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Soulbury Commission
The Soulbury Commission (Sinhala: සෝල්බරි කොමිෂන් සභාව Solbari Komisyan Sabawa; Tamil: சோல்பரி ஆணைக்குழு) was a prime instrument of constitutional reform in British Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) that succeeded the Donoughmore Commission. It was announced in 1944 and headed by Herwald Ramsbotham, 1st Viscount Soulbury. The immediate basis for the appointment of a commission for constitutional reforms was the 1944 draft constitution of the Board of Ministers, headed by D.S. Senanayake. This commission ushered in the Soulbury Constitution and independence to the Dominion of Ceylon in 1948. Its constitutional recommendations were largely those of the 1944 Board of Ministers' draft, a document reflecting the influence of Senanayake and his main advisor, Sir Ivor Jennings.
The struggle for independence in Ceylon had been fought on "constitutionalist" lines rather than on the strongly confrontational approach that had developed in British India. Only the Marxists, a tiny minority, had attempted to create confrontational conditions which they believed to be a harbinger of the impending proletarian revolution against Imperialism. D. S. Senanayake was the leader of the "constitutionalist" wing of the Sri Lankan independence movement. He began to develop a "Ceylonese" vision for Sri Lanka, i.e., co-operation of all the ethnic and religious groups. To this end he masterminded the appointment of Arunachalam Mahadeva, a respected Tamil politician as the minister of Home Affairs. Senanayake began to formulate a draft constitution following the conditions laid down by the Colonial Secretary of State in 1943. There were three aspects to the effort. The first was the abandonment of the Donoughmore Constitution and the formulation of a Westminster Model. The second was that the Governor's reserve powers and other controls of the Imperial government would be abandoned and there would be full responsibility in internal civil matters. However, the crown's reserve powers would be retained especially in regard to limitations set upon the Ceylonese legislature regarding religious and ethnic minorities. The Crown would also retain defence and external affairs. The third was the ratification of the new constitution by a 3/4 majority in the State Council of Ceylon.
Senanayake and his advisors worked quickly and a draft was made ready for submission to Whitehall in 1944. Groups who opposed the move towards independence, notably British business groups[who?] and certain church dignitaries[who?][citation needed] criticized the rapid moves in what they termed "lack of consultation". The 1943 Colonial Secretary's discussions envisaged that the draft constitution would be examined by a "suitable commission or conference", after the victory over the Axis powers. However, Senanayake pressed for an immediate consideration of their proposals. There was great reluctance and no sense of urgency on the part of the Colonial office. However, Senanayake, Oliver Goonetilleke and others had developed impressive contacts with Lord Mountbatten who, as Supreme Allied Commander of South-East Asia had worked from Colombo. A telegram from Lord Mountbatten is believed have been crucial in over-riding the foot-dragging of the Colonial office and conceding to Senanayake's demands. The appointment of a commission was made on 5 July 1944.
Although the appointment of a commission without waiting for the end of the War was a great concession, the announcement of the Commission headed by Lord Soulbury was greeted with dismay by Senanayake and others. Their disappointment was due to the widening of the scope of the commission beyond what was set out by the Colonial Secretary in 1943, to also consult with "various interests, including the minority communities concerned with the subject of constitutional reforms in Ceylon". Senanayake was a man who preferred behind-the-curtain negotiations instead of confrontational public hearings. He felt that such consultations would simply become very divisive. In fact, the politics of the 1930s had become very communal or racist, with the first Sinhala-Tamil riot occurring in 1939, after an inflammatory speech by G. G. Ponnambalam, a leading Tamil politician. Senanayake and the Board of Ministers resorted to an official boycott of the commission as an expression of their disapproval of the widening of the scope of the commission. However, this merely meant that they did not appear before the commission in public or "official" sittings. Senanayake and his associates held private meetings where the commissioners were the guests of honour. In fact, Oliver Goonetilleke became an "unofficial secretary" to the commission and significantly influenced it. This enabled Senanayake and his advisors to present their views without getting into confrontational politics with the Tamil Congress, led by G. G. Ponnambalam who was allowed to dominate many of the official hearings.
