dominant success, including Oklahoma's national championships in 1974 and 1975. The scheme's core principles include misdirection, decision-making, and precise blocking angles, allowing offenses to block only nine defenders while the quarterback reads an unblocked defender (often a or linebacker) to exploit over-pursuit or poor positioning. Common variations include the veer option, where the quarterback reads a defensive lineman to decide between a dive handoff and a keep or pitch; the midline option, targeting the center with a read on the nose guard; and the , a staple in formations like the Wishbone, Flexbone, or modern shotgun spread, which can be adapted across pro-style, spread, or I-formation setups. Its advantages lie in maximizing athletic quarterbacks and speedy backs, confusing defenses with layered threats, and requiring fewer complex pass protections, though it demands high execution to avoid turnovers from fumbles or poor reads. In contemporary football as of the 2020s, the option has been integrated into offenses as a "constraint play" to counter aggressive defenses, with teams like the under incorporating read-options and run-pass options (RPOs) leveraging quarterbacks like . Service academies such as and continue to rely on triple-option schemes for underdog success. This evolution integrates option elements into broader systems like the zone read and Air Raid, blending run deception with passing threats to keep defenses off-balance in both college and professional play.

Fundamentals

Definition and Principles

The option offense is a run-oriented offensive system in characterized by the quarterback's ability to read an unblocked defender—typically a linebacker or —and make a split-second decision to either hand off the ball to a dive back, keep it for a quarterback run, or pitch it to a trailing back. This flexible scheme evolved from single-wing formations popularized in the early , emphasizing misdirection and player reads over predetermined plays. Core principles revolve around forcing defensive choices through deception, presenting a triple-threat dynamic where the quarterback can run, pitch, or keep the ball, and prioritizing athletic, speedy s and agile linemen over larger, power-based blocking units. The "ride and decide" mechanic requires the quarterback to extend the ball into the dive back's midsection at the mesh point and react in under one second based on the defender's movement. Key terminology includes the dive key, the primary read for the handoff, usually the first defender from head-up to the outside shoulder of the play-side tackle; the pitch key, the secondary read for the pitch option, often the force defender responsible for containing the edge; and the mesh point, the critical contact area where the and dive back align for the potential exchange or fake, ensuring precise timing and spacing. These elements create layers of decision-making that stretch the defense horizontally and vertically. The option offense offers advantages such as exploiting defensive overcommitment by leaving one player unblocked to create hesitation, effectively neutralizing nine of the eleven defenders with simpler blocking schemes, and enabling undersized but quick linemen to succeed through deception and speed. However, it is vulnerable to disciplined defenses that assign proper contain responsibilities and adapt keys, limiting its effectiveness against complex blitzes, and places significant physical demands on the due to repeated running and the need for exceptional and under contact. Additionally, the scheme requires extensive practice for timing and can be challenging to install mid-season or with players lacking specific athletic traits.

Historical Development

The option offense traces its roots to the early innovations in , particularly Glenn "Pop" Warner's development of the around while coaching at . This unbalanced backfield setup, with the positioned behind the line and multiple backs in motion, emphasized deception, misdirection, and quick decision-making by the ball carrier, laying foundational principles for later option schemes where the quarterback reads defenders to choose running paths. Warner's system revolutionized offensive play by prioritizing speed and unpredictability over power, influencing subsequent formations that incorporated quarterback option reads. A key advancement came in 1941 when , head coach at the , introduced the Split-T formation. This innovation featured wider offensive line splits and the reading a to decide between handing off inside or keeping for an outside run, establishing the core read-option mechanics that would define the option offense. The Split-T allowed for better exploitation of defensive alignments and quickly influenced college programs seeking to counter power-based defenses. In the mid-20th century, the option evolved into more structured systems, with the veer offense emerging as a pivotal advancement. Invented by at the in 1965, the veer introduced a split-back veer that allowed the to read the and either keep the ball, hand off to a dive back, or pitch to a trailing back, executed from under center for deceptive mesh points. This innovation addressed limitations in earlier run schemes by enhancing quarterback autonomy and backfield flexibility, quickly gaining traction in college programs seeking to counter stacked defenses. By the late 1960s, the further refined these concepts; offensive coordinator debuted it at the in 1968, aligning three backs in a Y-shape behind the to maximize execution and misdirection. The wishbone's debut propelled Texas to a 9-1 record that year, establishing it as a dominant run-oriented attack. The 1970s saw widespread adoption of wishbone and veer variants, particularly at powerhouse programs. At the , offensive coordinator implemented the wishbone in 1971 under head coach , leading to an 11–1 season and a No. 2 national ranking, with the averaging 44.5 points per game and setting an NCAA record of 472 rushing yards per contest through relentless option execution. This success popularized the scheme across , influencing military academies where resource constraints favored low-risk, high-reward run options. In the 1980s, head coach adapted the wishbone into the flexbone offense, flexing the fullback behind the quarterback and slotbacks wider to enhance blocking angles and passing threats while maintaining triple-option core; introduced around 1981, it became a staple for service academies like , which integrated similar veer and flexbone elements starting in the late 1970s to emphasize discipline and execution. By the and , the option's prominence waned in professional football due to evolving rules and strategic shifts. The NFL's 1978 rule changes, which loosened restrictions on offensive linemen and passing, encouraged pass-heavy schemes like Bill Walsh's , debuting with the in 1979 and emphasizing short, timed passes over quarterback runs to exploit defensive alignments. This transition reduced option usage in the pros, as teams prioritized aerial attacks amid increasing specialization and injury risks for scrambling quarterbacks, though college programs continued refining variants for their tactical advantages.

