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AHS Centaur
AHS Centaur
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A single-funnelled merchant ship at rest. The ship is painted white, with a dark green horizontal band along the hull, interspersed by three red crosses. The number "47" is painted near the bow, in a black box above the green line.
AHS Centaur following her conversion to a hospital ship. The Red Cross designation "47" can be seen on the bow.
History
United Kingdom
NameCentaur
NamesakeThe Greek mythological creature
OwnerOcean Steamship Company
OperatorAlfred Holt & Co Ltd (Blue Funnel Line)
Ordered1923
BuilderScotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Greenock
Laid down16 November 1923
Launched5 June 1924
Completed29 August 1924
Homeport
  • Liverpool, England (registered)
  • Fremantle, Western Australia (actual)
IdentificationUnited Kingdom Official Number 147275
FateTransferred to Australia
General characteristics as merchant vessel
Tonnage3,222 GRT
Length96 m (315 ft)
Beam14.7 m (48 ft)
Draught6.1 m (20 ft)
Propulsiondouble screw; 4-stroke, 6-cylinder Burmeister and Wain diesel oil engine providing 1,400 bhp (1,000 kW)
Speed20.5 knots (38.0 km/h; 23.6 mph)
Capacity
  • 72 passengers (50 first class, 22 second class)
  • 450 cattle
  • Cargo in four holds
Crew39 officers, 29 ratings
Armament
Australia
NameCentaur
Operator2nd Australian Imperial Force
Acquired4 January 1943
ReclassifiedHospital ship
HomeportSydney, New South Wales
IdentificationRed Cross Ship 47
FateTorpedoed on 14 May 1943 by Japanese submarine I-177
General characteristics as hospital ship
Capacity252 bed-patients
Crew75 crew, 65 permanent Army medical staff
ArmamentAll weapons removed, degaussing equipment remained

Australian Hospital Ship (AHS) Centaur[a] was a hospital ship which was attacked and sunk by a Japanese submarine off the coast of Queensland, Australia, on 14 May 1943. Of the 332 medical personnel and civilian crew aboard, 268 died, including 63 of the 65 army personnel.

The Scottish-built vessel was launched in 1924 as a combination passenger liner and refrigerated cargo ship and operated a trade route between Western Australia and Singapore via the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), carrying passengers, cargo, and livestock. At the start of World War II, Centaur (like all British Merchant Navy vessels) was placed under British Admiralty control, but after being fitted with defensive equipment, was allowed to continue normal operations. In November 1941, the ship rescued German survivors of the engagement between Kormoran and HMAS Sydney. Centaur was relocated to Australia's east coast in October 1942, and used to transport materiel to New Guinea.

In January 1943, Centaur was handed over to the Australian military for conversion to a hospital ship, as her small size made her suitable for operating in Maritime Southeast Asia. The refit (including installation of medical facilities and repainting with Red Cross markings) was completed in March, and the ship undertook a trial voyage: transporting wounded from Townsville to Brisbane, then from Port Moresby to Brisbane. After replenishing in Sydney, Centaur embarked the 2/12th Field Ambulance for transport to New Guinea, and sailed on 12 May. Before dawn on 14 May 1943, during her second voyage, Centaur was torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine off Moreton Island, Queensland. The majority of the 332 aboard died in the attack; the 64 survivors were discovered 36 hours later.[4] The incident resulted in public outrage as attacking a hospital ship is considered a war crime under the 1907 Hague Convention. Protests were made by the Australian and British governments to Japan and efforts were made to discover the people responsible so they could be tried at a war crimes tribunal. In the 1970s the probable identity of the attacking submarine, I-177, became public.

The reason for the attack is unknown; there are theories that Centaur was in breach of the international conventions that should have protected her, that I-177's commander was unaware that Centaur was a hospital ship, or that the submarine commander, Hajime Nakagawa, knowingly attacked a protected vessel. The wreck of Centaur was found on 20 December 2009; a claimed discovery in 1995 has been proven to be a different shipwreck.

Design and construction

[edit]

Original design

[edit]

In early 1923, the Ocean Steamship Company (a subsidiary of Alfred Holt's Blue Funnel Line) decided that a new vessel would be required to replace the ageing Charon on the Western Australia to Singapore trade route.[5] The vessel had to be capable of simultaneously transporting passengers, cargo, and livestock.[5] She also had to be capable of resting on mud flats out of the water as the tidal variance in ports at the northern end of Western Australia was as great as 8 metres (26 ft).[6]

MV Centaur underway

Scotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Company in Greenock was chosen to build Centaur.[5] The keel was laid on 16 November 1923, and the ship was ready for collection by 29 August 1924.[5] Constructed at a cost of £146,750 sterling, Centaur was designed to carry 72 passengers and 450 cattle.[5][7] Cargo was carried in four holds; the two decks within the hull were primarily for livestock, and could also be used as extra cargo space.[5][8] The hull of the ship was a 'turret deck' design; decks below the waterline were wider than those above water, and a flat, reinforced hull allowed the ship to rest on the bottom.[5] Centaur was among the first civilian vessels to be equipped with a diesel engine.[9] One of the most visible characteristics was the 35-foot (11 m) smokestack, the extreme size was more a concession to tradition than of practical advantage on a diesel-powered vessel.[5] Her engine was 6-cylinder 4-stroke, single cycle single action diesel engine. It had cylinders of 241516 inches (64 cm) diameter by 51316 inches (135 cm) stroke. The engine was built by Burmeister & Wain, Copenhagen, Denmark.[10] One of her holds was fitted with refrigeration equipment. The refrigerant was brine and the insulation was cork. The refrigerated hold had a capacity of 3,000 cubic feet (85 m3).[11]

In December 1939, Centaur underwent a minor refit in Hong Kong, with a supercharger and a new propeller fitted to the engine.[12] The supercharger broke down in April 1942, and could not be repaired because of equipment shortages and restricted dockyard access caused by World War II.[13]

Hospital ship refit

[edit]

At the beginning of 1943, Centaur was placed at the disposal of the Australian Department of Defence for conversion to a hospital ship.[14] The conversion was performed by United Ship Services in Melbourne, Australia, and was initially estimated to cost AU£20,000.[15]

Inside of a medical ward aboard a ship: Bunk beds line the right side, other furnishings protrude into the bottom edge of the photograph, but apart from these, the room is empty. A door at the far end of the room has the text "F WARD" painted on it.
One of Centaur's wards shortly after her conversion to a hospital ship

The cost increased to almost AU£55,000, for a variety of reasons.[15] It was originally intended for the ship to travel between ports in New Guinea and Townsville, Queensland, Australia.[15] Increasing casualty numbers in the New Guinea campaign meant that the hospitals in Queensland would quickly become unable to deal with the quantity of the casualties and the nature of their injuries, so a longer voyage to Sydney was required.[15] The Army demanded that more facilities and conversions be added to the original plans such as expanded bathing and washing facilities, hot water made available to all parts of the ship through installation of a calorifier, the rerouting of all steam pipes away from patient areas, and ventilation arrangements suitable for tropical conditions.[15] The unions representing the ship's crew requested improved living and dining conditions, including new sinks in the food preparation areas and the replacement of flooring in the quarters and mess rooms.[15]

When AHS Centaur was relaunched on 12 March 1943, she was equipped with an operating theatre, dispensary, two wards (located on the former cattle decks), and a dental surgery, along with quarters for seventy five crew and sixty five permanent Army medical staff.[2][16] To maintain the ship's mean draught of 6.1 metres (20 ft), 900 tons of ironstone were distributed through the cargo holds as ballast.[15] AHS Centaur was capable of voyages of 18 days before resupply and could carry just over 250 bedridden patients.[17]

Operational history

[edit]

1924 to 1938

[edit]

Centaur was allocated the United Kingdom Official Number 147275 and the Code Letters KHHC. Her port of registry was Liverpool.[18] When Centaur entered service at the end of 1924, the FremantleJavaSingapore trade route was being serviced by two other Blue Funnel Line vessels; Gorgon (which remained in service until 1928) and Charon (which Centaur was replacing).[19] Centaur's route ran from Fremantle up the Western Australian coast calling at Geraldton, Carnarvon, Onslow, Point Samson, Port Hedland, Broome, and Derby[20] then to the Bali Strait, Surabaya, Semarang, Batavia, and Singapore.[6] Centaur operated as a cross between a tramp steamer and a freight liner; she travelled a set route, but stops at ports along the route varied between journeys.[19] From 1928 until sometime in the 1930s, Centaur remained alone on her route, but the increase in trade along this route prompted Blue Funnel Line to reassign Gorgon and assign the new Charon to work alongside Centaur.[21]

Following the change in Code Letters in 1934, Centaur was allocated the Code Letters GMQP.[10] A highlight of Centaur's pre-war career was the rescue of the 385 ton Japanese whale-chaser Kyo Maru II in November 1938.[22] Kyo Maru II had developed boiler problems while returning from the Antarctic and was drifting towards the Houtman Abrolhos Archipelago, where she was in danger of being wrecked by the reefs in the area.[19] Centaur responded to the distress signal and towed Kyo Maru II to Geraldton.[19]

1939 to 1942

[edit]

As a vessel of the British Merchant Navy, Centaur was affected by the British Parliament's 1939 outline of how the Merchant Navy would respond to the declaration of war, primarily submission to the Admiralty in all matters excluding the crewing and management of vessels.[23] Following the outbreak of World War II on 3 September 1939, Centaur was equipped with a stern-mounted 4-inch (100 mm) Mark IX naval gun and two .303 Vickers machine guns located on the bridge wings for protection against Axis warships and aircraft. She was also fitted with port and starboard paravanes and degaussing equipment for protection against naval mines.[24] The weapons were removed during the hospital ship refit, although the anti-mine countermeasures remained.[25] Centaur initially remained in service on her original trade route.[23]

On 26 November 1941, a damaged lifeboat carrying 62 Kriegsmarine (German navy) sailors and officers was spotted by an aircraft looking for the missing Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney; the aircraft directed Centaur to the lifeboat.[26] Upon encountering the lifeboat, food was lowered to its occupants, and one person was allowed on board to explain the situation.[27] Initially posing as a Norwegian merchant navy officer, the man quickly revealed that he was the first officer of the German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran and that the lifeboat contained German survivors from Kormoran's battle with HMAS Sydney seven days earlier, including Captain Theodor Detmers.[27]

Photograph looking down on two lifeboats crammed with people in naval uniforms. A third lifeboat of a different design can be seen behind the first two.
Survivors from Kormoran under tow in two of Centaur's lifeboats. The German lifeboat can be seen behind them.

