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Said Bahaji (Arabic: سعيد بحجي, also transliterated as Saeed Bahaji, also known as Zuhayr al-Maghribi,[4] 15 July 1975 in Haselünne, Lower Saxony – September 2013),[5] was a citizen of Germany, electrical engineer, and an alleged member of the Hamburg cell that provided money and material support to the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks.

Key Information

History

[edit]

Bahaji was a German citizen, born in 1975 to a Moroccan father and a German mother. Raised in a small town in Lower Saxony, he moved with his family when he was nine years old to Morocco, where he completed his education.[6] He came to Hamburg in 1995. He enrolled in an electrical engineering program at a technical university in 1996. He spent five months in the German army and then received a medical discharge. He lived in a student home during the weekdays and he spent weekends with his aunt, Barbara Arens. Both of them loved computers, and he called her his "high-tech aunt". She saw that he was secular until other students introduced him to radical Islam. She later put an end to the weekend visits.

On November 1, 1998, he moved into an apartment in Germany with future hijackers Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The Hamburg cell was born at this apartment.[6][7][8] They met three or four times a week to discuss their anti-American feelings and plot possible attacks. Many al-Qaeda members lived in this apartment at various times, including hijacker Marwan al-Shehhi, Zakariya Essabar, and others. He served as the group's Internet expert.

He had already been under investigation by German intelligence for his connections with Mohammed Haydar Zammar, a radical Islamic cleric. Through this, German intelligence was able to learn some of the activities of Atta and others, but the investigation was eventually dropped for lack of evidence.

In October 1999, he got married at the Al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg. Atta, Jarrah, Shehhi, Zammar, and bin al-Shibh all attended his wedding.

In late 1999, Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and bin al-Shibh decided to travel to Chechnya to fight against the Russians, but were convinced by Khalid al-Masri and Mohamedou Ould Slahi at the last minute to change their plans. They instead traveled to Afghanistan to meet with Osama bin Laden and train for terrorist attacks. There are conflicting reports as to whether he went with them; some news reports say that he went, but the 9/11 Commission Report says he stayed in Germany and helped cover for them in their absence. When the group returned to Germany, he was put on a border patrol watch list.

He told his employer in June 2001 that he was going to an internship for a software company in Pakistan. His aunt, Barbara Arens, says that she was suspicious and that she went to the police and pleaded to them "to do something." She says that police took no action against him. Al-Qaeda leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told him in August that if he wanted to go to Afghanistan, he should go in the next few weeks, because it would soon become more difficult. He left Germany on September 4, 2001, just a week before the attacks,[6] and flew to Karachi via Istanbul.

Aftermath of the attacks

[edit]

He and Ramzi bin al-Shibh were charged with 5,000 counts of murder by German officials.[citation needed] Bin al-Shibh was arrested on 11 September 2002, but Bahaji was still at large at the time.

During the October 2009, Pakistan military operation against terrorists in South Waziristan, his German passport was found in a captured militant town.[6][9][10] This region, part of the tribal areas, had become a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups following the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001.[6]

In mid-2010, Bahaji reunited with Ahmad Wali Sidiqi and Naamen Meziche, longtime acquaintances from Hamburg. According to Der Spiegel, the meeting was described as a joyful gathering of old veterans.[6]

Death

[edit]

In August 2017, the Associated Press reported that al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced in an audio message that Bahaji (referring to him by his alias "Zuhayr al-Maghrebi") had died but did not say when or how he died.[11] In a list published by the United Nations Security Council of people and entities against whom there are sanctions, Bahaji is said to be "reportedly deceased in September 2013 in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area."[5]

However, the German BKA still maintains an active wanted notice for Bahaji, which was last updated in June 2024.[12]

