The Taba Summit (also known as Taba Talks) were talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, held from 21 to 27 January 2001 in Taba, Egypt. The talks took place during a political transition period. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had resigned six weeks previously on 9 December 2000, and elections were due on 6 February 2001, and the inauguration of President George W. Bush had taken place just one day prior, on 20 January 2001.

The Taba negotiations followed previous peace negotiation efforts, including the Oslo Accords (1993–1995) and the Camp David Summit (2000), which had failed to reach an agreement on key issues such as borders, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements in occupied territories, and Jerusalem.

The Taba negotiators hoped to address final status issues and bring an end to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. According to a statement issued at the end of the talks, they came closer to this goal than in any previous peace talks. The talks ended on 27 January 2001 due to the upcoming Israeli election, and the new Ariel Sharon government did not restart them.

The Taba Summit took place from 21 to 27 January 2001 at Taba, after the failed Camp David 2000 Summit between Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak and the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, and against the backdrop of the Second Intifada that commenced. The parties had first negotiated at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, hosted by President Bill Clinton from 19 to 23 December 2000. The Israelis under Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Palestinian under senior negotiator Saeb Erekat, Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo and Gaza security chief Mohammed Dahlan attended the meeting. President Clinton presented bridging proposals (the so-called "Clinton Parameters"). A summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, mediated by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, was planned on 28 December. As the Palestinians delayed their acceptance of the Clinton Parameters, Barak decided not to go.

At the start of the Taba Summit, Israel held on three main points:

January 2001, the European Special Representative to the Middle East Process Miguel Moratinos presented a document, known as "The Moratinos non-paper," describing the outcome of the Taba negotiations. Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. It describes observed positions on the permanent status issues territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security, in order to find ways to come to joint positions. "At the same time it shows that there are serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be overcome in future negotiations." Summary of the paper:

The two sides agreed that in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242, the 4 June 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the Palestinian state. Israel reduced its demands to 6% with territorial compensation that would offset about 3%, while the Palestinians proposed an Israeli annexation of about 3% along with a territorial compensation of the same amount. The Israeli proposal would have given the Palestinians some 97% of the land area of the West Bank.

Both sides presented their own maps of the West Bank. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understanding of Israeli interests in the West Bank. The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide for annexation of Settlement blocs, areas which only had a small number of Palestinians. The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to the Palestinians residing in areas Israel sought to annex.