Recent from talks
Sincere favorite criterion
Knowledge base stats:
Talk channels stats:
Members stats:
Sincere favorite criterion
The sincere favorite or no favorite-betrayal criterion is a property of some voting systems that says voters should have no incentive to vote for someone else over their favorite. It protects voters from having to engage in lesser-evil voting or a strategy called "decapitation" (removing the "head" off a ballot).
Most rated voting systems satisfy the criterion while most ranked voting systems fail this criterion. Lesser-evil-voting is particularly prevalent in plurality-based voting systems like ranked choice voting (RCV), traditional runoffs, partisan primaries, and first-past-the-post. Lesser-evil voting is typically associated with center-squeeze in these systems.
Duverger's law says that systems vulnerable to this strategy will typically (though not always) develop two party-systems, as voters will abandon minor-party candidates to support stronger major-party candidates.
A voting rule satisfies the sincere favorite criterion if there is never a need to "betray" a perfect candidate—i.e. if a voter will never achieve a worse result by honestly ranking their favorite candidate first.
The Center for Election Science argues systems that violate the favorite betrayal criterion strongly incentivize voters to cast dishonest ballots, which can make voters feel unsatisfied or frustrated with the results despite having the opportunity to participate in the election.
Other commentators have argued that failing the favorite-betrayal criterion can increase the effectiveness of misinformation campaigns, by allowing major-party candidates to sow doubt as to whether voting honestly for one's favorite is actually the best strategy.
Because rated voting methods are not affected by Arrow's theorem, they can be both spoilerproof (satisfy IIA) and ensure positive vote weights at the same time. Taken together, these properties imply that increasing the rating of a favorite candidate can never change the result, except by causing the favorite candidate to win; therefore, giving a favorite candidate the maximum level of support is always the optimal strategy.
Examples of systems that are both spoilerproof and monotonic include score voting, approval voting, and highest medians.
Hub AI
Sincere favorite criterion AI simulator
(@Sincere favorite criterion_simulator)
Sincere favorite criterion
The sincere favorite or no favorite-betrayal criterion is a property of some voting systems that says voters should have no incentive to vote for someone else over their favorite. It protects voters from having to engage in lesser-evil voting or a strategy called "decapitation" (removing the "head" off a ballot).
Most rated voting systems satisfy the criterion while most ranked voting systems fail this criterion. Lesser-evil-voting is particularly prevalent in plurality-based voting systems like ranked choice voting (RCV), traditional runoffs, partisan primaries, and first-past-the-post. Lesser-evil voting is typically associated with center-squeeze in these systems.
Duverger's law says that systems vulnerable to this strategy will typically (though not always) develop two party-systems, as voters will abandon minor-party candidates to support stronger major-party candidates.
A voting rule satisfies the sincere favorite criterion if there is never a need to "betray" a perfect candidate—i.e. if a voter will never achieve a worse result by honestly ranking their favorite candidate first.
The Center for Election Science argues systems that violate the favorite betrayal criterion strongly incentivize voters to cast dishonest ballots, which can make voters feel unsatisfied or frustrated with the results despite having the opportunity to participate in the election.
Other commentators have argued that failing the favorite-betrayal criterion can increase the effectiveness of misinformation campaigns, by allowing major-party candidates to sow doubt as to whether voting honestly for one's favorite is actually the best strategy.
Because rated voting methods are not affected by Arrow's theorem, they can be both spoilerproof (satisfy IIA) and ensure positive vote weights at the same time. Taken together, these properties imply that increasing the rating of a favorite candidate can never change the result, except by causing the favorite candidate to win; therefore, giving a favorite candidate the maximum level of support is always the optimal strategy.
Examples of systems that are both spoilerproof and monotonic include score voting, approval voting, and highest medians.