References

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Said Bahaji

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Said Bahaji (born 15 July 1975) is a German national born in Haselünne, , to Moroccan parents and a suspected operative who served as a logistical supporter in the Hamburg-based cell that planned and executed the September 11, 2001, attacks on the . A computer engineering student at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg, Bahaji radicalized in the late 1990s through contacts at the , where he associated with cell leader , , , and Ramzi Binalshibh. German and U.S. authorities designate Bahaji for his role in financing, planning, and facilitating the attacks, including renting an apartment as an operational base in and aiding Binalshibh in forging documents for a U.S. application. In spring 2000, he traveled to for jihadist training and was reportedly recruited into the plot by . Alerted by Atta days before the hijackings, Bahaji fled on September 3, 2001, to an al-Qaeda camp, later relocating to Pakistan's tribal areas; his abandoned , containing jihadist materials, was recovered by Pakistani forces in South Waziristan in 2009 during operations against militants. Bahaji remains a fugitive with an outstanding German for , , and membership in a terrorist , and continues to appear on UN and U.S. sanctions lists without confirmed capture or death as of recent designations. Intelligence from captured jihadists has periodically placed him in al-Qaeda's media and operational networks in , though unverified claims of his death surfaced in 2017 from al-Qaeda sources.

Early Life and Background

Family Origins and Childhood

Said Bahaji was born on July 15, 1975, in Haselünne, , . His father was a Moroccan immigrant who had settled in , while his mother, Anneliese Bahaji, was German, granting him German by birth. Following his birth, Bahaji's family relocated to , where he was raised during his childhood. Little is publicly documented about his early years there, though the move reflected his father's Moroccan heritage and likely exposed him to North African cultural and Islamic influences amid a binational family dynamic. In his late teens or early twenties, Bahaji returned to to pursue higher education, enrolling at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg in 1996 to study . This transition marked his reintegration into German society, where he initially adapted as a quiet, technically inclined student before later associations altered his trajectory.

Education and Early Career

Bahaji, who had been educated in after his family relocated there during his childhood, returned to in 1995 and enrolled the following year in the program at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg (TUHH). His studies focused on technical subjects aligned with computer and , though he did not complete a degree before disengaging from academia amid other activities. Following his university enrollment, Bahaji entered the workforce as a computer specialist in , handling IT-related tasks at a local firm. This role involved technical support and administrative duties, providing him with skills in and that he later applied in personal capacities. By early , he was employed in this capacity, maintaining a professional facade until abruptly resigning in September, citing an opportunity at a computer company in .

Radicalization in Hamburg

Exposure to Islamist Ideology

Said Bahaji, born on September 1, 1975, in Haselünne, , to a Moroccan father and German mother, initially maintained a secular lifestyle despite his Muslim heritage, including alcohol consumption and a romantic engagement to a Turkish-German woman. While studying at the Hamburg University of Technology starting in 1996, he encountered Islamist influences through fellow students and local radical networks in , a hub for Salafi-jihadist activity in the late . In 1997 or 1998, Bahaji was introduced to and other radicals by , a Moroccan involved in jihadist circles, leading him to frequent the , where Syrian preacher Mohammed Haydar Zammar delivered fiery sermons advocating armed against perceived enemies of Islam, including in and Bosnia. This exposure prompted Bahaji to abruptly end his engagement, grow a , adopt traditional Islamic attire, and intensify prayer practices, marking his shift toward a stricter Salafi interpretation. By late 1998, Bahaji co-founded the "Islam AG" at the with Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh, ostensibly for Islamic learning but serving as a venue for discussing radical texts and videos promoting global , including works by Abdullah Azzam emphasizing martyrdom and resistance to Western influence. In November 1998, he moved into the shared apartment at 54 Marienstraße with Atta and Binalshibh, immersing himself in this environment and contributing to the formation of the Hamburg cell's ideological core. Bahaji's radicalization deepened in 1999 when he married Aysel Senguen, a convert influenced by the same circle, in a ceremony at the attended by Zammar and other suspected affiliates, solidifying his commitment to transnational jihadist networks. His engagement with online platforms like qoqaz.de, which disseminated on the Chechen , further reinforced these views, transitioning him from peripheral sympathizer to active supporter.