Types

Triple Option Variants

The triple option is the foundational play in option offenses, presenting the defense with three potential ball carriers: the (QB), dive back (typically a fullback), and pitch back (typically a halfback or tailback). The QB initiates the play by meshing with the dive back on an inside handoff fake, reading the play-side as the dive key; if the end crashes inside to pursue the dive back, the QB pulls the ball and advances, potentially keeping it or pitching based on the secondary read of the pitch key, usually the strong safety or force defender. If the maintains outside leverage, the QB hands off to the dive back, who attacks the A or B gap. This structure forces the defense to account for multiple threats without additional blockers, freeing offensive linemen for downfield support. Key variants of the triple option adapt the alignment, blocking, and reads to exploit specific defensive alignments or create misdirection. The midline option aligns the QB directly under for a more direct inside attack, with the dive back aiming at the 's midline; the QB reads the first defender aligned on or outside the play-side guard (often a tackle in odd fronts) to decide between handing off inside or pulling for a keep, followed by a pitch read on the secondary force player. This variant emphasizes interior control and is particularly effective against odd defensive fronts like 3-4 schemes, where it isolates the tackle and reduces edge pursuit. The outside veer variant shifts the attack to the perimeter, with a pulling guard leading the dive back through the C-gap (outside the tackle); the QB aligns slightly outside and reads the first defender on or outside the , handing off if that defender squeezes inside or keeping and reading for a pitch if the defender maintains outside leverage. This play, rooted in the veer system of the , leverages misdirection from the pulling blocker to stretch even fronts like 4-3 defenses horizontally, creating cutback lanes for the QB keep. Execution requires precise timing, as the pitch back trails the QB by 4-5 yards at a 45-degree to maintain pitch relationship and maximize yards after the handoff. In contrast, the speed option simplifies the threat by eliminating the dive back, positioning the pitch back in a trailing role while the QB sprints directly to the edge; the QB reads the perimeter contain defender (often the defensive end in a 7 technique on the outside shoulder of the offensive tackle or tight end, or a linebacker or safety depending on defensive alignments and fronts), keeping the ball if forced inside or pitching if the defender crashes on the QB. In alignments where the offense reads the 7 technique, the player being read is the defensive end, whose reaction determines whether the quarterback keeps the ball or pitches to the trailing back. This variant prioritizes QB and pitch back speed over interior blocking, attacking unbalanced or spread defenses with a direct perimeter threat and an optimal pitch angle of 3-5 yards behind the QB to ensure the ball carrier can arc outside for big gains. A prominent historical example is the U.S. Naval Academy's implementation of the midline triple option under head coach Ken Niumatalolo from 2007 to 2022, particularly during their successful 2009 (10-4 record) and 2015 (11-2 record) seasons, where the flexbone formation and midline reads contributed to an 11-game winning streak against Army from 2005 to 2015 by controlling the line of scrimmage and averaging over 300 rushing yards per game.