Unwilling to leave the shipwrecked men at sea, but afraid of having his ship captured by the Germans, Centaur's master decided to take the lifeboat in tow, after allowing nine wounded men aboard.[28] During the tow towards Carnarvon, Western Australia, the lifeboat was swamped and partially sunk by rough seas, so two of Centaur's lifeboats were lowered to carry the Germans.[28] On arrival in Carnarvon, the Germans were relocated to the number one cargo hold, where they were joined by another hundred Kormoran survivors collected by other ships, plus forty Australian Army guards, which were then transported by Centaur to Fremantle.[27][28]

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the beginning of the Malayan Campaign on 7 December 1941, Centaur's run was curtailed to Broome, Western Australia.[13] On 6 October 1942, Centaur was ordered to sail to Queensland, where she began runs between the east coast of Australia and New Guinea, carrying materiel.[29]

1943

[edit]

With the commencement of hostilities between Japan and the British Empire, it became clear that the three hospital ships currently serving Australia—Manunda, Wanganella, and Oranje—would not be able to operate in the shallow waters typical of Maritime Southeast Asia, so a new hospital ship was required.[14] Of the Australian Merchant Navy vessels able to operate in this region, none were suitable for conversion to a hospital ship, and a request to the British Ministry of Shipping placed Centaur at the disposal of the Australian military on 4 January 1943.[14] The conversion work began on 9 January and Centaur was commissioned as an Australian Hospital Ship on 1 March.[30] During her conversion, Centaur was painted with the markings of a hospital ship as detailed in Article 5 of the tenth Hague Convention of 1907 ("Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention");[31] white hull with a green band interspersed by three red crosses on each flank of the hull, white superstructure, multiple large red crosses positioned so that the ship's status would be visible from both sea and air, and an identification number (for Centaur, 47) on her bows.[32] At night, the markings were illuminated by a combination of internal and external lights.[33] Data on the ship's markings and the layout of identifying structural features was provided to the International Committee of the Red Cross during the first week of February 1943, who passed this on to the Japanese on 5 February.[30] This information was also circulated and promoted by the press and media.[34]

A single-funnelled merchant ship at rest. The ship is painted white, with a dark horizontal band along the hull, interspersed by dark crosses. The number "47" is painted near the bow, in a black box above the line.
AHS Centaur in Sydney Harbour

Centaur entered operation as a hospital ship on 12 March 1943.[35] The early stages of Centaur's first voyage as a hospital ship were test and transport runs; the initial run from Melbourne to Sydney resulted in the Master, Chief Engineer, and Chief Medical Officer composing a long list of defects requiring attention.[36] Following repairs, she conducted a test run, transporting wounded servicemen from Townsville to Brisbane to ensure that she was capable of fulfilling the role of a medical vessel.[35] Centaur was then tasked with delivering medical personnel to Port Moresby, New Guinea, and returning to Brisbane with Australian and American wounded along with a few wounded Japanese prisoners of war.[37]

Arriving in Sydney on 8 May 1943, Centaur was re-provisioned at Darling Harbour, before departing for Cairns, Queensland on 12 May 1943.[38] From there, her destination was again New Guinea.[38] On board at the time were 74 civilian crew, 53 Australian Army Medical Corps personnel (including 8 officers), 12 female nurses from the Australian Army Nursing Service, 192 soldiers from the 2/12th Field Ambulance, and one Torres Strait ship pilot.[39][40] Most of the female nurses had transferred from the hospital ship Oranje, and the male Army personnel assigned to the ship aboard were all medical staff.[41][42] During the loading process, there was an incident when the ambulance drivers attached to the 2/12th attempted to bring their rifles and personal supplies of ammunition aboard.[43] This was met with disapproval from Centaur's Master and Chief Medical Officer, and raised concerns amongst the crew and wharf labourers that Centaur would be transporting military supplies or commandos to New Guinea: the rifles were not allowed on board until Centaur's Master received official reassurance that the ambulance drivers were allowed to carry weapons under the 10th Hague Convention (specifically Article 8), as they were used "for the maintenance of order and the defence of the wounded."[38][44] The remaining cargo was searched by the crew and labourers for other weapons and munitions.[44]

Sinking

[edit]

At approximately 4:10 am on 14 May 1943, while on her second run from Sydney to Port Moresby, Centaur was torpedoed by an unsighted submarine.[45] The torpedo struck the portside oil fuel tank approximately 2 metres (6 ft 7 in) below the waterline, creating a hole 8 to 10 metres (26 to 33 ft) across, igniting the fuel, and setting the ship on fire from the bridge aft.[39][46] Many of those on board were immediately killed by concussion or perished in the inferno.[47] Centaur quickly took on water through the impact site, rolled to port, then sank bow-first, submerging completely in less than three minutes.[39][48] The rapid sinking prevented the deployment of lifeboats, although two broke off from Centaur as she sank, along with several damaged liferafts.[49][50]

According to the position extrapolated by Second Officer Gordon Rippon from the 4:00 am dead reckoning position, Centaur was attacked approximately 24 nautical miles (44 km; 28 mi) east-northeast of Point Lookout, North Stradbroke Island, Queensland.[51][52] Doubts were initially cast on the accuracy of both the calculated point of sinking and the dead reckoning position, but the 2009 discovery of the wreck found both to be correct, Centaur located within 1 nautical mile (1.9 km; 1.2 mi) of Rippon's coordinates.[53][54]

Survivors

[edit]
Survivor breakdown[55]
Group Embarked Survived
Crew[b] 75 30
Army officers 8 0
Army nurses 12 1
2/12th Field Ambulance 192 32
Other Army 45 1
Total 332 64

Of the 332 people on board, 64 were rescued.[56] Most of the crew and passengers were asleep at the time of attack, and thus had little chance to escape.[49] It is estimated that up to 200 people may have still been alive at the time Centaur slipped beneath the waves.[57] Several people who made it off the ship alive later died from shrapnel wounds or burns; others were unable to keep themselves afloat without support and eventually drowned.[57][58]

The survivors spent 36 hours in the water, using barrels, wreckage, and the two damaged lifeboats for flotation.[49] During this time, they drifted approximately 19.6 nautical miles (36.3 km; 22.6 mi) north east of Centaur's calculated point of sinking and spread out over an area of 2 nautical miles (3.7 km; 2.3 mi).[30][59] The survivors saw at least four ships and several aircraft during this time, but were unable to attract their attention.[43]

At the time of rescue, the survivors were in two large and three smaller groups, with several more floating alone.[30] Amongst those rescued were Sister Ellen Savage, the only surviving nurse from the 12 aboard; Leslie Outridge, the only surviving doctor of the 18 aboard; Gordon Rippon, second officer and most senior surviving crew member; and Richard Salt, the Torres Strait ship pilot.[60][61] In 1944, Ellen Savage was presented with the George Medal for providing medical care, boosting morale, and displaying meritorious courage during the wait for rescue.[62][63]

Rescue

[edit]
Black-and-white photograph of a dark-haired woman in a military uniform and wearing a hat
Sister Ellen Savage was the sole survivor of the 12 female nurses on board Centaur.

On the morning of 15 May 1943, the American destroyer USS Mugford departed Brisbane to escort the 11,063 ton New Zealand freighter Sussex on the first stage of the latter's trans-Tasman voyage.[64] At 2:00 pm, a lookout aboard Mugford reported an object on the horizon.[65] Around the same time, a Royal Australian Air Force Avro Anson of No. 71 Squadron, flying ahead on anti-submarine watch, dived towards the object.[65] The aircraft returned to the two ships and signalled that there were shipwreck survivors in the water requiring rescue.[65] Mugford's commanding officer ordered Sussex to continue alone as Mugford collected the survivors.[65][66] Marksmen were positioned around the ship to shoot sharks, and sailors stood ready to dive in and assist the wounded.[67] Mugford's medics inspected each person as they came aboard and provided necessary medical care.[67] The American crew learned from the first group of survivors that they were from the hospital ship Centaur.[66]

At 2:14 pm, Mugford made contact with the Naval Officer-in-Charge in Brisbane, and announced that the ship was recovering survivors from Centaur at 27°03′S 154°12′E / 27.050°S 154.200°E / -27.050; 154.200, the first that anyone in Australia had knowledge of the attack on the hospital ship.[56][68] The rescue of the 64 survivors took an hour and twenty minutes, although Mugford remained in the area until dark, searching an area of approximately 7 by 14 nautical miles (13 by 26 km; 8 by 16 mi) for more survivors.[65][69] After darkness fell, Mugford returned to Brisbane, arriving shortly before midnight.[56] Further searches of the waters off North Stradbroke Island were made by USS Helm during the night of 15 May until 6:00 pm on 16 May, and by HMAS Lithgow and four motor torpedo boats from 16 to 21 May, neither search finding more survivors.[30][70]

Identifying attacker

[edit]

At the time of the attack, none aboard Centaur witnessed what had attacked the ship. Due to the ship's position, the distance from shore, and the depth, it was concluded that she was torpedoed by one of the Japanese submarines known to be operating off the Australian east coast.[49] Several survivors later claimed to have heard the attacking submarine moving on the surface while they were adrift, and the submarine was seen by the ship's cook, Francis Martin, who was floating alone on a hatch cover, out of sight from the main cluster of survivors.[71] Martin described the submarine to Naval Intelligence following the survivors' return to land; his description matched the profile of a KD7 type Kaidai-class submarine of the Imperial Japanese Navy.[71]

A large submarine underway. Japanese flags and the number "176" are painted on the fin.
I-176, a KD7 type Kaidai-class submarine. The three suspected attackers were all of this type.