Formation of the Hamburg Cell

Said Bahaji, born in 1975 to a Moroccan father and German mother, returned to Germany from Morocco in 1995 to study computer engineering at the Hamburg University of Applied Sciences. There, he encountered Mohamed Atta and other future members of the group through student networks and Islamist study circles. By late 1997 or early 1998, Bahaji began frequenting the Al-Quds mosque in Hamburg, a hub for radical preaching linked to al-Qaeda figures such as Mamoun Darkazanli, which facilitated connections among the emerging network. The core of the cell coalesced around 1997–1998 when Atta, , and Ramzi Binalshibh shared an apartment at Marienstrasse 54, with Bahaji serving as Atta's roommate and providing technical support using his computing skills. joined the group shortly after arriving in in 1996 for studies, bonding over shared attendance at the and opposition to Western influence. This proximity fostered collaborative discussions on jihadist ideology, drawing from sermons at the mosque that glorified violence against perceived enemies of . Bahaji's wedding in October 1999, attended by Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, and bin al-Shibh, marked a public affirmation of their tight-knit radical circle, though German authorities later noted Bahaji's initially limited religious knowledge before deeper immersion. The group's formation was cemented by mutual reinforcement of extremist views, logistical sharing—such as Bahaji's computer loaned to Atta for preparations—and plans for travel to , where several members pledged (allegiance) to in late 1999. This evolution from informal meetings to an operational affiliate cell relied on Hamburg's tolerant environment for foreign students and unchecked radical venues like the .

Role in Al-Qaeda and 9/11 Planning

Logistical Support to Hijackers

Said Bahaji, as a member of the , shared an apartment at 54 Marienstrasse in with 9/11 hijackers and Ramzi Binalshibh from November 1998 to July 1999, facilitating their operational base in . This arrangement provided housing and a secure environment for cell activities, with Bahaji's status as a German citizen enabling legal rentals and reducing suspicion for the group's logistics. German authorities later identified this shared residence as central to the cell's coordination, where planning discussions occurred. Bahaji supplied logistical resources, including access to his , which Atta and Binalshibh used for related to and attack reconnaissance; post-9/11 seizures of documents and diskettes from the apartment confirmed this usage. His technical background in supported the cell's needs for secure communications and data handling. Additionally, while Atta and Binalshibh traveled to in late 1999 for al- training, Bahaji managed routine administrative matters on their behalf, such as correspondence and financial obligations, to maintain operational secrecy and continuity. United Nations sanctions listings describe Bahaji's involvement in a group from summer 1999 to , 2001, that offered financial, logistical, and other aid directly to the hijackers, leveraging his local resources and networks. German prosecutors noted his payment of rent for cell-associated apartments, further evidencing financial backing that sustained the plotters' presence in . These actions, inferred from intercepted materials and witness accounts, positioned Bahaji as an enabler rather than a direct operational leader, though his contributions were integral to the cell's pre-attack preparations.

Direct Contributions to Attack Preparation

Said Bahaji, a German citizen of Moroccan descent, served as a key logistical supporter within the , handling administrative and financial tasks that enabled core members like and Ramzi Binalshibh to focus on operational planning for the . As the cell's primary bookkeeper, he managed the group's funds and correspondence, including routine matters such as bill payments and maintaining cover while Atta and others traveled abroad for training in in late 1999. From November 1998 to July 1999, Bahaji shared an apartment at 54 Marienstrasse with Atta and Binalshibh, providing his computer for their related to and attack logistics, as evidenced by seized documents and diskettes analyzed post-attacks. This access facilitated early and efforts, though Bahaji's own ideological commitment appeared secondary, characterized by German investigators as that of an "insecure follower" with limited prior knowledge of Islamist doctrine. In the lead-up to the attacks, Bahaji continued aiding preparations by assisting hijackers in , including help with documentation and financial transfers that supported their visa applications and travel arrangements to the . His role ensured operational continuity, concealing the cell's activities from authorities until his departure from on September 3, 2001.

Immediate Aftermath and Flight

Departure from Germany

Said Bahaji fled on September 3, 2001, shortly after receiving a warning from on July 16, 2001, about impending attacks that necessitated his departure to evade detection. This decision was coordinated with fellow members Ramzi Binalshibh and , who similarly prepared to leave amid growing risks to the group's operations. Bahaji departed from Hamburg using his legitimate German passport, which allowed him to pass through airport security without incident, boarding a commercial flight bound for Istanbul. Prior to his exit, he had managed logistical details for the cell, including terminating utilities and contracts at their shared Marienstrasse apartment, while his computer—left behind—contained files linking him to Atta and al-Qaeda materials such as videos of Osama bin Laden. German authorities issued an for Bahaji on September 21, 2001, charging him with 5,970 counts of murder and accessory to murder in connection with the , based on evidence recovered from the Hamburg cell's residences after the assaults. His timely departure prevented immediate apprehension, as intensified investigations in Germany targeted the cell only after the attacks unfolded.