Power Option Systems

Power option systems represent hybrid offensive schemes that blend traditional power running concepts with quarterback option reads, typically executed from I-formations or pro sets to emphasize physicality and misdirection. These systems incorporate traps, counters, and power sweeps where the quarterback retains an option to keep the ball, distinguishing them from speed-based veer schemes by prioritizing gap-scheme blocking to create interior leverage. Often rooted briefly in Wishbone-era power plays, they allow offenses to attack stacked defenses more effectively through coordinated line movement. Key variants include the Power-I option, where the reads the man on the (EMOLOS) after a potential handoff to the tailback on a power sweep, keeping the ball on the edge if the EMOLOS pursues inside. In this setup, the fullback or typically kicks out the EMOLOS, while the backside guard pulls to lead block, enabling the quarterback's keep to exploit over-pursuit. Another variant, the counter option, introduces misdirection by faking a power run to one side before the ball carrier (often the tailback) counters backside with a trap block from a pulling lineman, presenting the quarterback with a pitch threat to the trailing back if the contain defender crashes. This creates hesitation in linebackers flowing to the initial fake, opening cutback lanes. Mechanically, these systems rely on double-team blocks at the point of attack to drive defensive linemen off the ball, with playside linemen down-blocking and a backside guard or tackle pulling to seal the edge or lead through gaps. The meshes with the dive back near the line, reading the EMOLOS's reaction—keeping if the defender squeezes inside or handing off if the defender maintains outside leverage—to force a one-on-one decision that stresses the defense's . This emphasis on power blocking contrasts with zone schemes, as it assigns specific man assignments to create movement and angles for the option element. Notable adaptations emerged in the early 2000s at the University of Maryland under coach Ralph Friedgen, who integrated power options into an I-formation base to balance run-heavy attacks with option keeps, helping revitalize the program through physical, pro-style execution that kept defenses off-balance. In modern high school contexts, flex/power hybrids combine these elements with alignments and spread looks, allowing quicker snaps while retaining power blocking for interior runs and options, as seen in innovative schemes like the Pistol-Flex variants. The strengths of power option systems lie in their ability to counter stacked boxes by generating line movement through double teams, integrating seamlessly with zone runs for complementary attacks, and forcing defenses to respect the quarterback's keep without overcommitting to the handoff. However, weaknesses include a slower mesh point due to the power emphasis, which can allow quicker defensive penetration, and vulnerability to backside pursuit if the pulling blockers are contained.

Key Plays

Option Runs

Option runs form the core of the option offense, emphasizing the quarterback's read of defensive alignments to distribute the ball among multiple ball carriers on the ground. The play typically begins with pre-snap motion, such as a or shifting to reveal the defense's force defender or adjust blocking leverage. Upon the snap, the offensive line executes inside zone blocking to create horizontal stretch, allowing the quarterback to —ride the exchange—with the fullback or dive back at the while reading the assigned defender. This mesh point forces the defense to commit, as the quarterback decides in real time whether to hand off, keep, or pitch based on the defender's reaction. Among the most common option runs is the veer, where the quarterback reads the ; if the end crashes inside on the dive back's path, the quarterback keeps toward the edge, often supported by a pulling guard to kick out the edge defender. A related perimeter-focused variant is the speed option, where the quarterback attacks the edge and reads the defensive end, typically aligned in the 7 technique on the outside shoulder of the offensive tackle or tight end. The quarterback decides to keep the ball if the defender pursues the pitch back or crashes inside, or pitches to the trailing back if the defender commits to the quarterback. The midline option, typically run from under , directs the quarterback to read an interior defensive lineman, such as the first defender on or past the , handing off to the dive back if the lineman pursues or keeping and reading for a pitch if not. For perimeter attacks, the rocket toss involves a quick pitch to a in motion, aiming to leverage the edge with speed while the line reaches to seal inside pursuit. Defenses counter option runs through force and contain principles, assigning the to force the ball carrier inside while a or linebacker contains the pitch to prevent outside breaks. Blitz reads assign specific defenders to shadow each option path, such as a linebacker scraping to the or a crashing on the pitch. Offenses adjust by faking the dive handoff to freeze the initial read defender, slowing pursuit and opening lanes for the keep or pitch. In , option runs have historically averaged 5-7 yards per carry, reflecting their efficiency against spread-out defenses. For instance, 's 2019 triple option implementation produced 5.2 yards per carry and 298 rushing yards per game, leading in ground production. A key variation is the no-look option, where the disguises the read by looking away from the primary defender—such as toward the pitch back—to delay reaction and exploit hesitation in assignment.

