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Protocol of Sèvres
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Protocol of Sèvres
The Protocol of Sèvres (French, Protocole de Sèvres) was a secret agreement reached between the governments of Israel, France, and the United Kingdom during discussions held between 22 and 24 October 1956 in Sèvres, France. The protocol concerns their joint political and military collusion to topple the Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, by invading and occupying the Suez Canal zone in response to President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July. The planning for and the agreements contained in the protocol began the Suez Crisis on 29 October 1956.
On 22 October 1956, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Director General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres, and Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces Moshe Dayan secretly travelled from Israel to an isolated house in Sèvres to meet with the French Minister of Defence Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau, and Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces General Maurice Challe, and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and his assistant Sir Patrick Dean.
Together, they and their aides secretly planned a two-step invasion of Egypt, including the cover story. Israel would first attack Egypt in the Sinai, and Britain and France would then invade on the pretext of "separating the combatants" and protecting the canal under the terms of a 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement to withdraw all British forces from Egypt. One of the most painstaking aspects was formulating a plan to which both Britain and Israel could agree. The Israelis distrusted the British, but the French were not prepared to act without their British allies and so Israel was forced to deal with Britain. The British maintained strong links with a number of Arab countries and did not want any involvement with Israel that might damage them.
After 48 hours of negotiations and compromise, the seven-point agreement was signed by Ben-Gurion, Pineau and Dean. At the insistence of the Israeli diplomats, who wanted to prevent being abandoned in the middle of the invasion, each group left Sèvres with a signed copy, written in French.
Although they were not part of the protocol, the occasion allowed Israel to secure French commitments to constructing the Negev Nuclear Research Center and to supplying natural uranium.
According to the Israeli historian Avi Shlaim,
“Rumours and accusations of collusion started flying around as soon as the Suez War broke out but no hard evidence was produced at the time, let alone a smoking gun.... A number of participants have written about the meeting in their memoirs.... But the principal, most prolific, and most reliable chronicler of the proceedings of the Sèvres conference is Colonel Mordechai Bar-On, chief of bureau of the IDF chief of staff, who served as the secretary of the Israeli delegation and took copious notes throughout. In 1957, at Dayan’s request, Bar-On, who had a degree in History, wrote a detailed account of the events that led to the Suez War with access to all the official documents”.
On 14 October 1956, General Maurice Challe, the deputy chief of staff of the French armed forces, made the suggestion that "Israel would be invited to attack the Egyptian army in Sinai and pose a threat to the Suez Canal and this would provide Britain and France with the pretext to activate their military plans and occupy the Suez Canal Zone, ostensibly in order to separate the combatants and protect the canal."
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Protocol of Sèvres
The Protocol of Sèvres (French, Protocole de Sèvres) was a secret agreement reached between the governments of Israel, France, and the United Kingdom during discussions held between 22 and 24 October 1956 in Sèvres, France. The protocol concerns their joint political and military collusion to topple the Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, by invading and occupying the Suez Canal zone in response to President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July. The planning for and the agreements contained in the protocol began the Suez Crisis on 29 October 1956.
On 22 October 1956, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Director General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres, and Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces Moshe Dayan secretly travelled from Israel to an isolated house in Sèvres to meet with the French Minister of Defence Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau, and Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces General Maurice Challe, and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and his assistant Sir Patrick Dean.
Together, they and their aides secretly planned a two-step invasion of Egypt, including the cover story. Israel would first attack Egypt in the Sinai, and Britain and France would then invade on the pretext of "separating the combatants" and protecting the canal under the terms of a 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement to withdraw all British forces from Egypt. One of the most painstaking aspects was formulating a plan to which both Britain and Israel could agree. The Israelis distrusted the British, but the French were not prepared to act without their British allies and so Israel was forced to deal with Britain. The British maintained strong links with a number of Arab countries and did not want any involvement with Israel that might damage them.
After 48 hours of negotiations and compromise, the seven-point agreement was signed by Ben-Gurion, Pineau and Dean. At the insistence of the Israeli diplomats, who wanted to prevent being abandoned in the middle of the invasion, each group left Sèvres with a signed copy, written in French.
Although they were not part of the protocol, the occasion allowed Israel to secure French commitments to constructing the Negev Nuclear Research Center and to supplying natural uranium.
According to the Israeli historian Avi Shlaim,
“Rumours and accusations of collusion started flying around as soon as the Suez War broke out but no hard evidence was produced at the time, let alone a smoking gun.... A number of participants have written about the meeting in their memoirs.... But the principal, most prolific, and most reliable chronicler of the proceedings of the Sèvres conference is Colonel Mordechai Bar-On, chief of bureau of the IDF chief of staff, who served as the secretary of the Israeli delegation and took copious notes throughout. In 1957, at Dayan’s request, Bar-On, who had a degree in History, wrote a detailed account of the events that led to the Suez War with access to all the official documents”.
On 14 October 1956, General Maurice Challe, the deputy chief of staff of the French armed forces, made the suggestion that "Israel would be invited to attack the Egyptian army in Sinai and pose a threat to the Suez Canal and this would provide Britain and France with the pretext to activate their military plans and occupy the Suez Canal Zone, ostensibly in order to separate the combatants and protect the canal."