Entry into Al-Qaeda Safe Havens

Following his departure from Germany, Said Bahaji arrived in , , on September 4, 2001, via a flight from , traveling with four companions including Abdullah Hussainy and Ammar Moula. From , the group proceeded inland to in province, a hub for transit to , where they were met by a local facilitator who transported them to a secure location. This arrangement aligned with established logistics for channeling European recruits into Taliban-controlled territories. In , Bahaji and his associates crossed into shortly thereafter, entering Al-Qaeda safe havens in areas such as under protection, where maintained his primary operational base. These havens provided sanctuary for plot participants to regroup amid the impending U.S. military response, with German investigators later confirming Bahaji's integration into networks there based on intercepted communications and defector accounts. The timing of his entry, just days before the , facilitated his evasion of post-attack scrutiny as the U.S. invasion of commenced on October 7, 2001, prompting many militants, including those from the , to retreat to Pakistan's (FATA). Bahaji's presence in these regions was corroborated years later by the discovery of his discarded German passport in , , in October 2009 during a against militants, indicating sustained use of cross-border safe havens. Interrogations of captured German jihadists further placed him in by 2011, working in Al-Qaeda's media operations, underscoring the seamless transition between Afghan and Pakistani sanctuaries.

Post-9/11 Activities and Evasion

Involvement in Tora Bora and Waziristan

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Said Bahaji traveled from to an training camp in , where he joined the organization's efforts to resist the U.S.-led invasion. He participated in combat operations alongside , including fighting in the mountain complex during the from December 6 to 17, 2001, against coalition forces seeking to capture or kill senior leaders. After al-Qaeda's retreat from , Bahaji crossed into Pakistan's , establishing a presence in the region, a key sanctuary for militants along the Afghan border. There, he contributed to al-Qaeda's propaganda operations under the media wing, serving as a technical infrastructure manager for and delivering speeches in for and ideological dissemination. Accounts from captured German jihadists, including Rami Makanesi and Wali Sidiqi, placed him in Mir Ali, North , as late as May 2010, confirming his ongoing role in the network's evasion and support activities. In October 2009, during Pakistani military operations in South Waziristan's Sherwangai village, forces recovered a German passport issued to Bahaji, providing physical evidence of his presence in the area amid efforts to dismantle Taliban and al-Qaeda strongholds. This discovery underscored Waziristan's role as a hub for al-Qaeda operatives involved in prior attacks on the West, though Bahaji's exact movements remained unconfirmed beyond intelligence reports.

Rumored Operations and Transformations

Reports from captured German jihadists indicate that Bahaji relocated to Pakistan's region following the U.S. invasion of , where he allegedly contributed to al-Qaeda's efforts by producing media materials aimed at recruiting and inspiring Western extremists. These accounts, derived from interrogations conducted around 2011, suggest a shift from his prior logistical roles in the to supporting al-Qaeda's information operations in tribal areas, though no independently verified outputs have been attributed to him. In 2012, German national Ahmed Siddiqui, detained in Afghanistan and later transferred to Guantanamo Bay, claimed to have encountered Bahaji in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, during 2009-2010, describing him as embedded within al-Qaeda networks facilitating training and evasion tactics for foreign fighters. This sighting aligns with unconfirmed intelligence placing Bahaji in sustained combat roles against U.S. and Pakistani forces in the region, including living off the land in mountainous areas to avoid detection. Speculation persists regarding Bahaji's potential links to later European plots, such as the 2006 transatlantic aircraft bombing conspiracy, based on indirect associations traced through shared contacts, but investigators have emphasized these as exploratory rather than substantiated. No evidence confirms a formal transformation in his operational status beyond adaptation to sanctuary environments, with reports consistently portraying him as a low-profile rather than a strategic leader.