Run-Pass Options (RPO)

Run-pass options (RPOs) represent a hybrid play in where the quarterback makes a post-snap read on a defender to decide between handing off to the on a run play or throwing a quick pass to a receiver, typically paired with zone blocking schemes to create defensive conflicts. This design forces the defense to account for both run and pass threats simultaneously, often using simple routes like bubble screens or to exploit quick decisions. The offensive line executes run blocks regardless, allowing the quarterback to pull the ball and pass without altering protections. In terms of mechanics, the quarterback's read focuses on the first defender to the flat, such as the Will linebacker, determining whether to hand off on the play-side run or throw to the opposite side pass option. If the read defender flows toward the run, the quarterback pulls and delivers a quick pass; conversely, if the defender sits or passes off the run, the handoff proceeds. This post-snap choice leverages the spread formation to isolate the read, minimizing pre-snap tells while maximizing offensive efficiency against aggressive defenses. RPOs evolved as a modern adaptation of traditional option concepts, gaining prominence in the through college innovators like , who integrated zone reads and pass attachments during his tenures at and . Rodriguez's early work in the at smaller programs laid foundational elements, blending run options with quick passes to confuse defenses. The scheme's NFL adoption accelerated via Chip Kelly's influence at , where his high-tempo featured RPO elements that translated to pro systems, notably contributing to the ' victory in 2018. By the mid-, RPOs had become a staple in over 50% of college offenses, bridging gaps between collegiate and professional schemes. Common variants include the glance RPO, which involves an immediate post-snap read on the boundary or outside linebacker using a glance route—a quick out or hitch—to attack man coverage, often attached to an inside zone run. Another is the levels concept, a high-low read on the coverage where the targets an underneath route (like a slant) against a dropping defender or a deeper over route if the coverage sinks, creating vertical stress while maintaining the run threat. These adaptations allow offenses to adjust to defensive structures, such as single-high looks for glance plays or two-high shells for levels. The impact of RPOs has been significant in boosting offensive efficiency, as evidenced by 2018 Oklahoma's RPO-integrated spread attack under , which averaged 48.4 en route to a Big 12 title and appearance. In the , RPO usage rose from 4.7% of plays in to 11.4% in , with non-screen RPO passes generating 0.201 expected points added (EPA) per play—substantially higher than traditional passes at 0.064 EPA—particularly in spread offenses where they often comprise 20-30% of the playbook to exploit defensive box counts. This has elevated scoring across levels, with teams like the [Kansas City Chiefs](/page/Kansas_City Chiefs) leveraging RPOs for quarterback-friendly decisions that enhance overall passing production. Challenges for RPOs stem from rules changes limiting offensive linemen's downfield movement, such as the NFL's restriction to one yard before a compared to college's three yards, which curbs vertical route options and increases penalty risks on aggressive blocks. Additionally, stricter enforcement of defender contact rules on quick throws—prohibiting unnecessary roughness beyond five yards—complicates defensive responses but also exposes offenses to hits if passes are delayed, prompting adaptations like shorter routes in pro schemes.

Strategy and Execution

Quarterback Decision-Making

In the option offense, the quarterback's decision-making process revolves around a structured read progression that forces defensive players to declare their intentions, creating numerical advantages for the offense. The primary read typically involves the dive key, often the or tackle aligned over the fullback, determining whether to hand off on the dive; if the defender crashes inside, the quarterback pulls the ball and advances to the secondary read. The secondary read focuses on the pitch key, such as the playside linebacker or end, deciding between keeping the ball for a quarterback run or pitching to the trailing back; this choice exploits overpursuit by the defense. In advanced schemes, a tertiary option may include scrambling for yards or checking down to a receiver if the defense loads the box heavily, though this varies by system like the or midline variants. Physically, the quarterback must master ball-handling at the mesh point—the critical exchange area between the fullback and —where subtle fakes mislead the read defender without direct eye contact, maintaining deception through body positioning and arm movements. Pitch accuracy remains essential under duress, requiring a sidearm or underhand throw to the trailing back while on the run, often at full speed to evade pursuit. Precise footwork underpins these actions, including crossover steps for fakes and bursts for the keep, ensuring the quarterback can transition seamlessly without telegraphing intentions. Mentally, s in option systems perform pre-snap adjustments by identifying the defensive front, such as shifting protections or audibling to a different option against a 4-3 alignment versus a 3-4, to counter potential contain or spill techniques. Extensive film study enables exploitation of defensive tendencies, like a linebacker who consistently overreacts to the dive, allowing the to anticipate and capitalize on predictable reactions during live play. These cognitive demands emphasize rapid and adaptability, distinguishing option quarterbacks from those in pro-style offenses. Training for option quarterbacks emphasizes repetitive drills to ingrain these skills, such as "read and react" circuits where defenders simulate keys in controlled scenarios, building instinctive decision speeds under fatigue. Mobile quarterbacks like at Louisville in 2016 exemplified this preparation, averaging approximately 121 rushing yards per game through effective option execution in a spread variant. Despite these benefits, the option places unique risks on the , including elevated fumble potential at the mesh point due to the dynamic exchanges. Additionally, the frequency of designed runs exposes quarterbacks to greater injury risk from hits, as evidenced by broader on mobile signal-callers sustaining more lower-body impacts per carry.