At the time of the attack, three KD7 Kaidai were operating off Australia's east coast: I-177 under the command of Hajime Nakagawa, I-178 under Hidejiro Utsuki, and I-180 under Toshio Kusaka.[49][72] None of these submarines survived the war; I-177 was sunk by USS Samuel S. Miles on 3 October 1944,[73] I-178 by USS Patterson on 25 August 1943,[74] and I-180 by USS Gilmore on 26 April 1944.[75] Kusaka and Nakagawa were transferred to other submarines before the loss of I-180 and I-177 respectively, but Utsuki and I-178 were sunk while returning from the patrol off the coast of Australia.[76]

In December 1943, following official protests, the Japanese government issued a statement formally denying responsibility for the sinking of Centaur.[77] Records provided by the Japanese following the war also did not acknowledge responsibility.[74] Although Centaur's sinking was a war crime, no one was tried for sinking the hospital ship.[78] Investigations into the attack were conducted between 1944 and 1948, and included the interrogation of the commanders of the submarines operating in Australian waters at the time, their superiors, plus junior officers and crewmen from the submarines who had survived the war.[78] Several of the investigators suspected that Nakagawa and I-177 were most likely responsible, but they were unable to establish this beyond reasonable doubt, and the Centaur case file was closed on 14 December 1948 without any charges laid.[78]

Historians were divided on which submarine was responsible.[79] In Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, published in 1968 as part of the series detailing the Australian official history of World War II, George Hermon Gill concluded that either I-178 or I-180 was responsible; the former was more likely as she had served in Australian waters the longest of any Japanese submarine at the time, but had claimed no kills in the three-month period surrounding Centaur's sinking.[74][79] In 1972, German military historian Jürgen Rohwer claimed in Chronology of the war at sea that I-177 torpedoed Centaur, based on a Japanese report stating that I-177 had attacked a ship on 14 May 1943 in the area the hospital ship had sunk.[79][80] Japanese Rear Admiral Kaneyoshi Sakamoto, who had shown Rohwer the report, stated that Nakagawa and I-177 were responsible for the attack on Centaur in his 1979 book History of Submarine Warfare.[79]

As an official history of the Japanese Navy, Sakamoto's work was considered to be official admission of the attacking submarine's identity.[79] Subsequently, most sources assumed as fact Nakagawa's and I-177's role in the loss of Centaur.[81] Nakagawa, who died in 1991, refused to speak about the attack on Centaur following the war crimes investigation at the end of World War II or even to defend himself or deny the claims made by Rohwer and Sakamoto.[71][82]

Reaction

[edit]

Public reaction

[edit]
A painting showing a hospital ship on fire and sinking. In the foreground, a man and a woman cling to a spar to keep afloat, while other people are shown leaving the ship by lifeboat or jumping overboard. The poster is captioned across the top with the words "WORK • SAVE • FIGHT", and across the bottom with "and so AVENGE THE NURSES!"
A propaganda poster calling for Australians to avenge the sinking of Centaur

The media were notified of Centaur's sinking on 17 May 1943, but were ordered not to release the news until it had been announced in the South West Pacific Area's General Headquarters dispatch at midday on 18 May, and in Parliament by Prime Minister John Curtin that afternoon.[83] News of the attack made front pages throughout the world, including The Times of London, The New York Times, and the Montreal Gazette.[84] In some newspapers, the news took precedence over the 'Dambuster' raids performed in Europe by No. 617 Squadron RAF.[85]

The initial public reaction to the attack on Centaur was one of outrage, significantly different from that displayed following the loss of Australian warships or merchant vessels.[3] As a hospital ship, the attack was a breach of the tenth Hague Convention of 1907, and as such was a war crime.[86] The sinking of Centaur drew strong reactions from both Prime Minister Curtin and General Douglas MacArthur. Curtin stated that the sinking was "an entirely inexcusable act, undertaken in violation of the convention to which Japan is a party and of all the principles of common humanity".[87] MacArthur reflected the common Australian view when he stated that the sinking was an example of Japanese "limitless savagery".[88] Politicians urged the public to use their rage to fuel the war effort, and Centaur became a symbol of Australia's determination to defeat what appeared to be a brutal and uncompromising enemy.[89][90] The Australian Government produced posters depicting the sinking, which called for Australians to "Avenge the Nurses" by working to produce materiel, purchasing war bonds, or enlisting in the armed forces.[90]

People also expressed their sympathy towards the crew, and there were several efforts to fund a new hospital ship.[89] The councillors of Caulfield, Victoria, organised a fund to replace the lost medical equipment, opening with a donation of AU£2,000.[89] Those who worked on Centaur's conversion contributed money towards a replacement, and employees of Ansett Airways pledged to donate an hour's pay towards the fitting out of such a replacement.[89]

With some people unable to believe that the Japanese would be so ruthless, rumours began to spread almost immediately after news of the attack was made public.[91] The most common rumour was that Centaur had been carrying munitions or commandos at the time of her sinking, the Japanese being made aware of this before her departure.[91] This stemmed from an incident involving the ambulance drivers' weapons during loading in Sydney.[43]

Military reaction

[edit]

The attack was universally condemned by Australian servicemen, who commonly believed that the attack on Centaur had been carried out deliberately and in full knowledge of her status.[92] Similar reactions were expressed by other Allied personnel; United States Army Air Forces General George Kenney recalled having to talk a sergeant bombardier out of organising a retaliatory bombing run on a Japanese hospital ship known to be in their area.[93]

Black-and-white photograph of two soldiers working with a lathe. A poster behind them depicts a ship with hospital markings sinking by the bow and is captioned with "SAVE for the brave" and "Let us avenge the Nurses".
A war loan poster depicting the sinking of Centaur displayed at an Australian Army workshop in Lae, New Guinea, in September 1944

Six days after the attack on Centaur, a request was made by the Australian Department of Defence that the identification markings and lights be removed from Australian hospital ship Manunda, weapons be installed, and that she begin to sail blacked out and under escort.[94] The conversion was performed, although efforts by the Department of the Navy, the Admiralty, and authorities in New Zealand and the United States of America caused the completed conversion to be undone.[94] The cost of the roundabout work came to £12,500, and kept Manunda out of service for three months.[95] On 9 June 1943, communications between the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject of hospital ships contained a section referring to the Manunda incident as a response to the attack on Centaur, with the conclusion that the attack was the work of an irresponsible Japanese commander, and that it would be better to wait until further attacks had been made before considering the removal of hospital ship markings.[96]

When the consideration was made that the ambulance drivers' weapons incident just before Centaur's voyage may have been partially responsible for the attack, it led to the tightening of rules regarding who was allowed to travel on a hospital ship.[43] Quasi-medical staff, like repatriation teams, were no longer permitted on hospital ships.[43][97] Ambulance drivers had to transfer from the regular Army to the Australian Army Medical Corps before they were allowed aboard, although they were still permitted to carry their unloaded weapons and ammunition.[43][97]

Official protests

[edit]

After consultation with the Australian armed forces, General MacArthur, the Admiralty, and the Australian Government, an official protest was sent.[98] This was received by the Japanese Government on 29 May 1943.[98] At around the same time, the International Committee of the Red Cross sent a protest on behalf of the major Allied Red Cross organisations to the Japanese Red Cross.[98]

On 26 December 1943, a response to the Australian protest arrived.[95] It stated that the Japanese Government had no information justifying the allegation made, and therefore took no responsibility for what happened.[95] The reply counter-protested that nine Japanese hospital ships had been attacked by the Allies, although these claims were directed against the United States, not Australia.[43][95] Although several later exchanges were made, the lack of progress saw the British Government inform the Australian Prime Minister on 14 November 1944 that no further communications would be made on the loss of Centaur.[99]

Theories for attack

[edit]

Torpedo attacks in Australian waters were common at this time, with 27 Japanese submarines operating in Australian waters between June 1942 and December 1944.[100] These submarines attacked almost 50 merchant vessels, 20 ships confirmed to be sunk as result of a Japanese attack, plus 9 more unconfirmed.[100] This was part of a concentrated effort to disrupt supply convoys from Australia to New Guinea.[101]

Several actions on Centaur's part may have contributed to her demise. Centaur was under orders to sail well out to sea until reaching the Great Barrier Reef; her course keeping her between 50 and 150 nautical miles (90 and 280 km; 60 and 170 mi) from shore.[102] Centaur's Master, believing he had been given a route intended for a merchant vessel, set a course closer to land, but on the seaward side of 2,000 metres (6,600 ft) in depth.[103] Also, Centaur was sailing completely illuminated, with the exception of the two bow floodlights, which had been switched off as they interfered with visibility from the bridge.[39]

There are three main theories as to why Centaur was attacked:

Legitimate target

[edit]