Tamils, both indigenous and of Indian descent, were about 25% of the population, and had a strong, dominant position in the early legislatures of the country. The introduction of Universal Franchise in 1931 completely changed the character of Ceylonese politics, where Tamil politicians found it very difficult to accept that they would become a minority. The eminent Peradeniya historian, Prof. K. M.de Silva attributes this to the collapse of the Ceylon National Congress. This, as well as other factors led to a development of Tamil nationalism and communal feeling, displacing casteism to a secondary place in the nation's politics. Communal politics, which involved attacks on the Mahavamsa, suspicious examination of appointments to public office, opening of colonisation schemes etc., for communal bias became common place. G. G. Ponnambalam wrested control of Tamil politics from the Arunachalam-family elitist Colombo Tamil group and followed a stridently communal political program. This was matched by similar nationalist politics, led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the Sinhalese counterpart of Ponnambalam.[citation needed]
The Tamil Congress, led by Ponnambalam, had evolved the policy of 50-50, i.e., allocation of an equal number of seats in the legislature to the Tamils with other non-Sinhalese, and the Sinhalese, where the 25% Tamils, 75% Sinhalese [citation needed], would lead to only about 25 Tamil seats in a chamber with 100 representatives,( p308). Ponnambalam, an English-educated Hindu lawyer justified this by pointing out that there were roughly equal numbers of English educated (i.e., upper caste) Sinhalese and Tamils, and that this would also guarantee a place of political parity for the Tamils.[citation needed] Thus Ponnambalam proposed that the legislature should be: "based on the balanced scheme of representation that would avoid the danger of concentration of power in one community, but would ensure its equitable distribution among all communities and the people as a whole"(, p. 92). Ponnambalam also proposed further constitutional mechanisms to "safeguard minority rights".
Ponnambalam's schemes for securing the continued parity of status of Tamils, met with severe disapprobation by the commissioners. They stated that "any attempt by artificial means to convert a majority into a minority is not only inequitable, but doomed to failure". Ponnambalam's proposals were considered to be a means of conferring a minority supremacy amounting to virtual minority rule, and "denial of the democratic principle"( p. 311). The Hindu Organ, an influential newspaper of the time, condemned it as something that "can only be maintained against the united opposition of the Sinhalese by British bayonets".
The submissions in front of the Soulbury Commission also included specific grievances of the Ceylon Tamils regarding claimed unfair discrimination against their community. These included claims of discrimination in appointments to the Public Service, claims of settlement policies in newly opened colonisation schemes which favour the Sinhalese, the Buddhist Temporalities act of 1931, the Anuradhapura Preservation Ordinance of 1931, the question of ports in the Northern peninsula, a claimed discriminatory bias in education, medical services etc., favouring the Sinhalese.
Soulbury Commission
The Soulbury Commission (Sinhala: සෝල්බරි කොමිෂන් සභාව Solbari Komisyan Sabawa; Tamil: சோல்பரி ஆணைக்குழு) was a prime instrument of constitutional reform in British Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) that succeeded the Donoughmore Commission. It was announced in 1944 and headed by Herwald Ramsbotham, 1st Viscount Soulbury. The immediate basis for the appointment of a commission for constitutional reforms was the 1944 draft constitution of the Board of Ministers, headed by D.S. Senanayake. This commission ushered in the Soulbury Constitution and independence to the Dominion of Ceylon in 1948. Its constitutional recommendations were largely those of the 1944 Board of Ministers' draft, a document reflecting the influence of Senanayake and his main advisor, Sir Ivor Jennings.
The struggle for independence in Ceylon had been fought on "constitutionalist" lines rather than on the strongly confrontational approach that had developed in British India. Only the Marxists, a tiny minority, had attempted to create confrontational conditions which they believed to be a harbinger of the impending proletarian revolution against Imperialism. D. S. Senanayake was the leader of the "constitutionalist" wing of the Sri Lankan independence movement. He began to develop a "Ceylonese" vision for Sri Lanka, i.e., co-operation of all the ethnic and religious groups. To this end he masterminded the appointment of Arunachalam Mahadeva, a respected Tamil politician as the minister of Home Affairs. Senanayake began to formulate a draft constitution following the conditions laid down by the Colonial Secretary of State in 1943. There were three aspects to the effort. The first was the abandonment of the Donoughmore Constitution and the formulation of a Westminster Model. The second was that the Governor's reserve powers and other controls of the Imperial government would be abandoned and there would be full responsibility in internal civil matters. However, the crown's reserve powers would be retained especially in regard to limitations set upon the Ceylonese legislature regarding religious and ethnic minorities. The Crown would also retain defence and external affairs. The third was the ratification of the new constitution by a 3/4 majority in the State Council of Ceylon.