Blocking and Formations

In the option offense, blocking schemes are designed to create multiple running lanes while protecting the quarterback's read options, emphasizing quick ball movement and misdirection. The inside zone scheme, commonly used in veer and midline options, involves offensive linemen double-teaming the and then climbing to the linebacker, allowing the quarterback to read the unblocked defender's reaction for handoff or keep decisions. Reach blocking, a staple in the veer option, requires the guards to pull and reach the edge to seal off pursuit defenders, enabling the dive back to hit inside while the quarterback and pitch back exploit the perimeter. For power option variants, trap blocking is employed where a lineman pulls from the backside to trap the edge defender, creating a downhill path for the dive or keep. Formations in the option offense are structured to maximize backfield spacing and force defensive alignment dilemmas, often featuring tight, multi-back setups to facilitate inside runs. The classic aligns the under center with three backs in a diamond shape behind him—a fullback directly behind, flanked by two halfbacks—allowing for quick mesh points in plays. The modifies this by flexing a out to create a 10 personnel look (one back, zero tight ends), providing additional blocking on the perimeter or releasing for pass protection in option-pass hybrids. Spread option formations, adapted for modern no-huddle tempos, place the in with slot receivers and a single back, stretching the defense horizontally to open cutback lanes for the quarterback's keep. Lineman assignments prioritize creating numerical advantages through unbalanced lines, which shift multiple blockers to one side to overload the defense and force overcommitment. Backfield players, including the pitch back, often release to the perimeter for crack blocks or pitch protection, shielding the from contain defenders. Against defensive adjustments, option blocking incorporates scoop techniques to handle blitzes, where interior linemen angle outward to redirect incoming linebackers without turning to engage them directly. For stunts and twists, rule-based line slides ensure the offensive front maintains gap integrity, sliding protections toward the point of attack to counter looping defenders. A practical example of these elements is seen in the 2022 ' 2-back flex formation, which combined a flexed with a veer slot back to create inside zone paths while using reach blocks from pulling guards to exploit defensive overpursuit, contributing to their 326.7 rushing yards per game average. Over time, option blocking has evolved from predominantly man schemes in the , which assigned linemen to specific defenders for direct engagement, to zone blocking in the , emphasizing area coverage to better protect mobile quarterbacks and adapt to faster, more athletic defenses. This shift improved execution against complex fronts by allowing linemen to work in tandem without individual matchups.