This theory stems from the rumours spreading after Centaur's sinking. If Centaur had been in breach of the Hague Convention of 1907, and someone had informed the Japanese of this, I-177 may have been under valid orders to attack.[104] When Centaur left Sydney, her decks were packed with green-uniformed men, and as Field Ambulance uniforms were only distinguishable from other Army uniforms by badge insignia and the colouration of the cloth band ringing the hat, a distant observer could have concluded that the hospital ship was transporting soldiers.[105] Those witnessing the loading in Sydney would have seen the ambulance drivers bring their weapons aboard, and could have come to a similar conclusion.[44] If a spy or informant had passed this information to the Japanese, I-177 could have been lying in wait.[104] The main flaw in this theory is the question of how Nakagawa and his crew were able to predict that Centaur was taking an alternative route and how they were able to determine the new route selected.[106]

Similar but later rumours included that during her first voyage, Centaur had transported soldiers to New Guinea, or Japanese prisoners of war back to Australia for interrogation, and consequently had been marked as a legitimate target by the Japanese.[107] Centaur had carried 10 prisoners of war on her return voyage from New Guinea, but as they were all wounded personnel, transporting them on a hospital ship was legal.[108]

Mistaken target

[edit]

This theory states that Nakagawa was unaware that the vessel he was attacking was a hospital ship, and that the sinking was an unfortunate accident.[109] This view was supported by several Japanese officers, both before and after the revelation that Nakagawa was responsible.[109] Amongst them was Lieutenant Commander Zenji Orita, who took command of I-177 after Nakagawa.[109] Orita did not hear anything from the crew about having sunk a hospital ship, not even rumours, and believed that if I-177 had knowingly attacked Centaur, he would have learned this from the crew's gossip.[109]

When compared to the other contemporary Australian hospital ships, Centaur was the smallest, approximately a third of the size of Manunda or Wanganella.[14] Centaur was also slightly shorter than I-177.[92] The observation of Centaur was made through a periscope, and submarine officers attest that at 1,500 metres (4,900 ft), the optimum range of attack for World War II–era Japanese submarines, some officers would not be able to clearly identify a target ship's profile or hull markings.[110] With Centaur's bow floodlights out, and with the observation of the target made through the periscope, there is a possibility Nakagawa would not have seen the hospital ship's markings if he had been in the wrong position.[110] Apart from the two bow floodlights, Centaur was lit up brilliantly.[106] To attack, I-177 would have had to approach from abeam of Centaur, which was illuminated by both its own lights and a full moon.[110]

Intentional target

[edit]

This theory states that Nakagawa was fully aware that his target was a hospital ship and decided to sink her regardless, either on his own initiative or on a poor interpretation of his orders.[111] Researchers speculate that as Nakagawa was approaching the end of his tour in Australian waters, and had only sunk a single enemy vessel, the 8,742 ton freighter Limerick, he did not want to return with the disgrace of a single kill.[39] Other claims include that Nakagawa may have been acting in vengeance for casualties inflicted by the Allies during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, or may have expected praise for the sinking of an enemy naval vessel.[112]

In February 1944, while in command of I-37, Nakagawa ordered the machine-gunning of survivors from three British merchant vessels torpedoed by his submarine (British Chivalry, on 22 February; Sutlej, on 24 February; and Ascott, on 29 February).[113] His defence, that he was acting under orders from Vice Admiral Shiro Takasu, was not accepted, and he was sentenced to four years imprisonment at Sugamo Prison as a Class B war criminal.[113] These incidents showed that Nakagawa was willing to ignore the laws of war.[113]

Shipwreck

[edit]

Following World War II, several searches of the waters around North Stradbroke and Moreton Islands failed to reveal Centaur's location. It was believed that she had sunk off the edge of the continental shelf, to a depth at which the Royal Australian Navy did not have the capability to search for a vessel of Centaur's size.[1] Some parties also believed that Rippon's calculated point of sinking was inaccurate, either intentionally or through error.[53][54]

Several points were incorrectly identified as the location where Centaur sank. The first was in the War Diary Situation Report entry for the hospital ship's sinking, which gives 27°17′S 154°05′E / 27.283°S 154.083°E / -27.283; 154.083, 7 nautical miles (13 km; 8.1 mi) east of Rippon's position.[114] According to Milligan and Foley, this likely occurred because an estimated 50-nautical-mile (93 km; 58 mi) distance from Brisbane, included as a frame of reference, was interpreted literally.[114] In 1974, two divers claimed to have found the ship approximately 40 nautical miles (74 km; 46 mi) east of Brisbane, in 60 metres (200 ft) of water, but did not disclose its exact location.[115] Attempts to relocate the site between 1974 and 1992 were unsuccessful, an associate of the divers claiming that the Navy destroyed the wreck shortly after its discovery.[116]

Dennis's claim

[edit]

In 1995, it was announced that the shipwreck of Centaur had been located in waters 9 nautical miles (17 km; 10 mi) from the lighthouse on Moreton Island, a significant distance from her believed last position.[117] The finding was reported on A Current Affair, during which footage of the shipwreck, 170 metres (560 ft) underwater, was shown.[117] Discoverer Donald Dennis claimed the identity of the shipwreck had been confirmed by the Navy, the Queensland Maritime Museum, and the Australian War Memorial.[117] A cursory search by the Navy confirmed the presence of a shipwreck at the given location, which was gazetted as a war grave and added to navigation charts by the Australian Hydrographic Office.[1][117]

Over the next eight years, there was growing doubt about the position of Dennis' wreck, due to the distance from both Second Officer Rippon's calculation of the point of sinking and where USS Mugford found the survivors.[118] During this time, Dennis had been convicted on two counts of deception and one of theft through scams.[118] Two wreck divers, Trevor Jackson and Simon Mitchell, used the location for a four-hour world record dive on 14 May 2002, during which they examined the wreck and took measurements, claiming that the ship was too small to be Centaur.[119] Jackson had been studying Centaur for some time, and believed that the wreck was actually another, much smaller ship, the 55-metre-long (180 ft) MV Kyogle, a lime freighter purchased by the Royal Australian Air Force and sunk during bombing practice on 12 May 1951.[117][119] The facts gathered on the dive were inconclusive, but the divers remained adamant it was not Centaur, and passed this information onto Nick Greenaway, producer of the newsmagazine show 60 Minutes.[119]

On the 60th anniversary of the sinking, 60 Minutes ran a story demonstrating that the wreck was not Centaur.[117] It was revealed that nobody at the Queensland Maritime Museum had yet seen Dennis' footage, and when it was shown to Museum president Rod McLeod and maritime historian John Foley, they stated that the shipwreck could not be Centaur due to physical inconsistencies, such as an incorrect rudder.[117] Following this story, and others published around the same time in newspapers, the Navy sent three ships to inspect the site over a two-month period; HMA Ships Hawkesbury, Melville, and Yarra, before concluding that the shipwreck was incorrectly identified as Centaur.[1] An amendment was made to the gazettal, and the Hydrographic Office began to remove the mark from charts.[1]

Discovery

[edit]

In April 2008, following the successful discovery of HMAS Sydney, several parties began calling for a dedicated search for Centaur.[120] By the end of 2008, the Australian Federal and Queensland State governments had formed a joint committee and contributed A$2 million each towards a search, and tenders to supply equipment (including the search vessel, side-scan sonar systems, and a remotely operated inspection submersible) were opened in February 2009, and awarded during the year.[121][122][123] The search, conducted from the Defence Maritime Services vessel Seahorse Spirit and overseen by shipwreck hunter David Mearns, commenced during the weekend of 12–13 December 2009.[124] The initial search area off Cape Moreton covered 1,365 square kilometres (527 sq mi), the search team being given 35 days to locate and film the wreck before funding was exhausted.[124][125]

Close up photograph of part of a ship's bow. The bow is at an angle. An anchor is located in the centre of the image. A coloured band runs from the top left corner to the right third of the bottom edge. A dark square and the remains of a number "7" are above and to the left of the anchor and band. The bow is covered in rust and marine growth. The image has a blue-green tinge, as it has been taken deep underwater.
The bow of the Centaur wreck. The starboard anchor (centre), and the remains of the Red Cross identification number (above the anchor) can be seen.

Six sonar targets with similar dimensions to Centaur were located between 15 and 18 December: as none of the contacts corresponded completely to the hospital ship, the search team opted to take advantage of favourable weather conditions and continue investigating the area before returning to each site and making a detailed inspection with a higher-resolution sonar.[125][126] On the afternoon of 18 December, the sonar towfish separated from the cable, and was lost in 1,800 metres (5,900 ft) of water, forcing the use of the high-resolution sonar to complete the area search.[127] After inspecting the potential targets, Mearns and the search team announced on 20 December that they had found Centaur that morning.[48][54][126]

The wreck was found at 27°16.98′S 153°59.22′E / 27.28300°S 153.98700°E / -27.28300; 153.98700 (30 nautical miles (56 km; 35 mi) east of Moreton Island, and less than 1 nautical mile (1.9 km; 1.2 mi) from Rippon's coordinates), resting 2,059 metres (6,755 ft) below sea level in a steep-walled gully, 150 metres (490 ft) wide and 90 metres (300 ft) deep.[48][54][126] After returning to shore for Christmas and to install a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) aboard Seahorse Spirit, the search team commenced efforts to document the wreck, the first photographs being taken by the ROV in the early morning of 10 January 2010 confirming that the wreck is Centaur.[128] Conditions for documenting the hospital ship were not optimal on the first ROV dive, and three more dives were made during 11 and 12 January.[129] During the four dives, over 24 hours of footage were collected, along with several photographs: features identified during the operation include the Red Cross identification number, the hospital ship markings, and the ship's bell.[129] The Centaur wreck site has been marked as a war grave and protected with a navigational exclusion zone under the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976.[54]

Memorials

[edit]
Stained glass window depicting AHS Centaur at Concord Repatriation General Hospital

