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Anti-Secession Law
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Anti-Secession Law
The Anti-Secession Law is a law of the People's Republic of China, passed by the 3rd Session of the 10th National People's Congress. It was ratified on March 14, 2005, and went into effect immediately. Although the law, at ten articles, is relatively short, Article 8 formalized the long-standing policy of the PRC to use military means against Taiwanese independence in the event peaceful means become impossible.
The re-election of Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to the Taiwanese presidency, led many to conclude that there has been an increase in Taiwan independence sentiment and that a new Taiwanese identity is emerging on the island which is opposed to identification with China. During the 2004 Taiwanese Legislative Election, the strategy of the pan-Green coalition was to try to capitalize on this trend to win a majority in the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan. Among some Taiwanese Independence supporters, it is believed that a pan-green majority could force a crucial referendum for constitutional reform and, perhaps, to further move the island toward de jure independence. Many Taiwanese independence supporters, including former President Lee Teng-Hui, argued that Taiwan should declare independence before 2008 on the theory that international pressure over the Beijing Olympics would prevent the PRC from using force against Taiwan.[citation needed]
These events in late 2004 caused a great deal of alarm in Beijing. Observers indicated that many in Beijing believed that its policies toward Taiwan had failed both because it did not have sufficient incentives to gain Taiwanese public support for unification and at the same time, it seemed that many in Taiwan did not take Beijing's stated threats of force seriously. The Taiwanese government had defined the status quo in such a way that a de jure declaration of independence could be argued to not represent a change in the status quo. Some Chinese[who?] believe these events led to the formulation in 2003 and 2004 of the Anti-Secession Law.[citation needed]
In a string of unsuccessful efforts to change Taiwanese public opinion, several propositions and leaks from PRC governmental organs expressed consideration for a law aiming to formalize the policy for Chinese unification between mainland China and Taiwan under the authority of the PRC. This culminated in May 2004, when Premier Wen Jiabao pronounced to a group of Chinese expatriates in London that serious consideration of such a law would be taken. Several days later, Yu's suggestion (similar to a green paper) emerged.
In early 2004 a draft law appeared: Titled the National Unification Promotion Law of the People's Republic of China (Chinese: 中华人民共和国国家统一促进法), it was authored by a Chinese academic Yu Yuanzhou (余元洲), a professor from Jianghan University in Wuhan who did not hold any formal governmental position, as a suggestion to create a formal legal basis for the People's Republic of China's unification with Taiwan. The draft document has 31 articles, organized in 8 chapters. Its provisions touch mostly constitutional law. Article 2 of the proposal would establish Taiwan as the "Taiwan Special Political Area of PRC, or Taiwan SPA of PRC for short" (simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国台湾特别政治区; traditional Chinese: 中華人民共和國台灣特別政治區). Although no formal legislative action was taken on the document, the heavy debate surrounding it, and the suggestion that some sort of anti-secession law would be passed, was viewed by many in Taiwan as evidence of hostile intent by the PRC government towards Taiwan independence supporters.[citation needed]
The ROC President Chen Shui-bian expressed serious concerns about this proposal and doubts that the Taiwanese public would find it acceptable. Chen pointed out that the law being proposed is mostly intended as a measure to legitimize the PRC's military threats against the ROC. Furthermore, the proposed law would incriminate anyone holding opinions other than those supporting PRC policy on the question of unification. Under the law dissidents would be prosecuted under charges of treason, retroactively effective up to 100 years, raising serious questions about freedom of speech and civil liberties. Chen stated that the law would only serve to increase the feelings of animosity of the Taiwanese people towards the PRC and increase tensions.
In the December 2004 Taiwanese legislative election, although the ruling DPP party increased its share of votes in the legislature and remained the largest single party there, the Pan-Blue Coalition gained a razor-thin majority, which surprised many. However, this result may have been less a reflection of popular sentiment than a testament to the effectiveness of the KMT's more frugal nomination of candidates (116) compared with the DPP's over-nomination of candidates (122) and the KMT's rigid party rules for allotment of votes to its candidates within individual districts. This election result ended most prospects of an immediate declaration of independence and also called into question whether there really had been an increase in Taiwanese independence sentiment. Despite this, the PRC proceeded with the drafting of the anti-secession law. The main reasons given to foreign interlocutors were that the PRC leadership believed that its Taiwan policy in the past had been reactive rather than proactive and that it was necessary for the PRC to show initiative. Furthermore, Beijing expressed a residual distrust of Chen Shui-bian. Many foreign experts have argued that the PRC's decision-making system was rigid and that plans put into place to deal with a pan-green victory had simply developed too much momentum to be shut down.[citation needed]
In December 2003, General Secretary Hu Jintao instructed the NPC to create a "special legislation on Taiwan". At an internal meeting of the NPCSC's Party members, NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo said that the legislature must expedite Taiwan legislation because "[t]he possibility of major 'Taiwan independence' incidents during [Taiwan's] 'constitutional reform' process cannot be ruled out." In December 2004, the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress announced that it would review the draft Anti-Secession Law and subsequently decided to submit it to the National People's Congress for deliberation. In announcing the drafting of the law in December 2004, the Head of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress mentioned explicitly that the law was not intended to be applied to Hong Kong and Macau.