Modern Applications

College Football Usage

In college football, the option offense maintains its strongest foothold at the service academies, where , , and continue to employ schemes as the core of their attacks, emphasizing time-consuming ground plays that align with their military training ethos. These programs typically execute rushing plays on over 80% of offensive snaps, leveraging the scheme's efficiency in controlling the clock and minimizing turnovers, as seen in 's 2024 season where they ranked No. 1 nationally in red-zone percentage at 81.0%. This dominance persists despite broader shifts in the sport, with and ranking in the top 40 nationally in offensive efficiency during the 2024 campaign. Beyond the academies, spread-option variants thrive in Group of 5 conferences, blending option runs with formations and play-action passes to create explosive opportunities. Liberty University's 2023 season exemplifies this approach, as the Flames used a spread-option system under head coach to average 38.3 points per game while rushing for 293.3 yards per contest, culminating in a 13-1 record and a championship. In Power 5 conferences, adaptations incorporate pro-style elements like zone-read options into more balanced offenses, as Georgia did in 2021 under by integrating zone schemes that balanced gap and zone runs at roughly 50% each, enhancing their rushing efficiency despite a pocket-passer . Recruiting for these systems prioritizes dual-threat s who can execute reads while contributing through the air, with programs like targeting athletes skilled in both passing and evasion to sustain the scheme's demands. Notable success underscores the option's viability, such as Army's 2024 campaign, where a refined propelled them to a school-record 12 wins and an AAC championship, averaging 258.6 rushing yards per game. However, the Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) era presents challenges, as elite dual-threat quarterbacks increasingly gravitate toward pass-heavy systems offering higher earning potential through highlight-reel throws, complicating recruitment for option-dependent programs outside the academies. Coaches like Paul Johnson exemplified sustained implementation at from 2008 to 2018, where his offense yielded an 82-60 record, averaging 7.5 wins per season and three ranked finishes, including an eighth-place ranking in 2014. Overall trends show a decline in pure option usage since the , when it was more prevalent across FBS programs, giving way to spread offenses that prioritize passing volume; traditional option schemes have become rare as a base, though analytics-driven hybrids like run-pass options (RPOs) have risen in the SEC during the 2020s, integrating option reads with quick passes for higher explosive play rates. In 2025, under head coach Scott Abell installed a new option offense, providing a fresh example of the scheme's adoption in a Group of 5 program.

Professional Football Usage

The option offense has seen limited adoption in professional football, primarily through scrambling quarterbacks and read-option elements rather than full triple-option schemes prevalent in college. In the 1970s, Minnesota Vikings quarterback , known as "the Scrambler," pioneered mobile play by incorporating option-like decisions on the move, rushing for over 3,000 yards in his career and influencing offenses with his ability to evade pressure and extend plays. Although not a traditional option system, Tarkenton's style laid groundwork for later developments, as his 1975 MVP season featured 13 rushing touchdowns, a record at the time. The 2010s marked a resurgence of read-option plays in the , driven by coaches adapting college concepts to pro rosters. Under head coach , the 2013 Philadelphia Eagles integrated zone-read options extensively, leading the league with 1,713 yards on 304 such carries, averaging 5.6 yards per carry and boosting their overall rushing efficiency compared to prior seasons. This approach complemented LeSean McCoy's output, contributing to the Eagles' league-leading 2,796 total rushing yards that year. In recent years, mobile quarterbacks have elevated option elements within broader schemes. , drawing from his college option background at Louisville, has been central to the team's designed runs from 2019 to 2023, averaging 65 rushing yards per game across 70 regular-season contests, with 4,570 total rushing yards and 21 touchdowns during that span. Similarly, in 2022, utilized speed-based option plays, rushing for an NFL-record 1,143 yards as a quarterback—the most explosive rushing season by any player that year, with 33 runs of 10+ yards. NFL adaptations of the option offense differ markedly from due to the shorter decision-making window on fields, limiting full triple options in favor of run-pass options (RPOs) and draws, which comprise roughly 5-10% of plays league-wide compared to up to 30% in systems. Challenges include heightened injury risks for from high-speed collisions and defenses' superior athleticism, which can neutralize edges through disciplined assignments, though studies indicate no overall increase in injury rates for rushing QBs versus pocket passers. In 2024, head coach incorporated zone-option variations into his outside zone scheme, enhancing Brock Purdy's mobility and contributing to a top-10 ranked offense in yards per game (10th at 349.4). Rule changes have indirectly supported option usage by protecting mobile quarterbacks. The emphasis on roughing-the-passer penalties, which saw 51 flags in the preseason alone, has deterred excessive contact on scrambling QBs, facilitating more designed runs without disproportionate hits. This protection aligns with the influx of college-option-trained quarterbacks like Jackson and Fields entering the .