In 1948, Queensland nurses established the "Centaur Memorial Fund for Nurses" which used the money raised to purchase an establishment and name it "Centaur House"; a facility supporting nurses by holding convivial meetings and providing inexpensive accommodation for out-of-town nurses.[130] The original Centaur House was sold in 1971, a new building being purchased and renamed.[131] The second Centaur House was sold in 1979 and although the fund still exists, it no longer owns a physical facility.[131] On 15 September 1968, a cairn was unveiled at Caloundra, Queensland, erected by the local Rotary International Club.[132] In 1990, a stained glass memorial window depicting Centaur, along with a plaque listing the names of those lost in the attack, was installed at Concord Repatriation General Hospital, at a cost of A$16,000.[133] A display about Centaur was placed at the Australian War Memorial.[134] The centrepiece of the display was a scale model of Centaur presented to the Memorial by Blue Funnel Line, and the display included items that were donated by the survivors, such as a lifejacket, a signal flare, and a medical kit.[134] It was removed in 1992 to make way for a display related to the Vietnam War.[134]

A memorial to Centaur was unveiled at Point Danger, Coolangatta, Queensland on 14 May 1993, the 50th anniversary of the sinking.[135] It consists of a monumental stone topped with a cairn, surrounded by a tiled moat with memorial plaques explaining the commemoration. The memorial is surrounded by a park with a boardwalk, overlooking the sea, with plaques for other Merchant Navy and Royal Australian Navy vessels lost during World War II. The unveiling of the memorial was performed by Minister for Veterans' Affairs, Senator John Faulkner.[135]

A large stone sitting in a circular basin. The stone is capped with a small metal pyramid. Four plaques also sit in the basin. The entire memorial is located on a hill, with flowers in the foreground and the ocean behind.
Centaur memorial at Point Danger, in Coolangatta, Queensland

A memorial plaque was laid on the foredeck of Centaur on 12 January 2010, during the fourth and final ROV dive on the hospital ship.[129] This would normally be a breach of the Historic Shipwrecks Act, but a special dispensation permitted the manoeuvre, as placing the plaque on the seabed next to the ship would have seen it sink into the sediment.[129] Following the ship's discovery, a national memorial service at St John's Cathedral, Brisbane on 2 March 2010 was attended by over 600 people, including Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.[136] A second ceremony for 300 relatives of the hospital ship's personnel was held aboard HMAS Manoora on 24 September.[137] During the service, which occurred over the wreck site, wreaths were laid and the ashes of three survivors were scattered.[137]

The Centaur is also memoralised in the name of a school in New South Wales. Centaur Primary School, in the Northern Rivers suburb of Banora Point, was named after the ship, which features in the school's emblem.[138]

See also

[edit]

Footnotes

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c d e Department of Defence, Navy findings of search for ex Army Hospital Ship (AHS) Centaur
  2. ^ a b c Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 51
  3. ^ a b Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, pp. 186–187
  4. ^ Sinnamon, Myles (13 May 2013). "Sinking of the AHS Centaur". State Library Of Queensland. Archived from the original on 8 November 2023. Retrieved 18 September 2023.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 9
  6. ^ a b Jenkins, Battle Surface, p. 281
  7. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 5–6
  8. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 22
  9. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 2
  10. ^ a b Lloyd's Register. "Lloyd's Register, Navires a Vapeur et a Moteurs" (PDF). Plimsoll Ship Data. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 May 2014. Retrieved 14 May 2014.
  11. ^ Lloyd's Register. "List of Vessels Fitted With Refrigerating Appliances – continued. Part II. – List of vessels having a capacity of less than 80,000 cubic feet (if not holding Lloyd's R.M.C.)" (PDF). Plimsoll Ship Data. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 May 2014. Retrieved 14 May 2014.
  12. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 14
  13. ^ a b Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 25
  14. ^ a b c d Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 19
  15. ^ a b c d e f g Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 21
  16. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, pp. 21–22
  17. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 40
  18. ^ Lloyd's Register. "Lloyd's Register, Navires a Vapeur et a Moteurs" (PDF). Plimsoll Ship Data. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 May 2014. Retrieved 14 May 2014.
  19. ^ a b c d Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 13
  20. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 12
  21. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, pp. 13, 15
  22. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 13
  23. ^ a b Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 15
  24. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 18
  25. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 21, 53
  26. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 18
  27. ^ a b c Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 19
  28. ^ a b c Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 16
  29. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 26
  30. ^ a b c d e Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p. 258
  31. ^ "Laws of War : Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention (Hague X); October 18, 1907". Archived from the original on 2 November 2015. Retrieved 14 May 2014.
  32. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 43–44
  33. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 44
  34. ^ Goodman, Our War Nurses, p. 194
  35. ^ a b Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 23
  36. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 52
  37. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 24
  38. ^ a b c Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 25
  39. ^ a b c d e Jenkins, Battle Surface, p. 278
  40. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 27
  41. ^ Adam-Smith, Australian Women at War, p. 176
  42. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 198
  43. ^ a b c d e f g Goodman, Our War Nurses, p. 195
  44. ^ a b c Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 76–77
  45. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 28
  46. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 104
  47. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 105
  48. ^ a b c Australian Associated Press, Hospital ship Centaur discovered off Queensland coast
  49. ^ a b c d e Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p. 259
  50. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 128
  51. ^ Stevens, A Critical Vulnerability, p. 358
  52. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 38
  53. ^ a b Milligan & Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 238–239
  54. ^ a b c d e Fraser, Discovery proves maligned navigator got it right
  55. ^ Numerical comparison of crew and survivor statistics. Smith, Three Minutes of Time, pp. 27, 34
  56. ^ a b c Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 34
  57. ^ a b Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 122
  58. ^ Jenkins, Battle Surface, p. 279
  59. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 26
  60. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, pp. 34, 54–57
  61. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 156
  62. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 250
  63. ^ "No. 36669". The London Gazette (Supplement). 22 August 1944. p. 3941.
  64. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 144–145
  65. ^ a b c d e Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p. 257
  66. ^ a b Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 33
  67. ^ a b Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 149
  68. ^ Milligan & Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 150
  69. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 153
  70. ^ Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 35
  71. ^ a b c Smith, Three Minutes of Time, p. 29
  72. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 201
  73. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 247
  74. ^ a b c Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p. 260
  75. ^ Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, vol 3, p. 100
  76. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 201–202
  77. ^ Frame,. No Pleasure Cruise, p. 188
  78. ^ a b c Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 196–214
  79. ^ a b c d e Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 214–215
  80. ^ Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the war at sea, 1939–1945, p. 201
  81. ^ Dennis et al., The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 124
  82. ^ Jenkins, Battle Surface, pp. 284–285
  83. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 169–171
  84. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 175
  85. ^ Wilson, Sunken Hearts, p. 23
  86. ^ Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, p. 187
  87. ^ Adam-Smith, Australian Women at War, p. 174
  88. ^ McKernan, All In:, pp. 134–135
  89. ^ a b c d Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 179
  90. ^ a b Department of Veterans' Affairs, Sinking of the Centaur – Commemoration
  91. ^ a b Frame, No Pleasure Cruise, p. 177
  92. ^ a b Jenkins, Battle Surface, p. 282
  93. ^ Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 245–246
  94. ^ a b Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 189–192
  95. ^ a b c d Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 192
  96. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 191
  97. ^ a b Goodman, Our War Nurses, p. 197
  98. ^ a b c Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 187
  99. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 194
  100. ^ a b Jenkins, Battle Surface, p. 286
  101. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 68
  102. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 87
  103. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 88
  104. ^ a b Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 232
  105. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 75, 85
  106. ^ a b Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 233
  107. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 227
  108. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 65
  109. ^ a b c d Jenkins, Battle Surface, p. 280
  110. ^ a b c Jenkins, Battle Surface, p. 283
  111. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 235
  112. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 236
  113. ^ a b c Jenkins, Battle Surface, p. 284
  114. ^ a b Milligan & Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 239
  115. ^ Milligan & Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 240
  116. ^ Milligan & Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 240–241
  117. ^ a b c d e f g A Grave Mistake [60 Minutes segment]
  118. ^ a b Wilson, Sunken Hearts, p. 24
  119. ^ a b c Jackson, Wreck diving in Southern Queensland, pp. 157–181
  120. ^ Dart, Shipwreck hunter offers to find Centaur remains
  121. ^ Crutcher, Let Aussie shipwreck hunters find the Centaur
  122. ^ Atkinson, Companies show interest in Centaur search
  123. ^ Berry, Search for sunken hospital ship to begin soon
  124. ^ a b Tedmanson, Search begins for wreckage of hospital ship Centaur destroyed in war
  125. ^ a b Australian Associated Press, Centaur searchers find 'target' off Qld
  126. ^ a b c Heger, Shipwreck hunter David Mearns confirms ship is the Centaur
  127. ^ Australian Associated Press, Centaur searchers lose vital equipment
  128. ^ Barbeler & Long, First photos of hospital ship Centaur
  129. ^ a b c d Barbeler & Australian Associated Press, Memorial plaque laid on the Centaur
  130. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 251
  131. ^ a b Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 252
  132. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, pp. 256–257
  133. ^ Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 257
  134. ^ a b c Milligan and Foley, Australian Hospital Ship Centaur, p. 255
  135. ^ a b Larsen, Centaur memorial unveiled, p. 2
  136. ^ Barbeler, Centaur dead remembered
  137. ^ a b Hurst, Hope floats
  138. ^ "Mysterious origins of Centaur Primary School's name". Daily Telegraph. 15 May 2013. Retrieved 24 October 2025.