Claims of Death and Ongoing Status

Unverified Reports of Demise

In September 2013, U.S. and German intelligence services reported that Said Bahaji had been killed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, possibly during military operations targeting militants. The similarly noted him as "reportedly deceased" in that timeframe and location, though without specifying a cause such as a drone strike or ground engagement. These assessments gained partial corroboration from Al-Qaeda sources in August 2017, when the organization's leader, , released an audio message praising Bahaji—using the alias Zuhair al-Maghribi—as a "" who "sacrificed his life" while working for the group's media arm, . Zawahiri provided no details on the date, location, or circumstances of the purported death, and the recording's authenticity, while consistent with prior Zawahiri messages, was not independently verified at the time. German authorities, including the (BND), declined to comment on the claim. The reports' credibility is undermined by the absence of forensic evidence, such as a body or DNA confirmation, and Al-Qaeda's history of using martyrdom announcements for propaganda purposes without substantiation. German wanted notices for Bahaji remained unchanged post-2017, reflecting ongoing uncertainty, and no subsequent intelligence updates have provided conclusive proof of his demise as of official records.

Current Fugitive Standing as of 2025

As of October 2025, Said Bahaji remains an active fugitive under and wanted lists, designated by the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee for his alleged role in supporting operations, including the 9/11 attacks. German authorities maintain an issued on September 21, 2001, charging him with membership in a terrorist organization and aiding the Hamburg cell's preparations. His status reflects ongoing evasion, with no verified capture, surrender, or confirmed death reported by law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Claims of Bahaji's death, propagated in 2017 by an al-Qaeda-affiliated media outlet under his purported alias Zuhair al-Maghribi, lack independent corroboration and are treated as unverified by Western security analysts, given al-Qaeda's of disseminating misleading information to obscure operative statuses. Active listings in national sanctions regimes, such as the United Kingdom's consolidated list updated through 2025, affirm his standing without delisting or resolution. Potential whereabouts in Pakistan's tribal regions, last suggested by German jihadist interrogations around 2011, remain unconfirmed amid regional instability, underscoring persistent challenges in the global manhunt. International efforts continue through entities like , which supports provisional arrest requests aligned with Germany's warrant, though public Red Notice details for Bahaji are not explicitly detailed in accessible databases as of 2025. This enduring status highlights gaps in counterterrorism operations against pre-9/11 remnants, with Bahaji representing one of the few unresolved high-profile fugitives from the .

Arrest Warrants and Charges

German federal prosecutors issued an international arrest warrant for Said Bahaji on September 21, 2001, accusing him of membership in a foreign terrorist organization under Section 129a of the German Criminal Code and aiding and abetting the murders committed in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the , which resulted in 2,976 deaths. The charges stemmed from evidence of Bahaji's role in the , including logistical support such as falsifying documents and providing financial assistance to operatives involved in the plot. Spanish authorities also issued an against Bahaji for terrorism-related offenses linked to activities and the 9/11 planning, in coordination with international efforts. Interpol subsequently published a Red Notice for Bahaji, requesting his provisional arrest for purposes based on the German and Spanish warrants. Additionally, Bahaji was designated under 1267 in October 2001 for providing assistance to in the 9/11 attacks, subjecting him to global asset freezes and travel bans. No formal U.S. has been publicly detailed beyond the fugitive status tied to the findings on his involvement, though he remains a priority target in international operations. The warrants remain active as of 2025, with Bahaji's evasion preventing trial.

Sanctions and Global Manhunt Efforts

German authorities issued an international for Bahaji on September 21, 2001, charging him with membership in a terrorist organization and the of 2,976 people in the . The warrant stemmed from his role in the , including logistical support such as apartment rentals and visa assistance for co-conspirators. On September 30, 2002, the designated Bahaji as a (SDGT) under , subjecting him to asset freezes and prohibiting U.S. persons from transactions with him. Concurrently, the UN Security Council's Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee listed him under resolution 1390 (2002), imposing a global assets freeze, travel ban, and due to his participation in Al-Qaida's financing, , and facilitation of acts supporting the group, including the 9/11 plot. The implemented these UN measures through Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, extending the sanctions regime to EU member states and aligning with Germany's domestic enforcement. Global manhunt efforts have involved close cooperation between German federal police (BKA), the FBI, and intelligence agencies in and , focusing on his suspected presence in Al-Qaida strongholds along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Post-9/11, joint operations included raids and intelligence sharing to track his movements from to , though no confirmed captures or sightings have materialized despite unverified tips. The UN listing triggered an INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice, facilitating worldwide alerts for provisional , while U.S.-German task forces continue monitoring financial and communication trails linked to his aliases. As of 2025, Bahaji remains at large, with sanctions renewed periodically under UN resolution reviews, underscoring sustained international pressure despite evasion challenges in ungoverned regions.

References

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