Senanayake and his advisors worked quickly and a draft was made ready for submission to Whitehall in 1944. Groups who opposed the move towards independence, notably British business groups[who?] and certain church dignitaries[who?][citation needed] criticized the rapid moves in what they termed "lack of consultation". The 1943 Colonial Secretary's discussions envisaged that the draft constitution would be examined by a "suitable commission or conference", after the victory over the Axis powers. However, Senanayake pressed for an immediate consideration of their proposals. There was great reluctance and no sense of urgency on the part of the Colonial office. However, Senanayake, Oliver Goonetilleke and others had developed impressive contacts with Lord Mountbatten who, as Supreme Allied Commander of South-East Asia had worked from Colombo. A telegram from Lord Mountbatten is believed have been crucial in over-riding the foot-dragging of the Colonial office and conceding to Senanayake's demands. The appointment of a commission was made on 5 July 1944.
Although the appointment of a commission without waiting for the end of the War was a great concession, the announcement of the Commission headed by Lord Soulbury was greeted with dismay by Senanayake and others. Their disappointment was due to the widening of the scope of the commission beyond what was set out by the Colonial Secretary in 1943, to also consult with "various interests, including the minority communities concerned with the subject of constitutional reforms in Ceylon". Senanayake was a man who preferred behind-the-curtain negotiations instead of confrontational public hearings. He felt that such consultations would simply become very divisive. In fact, the politics of the 1930s had become very communal or racist, with the first Sinhala-Tamil riot occurring in 1939, after an inflammatory speech by G. G. Ponnambalam, a leading Tamil politician. Senanayake and the Board of Ministers resorted to an official boycott of the commission as an expression of their disapproval of the widening of the scope of the commission. However, this merely meant that they did not appear before the commission in public or "official" sittings. Senanayake and his associates held private meetings where the commissioners were the guests of honour. In fact, Oliver Goonetilleke became an "unofficial secretary" to the commission and significantly influenced it. This enabled Senanayake and his advisors to present their views without getting into confrontational politics with the Tamil Congress, led by G. G. Ponnambalam who was allowed to dominate many of the official hearings.
Tamils, both indigenous and of Indian descent, were about 25% of the population, and had a strong, dominant position in the early legislatures of the country. The introduction of Universal Franchise in 1931 completely changed the character of Ceylonese politics, where Tamil politicians found it very difficult to accept that they would become a minority. The eminent Peradeniya historian, Prof. K. M.de Silva attributes this to the collapse of the Ceylon National Congress. This, as well as other factors led to a development of Tamil nationalism and communal feeling, displacing casteism to a secondary place in the nation's politics. Communal politics, which involved attacks on the Mahavamsa, suspicious examination of appointments to public office, opening of colonisation schemes etc., for communal bias became common place. G. G. Ponnambalam wrested control of Tamil politics from the Arunachalam-family elitist Colombo Tamil group and followed a stridently communal political program. This was matched by similar nationalist politics, led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the Sinhalese counterpart of Ponnambalam.[citation needed]
The Tamil Congress, led by Ponnambalam, had evolved the policy of 50-50, i.e., allocation of an equal number of seats in the legislature to the Tamils with other non-Sinhalese, and the Sinhalese, where the 25% Tamils, 75% Sinhalese [citation needed], would lead to only about 25 Tamil seats in a chamber with 100 representatives,( p308). Ponnambalam, an English-educated Hindu lawyer justified this by pointing out that there were roughly equal numbers of English educated (i.e., upper caste) Sinhalese and Tamils, and that this would also guarantee a place of political parity for the Tamils.[citation needed] Thus Ponnambalam proposed that the legislature should be: "based on the balanced scheme of representation that would avoid the danger of concentration of power in one community, but would ensure its equitable distribution among all communities and the people as a whole"(, p. 92). Ponnambalam also proposed further constitutional mechanisms to "safeguard minority rights".
Ponnambalam's schemes for securing the continued parity of status of Tamils, met with severe disapprobation by the commissioners. They stated that "any attempt by artificial means to convert a majority into a minority is not only inequitable, but doomed to failure". Ponnambalam's proposals were considered to be a means of conferring a minority supremacy amounting to virtual minority rule, and "denial of the democratic principle"( p. 311). The Hindu Organ, an influential newspaper of the time, condemned it as something that "can only be maintained against the united opposition of the Sinhalese by British bayonets".
The submissions in front of the Soulbury Commission also included specific grievances of the Ceylon Tamils regarding claimed unfair discrimination against their community. These included claims of discrimination in appointments to the Public Service, claims of settlement policies in newly opened colonisation schemes which favour the Sinhalese, the Buddhist Temporalities act of 1931, the Anuradhapura Preservation Ordinance of 1931, the question of ports in the Northern peninsula, a claimed discriminatory bias in education, medical services etc., favouring the Sinhalese.