References

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Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
AHS Centaur was an Australian that operated during the Second World War, converted from a civilian motor passenger vessel and commissioned in January 1943 to transport wounded personnel. On 14 May 1943, during its second voyage from northward to evacuate casualties from , the ship was struck by a from the Japanese submarine I-177 without prior warning, sinking within three minutes southeast of and resulting in the deaths of 268 out of 332 aboard, including 11 of 12 nurses. The vessel, marked in white with green bands and red crosses illuminated at night per Geneva Convention requirements, carried no armament or military cargo beyond medical supplies and staff from the 2/3rd Australian General Hospital. The rapid catastrophe left survivors adrift for up to 36 hours in lifeboats and rafts, with nurse Ellen Savage among those recognized for sustaining morale until rescue by HMAS Warramunga. The unprovoked attack on a protected fueled Australian public outrage and campaigns urging vengeance, while inquiries confirmed the perpetrator through Japanese records despite initial denials. The wreck was discovered in 2009 at 550 meters depth, preserving the site's integrity as a war grave.

Design and Construction

Original Passenger Liner Configuration

The MV Centaur was constructed as a passenger-cargo liner by Scotts' Shipbuilding and Engineering Company at , , and launched on 5 June 1924 before completion on 10 August 1924. She measured 315.7 feet in length, with a beam of 48.2 feet and a of 3,222. Designed primarily for the carriage of passengers, livestock, and general cargo including refrigerated goods on routes between , Java ports, and , Centaur featured four holds, one refrigerated with a capacity of 3,000 cubic feet. Accommodation was provided for 72 passengers, comprising 50 in first class and 22 in second class, alongside space for up to 450 head of cattle. Propelled by a single 6-cylinder, 4-stroke cycle, supercharged air (SCSA) built to a design, delivering approximately 1,650 brake horsepower, Centaur achieved a service speed of 11 knots on a single shaft. This configuration marked her as one of the early merchant vessels equipped with diesel propulsion, emphasizing for extended coastal and regional trade runs rather than high-speed ocean crossings. Owned by the Ocean Steamship Company of (operating under the ), she entered commercial service focused on the Australian-Asian trade, prioritizing versatility in mixed cargoes over luxury passenger amenities.

Conversion to Hospital Ship

In early 1943, the motor passenger ship Centaur underwent conversion to a hospital ship at a Sydney shipyard, following its allocation to the Australian Department of Defence in January. The refit entailed repainting the hull white with a broad green band running horizontally along both sides, interrupted at intervals by large red crosses to signify its protected status under the Geneva Conventions; additional red crosses were applied to the funnel, stern, and deckhouse, while the designation "AHS-47" appeared on the bow. All offensive armaments were removed, ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law prohibiting military hospital ships from offensive capabilities. The interior modifications included the installation of fully equipped operating theaters, a dental surgery, and wards configured to accommodate approximately 252 bedridden patients, along with storage for medical supplies from units such as the 2/12th Field . The vessel's staffing complement comprised crew for navigation, supplemented by military medical personnel: typically 7 medical officers, 12 nurses from the Australian Army Nursing Service, and around 112 orderlies to manage patient care. These adaptations prioritized evacuation and treatment roles, with the ship designed for illuminated operation at night to further advertise its neutral status. Following inspection and verification of its markings and facilities by Australian military authorities, Centaur was commissioned as the Australian Hospital Ship (AHS) Centaur in March 1943, certified for protected deployment in accordance with the 1929 Geneva Convention on maritime warfare. This process underscored adherence to protocols distinguishing hospital ships from combatants, though enforcement relied on belligerent recognition of such emblems.

Operational History

Interwar Commercial Service (1924–1938)

Centaur, a 3,222-gross-ton motor vessel built by Scotts' Shipbuilding and Engineering Company at , , was completed in 1924 for the Ocean Steam Ship Company's service between and . Designed with a reinforced flat bottom to navigate shallow ports and mud flats in the region, she accommodated up to 92 passengers in first-class cabins alongside refrigerated cargo holds for perishable exports such as meat and fruit. Her propulsion system, comprising two diesel engines delivering 1,600 horsepower, enabled a service speed of around 12 knots, suitable for the scheduled trade routes. Entering commercial operation following her maiden voyage to on 27 March 1925, primarily plied the Fremantle-to-Singapore route, with intermediate calls at ports in , , and other locations. This service supported 's export economy by transporting wool, frozen produce, and general eastward, while returning with manufactured goods and passengers. Throughout the , she maintained a reputation for punctuality and safety, contributing to the resumption of fortnightly sailings on the line after the introduction of similar "C-class" vessels. No significant accidents or losses were recorded during this time, underscoring her role in routine, dependable maritime commerce. The of the 1930s strained global shipping, yet Centaur's operations persisted with minimal interruption, adapting to reduced passenger volumes by emphasizing cargo capacity amid fluctuating trade demands. By , plans were underway to remodel her for enhanced efficiency, reflecting ongoing investment in the fleet despite economic pressures. Her peacetime service exemplified the Blue Funnel Line's focus on reliable inter-regional connectivity, free from major controversies or operational failures.

Wartime Deployment (1939–May 1943)

The Australian Hospital Ship (AHS) Centaur was commissioned on 1 March 1943 following her conversion from a passenger liner, marking the start of her wartime duties. She departed on 12 March 1943 for her maiden voyage to , , carrying medical personnel and supplies to support operations in the region. Upon arrival, Centaur evacuated wounded personnel from the Buna–Gona campaign, which had concluded in early 1943, transporting them back to alongside Australian and American casualties. This initial mission demonstrated her role in logistical medical support without direct exposure to combat. Subsequent voyages involved shuttling patients between Australian ports, including a trial run from to before proceeding to for further evacuations. Centaur adhered strictly to international protocols for ships, maintaining full illumination at night, displaying white hulls with green bands and red crosses, and avoiding designated combat areas to ensure protection under the Convention. Her operations focused on rear-area casualty transport, replenishing stores in between trips and supporting the broader Allied effort in the Pacific theater through non-combat medical logistics. By early May 1943, had completed several such rotations, preparing for another voyage to evacuate casualties from . She departed on 12 May 1943, with 332 personnel aboard, including 11 nurses and medical staff, initially bound for Cairns via intermediate stops such as Newcastle, to load additional supplies before proceeding northward. This deployment underscored her essential, unprotected role in sustaining troop readiness amid ongoing Pacific campaigns.

The Attack and Immediate Aftermath

Final Voyage and Torpedoing Details

The AHS Centaur embarked on her second wartime voyage from on 12 May 1943, bound for with a complement of medical personnel, stores, and equipment. She called at the next day for provisioning and departed that evening, steaming northward parallel to the Queensland coast in unescorted transit as per hospital ship protocols. At approximately 04:10 on 14 May 1943, while located about 30 nautical miles east of the southern tip of , (27°17′S 153°59′E), Centaur was struck by a single torpedo launched from the Japanese submarine I-177. The vessel was distinctly marked as a under the Hague Convention: painted overall white with a continuous dark green band along the hull interrupted by three large red crosses per side, red crosses on the single funnel, and the hull number "47" in a black square near the bow; she was fully illuminated throughout the night with all navigation and identification lights burning brightly. The torpedo detonated against the port side amidships, penetrating the oil fuel tank abaft No. 2 hatch adjacent to the engine room approximately 2 meters below the waterline. This impact triggered an immediate explosion of ignited fuel, generating a massive fireball that engulfed the midships section, while the breach caused rapid ingress of seawater and structural compromise.

Sinking Sequence and Onboard Chaos

A single torpedo struck the port side of AHS Centaur at approximately 4:10 a.m. on 14 May 1943, penetrating an oil fuel tank abaft No. 2 hatch and igniting a massive explosion and fire that rapidly spread. The forward impact caused immediate flooding, a severe list to port, and the bow to plunge, with the ship capsizing and sinking entirely within two to three minutes. The sudden detonation in pre-dawn darkness caught most of the 332 personnel asleep below decks, triggering alarms amid buckling bulkheads, roaring flames, and tilting decks that hindered movement to muster stations. Panic ensued as crew and passengers rushed to lifeboats, but the extreme heel and swift submersion prevented orderly launching; davits could not be swung out in time, and several boats either broke adrift partially or overturned when lowered haphazardly into the surging sea. Many jumped overboard without fully donning lifejackets, landing in burning oil slicks or clinging to floating wreckage and rafts. The rupture of the oil tanks accelerated the sink rate through uncontrolled flooding and loss of buoyancy forward, causally limiting escape opportunities and contributing to the high death toll of 268, including 11 of 12 nurses who were quartered amidships and struggled to reach the deck. Initial casualties stemmed from the blast, fire burns, crushing injuries, and in the chaos, exacerbated by cold-water immersion shock despite the subtropical location, disorienting swimmers, and opportunistic attacks on the vulnerable. Survivor Ellen Savage, the lone nurse to reach safety, later rendered aid to the injured amid the debris.

Survivor Accounts and Casualty Figures

Survivors consistently reported that the torpedo struck the Centaur without warning at approximately 4:10 a.m. on 14 May 1943, impacting the port side near the engine room and fuel tanks, which ignited a massive explosion and fire. The blast caused immediate structural failure, with decks collapsing and the ship listing severely within minutes, sinking stern-first in about three minutes. Nursing Sister Ellen Savage, the only nurse among the survivors, described being awakened and thrown from her bunk by two violent explosions, followed by the rapid influx of water and collapse of bulkheads in the nurses' quarters. She assisted in evacuating personnel to lifeboats amid chaos and darkness, later tending to the wounded on rafts while exposed to cold sea conditions. Other accounts from crew and medical staff detailed the sudden power failure, extinguishing of lights, and suction from the sinking vessel pulling individuals underwater. Of the 332 persons aboard—including 75 civilian crew members, 12 Nursing Sisters, additional medical personnel such as doctors and orderlies, and 193 members of the 2/12th Field Ambulance unit—64 survived, yielding 268 fatalities. This included 11 of the 12 nurses, with losses concentrated among those in lower decks due to the torpedo's point of impact. Official military records and post-incident inquiries, cross-referenced with embarkation manifests, confirm these figures, noting that while some perished instantly from blast trauma or fire, many others died from , injuries, or exhaustion during the subsequent 35 hours adrift.