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Anti-Secession Law
The Anti-Secession Law is a law of the People's Republic of China, passed by the 3rd Session of the 10th National People's Congress. It was ratified on March 14, 2005, and went into effect immediately. Although the law, at ten articles, is relatively short, Article 8 formalized the long-standing policy of the PRC to use military means against Taiwanese independence in the event peaceful means become impossible.
The re-election of Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to the Taiwanese presidency, led many to conclude that there has been an increase in Taiwan independence sentiment and that a new Taiwanese identity is emerging on the island which is opposed to identification with China. During the 2004 Taiwanese Legislative Election, the strategy of the pan-Green coalition was to try to capitalize on this trend to win a majority in the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan. Among some Taiwanese Independence supporters, it is believed that a pan-green majority could force a crucial referendum for constitutional reform and, perhaps, to further move the island toward de jure independence. Many Taiwanese independence supporters, including former President Lee Teng-Hui, argued that Taiwan should declare independence before 2008 on the theory that international pressure over the Beijing Olympics would prevent the PRC from using force against Taiwan.[citation needed]
These events in late 2004 caused a great deal of alarm in Beijing. Observers indicated that many in Beijing believed that its policies toward Taiwan had failed both because it did not have sufficient incentives to gain Taiwanese public support for unification and at the same time, it seemed that many in Taiwan did not take Beijing's stated threats of force seriously. The Taiwanese government had defined the status quo in such a way that a de jure declaration of independence could be argued to not represent a change in the status quo. Some Chinese[who?] believe these events led to the formulation in 2003 and 2004 of the Anti-Secession Law.[citation needed]
In a string of unsuccessful efforts to change Taiwanese public opinion, several propositions and leaks from PRC governmental organs expressed consideration for a law aiming to formalize the policy for Chinese unification between mainland China and Taiwan under the authority of the PRC. This culminated in May 2004, when Premier Wen Jiabao pronounced to a group of Chinese expatriates in London that serious consideration of such a law would be taken. Several days later, Yu's suggestion (similar to a green paper) emerged.
In early 2004 a draft law appeared: Titled the National Unification Promotion Law of the People's Republic of China (Chinese: 中华人民共和国国家统一促进法), it was authored by a Chinese academic Yu Yuanzhou (余元洲), a professor from Jianghan University in Wuhan who did not hold any formal governmental position, as a suggestion to create a formal legal basis for the People's Republic of China's unification with Taiwan. The draft document has 31 articles, organized in 8 chapters. Its provisions touch mostly constitutional law. Article 2 of the proposal would establish Taiwan as the "Taiwan Special Political Area of PRC, or Taiwan SPA of PRC for short" (simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国台湾特别政治区; traditional Chinese: 中華人民共和國台灣特別政治區). Although no formal legislative action was taken on the document, the heavy debate surrounding it, and the suggestion that some sort of anti-secession law would be passed, was viewed by many in Taiwan as evidence of hostile intent by the PRC government towards Taiwan independence supporters.[citation needed]
The ROC President Chen Shui-bian expressed serious concerns about this proposal and doubts that the Taiwanese public would find it acceptable. Chen pointed out that the law being proposed is mostly intended as a measure to legitimize the PRC's military threats against the ROC. Furthermore, the proposed law would incriminate anyone holding opinions other than those supporting PRC policy on the question of unification. Under the law dissidents would be prosecuted under charges of treason, retroactively effective up to 100 years, raising serious questions about freedom of speech and civil liberties. Chen stated that the law would only serve to increase the feelings of animosity of the Taiwanese people towards the PRC and increase tensions.
In the December 2004 Taiwanese legislative election, although the ruling DPP party increased its share of votes in the legislature and remained the largest single party there, the Pan-Blue Coalition gained a razor-thin majority, which surprised many. However, this result may have been less a reflection of popular sentiment than a testament to the effectiveness of the KMT's more frugal nomination of candidates (116) compared with the DPP's over-nomination of candidates (122) and the KMT's rigid party rules for allotment of votes to its candidates within individual districts. This election result ended most prospects of an immediate declaration of independence and also called into question whether there really had been an increase in Taiwanese independence sentiment. Despite this, the PRC proceeded with the drafting of the anti-secession law. The main reasons given to foreign interlocutors were that the PRC leadership believed that its Taiwan policy in the past had been reactive rather than proactive and that it was necessary for the PRC to show initiative. Furthermore, Beijing expressed a residual distrust of Chen Shui-bian. Many foreign experts have argued that the PRC's decision-making system was rigid and that plans put into place to deal with a pan-green victory had simply developed too much momentum to be shut down.[citation needed]
In December 2003, General Secretary Hu Jintao instructed the NPC to create a "special legislation on Taiwan". At an internal meeting of the NPCSC's Party members, NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo said that the legislature must expedite Taiwan legislation because "[t]he possibility of major 'Taiwan independence' incidents during [Taiwan's] 'constitutional reform' process cannot be ruled out." In December 2004, the Standing Committee of the 10th National People's Congress announced that it would review the draft Anti-Secession Law and subsequently decided to submit it to the National People's Congress for deliberation. In announcing the drafting of the law in December 2004, the Head of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress mentioned explicitly that the law was not intended to be applied to Hong Kong and Macau.
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