Notable Implementations

Influential Teams and Coaches

Paul "Bear" Bryant revolutionized Alabama's program by adopting the wishbone formation in 1971, a triple-option scheme learned from Texas coach Darrell Royal, which debuted with a 17-10 victory over USC and propelled the Crimson Tide to an 11-0 record that season. Bryant's implementation emphasized power running from the wishbone's triple-option veer, leading Alabama to lead the SEC in rushing (324.1 yards per game) and scoring (32.9 points per game) in 1971. This offensive shift culminated in the 1973 national championship, where Alabama finished 12-0 and averaged 366.1 rushing yards per game, outscoring opponents 301-48 during the regular season. Fisher DeBerry elevated Air Force's triple-option veer offense during his 23-year tenure from 1984 to 2006, amassing 169 wins and leading the Falcons to 12 bowl appearances by emphasizing misdirection and quarterback reads in the service academy tradition. DeBerry's veer scheme, a variation of the option that prioritizes inside veer runs and pitch options, transformed Air Force into a rushing powerhouse, ranking among the nation's top 10 in rushing multiple times. In 1985, his second season, Air Force co-won the championship with a 12-1 record, capping the year with a 24-16 victory over . Paul Johnson advanced the flexbone triple option, a refined wishbone variant with spread elements and A-back slot receivers for misdirection, during his stints at Georgia Southern (1997-2001), Navy (2007-2014), and (2008-2018). Johnson's flexbone emphasized speed and execution in the 's dive, keep, and pitch reads, leading Georgia Southern to two FCS national titles in 1999 and 2000 with an average of over 300 rushing yards per game. At , he produced consistent 8-5 seasons, including multiple bowl wins, by adapting the flexbone to service academy constraints. The 1974 , coached by , exemplified wishbone dominance with an 11-0 record and the , averaging 438.8 rushing yards per game on 73.9 attempts through Joe Washington's inside veer and quarterback Steve Davis's options. Switzer's no-huddle implementation in the accelerated Oklahoma's wishbone, allowing rapid option plays without huddles to tire defenses, as seen in the 1985 national title team's 38.7 points per game average. In 2008, Navy's flexbone under Johnson upset No. 15 Wake Forest 24-17, rushing for 292 yards on 59 carries despite a 3-2 start, contributing to an 8-5 finish and win. June Jones innovated the spread-flex at Hawaii, blending run-and-shoot passing with option elements like zone reads and pitches, leading the 2007 Warriors to a 12-1 record and WAC title before a 41-10 Sugar Bowl loss to Georgia. The option's legacies endure in dual-threat quarterbacks like Cam Newton, whose 2010 Auburn Heisman season featured spread-option zone reads and power options, rushing for 1,473 yards and 20 touchdowns en route to a national title. Army's 2018 Black Knights set a modern service academy rushing record at 312.5 yards per game under the triple option, finishing 11-2 with an Independence Bowl win.

Dominant Eras and Records

The Wishbone offense achieved its zenith in the 1970s and 1980s, powering teams to elite scoring levels through dominant ground attacks. The 1971 averaged 44.5 en route to an undefeated regular season, establishing an NCAA record of 472.4 rushing yards per game that remains unbroken. The 1974 squad, also Wishbone-based, led the nation in scoring at 43 , scoring at least 35 points in seven contests while finishing 11-0. Air Force's 1985 campaign exemplified service academy prowess with the , yielding a 12-1 record and a national-leading 39.2 , including a shared title. Service academies sustained option dominance into the 2000s and 2010s, with posting consistent results from 2003 to 2015 under the scheme. Over these 13 seasons, achieved 103 wins against 58 losses, averaging nearly 8 victories per year and securing nine berths, including a 10-4 mark in 2009. This era marked a revival for the Midshipmen, who upset power conference foes like Notre Dame and Wake Forest while maintaining a run-heavy identity. In the , hybrid option-run-pass option (RPO) systems have extended this legacy. Option offenses have produced landmark records underscoring their rushing efficiency. Army's 2018 triple option unit set the NCAA single-season team rushing mark with 4,150 yards, averaging 312.5 yards per game to fuel an 11-2 finish and a top-20 ranking. Individually, Kansas State Collin Klein joined the rare 1,000-1,000 club in 2011, amassing 1,918 passing yards and 1,141 rushing yards while leading the Wildcats to a 10-2 record and a Top 15 finish. Contemporary implementations continue to thrive, particularly at service academies and FCS programs. Air Force's 2024 triple option averaged 271.8 rushing yards per game, ranking third nationally and supporting a 5-7 campaign. In FCS, Furman's veer-based attack has driven recent contention, including a 10-3 overall record in 2022 and an 8-4 overall mark in 2023 (combined 18-7 from 2022-2023), with Tyler Huff rushing for 1,285 yards in that span. Analytically, option schemes proved efficient in 2023, with adopters like and ranking in the top 40 for offensive expected points added (EPA) per play at approximately 0.1 to 0.2 overall but yielding 0.8-1.0 EPA on designed runs, per advanced metrics.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.