Rescue and Attribution

Search and Recovery Efforts

Following the transmitted by AHS Centaur at approximately 04:10 on 14 May 1943, Allied forces in the area, including (RAAF) aircraft from No. 9 Operational Group and vessels, initiated an immediate search operation centered on the reported position of 27°17′S 153°58′E, about 50 km east of . The search faced logistical challenges stemming from the rapid sinking, which limited precise location data from the ship, and the dispersal of survivors into lifeboats that began drifting northeast under wind and current influences. By the afternoon of 15 May 1943, roughly 36 hours after the attack, the United States destroyer USS Mugford located the main group of lifeboats approximately 20 miles (32 km) northeast of the initial sinking site. The destroyer rescued 64 survivors, including Captain Leslie B. Northwood and the sole surviving nurse, Sister Ellen Savage, from the 12 Australian Army Nursing Service members aboard. No additional personnel or lifeboats were found during the operation, with the remaining 268 presumed lost at sea due to the extensive drift and environmental factors. The survivors endured severe , exposure to cold overnight temperatures and intense daytime sun, saltwater immersion injuries, and untreated wounds from the torpedo impact and sinking chaos. Onboard USS Mugford, basic medical aid was administered, including hydration and bandaging, before the vessel proceeded to , arriving on 16 May 1943, where further treatment occurred at local hospitals. The delay in location, attributable to the unpredicted drift rates of up to 1-2 knots in the , underscored the difficulties of wartime maritime search in contested waters without modern tracking aids.

Identification of Attacker: Japanese Submarine I-177

The Japanese submarine I-177, a Kaidai-type (KD-7 class) vessel commissioned on 27 September 1942, was under the command of Hajime Nakagawa during its first war patrol in 1943. Nakagawa, who had previously commanded submarines including I-58, departed Truk Lagoon on 10 April 1943 with I-177 assigned to patrol waters off the east coast of Australia, in coordination with I-178 and I-180 as part of the 22nd Submarine Flotilla's operations. The submarine's operational area encompassed the Coral Sea and approaches to , placing it in position southeast of Cape Moreton—precisely where AHS Centaur was torpedoed at approximately 04:10 on 14 May 1943. Attribution to I-177 relies on correlations from Japanese naval records, including patrol assignments and radio traffic, cross-referenced with Allied intelligence on submarine dispositions; no other Imperial Japanese Navy submarine was confirmed in the immediate vicinity capable of launching the single Type 95 torpedo that struck Centaur's port side amidships. Japanese war diaries for I-177 do not explicitly record the attack, a pattern observed in cases involving protected vessels to evade accountability under international conventions, but post-war decrypts and flotilla logs align the submarine's track with the incident's coordinates (27°17′S 153°58′E). Nakagawa's command history further supports the link, as I-177 under his leadership demonstrated disregard for maritime protections in other actions, including the torpedoing of merchant ships without warning. In February 1944, during I-177's subsequent patrol in the , Nakagawa ordered the machine-gunning of survivors from the torpedoed British tanker , resulting in his post-war conviction by Allied tribunals; he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eight years' hard labor at , though he denied responsibility for Centaur. The submarine itself continued operations until sunk on 3 October 1944 west of Saipan by depth charges from the U.S. destroyer escort USS Samuel S. Miles (DE-294), with all hands lost, precluding direct interrogation of the crew. This circumstantial convergence—patrol positioning, elimination of alternatives, and the commander's profile—solidified I-177's identification as the attacker in historical analyses by the 1970s.

Theories on the Motive for Attack

Evidence Supporting Legitimate Target Status

The 2/12th Field Ambulance unit, comprising medical support personnel destined for to establish field hospitals, was embarked on in on 12 as passengers under official manifests listing them as non-combatants. However, accounts from witnesses indicated that some attached personnel, including four men from the , boarded carrying rifles, contributing to post-sinking rumors within Australian military circles that the ship transported armed troops in violation of Hague Convention Article 1 and Convention provisions prohibiting hospital ships from carrying war matériel or combat forces. These personal weapons—totaling approximately 52 rifles and 2,000 rounds of —were justified under allowances for defensive armament to protect the wounded, yet the ship's captain reportedly questioned their legality upon embarkation, highlighting potential ambiguities in compliance that fueled perceptions of forfeited protected status. Japanese naval doctrine in the Pacific theater emphasized empirical threat assessment over reliance on markings, informed by documented Allied attacks on at least nine Japanese hospital ships between 1941 and 1943, which Tokyo protested as abuses eroding trust in neutral symbols. Submarine commanders like those of I-177 operated under standing orders to prioritize verifiable military utility, such as detected radio traffic or convoy associations, amid reports of Allied hospital ships covertly evacuating combat troops or supplies from Guadalcanal and other fronts, fostering a causal environment where visual identifiers alone were insufficient to override tactical suspicions. While official Australian records affirmed Centaur's cargo as strictly medical with no combat troops, unverified intelligence whispers in Allied commands persisted regarding undeclared or hidden among stores, echoing broader wartime patterns where vessels occasionally bent conventions for operational needs. These elements, though lacking direct confirmation from manifests, aligned with Japanese post-war rationales for engagements, positing that deviations from strict neutrality—however minor—rendered targets legitimate under the exigencies of .

Arguments for Accidental Mistake

The attack on AHS Centaur occurred at approximately 04:10 on 14 May 1943, in pre-dawn conditions off the coast, where darkness significantly impaired visual identification from a submerged 's . Although the weather was fine and clear with good surface visibility once daylight arrived, the absence of sunlight at that hour limited the effective range and clarity of observations to silhouettes and basic outlines rather than detailed markings such as the white hull, green bands, and red crosses required by international conventions for ships. Submarine periscopes of the era, including those on I-177, offered low magnification (typically 1.5x for search scopes) and narrow fields of view (around 40-45 degrees), making precise identification challenging against a moving target like Centaur, which maintained a service speed of about 15 knots. These observational constraints were compounded by operational necessities, as submerged submarines minimized periscope exposure times to evade detection, often conducting brief sweeps at reduced relative speeds to avoid creating a visible wake or trail on the surface. At Centaur's approach speed, the fleeting opportunity for scrutiny—potentially seconds per exposure—would have hindered discernment of protective emblems, especially if the ship's lights, while illuminating the deck and superstructure as per protocol, did not fully project hull markings into the periscope's limited aperture during a nighttime approach. Proponents of accidental error cite the commander's professional reputation, noting that contemporaries of Hajime Nakagawa, I-177's captain, described him as adhering to naval codes that respected protected vessels, implying any attack stemmed from misjudgment rather than intent. Historical precedents support visibility-driven misidentifications of marked ships during , where low light or obscured conditions led to attacks on vessels bearing neutral indicators. For instance, analyses of wartime naval engagements highlight cases where hospital ships were targeted due to silhouette confusion with troop transports or merchants, particularly in dawn or dusk scenarios with periscope-dependent targeting. Such errors were not uncommon in , where rapid under stealth constraints prioritized perceived threats over exhaustive verification. Further empirical indication of unawareness lies in the absence of any reference to a in Japanese operational records for the patrol; I-177's reports instead logged the sinking of an armed transport vessel of approximately 15,000 gross register tons on that date, consistent with a that the target lacked protected status. This discrepancy suggests the submarine crew classified Centaur as a legitimate or supply vessel based on incomplete visual cues, rather than deliberately overriding recognition of its markings.

Claims of Deliberate War Crime

Survivors consistently reported that the attack occurred without any prior warning, such as a challenge or signal to halt for inspection, despite the Centaur's prominent markings—including white hull with green bands, red crosses, and illuminated lights as required for identification at night—which were visible from afar. The single torpedo struck amidships at approximately 4:10 a.m. on May 14, 1943, causing a precise and devastating explosion that severed the ship effectively in two, an outcome suggestive of targeted intent rather than a glancing or erroneous hit. This precision aligns with claims that the Japanese submarine I-177, under Lieutenant Commander Hajime Nakagawa, deliberately fired despite recognizing the vessel's protected status, as the ship's configuration and lighting precluded mistaking it for a combatant. Such actions contravened Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, which exempts ships—dedicated solely to aiding the wounded and marked accordingly—from attack, permitting only demands for surrender or verification of neutral use prior to any . Proponents of deliberate intent cite Nakagawa's subsequent war crimes conviction by an Australian military tribunal in for machine-gunning survivors of merchant vessels, including orders to eliminate castaways from ships sunk by I-177, indicating a pattern of flouting conventions against undefended targets. These parallels extend to broader Japanese doctrine in the Pacific theater, where imperatives often prioritized sinkings over adherence to international norms, as evidenced by multiple documented breaches against protected shipping. Japanese authorities post-war denied specific intent regarding the Centaur, attributing the sinking to I-177 in official histories without admitting violation, yet conducted no internal probe into the command decisions, fueling assertions that accountability was evaded amid systemic disregard for Hague protections. Survivor accounts, including those from nursing sister Ellen Savage, emphasized the absence of any surface challenge or periscope signaling before the torpedo launch, reinforcing claims of premeditated aggression against a emblem of .

Investigations and Reactions

Allied and Australian Military Probes

Following the torpedo attack on 14 May 1943, Australian naval authorities convened a formal board of to examine the circumstances of the sinking, relying on survivor depositions and available naval records. The determined that AHS Centaur was struck without warning at approximately 04:10 while proceeding on a lit course with all required hospital ship markings illuminated, including white hull paint, green bands, and red crosses. No prior visual or acoustic contact with the attacker was reported, and the single torpedo detonated amidships, igniting fuel tanks and causing rapid flooding and fire. The board's findings explicitly stated there was no evidence of any provocation or deviation by from international conventions governing hospital ships, such as carrying combatants or armament beyond defensive small arms. It highlighted the vessel's compliance with Hague Convention protocols, including advance notification of its route to Allied commands, though not to Axis forces. Recommendations included stricter adherence to zigzagging patterns even for protected vessels and improved coordination with escort forces where feasible, to address vulnerabilities exposed by the unescorted voyage. Allied intelligence assessments by US Navy and analysts, drawing on decrypted Japanese communications and submarine patrol reconstructions, provisionally attributed the attack to submarine I-177 during wartime evaluations. These reports correlated I-177's position southeast of with the incident coordinates at 27°17′S 153°58′E, noting its recent operations in Australian waters. However, definitive confirmation awaited post-war access to captured Japanese logs, as wartime secrecy restricted cross-verification with enemy records.

Public and Media Response in Australia

Australian newspapers extensively covered the sinking of AHS Centaur on 14 May 1943, reporting the loss of 268 lives, including 11 nurses, and detailing survivor testimonies such as that of Sister Ellen Savage, who described the submarine's deceptive "coo-ee" calls post-attack. Coverage in outlets like The Courier-Mail and The Sydney Morning Herald emphasized the unprovoked torpedo strike on a clearly marked hospital ship, framing it as a barbarous act that shocked the nation. The incident generated significant public outrage, with reels screened in cinemas amplifying the horror and survivor ordeals to broad audiences. In response, the government issued propaganda posters depicting the ship's demise and bearing slogans like "Work, Save, Fight and so Avenge the Nurses," which expanded on John Curtin's "work or fight" exhortation to rally civilian support for war production, loans, and enlistment. This domestic reaction intensified amid , bolstering resolve for the Pacific theater without prompting shifts in or .

Diplomatic Protests and Japanese Denials

Following the sinking of AHS Centaur on 14 May 1943, the Australian lodged a formal diplomatic against on 20 May 1943, transmitted via the Swiss Legation in as the protecting power for Australian interests. The highlighted the vessel's clear markings as a under international conventions, including illuminated Red Cross insignia and radio broadcasts of its position, asserting the attack violated the of 1899 and 1907 prohibiting harm to medical transports. The similarly protested to , condemning the act as a breach of neutrality protections for , though neither nor Britain pursued reprisals, prioritizing broader Allied military objectives amid the Pacific theater's demands. In response, Japanese authorities issued an official denial in , disclaiming any knowledge of or responsibility for the incident and countering with unsubstantiated claims of Allied violations against Japanese medical vessels. This stance persisted through the war, with no Japanese admission despite survivor accounts and naval records later implicating submarine I-177 under Hajime Nakagawa. Post-war, the sinking received no specific indictment at the International Military Tribunal for the (Tokyo Trials, 1946–1948), where broader charges focused on systematic atrocities rather than isolated naval actions; Nakagawa faced no prosecution for Centaur and died in 1992 without public acknowledgment. Diplomatic efforts yielded no accountability, reflecting the era's total war dynamics where violations of protected status—such as submarine attacks on marked ships or incidental Allied bombings of medical sites—occurred amid strategic imperatives, rendering protests largely symbolic without enforceable mechanisms beyond potential escalation risks. Japan's official naval history obliquely confirmed I-177's torpedo strike but framed it without admitting deliberate intent or criminality, maintaining ambiguity on culpability.

The Shipwreck and Discoveries

Post-War Search Attempts and False Claims

In the decades following the sinking of AHS Centaur on 14 May 1943, locating the wreck proved challenging due to inconsistencies in survivor accounts of the precise position, which varied owing to the chaos of the attack, drifting in strong currents, and limited navigational data available at the time. The search area encompassed a vast expanse of the Coral Sea off Queensland's southeast coast, characterized by rapid currents, dramatic depth variations, and poor underwater visibility, complicating and diving operations. Renewed efforts in the 1990s were spurred by the 50th anniversary commemorations in 1993 and broader reflections on Axis war crimes during World War II, prompting amateur and semi-professional searches amid calls for historical closure. These initiatives often relied on reanalyzing wartime logs, but discrepancies persisted, as initial rescue reports placed survivors variably between 27°00'S and 27°30'S latitude, east of Brisbane. In 1995, Melbourne-based diver Don Dennis announced the discovery of what he believed to be Centaur's wreck at a depth of approximately 170 meters, positioned about 9 to 10 nautical miles off the northern tip of Moreton Island. Dennis conducted multiple dives, asserting the site's features matched the hospital ship's profile, and claimed corroboration from naval experts, the Queensland Maritime Museum, and the Australian War Memorial. Subsequent investigations disproved the identification, revealing the wreck as the SS Kyogle, a pre-war merchant vessel scuttled and used for target practice in the . Mismatches included the wreck's orientation, structural remnants inconsistent with Centaur's single-funnel design and hospital fittings, and positional data conflicting with refined drift modeling from survivor testimonies. No official confirmation was issued by Australian authorities, underscoring the claim's reliance on unverified visual inspections rather than comprehensive mapping.

2009 Confirmation of Location

![Close up photograph of part of a ship's bow. The bow is at an angle. An anchor is located in the centre of the image. A coloured band runs from the top left corner to the right third of the bottom edge. A dark square and the remains of a number "7" are above and to the left of the anchor and band. The bow is covered in rust and marine growth. The image has a blue-green tinge, as it has been taken deep underwater.](./ assets/Centaur_wreck_bow.jpg) The wreck of AHS Centaur was discovered on 20 December 2009 during a search expedition led by British marine archaeologist , commissioned by the Australian and governments. The team employed high-resolution from the survey vessel , identifying the target after seven days of operations in the search area east of . The confirmed location at 27° 16.98' S, 153° 59.22' E, approximately 30 nautical miles due east of Moreton Island's southern tip and at a depth of 2,059 metres, aligned closely with historical navigation logs and survivor-reported positions from the 14 May 1943 sinking. Multiple sonar images depicted the 2,700-tonne vessel's hull largely intact but broken amidships, lying on its port side at a 25-degree list, with structural damage indicative of a single torpedo impact below the waterline—consistent with the port-side strike reported in attack records attributed to Japanese submarine I-177. In response, the promptly declared the site a protected historic under state laws, restricting access and prohibiting recovery operations to preserve the remains. The extreme depth has precluded manned or remotely operated vehicle dives for detailed inspection, limiting post-discovery activities to non-intrusive and maintaining the site's undisturbed state as of the wartime incident.

Legacy

Commemorations and Memorials

The Centaur Memorial Fund for Nurses, established in 1948 by Queensland nurses, honors the 268 personnel lost in the sinking, with a particular emphasis on the 11 nurses among the victims, by advancing nursing and midwifery professions through scholarships and awards. The fund organizes an annual memorial service on 14 May at the Shrine of Remembrance in Brisbane's ANZAC Square, including a candlelight vigil, which has been held consistently to commemorate survivors and the deceased. Physical memorials include bas-relief panels at ANZAC Square depicting the ship's sinking and a sandstone sculpture funded by the Centaur Memorial Fund, both dedicated to the victims' sacrifice. Additional plaques and monuments, such as those at Caloundra's Centaur Park opened in , serve as sites for public remembrance of the event's national impact. For the 80th anniversary on 14 May 2023, Memorial Fund hosted a commemorative service in attended by descendants of survivors and victims, while the Australian War Memorial displayed artifacts like stopped watches from the deceased to evoke the moment of loss. These events underscore the ongoing role of commemorations in preserving of the hospital ship's crew and passengers. The wreck site, confirmed in 2009, is protected as a war grave under Australia's Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976, prohibiting disturbance and reinforcing its status as a solemn to the 268 lives lost.

Broader Historical Implications

The sinking of AHS Centaur underscored the inherent tensions between the protective provisions of the Hague Convention X of 1907—which mandated clear markings and immunity for hospital ships—and the operational imperatives of in the Pacific theater. Submarine commanders, operating under doctrines prioritizing disruption of enemy supply lines, often faced challenges in real-time verification of vessel status amid low visibility and high-speed engagements, yet Japanese Imperial Navy records and patterns indicate deliberate targeting of marked hospital ships beyond plausible error, as seen in multiple incidents involving Allied medical transports. This reflected a broader causal dynamic: in , the marginal strategic gain from sinking any seaborne asset outweighed the risks of international condemnation, eroding adherence to conventions that presupposed mutual restraint absent in asymmetric naval campaigns. Strategically, the Centaur's loss exerted minimal impact on Allied logistics, as hospital ships evacuated non-combatants and wounded personnel without carrying armament or troops that could justify attack under convention terms, and compensating capacity was available through amphibious and air evacuations scaling up by 1943. Symbolically, however, it amplified Allied narratives of Japanese barbarity, manifesting in efforts like Australian posters exhorting "Avenge the Nurses" to sustain public resolve and financing, thereby reinforcing domestic cohesion without altering frontline dispositions. The episode thus highlighted how violations of protected vessel protocols served informational warfare objectives more than material ones, with unverifiable claims of misuse enabling deniability on both sides. A truth-seeking assessment debunks portrayals of absolute Allied victimhood by noting reciprocal violations in the Pacific, where Allied submarines and aircraft targeted Japanese hospital ships amid confirmed instances of their misuse for covert combatant transport, forfeiting legal protections per stipulations. Empirical data from wartime logs reveal Japanese forces overloaded such vessels with troops or munitions in at least several cases, mirroring but not excusing Axis patterns, while Allied actions leaned toward precautionary strikes in unrestricted warfare environments. This mutual erosion stemmed from theater-wide dynamics—resource scarcity, intelligence gaps, and command pressures—rather than isolated moral failings, emphasizing how conventions faltered under the causal pressures of survival in a campaign where over 24 hospital ships of various flags were sunk overall, often with contested circumstances.

References

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